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Abstract 
In China, internal migrant children’s difficulties accessing schooling in 
metropolitan areas have been on the government’s policy agenda since 
2001. By 2006, a range of policies were in place, designed to facilitate their 
access to compulsory education. Yet there are still large numbers of 
migrant children unable to enrol in state schools. While there are myriad 
studies devoted to the schooling of migrant children, less is known about 
how the policy framework surrounding their education is developed and 
enacted. My research aims to fill this gap. Taking a policy sociology 
approach, I have produced a scholarly analysis of the power relations 
between the different actors involved in policy enactment, drawing mainly 
on Bourdieusian, but also Foucauldian, resources. The overall research 
question is ‘How do different individuals, organisations and groups of 
actors interpret and enact the policy for migrant children’s schooling?’ I 
have examined what happens both outside and inside schools. I have used 
semi-structured interviews as the main method in order to produce rich, in-
depth data. The findings of this research indicate that the migrant children's 
schooling policy carries with it the principle of equal access to education. 
Yet the degree to which that has been realized is questionable. I argue that, 
through processes of policy enactment, the unequal power relations 
between the migrant families, schools and the local government have been 
further reproduced, but in apparently legitimate ways. As a result, both 
migrant children and the schools that mainly recruit migrant children are 
marginalised in the urban education system. 
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Part I  
Chapter 1: Introduction 
In this chapter, I will give a brief introduction to the thesis research 
background and list the thesis research questions. I will also outline the 
thesis structure at the end of this chapter.  
1. Research background 
In China, during the last three decades of urbanisation, millions of rural 
labourers have left their hometowns to work in urban areas. In 2015, 
nationally there were 168.84 million migrant rural labourers (National 
Bureau of Statistics of China, 2016) with 13.67 million migrant children1 of 
compulsory education age (Ministry of Education of China, 2016). These 
internal migrants do not hold household registration (hukou) in the places 
where they are working and many of them belong to low-income groups. 
As I will elaborate in detail later (see chapter 2, section 3), without local 
hukou, these people are not entitled to full citizenship rights in urban areas 
and their children have encountered many difficulties accessing free 
compulsory education in urban state schools 2 . For example, in state 
																																																						
1 In the existing literature, there are different names for the children from the 
migrant labourer families without the local household registration card: ‘migrant 
children’ ‘immigrant children’ ‘children from migrant workers’ families’ or ‘floating 
children. Although using different names, scholars actually refer to the same 
group of children. In this thesis, I will use ‘migrant children’.  
2 The ‘state school’ (公办学校) is the fully government-funded school, which does 
not charge for tuition fees. Yet the private-funded school (私立学校 or 民办学校) 
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primary/secondary school recruitment, the schools give first priority to 
children with a local household registration card. Therefore, in some big 
cities with huge migrant populations, it is very hard for migrant children to 
enrol in state schools, since there is a shortage of places once the schools 
have recruited local students. At the same time, most migrant parents 
cannot afford to send their children to private schools, which have relatively 
higher costs. As a result, in the late 1990s when a large number of migrant 
children first came to big cities, many of them were unable to enrol in urban 
schools. For example, in Shanghai in 1997 there were 1054 migrant 
children of compulsory education age but only 641 (60.8%) of them finally 
enrolled in local schools. In the late 90s and early 00s with the changes in 
central and local government policies described below (chapter 6), the 
percentage and number of migrant children enrolling in urban state schools 
was increasing. In recent years, 80% of migrant children are enrolled in 
state schools nationwide (Table 11, chapter 9, section 2). However, in 
global metropolises like Beijing and Shanghai, there are still a large number 
of migrant children who are unable to enrol in urban state schools. 
Furthermore, in these cities since 2013, the local government has started 
to establish strict state school enrolment criteria for migrant children, 
producing increasing hardship in their school enrolment. What can be 
identified in the development of the government policies is a U-shaped 
																																																						
does charge. In spite of their different funding sources, both state school and 
private school follow the national curriculum and are under the direct supervision 
of the local government municipality of education. 
	 12	
curve of responses, from the strict criteria at the beginning of the period 
discussed (1996-2001) to the looser criteria in the middle period (2001-
2014) and to the recent return of strict criteria (2014-).  
2. Research questions 
In this thesis, my data collection and analysis focus on the following 
question: How do different individuals, organisations and groups of 
actors interpret and enact the policy for migrant children’s schooling? 
Based on this research question, I will explore the experience of different 
actors involved in the policy, including their interrelationship, negotiation, 
conflict or struggle. I will also examine how their interpretation and 
enactment of the policy is shaped by political, economic, social-cultural and 
historical factors.  
  Putting the research question into the specific context of Beijing and 
Shanghai and applying it to the empirical data, two further sub-questions 
have arisen: 1. how has the migrant children school enrolment policy 
developed and under what conditions? 2. what kind of education and 
school experiences do migrant children have after they have enrolled 
in state (or quasi-state) schools? The data analysis in this thesis is 
organized to address the two sub-questions and the overall question.   
3. Structure of the thesis 
The twelve thesis chapters are arranged as four parts:  
  Part I presents the research background, context, review of existing 
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literature and theoretical resources, and methods I have used in this thesis. 
Chapter 1 gives a brief introduction to the issue of Chinese internal migrant 
children’s schooling. It also lists the thesis research questions as well as 
the thesis structure. Chapter 2 gives an overview of the situation of migrant 
rural labourers and their children, the urban schooling system, the 
household registration (hukou) system and migrant children’s academic 
performance as the context of this research. Chapter 3 reviews the existing 
literature on migrant children’s schooling and policy in China and identifies 
the thesis research questions as contributing to filling some of the gaps in 
existing research. In order to address the research questions, I have 
adopted some theoretical resources from various authors (Bourdieusian, 
Foucauldian, and writers on ‘policy as a temporary consensus between 
groups’) and integrated them into a theoretical framework following a policy 
sociology approach (Chapter 4). Chapter 5 summarises the qualitative 
research approach and methods I have used, including the sources of data, 
sampling strategies, my relationships with respondents, the data analysis 
method, ethical issues, and the limitations.  
  Part II presents the first cluster of my findings, which is organized around 
the question: how has the migrant children school enrolment policy 
developed and under what conditions? In this part, I set the national 
and local governments at the centre of my analysis of the policy network, 
which contains government, schools, teachers, and migrant and local 
parents and children. I start with a review of the policy developments at 
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central and local levels since 1996, revealing the fluctuating nature of the 
policy, which has transferred from a hard beginning for migrant children’s 
state school enrolment to an easier situation and then returning to a hard 
situation in recent years (Chapter 6). Following the big picture I have drawn 
in chapter 6, Chapter 7 focuses on the recent policy changes after 2013. 
The Bourdieusian concept of ‘cross-field effects’ is used to explore how 
migrant children schooling policy is affected by politics, the economy and 
migrant population policies. The discussion of the inter-field relationships 
in chapter 7 provides a concrete foundation for Chapter 8, which looks 
deeply into the educational field regarding the recent policy change. 
Adopting a Foucauldian-influenced ‘policy cycle’ framework, chapter 8 
explores how the new state school enrolment policy is established and 
identifies the growth of a new policy discourse concerning education: 
‘education as social welfare’.  
  Part III presents the second cluster of my findings, which is organized 
around the question: what kind of education and school experiences 
do migrant children have after they have enrolled in state (or quasi-
state) schools? In this part, schools become the centre of analysis of the 
policy network, which contains state schools, unregistered informal private 
schools, quasi-state schools, city and district municipalities of education, 
school teachers, migrant and local parents and children. I start with the 
review of the historical development and current situation of state schools, 
unregistered informal private (UIP) schools and licensed private schools 
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(quasi-state school), as well as their roles in recruiting migrant children 
(Chapter 9). Chapter 9 provides the following two chapters with concrete 
background. Chapter 10 focuses on the state school, specifically the 
migrant majority state school, which is currently the predominant 
mainstream schooling channel for migrant children. The core question in 
this chapter is: what kind of relationships do migrant parents and children 
have with teachers and local children? And how do these relationships 
shape migrant children’s study and social inclusion? This chapter adopts 
the Bourdieusian concepts of field, habitus and capital to explore the 
interactions and relationships between migrant parents/children and 
teachers and local children. In Chapter 11, my focus shifts to the other main 
schooling channel for migrant children (mainly in Shanghai), which I call an 
‘interim quasi-state school system’. My analytical focus in this chapter is: 
what kind of education are migrant children receiving in these schools?  
  Part IV contains only one chapter (Chapter 12), presenting the 
concluding thoughts of this thesis. This chapter summarises the empirical 
findings of the thesis. It also discusses the principles of social justice 
guiding the policy enactment and explores the structuring and restructuring 
and reproduction of power relations in the policy enactment process. Finally, 
it discusses the strategies for progressive changes, towards an objective 
of attaining quality of condition.  
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Chapter 2: Context  
In this chapter, I will firstly give a brief introduction to migrant rural labourers 
and their children, including a discussion of who they are and their social-
economic conditions. I then move on to introduce the Chinese schooling 
system (compulsory education stage 6-15 years), outlining the legal 
aspects of compulsory education, the exam-orientated tradition and the 
hierarchy of schools, as well as the parents’ role in schooling in urban areas. 
I will also introduce the institutional barrier to migrant children’s school 
access, which is the household registration (hukou) system. Following the 
above background information, I then discuss the migrant children’s 
academic performance in terms of their test scores.  
1. Migrant rural labourers and their children 
1.1 Who are migrant rural labourers? 
This section introduces social classification in China and the migrant’s 
position in Chinese society. Since the 1990s, researchers have explored 
the condition of social stratification nationwide (Peking University, 1990; Li 
and Wang, 1992; Li, 1993; Li, 1995; Lu, 2002). Among them, the most 
established and influential study to date is a nationwide investigative report 
published in 2002 (Lu, 2002). It outlines ten occupational categories, which 
are then classified into five social classes. The categorisation of social 
class was based on four factors, namely occupation and the 
	 17	
organisational1, economic and cultural resources people have. Figure 1 
shows the relationships of the ten occupational categories and the five 
social classes. Although that research was done 15 years ago and the 
description was based on a nationwide analysis, it still resonates with my 
fieldwork data collected from Beijing and Shanghai. I acknowledge that 
Figure 1 presents a convincing version of the migrant rural labourer’s class 
position in contemporary Chinese society. Yet it is important to note that 
while Lu categorizes social class by examining multiple indicators, he takes 
occupation as a main indicator. As a result, his visualization of the relative 
positions of different social classes in the social space is occupation-based. 
While acknowledging the contributions of Lu’s work, I do not follow his 
analytical approach. Adopting the Bourdieusian conceptualization of social 
class, my study examines the cultural, economic and social aspects of the 
migrant families’ life condition with a focus on the cultural and lifestyle 
aspects (see chapter 10 for details). 
 
Figure 1: five social classes and ten occupational categories in China (Lu, 
2002: 9) 
 
																																																						
1 In the Chinese context, the organisational resource refers to the political and/or 
social resources derived from the political and bureaucrat system, or broadly, from 
the state sector. Those who work in government departments or as state 
entrepreneurs tend to find it easier to access the organisational resource than 
people working in the private sector (see Lu, 2002). 
	 18	
 
 
  In Figure 1, some important points need to be explained. First, while the 
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five classes/levels on the left side follow a descending sequence, the ten 
occupational categories on the right side do not necessarily follow a 
descending sequence. For example, being an owner of a private company 
(third from the top) or a professional (fourth from the top), one can both be 
in either upper, middle-upper or middle-middle level, depending on the 
exact occupation and the organisational, economic and cultural resources 
of that person. In other words, there is not a superior or inferior sequence 
between a private company owner and a professional. The same can be 
said of the service sector employees (seventh), industrial labourer (eighth) 
and the agricultural labourer (ninth). Second, within the Chinese context, 
the ‘bottom level class’, ‘middle-lower class’ and the bottom of the ‘middle-
middle class’ resonate with the concept of ‘working-class’ in the Western 
context. The reason is that the three classes in China cover the main 
manual labourer occupation categories such as service sector employees, 
industrial labourer and agricultural labourer (which accounts for the vast 
majority of the country’s population). Accordingly, most of the migrants I 
have interviewed can be categorised into these three classes, as I will 
elaborate in the next paragraph. Finally, there is a variety of social-
economic conditions within in each occupational category. That is to say, 
the people in the same occupational category can be classified into 
different social classes, depending on their occupation, income, cultural 
and organisational resources. For example, engaging in industrial labourer 
occupations, A is a technician with a professional certificate and works full-
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time in a big state-owned company with a good income, while B is a low-
skilled worker without a professional certificate and relevant experience, 
undertaking occasional work for several small private factories with low pay. 
Their social-economic situations can be very different. As a result, A may 
be considered as belonging to the middle-lower class, while B may be 
considered as belonging to the bottom class. Such diversity also applies to 
the migrant labourer group, as I will elaborate below.  
  However, as for the question of to which occupational category and class 
migrant rural labours belong, there is not a clear, unified and official 
definition. The term ‘internal migrant population’ refers to those who 
migrate from one place to another and do not hold the household 
registration (hukou) cards in their destination. The government, scholars, 
journalists and ordinary people apply the term ‘migrant rural labourer’ to 
more or less the same group, namely those rural migrants who are involved 
in routine manual work. Yet in most cases, people do not give a clear 
definition of this term, assuming that the readers have the same 
understanding as themselves. The authoritative definition of the term 
‘migrant rural labourer’ comes from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS): 
‘migrant rural labourer is those who have their household registrations 
(hukou) registered in rural areas but are working outside their villages’ 
(National Bureau of Statistics, 2015). According to this definition, any 
person who is employed or self-employed can be seen as a labourer, 
regardless of his/her actual occupation. As a result, some rural migrants 
	 21	
are engaged in those occupations that can hardly be considered as akin to 
a labourer’s job. For example, a rural migrant can be the owner or CEO of 
a construction company in Beijing. Therefore, an ambiguity exists in the 
NBS’ definition. The reason for this ambiguity is that traditionally, most of 
the rural residents worked as agricultural labourers with low income. This 
situation creates a perceptional link between the rural residency and 
manual labourer occupation in public discourses. Although this 
perceptional link is a prejudiced assumption, it is also accurate in many 
cases. In other words, if you are a rural migrant in an urban area, it is highly 
possible that you are working in a manual labourer job1. Since the NBS’s 
definition of ‘migrant rural labourer’ does not define what kinds of 
occupations are ‘labourer jobs’, in my research I do not select by people’s 
occupations when selecting rural migrant interviewees. It turns out that the 
majority of my migrant interviewees are working as industrial labourers, 
service sector employees, and small business owners; some women are 
doing part-time jobs or are unemployed, while a small number of them work 
as lower level managers (see the following paragraphs). Applying their 
social-economic status to Lu’s (2002) framework (see Figure 1), most of 
the participants can be categorized as middle-lower class or bottom level 
class. I have given a biological sketch of all the migrant interviewees in 
																																																						
1 There are indeed many rural students who graduated from universities and find 
‘good jobs’ in cities. But if they can find ‘good jobs’, such as government officer, 
state school teacher, or employment in big state/private companies, there is a 
good chance that their hukou would be moved to the cities with them as a welfare 
benefit of that job. In this case, legally they are not ‘rural residents’ any more, and 
thus they would not have been considered as ‘migrant rural labourers’.  
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Appendix One.  
  A nationwide investigation (Wan et al., 2010: 242) reveals that 20.1% of 
the ‘migrant labourer’ parents are manual workers in companies; 17.2% of 
them run their own small businesses (often with low income); 10% are 
construction workers; 9.6% are shopkeepers; 6.6% of them are 
unemployed; 5.4% work in haulage; 5.3% are managers; and the 
remaining 25.8% are other kinds of labourers. In other words, most of the 
migrant parents are doing labourer jobs, which are unlikely to offer them a 
strong monthly income. As revealed by Lu (2013: 13), in Shanghai 33.4% 
of the migrant labourer families have their total monthly incomes within the 
range of ¥1,001-3,000 (£100-300 equivalent); 30.2% of the migrant 
families have total monthly incomes within the range of ¥3,001-5,000 
(£300-500 equivalent); and only 32.6% have more than ¥5,000 (£500 
equivalent) per month. The same situation can be identified in Beijing. As 
revealed by Yuan et al (2013), 24.5% of the migrant labourer families have 
total monthly incomes within the range of ¥2000-2599 (£200-260 
equivalent); only 9.1% have more than ¥3000 (£300 equivalent) per month. 
A possible reason for their difficulties in finding well-paid jobs is that the 
migrants may have relatively low literacy levels. According to Lu (2013: 12), 
in Shanghai, only 8.9% of migrant labourers have higher education 
degrees, while 68.1% of them have only junior secondary (12-15) or 
primary education (6-12), or are illiterate; the remaining 22.1% have senior 
high school education (15-18). Without a senior high school degree, it is 
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very hard for a person to find a well-paid job in global metropolises like 
Shanghai.  
  Migrant mother En and her daughter, who I interviewed, are from a 
typical migrant rural labourer family in Beijing. In her 30s, En has been 
living in Beijing for nine years, during which time she met her husband, who 
is also a rural migrant and working as a TV technician; their daughter was 
born and raised in Beijing. En has junior secondary school literacy. She 
does not have a stable job after giving birth to her daughter. She is currently 
working as a part time voluntary teacher (with no pay) in her daughter’s 
nursery, which is an unregistered informal educational setting for migrant 
children. Her eight year old daughter, migrant child Er, was enrolled in a 
state school in Beijing in September 2014. However, her school enrolment 
was a miserable memory for her parents since they encountered many 
difficulties in preparing the school application documents. For example, En 
does not have a formal job and her family is living in an apartment, which 
is legally not eligible for renting, yet having a formal job and legally renting 
an apartment are required in the application document. Finally, she 
managed to sign a fake work contract and a house-renting contract to get 
all the required documents prepared. As a result, her daughter got into a 
local state school.  
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1.2 How many migrant children?  
During the past two decades, an increasing number of rural labourers and 
their children have migrated to urban areas. In 2015, nationally there were 
168.84 million migrant rural labourers (National Bureau of Statistics of 
China, 2016). Figure 2 shows the nationwide number of the children of 
migrant rural labourers of compulsory education age. The tendency for the 
rate of migration to increase can be identified.  
 
(Data source: 20101, 20112, 20123, 20134, 20145, and 20156) 
																																																						
1 Data source: Ministry of Education official website: ‘2010 national education 
development statistical bulletin’ 
(http:www.moe.gov.cn/srcsite/A03/s180/moe_633/201203/t20120321_132634.html) 
2 Data source: Ministry of Education official website: ‘2011 national education 
development statistical bulletin’ 
(http:www.moe.gov.cn/srcsite/A03/s180/moe_633/201208/t20120830_141305.html) 
3 Data source: Ministry of Education official website: ‘2012 national education 
development statistical bulletin’ 
(http:www.moe.edu.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/moe/moe_633/201308/155798.html) 
4 Data source: Ministry of Education official website: ‘2013 national education 
development statistical bulletin’ 
(http:www.moe.edu.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/moe/moe_633/201407/171144.html) 
5 Data source: Ministry of Education official website: ‘2014 national education 
development statistical bulletin’ 
(http:www.moe.edu.cn/srcsite/A03/s180/moe_633/201508/t20150811_199589.html) 
6 Data source: Ministry of Education official website: ‘2015 national education 
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  In recent years in Beijing and Shanghai, the number of migrant children 
accounts for around half of the total student population of compulsory 
education age. In 2012, the number of migrant children of compulsory 
education age in Shanghai was 538,0001, accounting for 45.09% of the 
total student number2 . The number in Beijing in 2013 was 529,0003, 
accounting for 51.65% of the total student number4. While the official data 
for the numbers of migrant children in Beijing and Shanghai has not been 
made available to the public since 2013, the percentage of migrant children 
in these two cities is likely to remain more or less the same, since the 
nationwide trend of rural-to-urban migration has not changed.  
1.3 ‘Migrant’ or ‘urban born and raised’ children?  
In recent years, more and more migrant children are now born and raised 
in urban areas, not their parents’ hometowns. As for the children’s parents, 
they are migrants, but most of them have been living in urban areas for 
many years. According to Lu (2013: 13), 44.7% of the migrant parents have 
been living in Shanghai for 5-10 years, while 27% of them have been living 
																																																						
development statistical bulletin’ 
(http://www.moe.edu.cn/srcsite/A03/s180/moe_633/201607/t20160706_270976.html) 
1 Data source: Shanghai Municipality of Education official website: ‘The annual 
report of education in Shanghai (2012)’ 
(http:www.shmec.gov.cn/web/xxgk/rows_list.php?node_code=904) 
2 Data source: Shanghai Municipality of Education official website: ‘Education 
development statistical bulletin (2012)’ 
(http:www.shmec.gov.cn/web/xxgk/rows_list.php?node_code=303). 
3 Data source: Author. 2015. ‘The numbers in the educational reform in Beijing’, 
China Education Daily, April 28. http://paper.jyb.cn/zgjyb/html/2015-
04/28/content_434566.htm?div=-1 
4  Data source: Beijing Municipality of Education official website: ‘Beijing 
education development statistical bulletin (2012-2013 academic year)’ 
(http:www.bjedu.gov.cn/) 
	 26	
in this city for more than 10 years. The same situation can be identified in 
Beijing. As Yuan et al (2013) has revealed, the average residency of the 
migrant parents in Beijing is 6.9 years. As a result, many of them gave birth 
to and raised their children in urban areas. Nationwide, in 2011, 29.8% of 
the migrant children were born in urban areas (Ma, 2015). In some cities 
such as Beijing and Shanghai, the percentages are higher. In Shanghai, 
for migrant families with children born in 2011, 58.8% of their children were 
born in the city (Lu, 2013: 8). My fieldwork supports this finding. Among the 
migrant families I have investigated, seven out of the twelve children were 
born in Beijing or Shanghai, three were brought to these cities before they 
were three-years-old, and two were brought to Beijing when they were 
seven and ten. In other words, most of the so-called ‘migrant children’ are 
now born and/or raised in the urban areas, and are second-generation 
migrant children. As I will detail in chapter 10 (section 4 and 5.2), these 
second-generation migrant children have urbanized habitus which 
facilitates their social inclusion in the urban schools.  
1.4 Migrant children’s motivations of enrolling in urban schools 
According to the interviews with migrant parents, there are several reasons 
why migrant children need to study in the cities, rather than being sent back 
to their parents’ hometown. First, in many migrant families both the father 
and mother are working in the cities (Mok, Wong and Guo, 2011). This was 
the case for all my parent respondents. It is natural that parents want their 
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children to stay with them. If they send their children back to their 
hometown, it is difficult to find someone to take care of them. Second, as 
stated above, nowadays more and more migrant children were born and 
raised in the cities. They consider the city as their hometown and are 
reluctant to go back to study in their parents’ hometowns. Third, many 
migrant families are from poor rural areas or remote mountain areas, where 
the village schools are too weak to provide quality education. Furthermore, 
as a result of the village school integration reform, there are fewer schools 
and this has left some villages without their own school. The children living 
in these villages have no choice but to attend the country-centre schools, 
which are often far from their houses. These young children need to live in 
the school accommodation or spend several hours every day on their way 
to school. This situation is inconvenient at best and dangerous at worst.  
2. The schooling system (compulsory education stage 6-15 years) 
2.1 The legal aspect of compulsory education in China 
In China, the nine-year compulsory education is a basic legal right and 
obligation of each citizen, guaranteed by the Law of Education and the Law 
of Compulsory Education. There are two stages of compulsory education: 
primary school education (from 6 to 12-years-old) and junior secondary 
school education (from 12 to 15-years-old). Compulsory education has the 
following intertwined aspects.  
  First, compulsion has an ‘obligation’ dimension. Every child, whether 
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they are living in the place of their household registration (hukou) or not, 
must access primary and junior secondary school in either a state or private 
school. In other words, if a child is not able to access compulsory education 
because of their parents, then the parents will have to take the legal 
consequences.  
  Second, compulsion has a ‘rights’ dimension. Every child has the right to 
access state school, whether they are in their place of household 
registration or place of residence (if the two places are different). As the 
Law of Compulsory Education states:  
If the parents are working or living in the places which are not the 
places where they have their household registration cards registered 
and want their compulsory education aged children to access state 
schools there, the receiving municipality should provide equal 
educational opportunities for these children. The detailed policies 
should be decided by the provincial governments.  
Here the law affirms the right of access to education for migrant children.  
  Third, another ‘rights’ aspect of compulsory education is that it is free of 
charge. All children have the right to access state school without paying 
tuition fees and incidental fees. Yet if the parents choose to send their 
children to private schools, they will waive this state educational welfare 
and will not receive government financial support for studying in private 
schools. The principle of free of charge is applied to all children in state 
schools, irrespective of whether they are migrant or local.  
  Fourth, school choice is not allowed in the state school sector for 
compulsory education. The state school must recruit all the local students 
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whose household registration cards are registered in the school district. 
For the migrant children, as long as they are living in the school district 
(and have the required proof) they are entitled to access the local state 
school.  
2.2 An exam-orientated education tradition and the hierarchy of 
schools  
In China, there is an exam-orientated tradition in school education (Bo and 
West, 2015; Chan et al., 2008). The league table of high stake exams, 
including the graduation examination and termly examination, is the main 
source of China’s hierarchy of schools.1 Performing well in the league 
table guarantees a school’s reputations and the resources they can receive 
from the government. In return, good reputations and sufficient resources 
help the schools attract excellent students who go on to perform well in the 
exams. A child’s score in the graduation examination from junior secondary 
school is used as the main criterion (or the only criterion) by the senior 
secondary schools to select students. As a result, the junior secondary 
schools have the motivation to work hard to prepare their students for the 
exam. At primary school stage, although nowadays those exam scores are 
not allowed to be used as a criterion for junior secondary school 
recruitment, the municipality of education still holds an unpublished league 
																																																						
1 Although the league table is unpublished to the public, it is accessible by the 
schools from the municipality of education. The information would spread to the 
public from the school headteachers, teachers and government officers in an 
informal way.  
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table of the scores of graduation examination and termly examination, 
which has a strong influence on the resources that the schools receive. As 
a result, teachers put a strong emphasis on the students’ academic study 
with regard to the exams. For the underperforming students, some 
teachers have to invest extra time for extra-curricular supervision and 
tutorials. Additionally, if the parents do not cooperate with the teachers in 
supporting their child’s progress, they are likely to incur a negative 
judgment from the teacher (see chapter 8, section 3, and chapter 10, 
section 5.1).  
  The hierarchy of the schools drives the parents to make school choices, 
although this is now prohibited in the state school sector. In the past, some 
parents used to deploy their social networks and pay expensive school 
choice fees to send their children to their target schools outside their school 
districts. In recent years, in some cities such as Beijing, the government 
has enforced restrictions on school choices in the state sector. As a result, 
it is hard for parents to choose schools outside their school district.  
2.3 The parents’ role in schooling in urban areas 
In urban schools, there is a tradition of home-school cooperation. Both 
teachers and parents believe the children’s education should be the focus 
of cooperation between home and school. The urban parents are readily in 
favour of this cooperation, since many of them have urban school or 
university experiences. Therefore, they have the confidence and 
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motivation to communicate with teachers and to facilitate their children’s 
study at home. For them, there seems to be a natural connection between 
school and home, and home is considered as a site for education. In return, 
the teachers do not treat parents as outsiders. Instead, they consider 
parents as their extra-curricular teachers at home. I will back to this point 
in chapter 10 (section 5.1).  
  The urban parents’ role as extra-curricular teachers includes cultivating 
their children’s hobbies. In metropolitan areas such as Beijing and 
Shanghai, a variety of institutions and individuals are engaged in the extra-
curricular activity and hobby market, providing children with classes or 
individual tutoring in music, arts, sports and sciences. Some of the classes 
or tutorials are provided at an affordable price for non-middle-class families. 
Expecting their children to develop into well-rounded young adults, many 
parents recognize the educational value of extra-curricular hobbies. 
Parents have also realized that expertise in a hobby can be turned into an 
advantage in their children’s enrolment for senior secondary school and 
university. In addition, the practice of cultivating children’s hobbies 
facilitates class reproduction or upward mobility in different cultural 
contexts, even if that is not the parents’ clear intention (Vincent and Ball, 
2007; Karsten, 2015). As a result, parents usually send their children to 
more than one extra-curricular class or individual tutorial, as reported by 
some of the teachers I have interviewed.  
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3. Household registration (hukou) system as the institutional barrier 
to migrant children’s state school access 
In some developing countries in the world, such as India, Vietnam, Turkey, 
Columbia and Brazil, internal rural-to-urban migrant children are facing 
social, economic and political exclusion similar to the situation in China. In 
these countries, social exclusion in education is shaped by such factors as 
ethnicity, language, religion, customs and income (Altinyelken, 2009; 
Deshingkar, 2006; Kusadokoroa and Hasegawab, 2016; Rosenzweig and 
Stark, 1997; Schultz, 1971) rather than legal status (hukou), as in China. 
For example, in Vietnam, the migrant children have limited access to state 
schools and therefore have to enrol in expensive private or semi-public 
schools (Deshingkar, 2006). In Turkey, internal migrant children are facing 
exclusions in schooling because of their migration experience and low 
socio-economic status (Altinyelken, 2009). In short, in these countries the 
migrant children’s disadvantage is to a large degree a result of their cultural 
background (ethnicity, language/dialect, custom, religion, etc.) and socio-
economic status. Yet when it comes to the Chinese context, the cultural 
background is not a dominant factor of internal migrant children’s 
disadvantage in school access. Rather, the main institutional barrier to their 
school access is the household registration (hukou) system, as I will 
elaborate below. When the children are enrolled in state schools, the 
factors shaping their social inclusion are mainly rural/urban differences and 
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class differences, rather than differences of the ethnicity, cultural custom 
and language.1 This situation differentiates the Chinese context from that 
of the other countries presented in the existing literature.  
  In China, the household registration (hukou) system is a unique 
population administration system. Before the Chinese economic reform in 
1978, people were not allowed to move to reside out of their village unless 
they got official approval. If they obtained approval to move, their 
household registration would be transferred correspondingly. After 1978, 
the government’s population mobility control was removed gradually, and 
people have since been free to move and reside outside their hometowns. 
However, when people move, not all of them can get their household 
registration cards moved to the new places accordingly, since the 
government sets yearly upper limits for the number of transfers of 
household registrations to reduce local government’s financial burdens for 
providing these newcomers with certain social welfare services (Wu, 2009). 
The household registration card is used as a credential with which people 
can enjoy a series of social welfare provisions in the place where they are 
registered. Without a local household registration card, migrant families are 
not fully entitled to access particular social welfare services provided by 
the receiving local government, including accessing state school 
																																																						
1 Although there are 56 different ethnic groups in China, most of the minority 
groups follow the cultural custom of Han (the dominant ethnic group), including 
the language, lifestyle, cultural conventions, etc. That is to say, normally it is hard 
to differentiate an ethnic minority person from the Han people in their daily life. In 
addition, the majority of the migrants are Chinese speakers. They may speak their 
hometown (Chinese) dialects at home, but can speak Mandarin Chinese as well.  
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education1. What can be identified here is that the hukou system is an 
embodied form of state sponsored welfare chauvinism (Kitschelt, 1995), 
under which the socio-economic policy and priority in social benefits are 
directed first and foremost to the region’s ‘own group’ (Mudde, 2000: 189). 
It restricts the local welfare provision to residents who hold the local 
household registration card - their ‘own people’ - as opposed to the other 
residents who do not. This distinction also gives rise to the ‘outsider’ 
discourse, which uses the household registration card status as the 
identifier to differentiate ‘outsiders’ from local residents (see chapter 8, 
section 2).  
  The institutional barrier of the hukou system and the ‘outsider’ discourse 
produce difficulties for migrant children’s state school enrolment. While in 
recent years 77%-80% of migrant children of compulsory education age 
are able to enrol in state schools (chapter 9, section 2), around one in five 
migrant children are studying in quasi-state schools and unlicensed 
informal schools, which tend to be inferior providers of schooling (chapter 
11), and some children have to go back and study in their parents’ 
hometown. When finishing compulsory education, the migrant children 
face further difficulties in accessing local senior high schools. For example, 
in Beijing, the current policy does not allow migrant children to enrol in 
																																																						
1 Although the Law of Compulsory Education affirms the right of access to education for 
migrant children (see section 2.1), it does not state explicitly that the receiving municipality 
should recruit all migrant children into local state schools. By doing this, the law leaves 
some spaces of discretion for the local government to interpret and enact the clause, 
based on the specific local socio-economic context. 
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academic senior high schools; instead, they are allowed to enrol in 
vocational schools, which are lower in status than academic schools and 
cannot recruit enough local students.  
4. Migrant children’s academic performance  
As I will elaborate in greater detail in chapter 9 (section 2), in Beijing and 
Shanghai a large percentage of the migrant children are studying in non-
elitist and ordinary state schools with a high percentage of migrant 
children.1 My fieldwork data was collected from this type of school. In my 
interviews, nine teachers from seven state schools talked about migrant 
children’s test scores, and five of them compared the test scores of 
migrants with those of local children. Four out of the five respondents claim 
that the majority of the migrant children’s overall test scores match those 
of the local children in their schools. What my respondents have reported 
resonates with the findings of a quantitative study examining migrant 
children’s learning outcomes and loneliness in state schools in Beijing, 
which concludes that ‘there is little difference in learning outcome or 
loneliness between urban native children and migrant children who attend 
public schools’ (Lu and Zhou, 2013: 85).  
  Yet my respondents also reported migrant-specific problems with regard 
to their test scores. As reported by most of the respondent teachers and 
headteachers, some migrant children in their classes frequently do not 
																																																						
1 Many of these schools are migrant majority schools with 60%-90% of their 
students being migrants.  
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finish their homework and/or show little motivation in the classroom 
teaching sessions. As a result, a small number of migrant children have 
notably low scores, lower than those that would be usual for the local 
students. According to these teachers, the main reason is that these 
children’s parents are disinterested and are incapable of supervising and 
facilitating their study, as I will detail in chapter 10 (section 5.1). Another 
unique issue is that some migrant children transferred to Beijing/Shanghai 
after receiving some of their education in their hometown. These children 
often struggle to catch up with their classmates as there is a regional 
difference in the content of the textbooks. As a result, their test scores are 
at the bottom of their classes with a big gap to the other students (migrant 
and local). This issue is particularly notable with English, as the schools in 
Beijing and Shanghai attach more importance to this subject and have 
more teaching resources than the schools in rural areas.  
  In short, in my sample schools, while there is a small group of migrant 
children who do not perform as well as the others owing to their past 
educational experiences or/and their disadvantaged home background, 
the majority of them are perceived by their teachers as performing equally 
with their local classmates in terms of their test scores. Yet this situation 
does not suggest that migrant children and local children (from across the 
cities) are performing equally in terms of their scores in Beijing and 
Shanghai, because my sample schools are non-elitist and ordinary state 
schools. The local students’ test scores in these schools does not reflect 
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the overall situation of the local students throughout the two cities, as most 
of the respondent headteachers, teachers and local parents point out that 
the scores of their schools are ranked in disadvantaged positions in the 
unpublished local league table.  
  Furthermore, if extending the scope of academic performance beyond 
test score, many migrant children in my sample schools are perceived by 
their teachers as having some ‘problems’ which the local students do not 
have in general. As I will elaborate in details in chapter 10 (section 5.1), 
given the migrant parents’ tendency to adopt a child rearing approach of 
‘accomplishment of natural growth’ (Lareau, 2003), many children do not 
complete their homework and some of them are perceived as having an 
indifferent attitude to teachers. While this situation does not make migrant 
children taken together an underachieving group in terms of the scores in 
the fieldwork schools, it does result in extra-curricular teaching burdens for 
the teachers, since they have to give extra guidance to those who are 
unable to catch up with the class. As a result, many respondent teachers 
and headteachers have negative perceptions or even a deficit view of 
migrant children’s academic performance. I will come back and discuss the 
(teacher’s perception of) migrant children’s study in chapter 10 with 
qualitative data. 
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5. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have outlined the broad social context of migrant children’s 
schooling in China, providing the readers with some background 
information. In section 1, I introduced the migrants’ social-economic 
background as being mainly involved in semi-skilled and unskilled 
occupations. I then presented the demographic statistical data of migrant 
children nationwide and in Beijing and Shanghai. In addition, I elaborated 
on the recent tendency for migrant children to be born and raised in the 
urban areas, as second-generation migrant children, and I summarised the 
reasons why these children need to study in the city. Section 2 elaborates 
on some key aspects of the school system in contemporary China. First, I 
introduced four legal aspects of compulsory education, which are: 
obligation, right, free of charge and anti-school choice. I then analysed how 
the exam-orientated tradition reinforces a hierarchy of schools. In addition, 
societal expectations of the parents’ role in schooling, especially with 
regard to home-school cooperation, are examined. In section 3, I 
elaborated on how the household registration (hukou) system functions as 
an institutional barrier against migrant children’s state school enrolment in 
compulsory and post-compulsory education stages. This situation 
differentiates the schooling situation of internal migrant children in China 
from that of children in other developing countries in Asia. I then introduced 
the issue of migrant children’s academic performance in terms of the test 
scores. While the majority of migrant children, who are studying in non-
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elitist and ordinary state schools, are performing at the same level as their 
local classmates, the migrant children (taken together) are in a 
disadvantaged position in the local state school system in terms of results.  
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Chapter 3: Literature review: migrant children’s schooling and 
policy in China 
In this chapter, I will review the existing literature on migrant children’s 
schooling and policy in China. The thesis research questions will be 
identified at the end of the chapter, as I outline the contribution of this 
research towards filling the gaps in the existing literature.  
  Since 2001, many academics have explored important issues related to 
the ‘Two Main Channels’ policy (‘TMC policy’ for short). Adopting multi-
disciplinary research perspectives drawn from political, sociological and 
economic fields, the key research findings from these studies are based on 
data collected from tens of cities in China with interview, questionnaire and 
observation as the main research methods.  
1. Educational financial system related to migrant children’s 
schooling 
The existing literature has clearly identified the financial situation of the 
receiving local governments at provincial, city and district levels as causing 
difficulties for migrant children’s schooling. The main issues are threefold. 
First, as mentioned by all the key findings on this topic, under the current 
household registration (hukou) system and educational financial system in 
China, the receiving local governments are unable to accommodate all of 
the migrant children in their local state education systems because the 
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educational funding that a local government can receive is calculated 
based on the number of students with local household registration in an 
area. Therefore, the local government is unable to receive extra funding 
from its superior government for migrant children’s education unless 
families can obtain a local household registration (CNIER, 2007b; Fan, 
2007; Han, 2007; Fu and Meng, 2008; Fan and Peng, 2009; Lei, 2010; 
Yuan, 2010). Second, there are some flaws in the design of the financial 
mechanism in the TMC policy. A main flaw, as argued by Fan (2007), Dong 
(2010) and Fan and Guo (2011), is that the TMC policy has not established 
that concrete financial responsibility lies with the Chinese central 
government. Therefore, central government does not offer enough 
financial support for all the receiving local governments. Third, some local 
governments are not willing to offer strong financial support to recruit all 
the migrant children in state schools, even if they could do so (Fan and 
Peng, 2009; Shao, 2010b; Yang, Tao and Li, 2011). Based on interviews 
with local government officers, some researchers adopt the concept ‘low-
lying land effect’ to state that ‘some local governments suspect that if they 
recruit all the migrant children into state schools, more and more migrant 
children might be attracted to their administrative areas’ (Shao, 2010b: 8). 
Although my research does not focus on the financial systems surrounding 
migrant children’s schooling, the existing literature has offered adequate 
background information for my research to analyse how receiving local 
governments implement the TMC policy with limited financial capability, 
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with regard to my first sub research question (see chapter 1, section 2). 
2. Migrant children’s school enrolment in different kinds of schools 
Based on interviews and questionnaires in different cities, the existing 
literature explores migrant children’s school enrolment in different kinds of 
schools in state and private sectors.  
2.1 State schools (local student majority)  
This type of school has widely been considered by the existing literature 
as optimal for providing the migrant children with an educational 
experience equal to that received by local students. This assertion is based 
on nationwide investigations in tens of cities in China (CNIER, 2007a, 2008; 
Li, 2010; Tao, Yang, Li, 2010; Liu, Wu, 2013; Chen, 2014). However, the 
existing literature has not put enough importance on the process of migrant 
student recruitment in these schools: which migrant children can enrol in 
these schools? Which migrant children cannot? Why do these schools only 
recruit a minor percentage of migrant children? These questions have 
contributed to my research on analysing the points of conflict among 
schools, local families, migrant families and receiving government (at 
provincial, city and district levels) in the TMC policy implementation, with 
regard to my first sub research question (see chapter 1, section 2).  
2.2 State schools (migrant children majority)  
According to the existing literature, a large number of migrant children are 
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studying in this kind of school, making it an important element in the TMC 
policy network (Qian and Walker, 2015). The existing literature has 
explored the reasons why these state schools changed from mostly 
recruiting local students to mostly recruiting migrant children. First, based 
on interviews with four state schools in Shanghai and Changchun, Zhou 
(2012) and Li (2010) have found that these state schools are losing local 
students because of their relatively low quality of curriculum and teaching. 
In order to fill their vacancies, they have recruited migrant children. Second, 
based on a review of data analysis in published journal articles and 
monographs, Liu and Wu (2013) reveal that some city governments require 
state schools (normally the ones with relatively low quality, as measured 
by test scores) to offer most of their quotas to migrant children. These 
findings serve as a good foundation for my exploration of the kind of 
education migrant children are receiving and what their relationship with 
their local peers and teachers are like in this kind of school. However, the 
existing literature has not attached enough importance to the unique 
situation regarding migrant children’s education in this kind of school by 
answering the following questions: are there any problems perceived by 
the teachers after recruiting a large number of migrant children? What are 
the teachers’ interpretations and attitudes towards this change? These 
questions have contributed to my research on analyzing the impetus of the 
policy change after 2013, with regard to my first sub research question (see 
chapter 1, section 2).  
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2.3 Unlicensed informal private (UIP) school 
In some big cities where many migrant children are unable to access local 
state schools, there are some unlicensed informal private (UIP) schools for 
migrant children. Without the government’s supervision, some of these 
schools do not follow the standard state curriculum and are lacking in 
certified teachers and basic teaching facilities (especially for non-
examination subjects such as arts, sports and music). Moreover, some 
schools have big class sizes, for example more than 50 students per class 
(Kwong, 2004; Woronov, 2004; CNIER, 2007a, 2008; Wang, 2008; 
Goodburn, 2009, 2015; Wu, 2010; Wang and Holland, 2011). The students 
studying in these schools have lower scores in key subjects such as 
Chinese and Maths (Chen and Feng, 2013; Lu and Zhou, 2013; Lai et al., 
2014) and have poorer sociocultural adaptation to urban life (Yuan et al., 
2013; Zhou and Guo, 2014), if compared with other migrant students who 
enrolled in the state schools. In certain cities, the government has closed 
down some of these schools. As shown in a nationwide investigation of 
twelve cities (CNIER, 2008), after the schools have been closed, their 
students were either transferred to state schools by the local government 
or the students were left to find other schools by themselves. In recent 
years, in some cities there is a new local government policy towards these 
schools, as revealed by researchers’ investigations in Shanghai. With 
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financial support from the receiving local government, some of these 
schools were able to improve their facilities and eventually receive formal 
registration (Li, 2009; Liu and Wu, 2015). The existing literature offers 
valuable information for future research, especially on the Shanghai 
government’s new policy. However, the existing literature has not given 
answers to some important questions: why have some private schools 
received the government’s support but others in the same cities have not, 
or have even have been closed by the government? After being registered, 
are these schools operating in the same way with regard to their 
relationship with the local municipality of education? What kinds of 
education these schools can offer for migrant children? These questions 
contribute to my analysis of the migrant children’s school experiences in 
the government financially supported private schools, with regard to my 
second sub research question (see chapter 1, section 2).   
3. The conflict and cooperation among different stakeholders in the 
‘Two Main Channel’ policy implementation  
As commented on in a recent study, the implementation of the TMC policy 
is ‘a product of interaction between policy design, participants and 
implementation context’ (Liu, Liu and Yu, 2017: 210). The existing literature 
has analysed the conflict and cooperation among the following participants 
of the TMC policy: the governments at provincial, city and district levels 
and in different regions; migrant children and parents; local children and 
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parents; receiving local state schools; and private schools for migrant 
children (Zhou, 2006; Shao, 2010a, 2010b; Yuan, 2010; Yang, Tao, Li, 2011; 
Liu and Shenglong, 2015; Liu, Liu and Yu, 2017). Their conflict and 
cooperation can include different aspects and the existing literature mainly 
explores the receiving cities’ and district governments’ relationship with and 
approaches to migrant families. A typical example is research that 
considers the concept of ‘containment mechanism’ when discussing the 
conflict between the receiving local governments and migrant families 
(Shao, 2010a, 2010b; Yang, Tao and Li, 2011). These studies set the 
analysis of the TMC policy into a broad background of the overall migrant 
population policy. The ‘Containment Mechanism’ means some receiving 
local governments utilize the migrant workers’ labour resources while 
offering them quite limited social welfare (excluding their children’s right of 
access to local state schools for instance), and in doing so ‘contain’ and 
limit the flow of migrant families to their areas (Shao, 2010a, 2010b; Yang, 
Tao and Li, 2011). This concept offers a useful perspective for my study by 
pointing out the effects of the interactions between education policy and 
migrant population policy. However, it has not discussed the other potential 
aspects of the relationship between these two kinds of policies: the TMC 
policy might not only have been influenced by the migrant population policy 
but also have been influenced by other public policies; or perhaps the TMC 
policy interacts with other aspects of the policies on migrant populations. 
Neither has it discussed the interactions among education policy, 
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population policy and other policies in political and economic domains. 
Responding to this research gap, I adopted the theoretical concept of 
‘cross-field effects’ (Lingard and Rawolle, 2004) to explore the interactions 
among the fields of politics, economy, education policy, and population 
policy, with regard to my first sub research question (see chapter 1, section 
2). In addition, the analyses and conclusions in the existing literature are 
mainly based on the authors’ speculation and data from other publications 
as well as some government statistical data. There is little first-hand data, 
and especially lacking is interview data from different stakeholders.  
  There are other gaps in the existing literature, such as research mainly 
focuses on the receiving local government’s attitudes regarding the migrant 
families and neglects other aspects: first, the existing literature does not 
include all stakeholders in the analysis. For example, the Sub-district Office 
of Culture and Education (SOCE, the lowest level of educational 
administration) is often excluded from consideration. According to my 
fieldwork, SOCE is also an important stakeholder, since it is in charge of 
verifying the migrant children’s school enrolment documents and issuing 
the Certificate of Studying in State School. Second, the conflict and 
cooperation between receiving city and district levels of government and 
state schools has not been explored. Finally, the existing literature tends to 
consider the whole government system as one stakeholder in TMC policy 
implementation. However, this hypothesis might not be reasonable in all 
the conditions. As Ball (1990: 20) states, ‘[t]he central state often finds itself 
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in conflict with elements of the local state…. Thus we need to be aware of 
centre-periphery relations within the educational state itself’. My fieldwork 
data also shows that within the government system, there are at least four 
stakeholders: in Beijing for example, the Chinese Ministry of Education, 
Beijing Municipal of Education, Beijing district municipal of education, and 
SOCE. Identifying these research gaps helps me to avoid a one-sided 
analysis in my research. Responding to the research gaps, I have explored 
the following questions: what stakeholders have involved in the enactment 
of the TMC policy? what kinds of pressures have the city and district 
governments put on the state schools to recruit migrant children? What are 
the conflicts and cooperation between receiving city and district levels of 
government and state schools? These questions contribute to my analysis 
of both sub questions under the thesis main research question.  
4. ‘Two Main Channel’ policy implementation in Beijing, Shanghai and 
Guangzhou  
Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou are considered the three major cities in 
China with a huge number of migrant children. The existing literature has 
already undertaken some preliminary work on the implementation of the 
TMC policy in these three cities. Compared to Beijing and Guangzhou, 
Shanghai is a relatively more successful example for including most of the 
migrant children into the state school system, supported by its huge 
financial investment. Compared to Shanghai, what the Beijing government 
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has done with more limited financial resources to implement this policy is 
not as comprehensive (Yuan, 2010; Liu, Liu and Yu, 2017). Some 
researchers consider Guangzhou as a negative example for including only 
a small percentage of the migrant children into state schools, as shown by 
the statistics: 29.7% in 2009 and around 50% in 2013 (Wang, 2013; Yuan, 
2010). Based on statistical data and interviews, the existing literature 
explores the main reasons for the difference among the three cities. A 
direct reason why the ratio of migrant children enrolling in state schools in 
Guangzhou is notably lower than that of Shanghai and Beijing is that the 
Guangzhou city government has established much more restrictive criteria 
concerning who can receive the Certificate of Study in State Schools. 
Another direct reason is that, as Yuan (2010) points out, in Beijing and 
Guangzhou it is the government at district level, rather than city level, who 
takes the main financial responsibility for migrant children’s schooling. But 
in Shanghai, the situation is the opposite: it is the city government rather 
than district government who takes the main financial responsibility. It is 
important to note that in China, the government at city level usually has 
much stronger financial capability than the government at district level, 
because the city government controls the finances of the county/district 
governments. This is partly the reason why the Shanghai government is 
able to provide the migrant children with adequate financial support. Wang 
(2013), based on the analysis of 117 policy texts among 28 different 
provinces in China, explains that one of the fundamental reasons why the 
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Guangzhou government chose to establish restrictive criteria is that 
Guangzhou is undergoing an industrial structural transformation from 
labour based industry to technology based industry, which requires a well-
educated labour force. Therefore, the rural migrant workers, who normally 
have relatively low education levels, are not welcome. Under these 
circumstances, setting restrictive state school enrolment criteria for their 
children as a way of deterring migrant rural workers from coming to the city 
is a way for Guangzhou’s government to attain its goal. Wang’s analysis is 
valuable for my research, since it takes the economic and social context of 
the TMC policy implementation into consideration, rather than merely 
focusing on educational issues. The existing literature offers valuable 
background information and perspectives of analysis for my research, 
which examine the policy enactment in Beijing and Shanghai.    
5. The migrant children’s social relationships and social inclusion in 
state schools  
With the majority of migrant children now studying in state schools, the 
existing studies have explored migrant children’s social relationships and 
social inclusion in Chinese urban state school (Woronov, 2004; Wang, 
2008; Dong, 2009; Goodburn, 2009; Xu, C., 2009; Li et al., 2010; Kwong, 
2011; Liu and Li, 2012; Lan, 2014; Mu and Jia, 2016; Zhang and Luo, 2016). 
Assuming the migrant children and the schools as a homogeneous group, 
most of the studies do not differentiate local majority state school from the 
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migrant majority ones, or the first-generation migrant children from the 
second-generation in their research designs.1 Accordingly, their findings 
show that the migrant children as a whole are distinguishable from the local 
students in their accent, appearance, style of dress and behaviours, and 
that this situation leads to negative attitudes from the local children and 
teachers, producing difficulty for the social inclusion of the migrant children. 
For example, Goodburn points out that ‘the accents, style of dress and 
different behaviour of many migrant children means that they are easily 
identifiable as different’ (2009: 498). Another investigation in Chengdu with 
questionnaires to several state primary/junior secondary schools reports 
that 26.5% of migrant children feel isolated in their relationship with local 
children (Xu, C., 2009). I acknowledge that the existing literature offers 
implications for my exploration of migrant children’s school experiences in 
state schools, with regard to my second sub research question (chapter 1, 
section 2). Yet I also note that their findings are likely to be generated based 
partly on the features of the first-generation migrants in local majority state 
schools 2 , and cannot be generalised to the situation of the second-
generation migrants in the migrant majority state school which I explore. 
																																																						
1 In the existing literature, it is rare that the paper pointed out both the age of 
migrant children when they came to the city and the percentage of migrants in the 
schools.  
2  Some previous studies have covered second-generation migrants in the 
migrant majority schools. Yet there is a possible bias in their interpretation of data. 
Namely, researchers merely present the data that differentiates some migrant 
children from the local children in some schools and ignore the data otherwise. It 
should be noticed that this kind of bias, or the subjectivity of a researcher, is hard 
to avoid (or should not be avoided) in social research, including my research.  
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As for the local majority state schools, they recruit some local students from 
middle-class family background, in comparison to the migrant children’s 
working-class background. In these schools, the class difference, together 
with the rural/urban cultural difference, make the migrant children easily 
distinguishable from the local students. Yet the situation can be different in 
the migrant majority schools, where local students are also from working-
class background, as supported by my empirical data (see chapter 10, 
section 1). In addition, the accent, style of dress, and behaviours of the 
first-generation migrant children, who have already had some experiences 
of rural life, can differentiate them from local children. Yet it can be hard to 
differentiate the second-generation migrant children from the local children, 
as supported by my empirical data (see chapter 10, section 4). As stated 
earlier (chapter 2, section 1.3), most of the migrant children in Beijing and 
Shanghai are now the second-generation migrants. In the meantime, the 
migrant majority state school has now been an established part in the state 
school system in these two cities (see chapter 9, section 2). Focuses on 
the second-generation migrant children in migrant majority schools, I 
acknowledge that my findings cannot be generalized beyond my specific 
sampling context.  
  As for how teachers treat migrant children, an unresolved controversy 
still exists in the literature: are teachers treating the migrant children in the 
same way as local children, without discrimination? The existing evidence 
is contested. According to the research finding of a nationwide 
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investigation (CNIER, 2008) that covered 22 state primary schools and 17 
state junior secondary schools in twelve big cities with questionnaire and 
in-depth interviews as the main research methods, the teachers in this 
study treated the migrant children in the same way as local children, or 
even gave migrant children some privileges (in consideration of their 
disadvantaged social background). The study suggested that teachers give 
the same amount of psychological and emotional guidance sessions to 
local and migrant children; teachers give even more emotional 
encouragement, assignment feedback, and individual academic tutorials 
to migrant children, calculated by the number of tutorial sessions; teachers 
also give more opportunities for teacher-student interaction to migrant 
children in classes. However, critics argue that some teachers do not treat 
the migrant children in the same way as local children with regard to their 
learning, philological development and emotional needs. Published as 
journal articles and an MA dissertation/PhD thesis, these studies use 
interview data from around ten state primary/junior secondary schools in 
Beijing, Tianjin and Changchun to support their argument (Goodburn, 2009; 
Li, 2010; Xu, L., 2009). Some researchers even conclude that migrant 
children are facing discrimination from some of their teachers. For example, 
based on semi-structured interviews with teachers, parents and students 
in Tianjin, Xu reports that some state schools consciously foster 
segregation by separating migrant and local children into different classes 
or different groupings within one class (Xu L., 2009). Based on data from 
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semi-structured interviews with teachers and students in six state schools 
in Beijing, Goodburn argues that ‘state school teachers confirmed that in 
most schools, students without a local hukou had no right to be selected 
as ‘‘thrice good’’ (san hao) honours1 students and had no scholarship 
opportunities’ (2009: 498). The controversy in the existing literature might 
come from the different sampling designs of different research, as the 
situation might be different in different cities, districts within one city, or 
schools within one district. Therefore, it is hard to draw a simple conclusion 
on the relationship between migrant children and teachers in Chinese state 
schools. The implication for my research is that I am not going to generalize 
my findings beyond my specific sampling contexts.  
  Furthermore with the increasing percentage of migrant children enrolled 
in urban schools, the migrant parents’ sometimes troubled relationships 
with schools has been reported by educators and researchers. The existing 
literature, taking the teacher’s point of view, has identified the limited 
parental involvement of the migrant parents as being the result of their 
limited literacy, poor parenting skills, and lack of time and willingness (Li et 
al., 2010; Liu and Jacob, 2013; Yuan et al., 2013). Yet the existing literature 
has not offered an in-depth exploration of the home-school interactions and 
how it affects migrant children’s relationships in school. Therefore, I have 
added parental involvement as a dimension in my exploration of migrant 
																																																						
1 The ‘thrice good’ (san hao) honour, which takes the students’ academic, moral 
and physical performance into consideration, is the top honour in Chinese 
primary/secondary schools. Only a small percentage of students can be awarded 
this honour. 
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children’s experiences in school, with regard to my second sub question 
(see chapter 1, section 2).  
6. Conclusion 
The existing literature provides some background information, secondary 
data and research perspectives for future research on the implementation1 
of the TMC policy. Yet there are still some research gaps that need to be 
explored. In my study, I explore each of the individual research gaps 
identified earlier, under the thesis’ main research question. In the existing 
literature, two common and fundamental research gaps can still be 
identified. First, considering the research methodology, the majority of 
existing conclusions are not based on systematic and in-depth research 
with solid qualitative and quantitative evidence. Instead, many of the 
authors did not collect new empirical data, but mainly relied on references 
to other research findings or to what they understand to be common 
knowledge. Noticing this research gap, my research has adopted semi-
structured interviews and policy documents to generate rich first-hand 
qualitative data (see chapter 5, section 2). Second, examining the existing 
literature’s understanding of the nature of ‘policy’ reveals that authors 
generally see policy as a top-down and linear process, within which a clear 
demarcation between policy formulation and implementation exists. This 
understanding prevents researchers from analysing some important 
																																																						
1 My research would rather use the term ‘enactment’, as I elaborate in chapter 5 
(section 1).  
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aspects of TMC policy: how do different individuals, organisations and 
groups of actors interpret and enact this policy? How is their interpretation 
and enactment influenced by political, economic, socio-cultural and 
historical factors? Can we understand the nature of TMC policy enactment 
as a set of dynamic and non-linear relationships and activities? This 
research gap is suitable for exploration through a ‘policy sociology’ 
approach, using mainly Bourdieusian and Foucauldian theoretical 
resources, which I will review in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 4: Theoretical review  
Following the review of literature on migrant children’s schooling and policy 
in China, in this chapter, I will review the theoretical resources I have used 
in the thesis.  
  As I have brought together ‘structural, macro-level analysis of education 
systems and education policies and micro-level investigation, especially 
that which takes account of people’s perception and experiences’ (Ozga, 
1990: 359), the scope of the research is large and the analysis is highly 
complex. Therefore, a ‘toolbox’ approach to theory (Ball, 1994: 14) that 
integrates various theoretical resources is needed, as Ball points out, ‘in 
the analysis of complex social issues – like policy – two theories are 
probably better than one’ (1994: 14). These theoretical resources include: 
Bourdieu’s work on ‘field, habitus and capital’ (Bourdieu, 1984, 1986, 1990, 
1993, 1996), Foucault’s work on ‘discourse’ (Foucault, 1979, 1986), and 
Truman (1951), Latham (1952) and Dye (2008)’s work on policy as 
temporary consensus between groups. The choosing of the above theories 
and concepts is based on their relevance to the main themes in my code 
list, which is a product of several rounds of data coding (see chapter 5, 
section 5). While there could be other relevant theoretical resources that I 
have not included here, I believe that the above theoretical resources are 
sufficient to give a coherent, well-rounded and in-depth analysis of the 
migrant children’s schooling policy in China, and thus to produce an original 
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contribution to knowledge. In order to address the potential charge of 
theoretical inconsistency, I argue that the use of a ‘toolbox of diverse 
concepts and theories’ (Ball, 1993: 10) is coherent in the sense that they 
facilitate my exploration of each sub research question, contributing 
towards the thesis’ main research question, as I will discuss in detail in 
section 4.  
1. Bourdieusian resources 
1.1 Bourdieu’s concepts 
Bourdieu has offered us a theoretical toolkit to analyse the structure and 
logic of practice. Field, habitus and capital are three of his key concepts, 
which, taken together, offer a unique perspective to explore the structure 
of power-relations in practice. Furthermore, what Bourdieu offers us is 
more than a set of theoretical tools. Rather, ‘the task is to produce, if not a 
“new person”, then at least a “new gaze”, a sociological view’ (Bourdieu 
and Wacquant, 1992: 251, original emphasis). Bourdieu’s aim is to bring 
an epistemological change to sociology, to change the way we understand 
the world. 
1.1.1 Field 
As summarised by Thomson, Bourdieu’s concept of ‘field’ is ‘not developed 
as grand theory, but as a means of translating practical problems into 
concrete empirical operations’ (Thomson, 2012: 79). Bourdieu defines field 
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as:   
A field is a structured social precondition, a field of forces, a force field. 
It contains people who dominate and people who are dominated. 
Constant, permanent relationships of inequality operate inside this 
precondition, which at the same time becomes a precondition in which 
the various actors struggle for the transformation or preservation of the 
field. All the individuals in this universe bring to the competition all the 
(relative) power at their disposal. It is this power that defines their 
position in the field and, as a result, their strategies (Bourdieu 1998a: 
40-41).   
According to this definition, several key points should be noticed: first, as 
a social ‘precondition’, a field, as a bounded site, has its (invisible) structure 
with various actors located in various ‘positions’ within the field. Second, in 
accordance with the field’s structure, there is also an (unequal) power 
relation among the actors with visible struggle and invisible opposing 
forces operating among them, following the invisible logic of that field: in 
Bourdieu’s terms, ‘a field of forces, a force field’ (Bourdieu, 1998a: 40). In 
addition, what Bourdieu has not stated here, but does so in other writings, 
is that a field is not of a concrete, figured and stable precondition, but its 
scope/structure is constantly shaping and being shaped by the power 
relations and struggle among actors, as well as actors’ possession and 
activation of capitals1 in terms of how such struggles play out. That is to 
say, ‘[t]here is a shift away from a structure/agency binary in Bourdieu’s 
fields’ (Thomson and Holdsworth, 2003: 382). The struggle among actors 
																																																						
1 It is worth noting that particular forms of capital are valued more or less highly 
in particular fields. 
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is always relative not absolute, relating to the definition of the field, in the 
meantime, it shapes the power relations and the structure of the field.  
Analysing a field: a three-level approach 
Therefore, how does one explore a certain field? Bourdieu states that the 
analytical approach involves three necessary and internally connected 
moments:  
First, one must analyse the positions of the field vis-à-vis the field of 
power… Second, one must map out the objective structures of 
relations between the positions occupied by the agents or institutions 
who compete for the legitimate forms of specific authority of which this 
field is a site. And, third, one must analyse the habitus of agents, the 
different systems of positions they have acquired by internalizing a 
determinate type of social and economic condition. (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant, 1992: 104-105) 
According to Bourdieu, in the Level 1 analysis, the point is to map out the 
position of the particular field vis-à-vis the field of power in the broader 
social space. Then the questions become: first, what is the field of power 
(how is it different from other fields and the broader social space)? The first 
step is to differentiate the concept of field from the social space. As Hardy 
summarises, ‘the term “social space” is used to indicate the sum total of 
occupiable social positions at any one time and space … By contrast, the 
term “field” is used to refer to a particular subset of the available positions’ 
(Hardy, 2012: 231). The field is one of the subsets of positions within the 
broader social space and it manifests itself by the dispositions (habitus) 
and resources (capital) of its agents and the way the agents struggle. As a 
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special form of the field, the field of power is,  
[T]he space of the relations of force between… the agents who 
possess a sufficient amount of one of the different kinds of capital to 
be in a position to dominate the corresponding field, whose struggles 
intensify whenever the relative value of the different kinds of capital is 
questioned (Bourdieu, 1998b: 34).  
In other words, in the field of power, the objective of the agents’ struggle is 
not for the accumulation or monopoly on a particular form of capital, but 
rather the ‘determination of the relative value and magnitude of the different 
forms of power that can be wielded in the different fields’, namely, the 
‘exchange rate’ between different types of capital (Bourdieu, 1996a: 265). 
The agents in the field of power are struggling in order to occupy dominant 
positions in the other fields1. This character differentiates the field of power 
from other fields, allowing it to occupy the dominant position in the social 
space.  
  The second question is: by what means can researchers map out the 
positions of particular fields vis-à-vis the field of power in the social space? 
On the one hand, some fields are contained in the field of power, as the 
agents in these fields are generally dominant agents in other fields. For 
example, Bourdieu argues that ‘the literary field is contained within the field 
of power where it occupies a dominated position’ (Bourdieu, 1992: 104). 
That is to say, artists and writers are part of the dominant class while they 
are a dominated fraction of that class. On the other hand, many fields are 
																																																						
1 As field is a conceptual space, the collectives of individuals and organisations 
can occupy more than one field at a time.  
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not contained within the field of power, as the field of power only contains 
the dominant agents of other fields. Yet even in this sense, these fields can 
still be seen as affiliated to the field of power, as their dominant agents 
maintain the structural and functional homologies between these fields and 
the field of power. as I will elaborate later. It is in this sense that Bourdieu 
generally maintains that individual fields are within the field of power, or the 
field of power is made up of multiple fields. For example, when describing 
the distribution of positions and hierarchy of different fields in the broader 
social space, Bourdieu writes, ‘the various fields are distributed within the 
field of power according to the objective hierarchy of forms of capital …’ 
(Bourdieu, 1996a: 270). Bourdieu’s analytical approach to map out the 
positions of particular fields vis-à-vis the field of power is based on his 
observation that the field of power, which also applies to the broader social 
space and its fields, is organized according to a chiasmatic structure. ‘The 
distribution according to the dominant principle of hierarchisation - 
economic capital - is, as it were, “intersected” by the distribution based on 
a second principle of hierarchisation - cultural capital’ (Bourdieu, 1996: 
270). This analytical approach is often visualized by Bourdieu as a two-
axes figure to present to chiasmatic structure of the positions of the agents 
in particular fields and fields in the broader social space (see, for example, 
Bourdieu, 1996a: 267, 268, 269; Bourdieu, 1996b: 124). In The Rules of 
Art, Bourdieu maps out the position of the field of cultural production vis-à-
vis the field of power in the social space by plotting the categories and 
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volumes of the economic, cultural and symbolic capital that the agents hold 
(Figure 3).1  
Figure 3: the field of cultural production in the field of power and in social 
space (Bourdieu, 1996b:124) 
 
																																																						
1 It is important to note that while the field of cultural production is within the field 
of power, the method to map out the relative positions of particular fields, the field 
of power and the social space also applies to other fields in Bourdieu’s account. 
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  In Bourdieu’s Level 2 analysis, the main task is to map out the 
structures of relations between the positions of agents or institutions. 
According to Bourdieu, the field of power (and other fields within it) is a field 
of forces that is ‘structurally determined by the state of the relations of 
power … or different forms of capital’ (Bourdieu, 1996a: 264). Therefore in 
empirical work, ‘it is one and the same thing to determine what the field is, 
where its limits lie, etc., and to determine what species of capital are active 
in it, within what limits, and so on’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 98-99). 
That is to say, what is happening in a particular field (‘what the field is’) and 
the boundary of that field (‘where its limits lie’) is the same thing as the 
capital. Here the configurations and volumes of the capital possessed by 
the agents is the analytical focus in the empirical work. As there are 
structural and functional homologies between the particular fields, the field 
of power and the social space, the analytical approach of level 2 analysis 
is similar to level 1 analysis. Mapping out the position of different agents is 
done by plotting the configurations and volumes of the capital they hold 
and visualized by a two-axes figure. 
  In the Level 3 analysis, the analysis focuses on the habitus of the 
agents and on how the habitus forms and shapes agents’ actions in a 
particular field. It is important to note that the focus of the analysis in this 
level is on the relationships or correspondences between the agents, 
instead of on the agents themselves or their habituses. As Grenfell 
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summarises, ‘we are interested in how particular attributes, which are 
social in as much as they only have value in terms of the field as a whole. 
We are not concerned with individual idiosyncrasies’ (Grenfell, 2012: 222). 
I will return and give detailed elaborations on the nature of the habitus and 
how to analyse it in a particular field in section 1.1.2.  
  In short, all three levels, from the external to the internal of a field, 
construct a well-rounded analytical approach to explore a particular field. 
As commented by Grenfell, ‘it is the links between individuals (habitus), 
field structures, and the positionings both within and between fields that 
form a conceptual framework for research’ (Grenfell, 2012: 223). Yet it is 
important to note that, although a field can be outlined through the above 
steps, fields remain intangible and unstable social spaces with indistinct 
borders.  
Logic of practice  
According to Bourdieu, each field has its specific logics of practice. For 
Bourdieu, the logic of practice is key to outlining a field; as he puts it ‘in 
order to construct the field, one must identify the forms of specific capital 
that operate within it, and to construct the forms of specific capital one must 
know the specific logic of the field’ (Bourdieu 1992: 108). The function of 
the logic in a field can be shown by an analogy: if we consider the field as 
a game, then the logic of practice can be seen as the ‘rule’ of the game 
followed by all players. Functioning as an ‘often imprecise but systematic 
principle of selection’ (Bourdieu 1990: 102), the logic of practice ‘proceeds 
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through a series of irreversible choices by the agents … in response to 
other choices obeying the same logic’ (Bourdieu 1990: 101). Yet unlike the 
rule of a game, the logic of practice functions in an ‘invisible’ way, which 
‘though immediately perceptible, has none of the strict, regular coherence 
of the concerted products of a plan’ (Bourdieu 1990: 102). In other words, 
the logic is not functioning as a written plan or rule that is published to all 
the actors in the game. In terms of how the actors are affected by the logic 
of practice, they ‘agree, by the mere fact of playing, and not by way of a 
“contract”, that the game is worth playing’ (Bourdieu 1992, 98).  
  Bourdieu uses the artistic field and economic field as examples to show 
how the logics of practice function. For example, Bourdieu argues that the 
logic in the artistic field is the rejection of the law of material profit, yet the 
logic in the economic field is that ‘business is business’:   
While the artistic field has constituted itself by rejecting or reversing 
the law of material profit (Bourdieu 1983d), the economic field has 
emerged, historically, through the creation of a universe within which, 
as we commonly say, ‘business is business’, where the enchanted 
relations of friendship and love are in principle excluded. (Bourdieu 
1992: 97-98)  
  Bourdieu also argues that while the logic of practice continuously shapes 
the actions of the agents, it can also be shaped by the agents’ actions, 
partially or completely. Agents can shape the logic of practice through 
changing ‘the exchange rate between various species of capital, through 
strategies aimed at discrediting the form of capital upon which the force of 
their opponents rests (e.g., economic capital) and to valorise the species 
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of capital they preferentially possess (e.g., juridical capital)’ (Bourdieu 1992: 
99).   
  When discussing giving an account of the logic of practice in each field, 
Bourdieu argues that the researcher should choose the conduct 
appropriate to each situation rather than resort to the imaginary ‘file of 
prefabricated representation’ (Bourdieu 1990: 100). That is to say, the 
researcher should try to understand the logic within the context of that field 
at that particular time, rather than adopting the same formula in all 
circumstances.  
Relationships and interactions of fields 
As for the relationship between the fields (not the field of power), some 
fields (e.g., economic field) occupy a dominant position in the social space 
while others (e.g., artistic field, education field) are in the dominated 
positions. According to Bourdieu, the distribution of the positions of fields 
is according to ‘the objective hierarchy of forms of capital, economic and 
cultural capital in particular’ (Bourdieu, 1996a: 270). Accordingly, the 
positions of particular fields can be plotted by a two-axes figure (with 
chiasmatic structure) through examining the figurations and volumes of 
capital (especially the economic and cultural capital) that the agents hold, 
as I have reviewed in level 1 field analysis (see Figure 3).  
  The configurations of capital in different fields also brings us to a relevant 
issue – how to map out the boundary of fields. In Bourdieu’s account, there 
is not entirely discrete boundary between fields. As a field is not of a 
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concrete, figured and stable precondition, there can be overlapping 
boundaries between fields. For example, the field of private schooling 
overlaps with the education field and the economic field. Yet a researcher 
can still outline a field as a means of ‘translating practical problems into 
concrete empirical operations’ (Thomson, 2012: 79). Then, the question 
arises how to map out the boundary of fields? As Bourdieu comments, the 
movement to different configurations of capital ‘entails a shift from one field 
to another field’ (Bourdieu, 1984: 126). A field, as a conceptual space, is 
organized with agents holding particular configurations of capital. For 
example, in the education field, the cultural resources (as cultural capital) 
are a key configuration of capital, which differentiate this field from other 
fields such as the economic field where the financial resources (as 
economic capital) act as a main configuration of capital. Yet Bourdieu has 
constantly reminded us that ‘the boundaries of the field can only be 
determined by an empirical investigation’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 
100). That is to say, there is not a definitive method that is suitable for every 
field. Bourdieu does offer a principle to outline the boundary of fields, as he 
has done in his empirical investigations. That is, as the boundary of a 
particular field is situated at the point where the effects of that field cease, 
the researchers must try ‘by various means to measure in each case the 
point at which these statistically detectable effects decline’ (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant, 1992: 100). A point I would add is that ‘statistically detectable’ 
might not be a criterion to judge whether the research work is creditable, 
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as the data collected through a qualitative approach can also offer another 
way to map the boundary of the field.  
  Bourdieu writes considerably about the division of fields, such as the 
division from the field of power to the economic field, and then to the 
housing field. Yet it is important to note that he does not equate the way 
that fields relate to each other to the relationship of a system and its sub-
systems. Bourdieu claims that a major difference between field and system 
is that ‘a field does not have parts, components. Every subfield has its own 
logic, rules and regularities, and each stage in the division of a field … 
entails a genuine qualitative leap’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 104). 
Thus, what does Bourdieu mean by a ‘qualitative leap’? A key point of the 
qualitative leap refers to the stake for which the agents struggle in each 
field. For example, in the field of power, the key stake is the ‘exchange rate’ 
between different types of capital, which is different from the commercial 
interests for which the agents struggle in the economic field. The qualitative 
leap also embodies the scope of the struggle, including the types of agents 
involved, the configurations and volumes of capital exerted. In this sense, 
a qualitative leap can be identified when shifting from the economic field 
down to the housing field, and then to the individual firm as a field. At each 
stage, the types of agents are narrowed and the configuration and volumes 
of capital become more specified or contextualized.  
  Bourdieu suggests that interactions exist among different fields. As the 
field is not a static and fixed precondition, as I reviewed earlier, its structure 
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and power-relations can be shaped by the logic of the other fields. For 
example, in the contemporary artistic field, the patronage (from the 
economic field) and censorship (from the political field) can shape the 
artists’ actions (Bourdieu 1992: 109-110). Another example is that in the 
journalism field, the journalists are driven by the commercial logic of the 
economic field and produce decontextualized pieces of news to grab the 
audience’s attention (Bourdieu, 1998a). He has also explored how the 
political field and the economic field influence the educational field 
(Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977). When analysing the interactions among 
fields, Bourdieu insists that ‘there are no transhistoric laws of the relations 
between fields, that we must investigate each historical case separately’ 
(Bourdieu 1992: 109, original emphasis). He does not pursue a general 
theory on interactions of fields. This reminds us that we must investigate 
each case separately.  
1.1.2 Habitus 
As Bourdieu observes, his thinking about habitus started from this point: 
‘how can behaviour be regulated without being the product of obedience to 
rules?’ (1990a: 65). I understand this as the key to understanding habitus 
and how it functions. For Bourdieu, habitus ‘tends to generate all the 
“reasonable”, “common-sense”, behaviours (and only these) which are 
possible within the limits of these regularities’ (Bourdieu, 1990c: 55). In this 
sense, habitus has some similarities with rule of behaviours, since both of 
them constrain agents’ perceptions and behaviours. Yet Bourdieu also 
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differentiates habitus from rule, stating that ‘habitus is a spontaneity without 
consciousness or will’ (1990c: 56). Bourdieu has used the metaphor of 
‘collectively orchestrated without being the product of the organizing action 
of a conductor’ (Bourdieu, 1990c: 53) to describe how the agents’ 
behaviours are shaped by habitus unconsciously. Bourdieu also 
deliberately separates habitus from ‘habit’. For him, an important difference 
between habitus and habit, which refers to individual behaviour modes, is 
that habitus has an underlying structure that is historically and socially 
constructed. Rooted in and arising from particular social-economic 
conditions, habitus is a ‘structured body, a body which has incorporated the 
immanent structures of a world or of a particular sector of that world – a 
field’ (1998a: 81). As a ‘structured body’, habitus is being shaped by actors’ 
past/present experiences, by the forms of capital they possess, and by the 
structure of the field, thus becoming the embodiment of the immanent 
necessity of the field. In turn, as a ‘structuring structure’, habitus is 
constantly ‘structuring’ the actors’ perceptions of the world and their actions 
in the world (Bourdieu, 1998a: 81).   
  Based on Bourdieu’s ideas, Maton argues that ‘relation is the essence 
of habitus’ (2012: 60), and the concept helps to overcome several 
dichotomies. First, habitus links the subjective with the objective. Habitus 
is a socialized body, which as cited above, ‘has incorporated the immanent 
structures of a world or of a particular sector of that world – a field’ 
(Bourdieu, 1998b: 81). It is not something purely intellectual or perceptional. 
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At the same time, habitus constantly shapes the agents’ actions, which in 
turn shape the field. Second, habitus connects social (collective) and 
individual trajectories. The habitus of an individual has roots in the person’s 
unique life experiences. In the meantime, ‘the subject is not the 
instantaneous ego of a sort of singular cogito, but the individual trace of an 
entire collective history’ (1990a: 91). That is to say, the experiences of an 
individual’s life may be unique but simultaneously share a structure with 
others from the same social class, gender, etc. Finally, habitus transcends 
the past/present dichotomy. Habitus ‘refers to something historical, it is 
linked to individual history’ (1990b: 86), thus it is constructed through 
individual/collective past experiences and is contributing to and being re-
shaped by individual/collective ongoing experiences. In short, habitus is ‘a 
present past that tends to perpetuate itself into the future’ (Bourdieu, 1990c: 
54).  
  The concept of habitus offers a unique perspective to examine how 
people’s knowledge, perceptions and attitudes are shaped by invisible 
rules, which are particularly valid for particular social groups, producing 
some degree of uniformity in their behaviours within the group. If so, then, 
what is the structure of habitus? In his writings, especially the section of 
‘Structures, habitus, practice’ in The Logic of Practice (1980), Bourdieu 
gives an account of different aspects of habitus, about how it is formed and 
how it functions. He has not given a definitive or authoritative definition of 
habitus to make it an operative concept, since he believes that the analysis 
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of habitus should be put together in relation to a particular field. The 
‘indeterminacy and changing notions of habitus’ (Reay, 2004: 438) can lead 
to a danger of tautological explanation, as reminded by Bourdieu himself: 
‘why does someone make petty-bourgeois choices? Because he has a 
petty bourgeois habitus!’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 129). When 
being applied to empirical studies, the indeterminacy can lead to real 
challenges for researchers, since ‘one does not “see” a habitus but rather 
the effects of a habitus in the practices and beliefs to which it gives rise’ 
(Maton, 2012: 61, originally emphasises). Specifically, the challenge could 
be giving a reasonable account in response to the following questions: 
‘what particular structure of the habitus is in play here compared to other 
possible habitus structures? And how can we tell when that habitus has 
changed, varied or remained the same?’ (Maton, 2012: 61). In addition, 
would the analysis be at collective or individual level? Yet this 
indeterminacy of the meaning also creates a space for the researchers’ 
own interpretations, which, as Reay comments, ‘makes possible 
adaptation rather than the more constricting straightforward adoption of the 
concept within empirical work’ (Reay, 1995: 357). Indeed, this is the 
positive aspect of the indeterminacy of the concept of habitus.  
1.1.3 Capital 
‘The forms of capital’ (Bourdieu, 1986) is Bourdieu’s classic work on the 
forms of capital and their inter-conversions. In this paper, Bourdieu 
criticized the traditional understanding of ‘capital’, which was limited to its 
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economic form, which is marked by its immediate and direct convertibility 
into money and its capability of being institutionalized in the forms of 
property rights. Extending the concept of ‘capital’ to a wider system of 
social and cultural exchanges, Bourdieu puts forward the concepts of 
social capital and cultural capital.  
  Bourdieu has defined social capital as follows:  
Social capital is the aggregate of the actual or potential resources 
which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less 
institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition 
– or in other words, to membership in a group – which provides each 
of its members with the backing of the collectively-owned capital, a 
‘credential’ which entitles them to credit, in the various senses of the 
word. (Bourdieu, 1986: 248-249)  
According to Bourdieu, to understand the formulation and operation of 
social capital, it is necessary to recognize that social capital is linked to a 
durable network of connections that provides the agent with collectively-
owned capital, and that the volume of social capital depends on the size of 
the network of connections owned by the agents. Therefore, the 
connection (or relationship) between actors is the key point for 
understanding social capital.  
  As for cultural capital, Bourdieu specifically classified its three states: the 
embodied state, the objectified state, and the institutionalized state. The 
objectified state is in the form of cultural goods such as paintings, books, 
dictionaries, instruments, machines, etc. A notable feature of this type of 
cultural capital is that it is transmissible in its materiality. In this, the 
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objectified state of cultural capital is different to the embodied state and 
institutionalized state, which are ‘linked to the body and presupposes 
embodiment’ (Bourdieu, 1986: 244). While the formation of the embodied 
and institutionalized state of cultural capital involves the exertion of 
economic and material resources, it takes time and cannot occur second 
hand. The embodied state is in the form of long-lasting dispositions of the 
mind and body, for instance, so-called cultivation. As for the 
institutionalized state, I consider it as a special part of the embodied state. 
While being materialized in forms such as educational qualifications, what 
is underneath the institutionalized state is the formation of the long-lasting 
dispositions of the mind and body. Yet the institutionalized state does have 
a unique feature, which makes it different to the embodied state. As noted 
by Bourdieu, an academic qualification is a certificate of cultural 
competence that confers on its holder a conventional, constant, legally 
guaranteed value, and ‘there is an essential difference between the 
officially recognized, guaranteed competence and simple cultural capital, 
which is constantly required to prove itself’ (Bourdieu, 1986: 248). In 
addition, the institutionalized state makes it possible to establish the 
‘conversion rates between cultural capital and economic capital’ (Bourdieu, 
1986: 248), by guaranteeing the monetary value of certain academic 
qualifications.  
  Unlike the social capital, economic capital and objectified state of cultural 
capital, the embodied state of cultural capital is not ‘transferable’ (in a 
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narrow sense). Instead, it could be cultivated through an accumulation 
process with the involvement of others’ cultural capital (this process could 
also be seen as ‘transference’, but in a broad sense). To offer an example, 
you cannot ‘borrow’ your parents’ knowledge (embodied state of cultural 
capital) to apply for university, but your parents’ social network and financial 
support might help you get a better university offer.  
  As an ‘accumulated labour’ (Bourdieu, 1986: 241), capital is 
accumulated through trajectories over time. Since labour accumulation is 
an ‘unceasing effort of sociability, a continuous series of exchanges in 
which recognition is endlessly affirmed and reaffirmed’ (Bourdieu, 1986: 
250), it links past trajectories with the present. In the meantime, labour is 
an amalgam of the subjective and the objective, as the subjective 
endeavour is necessary during the formation of capital and the objective 
resources serve as the base for the subjective endeavour. The 
accumulation of capital is also an integration of individual and collective 
endeavour. Bourdieu claims that ‘[s]ocial capital is the aggregate of the 
actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable 
network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual 
acquaintance and recognition’ (Bourdieu, 1986: 248).  
  Bourdieu argues that ‘[t]he convertibility of the different types of capital 
is the basis of the strategies aimed at ensuring the reproduction of capital 
(and the position occupied in social space)’ (Bourdieu, 1986: 253). Thus 
the conversion process amongst different forms of capital becomes an 
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invisible way of conserving and reproducing the capital. As for the capital 
conversions, although all different types of capital can be derived from 
economic capital, the transformation is not instantaneous and equivalent. 
Instead, it relies on labour and time as mediums (Bourdieu, 1986). In 
addition, the conversion also relies on institutional instruments. For 
example, the education system promotes the circulation of capital through 
the unification of the market in academic qualifications, which gives an 
agent the rights to occupy exclusive social positions and in the meantime 
disguises the system’s function of capital circulation.  
  As for the relationship between capital and field, Bourdieu states that the 
structure of the capital represents the ‘immanent structure of the social 
world’ (Bourdieu, 1986: 242). Capital accumulation in turn re-constructs the 
field by continuously shaping the positions and power-relations of the 
actors, as I have reviewed earlier in this chapter (section 1.1.1). As for the 
relation between capital (especially the embodied-state cultural capital) 
and habitus, Bourdieu states that capital contributes to the formation and 
transformation of one’s habitus, as it converts ‘into an integral part of a 
person, into a habitus’ (Bourdieu 1997: 48). In turn, habitus also shapes 
the way people exert their capitals as well as the gaining or losing of 
capitals in particular fields, for example, whether s/he has the awareness 
or motivation to deploy cultural, social, or economic resources as relevant 
capital for particular fields. My analysis in chapter 10 offers an example of 
how migrant parents’ habitus shapes their deployment of capital in the 
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educational field.  
1.1.4 Summary 
According to Bourdieu, field, habitus, and capital do not operate 
independently. Rather, the three concepts are inter-related, and Bourdieu 
has used an equation to illuminate their relationship: ‘(Habitus × Capital) + 
Field = Practice’ (1984: 101). He considers practice as a product of the 
collective interaction of field, habitus and capital. As I have reviewed earlier, 
field provides a social space (e.g. the field of schooling), which both shapes 
and reconstructs the actors’ power-relationships and struggles; habitus 
and capitals are shaped by and constantly reconstruct the field. As 
Bourdieu understands the concepts to be interrelated, Maton argues that 
‘any attempt to explain practice using habitus alone is not Bourdieusian’ 
(2012: 60). This argument also applies to the relationship between capital 
and field. When analysing the function of habitus and capital, Bourdieu and 
some other researchers are always clear about the particular field in which 
the actors are located to avoid splitting the connections between field and 
habitus/capital. For example, both Mu and Jia (2016) and Koo et al (2014) 
have found that the migrant children’s habitus and capital can be 
marginalized in some fields while valued in other fields. Whether 
marginalized or valued depends on what aspect of their habitus is under 
discussion (the rural or urban elements) and how their knowledge, abilities 
or material possessions are judged in different situations, namely, the field 
that the children are in (urban school or rural school). The interrelationship 
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of the three concepts should always be kept in mind when undertaking 
Bourdieusian research. I will be back to this point in more details in the end 
of section 1.2.2, where I review the Bourdieusian studies of migrant 
children’s social relationships in schools.   
1.2 Concepts that extend Bourdieu’s ideas 
1.2.1 Field, educational policy and cross-field effects 
Following Bourdieu’s concept of field, some researchers have theorized 
educational policy as a social field and have explored the ‘cross-field 
effects’ among different fields, such as educational policy, 
journalism/media, economy, and politics (Ladwig, 1994; Lingard and 
Rawolle, 2004; Lingard, Rawolle and Taylor, 2005; Thomson, 2005). 
Theorizing educational policy as a social field 
Bringing Bourdieu’s field theory into educational policy studies, Ladwig 
(1994) makes an initial attempt to examine ‘what it would mean to analyse 
educational policy as a social field’. In Ladwig’s account, the field of 
educational policy can be distinguished from the field of education. As 
Ladwig points out,  
[E]ducational policy concerns itself (mostly) with the practices that 
occur within schools and educational systems and yet remains 
‘outside’ or ‘above’ the schools themselves… most of the players in 
the field of education have little or no impact on educational policy (at 
the state or federal level) and cannot be considered players in the field 
of educational policy (1994: 344-345).  
The way Ladwig theorizes the relative autonomy of educational policy field 
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is to explore the agents’ objective positions, habitus and capitals that are 
specific to this field. His analytical approach matches with Bourdieu’s own 
account, as Bourdieu claims that it is necessary to analyse the positions of 
the field vis-à-vis the field of power, to map out ‘the objective structures of 
relations between the positions occupied by the agents or institutions’ and 
to analyse the habitus of agents (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 104-105; 
see also section 1.1.1 in this chapter). Ladwig also argues that there is an 
overlap between the educational policy field and the field of the State. In 
my research, I will further adopt Ladwig’s idea and consider education 
policy as a specific field, which is also a sub-field of the field of public policy 
(see chapter 7, section 2). I will outline the forms of capitals, the 
hierarchical relationships and each actor’s position, and the strategies the 
actors adopt in their struggle in the field of education policy. 
Cross-field effects  
Based on the idea of the relations and inter-dependence of different fields 
(Bourdieu, 1988, 1992; Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977; see also section 
1.1.1 in this chapter), Lingard and Rawolle put forward the concept of 
‘cross-field effects’, illustrating ‘how today educational policy can be 
spawned from developments in other public policy fields’ (Lingard and 
Rawolle, 2004: 361). In order to understand the relationships between 
media and policy, Lingard and Rawolle theorize ‘mediatisation’ (Fairclough, 
2000) as a process in which ‘the logics of practice of the journalistic field 
reconstituted the naming of that policy [The Chance to Change] as 
	 81	
aphorism’ (Lingard and Rawolle, 2004: 377). Through a case study of the 
Australian scientific policy The Chance to Change, their research shows 
that ‘as this policy went through various iterations and media 
representations, its naming and structure became more aphoristic’ 
(Lingard and Rawolle, 2004: 361). Through the mediatisation, the 
aphorisms are increasingly evident in the changes of the titles of the report, 
in the headers accompanying each section, and in the introductions to 
each report. As a result, ‘the style and presentation of the reports became 
more and more framed by factors related to marketing the policy, making it 
more amenable for medial up-take’ (Lingard and Rawolle, 2004: 371). In 
Lingard and Rawolle’s account, mediatisation is the main mechanism of 
the cross-field effects among the fields of journalism, science policy and 
education policy. 
  Another main contribution of Lingard and Rawolle (2004) is that they 
have summarised five general categories of cross-field effects and analyse 
how these effects happen from the scientific policy field to the educational 
policy field. The cross-field effects are: first, structural effects, which relate 
to the links between structures of the fields. The linkage imposes, by 
varying degrees, the logics of practice of one field over others. For example, 
the science policy field has been structurally affected by the media field, in 
the sense that the effectiveness of many science policies is dependent on 
their portrayal in the media. Second, event effects, which relate to specific 
occurrences whose impacts cascade between fields. The effects can be 
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ongoing, such as a political scandal involving systemic corruption, or short-
term, such as the discovery of a scientific fraud with little lasting substantive 
impacts. Third, systemic effects, which relate to broad changes in the 
values underpinning social fields. These effects are usually more 
incremental than event effects. For example, the principles of the 
government’s role as understood under the Keynesian settlement have 
changed under a neo-liberal consensus. Fourth, temporal effects, which 
are those limited in duration. Finally, hierarchical and vertical effects, which 
refer to the effects that exist as a result of asymmetrical structural links 
between fields which hold different positions relative to one another. For 
example, dependence can be identified between the education field and 
the state field, as education relies on the favourable funding and policy 
directions from the government. In addition, in another relevant paper, 
Lingard, Rawolle and Taylor point out that while the cross-field effects can 
happen among different fields within the nation state, they also have an 
international dimension with international agencies affecting domestic 
fields through processes of globalisation (Lingard, Rawolle and Taylor, 
2005). Among the five effects, event effects and systemic effects resonate 
with my re-conceptualisation of cross-field effects, as I will elaborate later, 
hence I further develop these concepts by enriching their meanings and 
adding analytical elements and using them in my study. The event effects 
relate to specific occurrences whose impacts cascade between fields. This 
concept is relevant to my data in that the alterations in migrant children’s 
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schooling policy were shaped by changes in migrant population policy. The 
systemic effects relate to broad changes in the values underpinning social 
fields, and are usually more incremental than event effects. As shown in 
my data, some respondents report that they can see connections between 
the change of educational policy and the change of political leaders and 
their governing priorities and strategies. In short, Lingard and Rawolle’s 
work on cross-field effects provides a valuable preliminary framework to 
explore how educational policy can be shaped by other social domains.  
  While acknowledging the contribution of Lingard and Rawolle (2004), I 
identify the following aspects of their research that are in need of 
development. First, Lingard and Rawolle indicate that there are some 
‘connections between different fields’ (2004: 368), serving as the 
precondition of the cross-field effects. However, they have not developed 
this idea by pointing out what the connections are and how they work. As 
shown by my data, the social domains (fields of education, population 
policy, politics and economy) are connected by the migrants themselves 
and the government departments in central and local level; these actors 
are all agents in Bourdieu’s account. This finding resonates with Thomson 
(2005), which identifies the role of agents as the connections in the 
interactions between fields. Enlightened by the data and Thomson’s work, 
I conceptualise the agents as the connections between fields, serving as 
part of the cross-field mechanisms.  
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  Second, but more important, while summarizing five general categories 
of effects, Lingard and Rawolle (2004) have not conceptualised the nature 
of cross-field effects.1 The indeterminacy of this key concept limits the 
explanatory power of the analytical framework. Yet they have offered a 
unique approach to reveal the nature of the effects through their discussion 
of ‘mediatization’. They theorize mediatization as a process in which the 
logic of practice of the journalistic field continuously shapes the style and 
presentation of scientific policy texts, making the policy ‘more amenable for 
media up-take’ (Lingard and Rawolle, 2004: 371). Their attention to the 
logic of practice (Bourdieu, 1990, 1992) resonates with my analysis of the 
policy text and interview data, as it shows that underpinning the change of 
migrant children’s policy is the change in the local government’s definition 
of the type of citizens they want. The concept of logic of practice can help 
one to understand the logic of the educational policy and how it is shaped 
by other fields.  
  Third, Lingard and Rawolle have not focused on Bourdieu’s level one 
field analysis (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992; see also section 1.1.1 earlier 
in this chapter) to map out the distribution and hierarchy within the 
journalistic field, the policy fields, and the field of power in the social space. 
As Bourdieu states, the field analysis involves three necessary and 
internally connected moments and in the level one analysis ‘one must 
																																																						
1 In another paper, Rawolle has summarized cross-field effects as ‘effects that 
result from the interrelations between fields’ (Rawolle, 2005: 709). But this 
summary is still a literal explanation rather than a conceptualization.  
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analyse the positions of the field vis-à-vis the field of power’ (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant, 1992: 104). This is necessary for empirical studies (including 
mine) as it provides a holistic perspective to examine the power relations 
between fields (see, for example, Thomson, 2005).   
  Finally, the arguments of Lingard and Rawolle (2004) are based on the 
analysis of policy texts with little interview data. This sole data source limits 
their analysis of how agents exert their social/cultural/economic capitals in 
their struggle in the fields. My research is based on analysis of both policy 
texts and interview data from a variety of types of agents in the related 
fields. Therefore, my analytical framework will integrate the analysis of 
struggle among different agents shaped by their capitals, of what role the 
struggle plays in the cross-field effects and how their struggle is being 
changed by the changed logic of practice.  
1.2.2 Habitus and cultural capital in education 
The operationalisation of the concept of habitus: three dimensions  
The existing research, including that of Bourdieu himself, has tried to 
operationalize the concept of habitus from three dimensions. In the first 
dimension, when examining the habitus from the aspect of different social 
groups, some studies have conceptualised specific varieties of habitus 
such as the ‘petit-bourgeois habitus’ (Bourdieu, 1984), ‘working-class 
habitus’ (Reay, 1997), ‘rural habitus’ (Atkin, 2000; Li, 2013; Mu and Jia, 
2016), and ‘vocational habitus’ (Colley et al., 2003; Vincent and Braun, 
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2011). In the second dimension, when examining the habitus of a particular 
group in a particular field, Bourdieu himself sometimes conceptualises it 
with a brief term, for example, a ‘habitus of order’ (1984), to capture the 
core characteristics of that habitus. Another example is Horvat and Antonio 
(1999), who when analysing the organisation habitus of an elite school 
summarise it as ‘a sense of oblivious entitlement’ characterized by white 
and wealthy privilege. My research will also conceptualise aspects of the 
rural habitus of migrant parents such as not seeing themselves as 
educators, a similar understanding to that of Lareau (1989) and Vincent et 
al (2010) regarding working-class groups within the US and UK contexts 
respectively. The third dimension is that the researchers mentioned have 
all explored specific aspects of the habitus. For example, Bourdieu 
explored the petit-bourgeois habitus from the specific aspects of 
‘asceticism, rigour, legalism, the propensity to accumulation in all its forms’ 
(1984: 331). Among the research on migrant children in the Chinese school 
field, Mu and Jia (2016) and Koo et al (2014) have shown that the 
exploration of students’ habitus can include the following aspects: what 
kinds of language or with what accent do they speak? What kinds of routine 
behaviours do they have? Their way of exploring the multiple aspects of 
school life is supported by multiple forms of data and offers a valuable 
mode for my analysis.  
Habitus, cultural capital and migrant children’s education in China 
Utilizing the Bourdieusian concepts of ‘field’, ‘capital’ and ‘habitus’, the 
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existing literature has explored a range of topics around educational policy 
and international migrant children’s education in different countries, 
through both qualitative (mainly interview) and quantitative (survey and 
statistical analysis) methods (Griffin et al., 2012; Nash, 2002; Lee and Kao, 
2009; Abada and Tenkorang, 2009). More specifically, some studies have 
explored migrant students’ social relationships in school (Devine, 2009; Gu, 
2011; Li, 2013; Koo et al., 2014; Mu and Jia, 2016; Xu, 2016). Based on 
empirical investigations of rural-to-urban migration in Mainland China, Mu 
and Jia (2016) and Koo et al (2014) look at migrant children in compulsory 
education age.  
  Mu and Jia (2016) explores how the rural habitus of migrant children 
differentiates them from their urban peers, conceptualising the habitus as 
marked by migrant children’s hometown accents and routine behaviours, 
including their hygiene, hobbies, sense of discipline, and the way they talk 
and behave. Their rural habitus was formed through their earlier life 
experiences in the rural area, where ‘[t]he rural population has long been 
physically and socially connected to farmlands, a field that nurtures 
freestyle being and doing’ (Mu and Jia, 2016: 418). Inheriting a ‘raw model 
of life’, the migrant children’s behaviors are ‘at odds with the so-called 
disciplines shaped by the urban school fields’ (Mu and Jia, 2016: 418). For 
example, their routine behaviours are perceived by the urban teachers and 
classmates as ‘didn’t have good hygienic habits’, ‘very loud in public’ and 
having ‘impoliteness’ (Mu and Jia, 2016: 418-419). Yet this paper also 
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suggests that in some other situations, the migrant children’s rural habitus 
could accrue value. For example, some teachers praised the migrant 
children in front of Beijing local students for their independence and ability 
and their willingness to help their parents with cooking, laundry and 
cleaning, or looking after their younger siblings. Based on its findings, this 
paper ‘challenges the static views that stereotype the rural habitus of 
floating children as [being a] disadvantaged dispositions at all times in all 
places’ (Mu and Jia, 2016: 423), which is another key finding for future 
research.  
  Like Mu and Jia (2016), Koo et al (2014) also explores how habitus 
shapes migrants’ transformation and deployment of capitals in the 
educational field. While the former focuses on the rural habitus of migrants 
in the urban school field, the latter focuses on their urban habitus in the 
rural school field. Koo et al study the remigration of migrant children1 to 
their hometowns as a change in their field, from the urban school field to 
the rural school field, and outlines the logics of practice of these fields. The 
logic in the urban school field places a stronger emphasis on a well-
rounded education and reduces the emphasis on examinations, while the 
logic in the rural school field is examination oriented education. The main 
contribution of Koo et al (2014) is that they have innovatively conceptualise 
the urbanisation of migrant children’s habitus as marked by their speaking 
																																																						
1 Koo et al (2014) has defined the ‘return migrant students’ as those ‘who have 
lived in cities where they had access to the compulsory education system, [and] 
are sent back to their rural hometowns to prepare for higher education in China’ 
(pp. 795).  
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of standard Mandarin and their appreciation of particular forms of 
politeness and civility1, and being in the view if the authors ‘more civilized’, 
‘more cosmopolitan’ and ‘open-minded’ (Koo et al., 2004: 802), which are 
marked as characteristic of the urban field. Koo et al (2014), Mu and Jia 
(2016), together with Li (2013), which focuses on rural students in 
university, offer implications for my study by outlining possible markers of 
migrant children’s habitus and capital: what kinds of language or with what 
accent do they speak? What kinds of routine behaviors do they have? What 
are their ‘way[s] of eating, walking and speaking’ (Li, 2013: 835)? What 
extra-curricular hobbies and social activities do they have? Applying their 
ideas to my empirical data, I have conceptualised the language that the 
migrant children use, the way they behave and present themselves, and 
their attitude to extra-curricular hobbies as markers of their habitus (see 
chapter 10, section 4)2.  
  In addition, Koo et al (2014) argue that the urbanized habitus can hardly 
be valued and transferred into valued cultural capital in the rural school 
field, where the dominant logic appreciates the virtue of extremely hard 
academic work, which the returning migrant children did not learn in cities. 
Their ability to speak standard Mandarin - a valued form of cultural capital 
																																																						
1 It is important to note that the authors tend to take a deficit view of the rural 
population by conceptualising the characteristics of politeness and civility as 
exclusively owned by urban residents. 
2 My conceptualization here resonates with the Bourdieusian influenced Great 
British Class Survey, which incorporates lifestyle indicators into its 
conceptualization of the cultural capital of seven social classes, such as people’s 
‘leisure interests, musical tastes, use of the media, and food preferences’ (Savage 
et al., 2013: 223-224).  
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in the urban field - has now been devalued since both teachers and local 
students prefer to speak their local dialect as the instructional language 
and language of daily communication. Similarly, their habitus of 
appreciating particular forms of politeness and civility have also been 
devalued in this field. This field-habitus mismatch has produced 
disadvantages for returning migrant children’s academic performance and 
peer relationships. Together with Mu and Jia (2016), Koo et al (2014) 
reminds me that inhabiting an urbanized habitus and owning the 
accompanying capital does not guarantee an advantageous position in any 
field and in return, inhabiting a rural habitus does not necessarily produce 
disadvantage. In contrast to some studies which claim to be Bourdieusian 
yet use capital and/or habitus detached from field, Mu and Jia (2016) and 
Koo et al (2014) highlight that when analysing the function of habitus and 
capital, we should always be clear about the field in which the habitus and 
capital are functioning. I have kept this in mind when analyzing migrant 
children and parents’ habitus and capital in the rural and urban educational 
field.  
  Yet in the existing studies on migrants’ habitus and their social inclusion 
in school, what has not been well-established is a holistic view of the re-
shaped identity and habitus and the inner-group differences of the migrants 
as a result of migration. First, it is a common practice that the researchers 
take a one-sided perspective of migrant’s habitus. For example, Mu and 
Jia (2016) focus on the rural habitus of migrants in the urban school field, 
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while Koo et al (2014) focuses on their urban habitus in the rural school 
field. In other words, both studies focus either on migrant children’s 
unchanged rural habitus or on their urbanized habitus, instead of exploring 
how the children’s habitus presents both rural and urbanized aspects. The 
underlying assumption of the existing literature resonates with what Erel 
(2010) criticises as a ‘rucksack approach’ in the studies of migrating 
cultural capital. The ‘rucksack approach’ assumes that the migrants ‘bring 
a set of cultural resources from the country of origin to the country of 
migration that either fit or do not fit’, whereas an alternative position is to 
examine the ‘ways of producing and re-producing (mobilizing, enacting, 
validating) cultural capital that builds on, rather than simply mirrors, power 
relations of either the country of origin or the country of migration’ (Erel, 
2010: 642). Erel’s idea also applies to the study of habitus, as capital 
converts ‘into an integral part of a person, into a habitus’ (Bourdieu 1997: 
48; see also, section 1.1.3 and 1.1.4 in this chapter). Following Erel’s idea, 
I examine both rural and urbanized aspects of the migrants’ habitus and 
cultural capital with the support of my empirical data. Second, the existing 
studies have a common assumption that the migrant parents and children 
have similar habitus. Based on this assumption, they tend to simply 
attribute the difficulties migrant children have in their social relationships to 
the common features of the dispositions of migrant as a social group. 
Accordingly, Mu and Jia (2016) and Koo et al (2014) have not included 
parent respondents in their research designs, and there are limited 
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discussions of parental habitus and its influences on children’s studying 
and the family-school interaction. The missing role of parents might lead to 
one-sided findings concerning children’s experiences in school. Yet as 
revealed by my empirical data, the migrant children’s habitus has been 
largely urbanised, any problems in the interaction with teachers are largely 
a result of their parents’ continued rural and working-class habitus. Noticing 
this research gap, my paper highlights the influence of home-school 
interactions on the migrant children’s social relationships in school. Finally, 
the re-shaping and differentiation of the habitus of migrant children from 
their parents can be examined through a discussion of the multi-
dimensions of their identities. I have conceptualized three dimensions of 
migrant children and parents’ identity, which are ‘migrant/urban grown up’, 
‘rural/urban’ and ‘working-class’ (see chapter 10, section 2). The migrant 
children’s habitus is restructured by their adaptation to urban life and 
growing up as city-based working-class children, while their parents have 
largely kept their identity as migrant rural workers. The three dimensions 
mutually contributes to the generational differentiation and shapes their 
power-relation with other actors in the field.  
2. Foucauldian resources 
The Foucauldian theoretical resources, such as the concept of ‘discourse’ 
(Foucault, 1971, 1981, 2002), and its usages by later researchers, such as 
‘policy as discourse’ and ‘policy as text’ (Ball, 1990, 1994), ‘policy cycle’ 
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(Bowe, Ball and Gold, 1992) and ‘policy archaeology’ (Foucault, 2002; 
Scheurich, 1994), provide a unique perspective to conceptualise 
educational policy processes in terms of discursive formation.  
2.1 Foucault, discourse, and power 
‘We shall call discourse a group of statements in so far as they belong to 
the same discursive formation… it is made up of a limited number of 
statements for which a group of conditions of existence can be defined’ 
(Foucault, 2002: 131). According to Foucault, discourse is a group of 
statements, and the function of statements is to define the conditions of 
existence of the objects. Here, Foucault has made a distinction between 
statement and sentence (or grammar and logic): ‘in examining the 
statements what we have discovered is a function that has a bearing on 
groups of signs, which is identified neither with grammatical “acceptability” 
nor with logical correctness’ (2002: 129). Statement is more than sentence, 
grammar, or logic. He continues explaining that statement carries with it:  
[A] referential (which is not exactly a fact, a state of things, or even an 
object, but a principle of differentiation); a subject (not the speaking 
consciousness, not the author of the formulation, but a position that 
may be filled in certain conditions by various individuals); an 
associated field (which is not the real context of the formulation, the 
situation in which it was articulated, but a domain of coexistence for 
other statements); a materiality (which is not only the substance or 
support of the articulation, but a status, rules of transcription, 
possibilities of use and re-use). (Foucault, 2002: 129)  
What Foucault wants to express here is that statement is about ‘a group of 
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conditions of existence’ (Foucault, 2002: 131). Accordingly, Foucault (2002) 
puts forward what he calls archaeology as a method to explore the 
discursive formation. He reminds us that we should not treat discourses as 
‘groups of signs (signifying elements referring to contents or 
representations), but as practices that systematically form the objects of 
which they speak’ (Foucault, 2002: 54). This understanding directs us to 
the concept of power relations invested and realized in the discursive 
formation, which is the main task of Foucault’s method of genealogy, 
another method Foucault uses in his studies (Foucault, 1978, 1979). 
Foucault maintains that the core of the nature of discourse is the 
inseparable nature of ‘knowledge/power’, as he posits:  
No body of knowledge can be formed without a system of 
communications, records, accumulation and displacement, which is in 
itself a form of power and which is linked, in its existence and 
functioning, to the other forms of power. Conversely no power can be 
exercised without the extraction, appropriation, distribution or retention 
of knowledge. On this level, there is not knowledge on the one side 
and society on the other, or science and the state, but only the 
fundamental forms of knowledge/power... (Foucault, 1971: 66, cited 
from Ball 1990: 17) 
Knowledge cannot be understood as simply objective facts about ‘reality’; 
rather, it is permeated by power relations, which can have different 
configurations, such as disciplinary power and biopower (Foucault, 1975, 
1981). In return, it is through knowledge, as a carrier, that power 
reproduces, reconstructs, and disseminates itself in an invisible way. The 
concept of ‘discourse’ helps us to explore the inter-relationship between 
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knowledge and power, to reveal how our understanding of things is 
constructed through the conjunction of knowledge/power. Discourse 
constructs what can be thought, what would be thought as impossible, and 
what can be said. As Ball summarises, ‘We do not speak the discourse. 
The discourse speaks us.’ (1990: 18)  
  Foucault has not put forward a conceptual framework for discourse. 
What he has done is to remind us about the inseparable nature of 
‘knowledge/power’, through asking ‘how is it that one particular statement 
appeared rather than another?’ (Foucault, 2002: 30). He has left a broad 
space for later researchers to deconstruct the ‘facts’, ideas and 
relationships that comprise our social life.  
2.2 Concepts that extend Foucault’s ideas 
While Foucault has put forward the concept of discourse, he did not apply 
it to educational policy studies. Following Foucault’s ideas, some 
researchers have tried to theorize the education policy process with the 
concept of discourse (Ball, 1990; Bowe, Ball and Gold, 1994; Scheurich, 
1994), although little existing literature adopts this concept to explore 
internal migrant children’s education in China.  
2.2.1 ‘Policy as discourse’ and ‘policy as text’ 
As Foucault puts it, ‘in any society the production of discourse is at once 
controlled, selected, organized and redistributed according to a number of 
procedures whose role is to avert its powers and its dangers, to master the 
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unpredictable event’ (1981: 53). Policy processes represent such a kind of 
procedure that controls, selects, organizes and redistributes the production 
of discourse, for policies are,  
pre-eminently, statements about practice - the way things could or 
should be - which rest upon, derive from, statements about the world 
- about the way things are. They are intended to bring about idealised 
solutions to diagnosed problems. Policies embody claims to speak 
with authority, they legitimate and initiate practices in the world, and 
they privilege certain visions and interests. They are power/knowledge 
configurations par excellence. (Ball, 1990: 22, original emphasis) 
Since policy means to bring about idealized ‘solutions’ to ‘diagnosed 
problems’, it becomes the perfect carrier for power/knowledge 
configurations. Therefore, the concept of discourse ‘provides a particular 
and pertinent way of understanding policy formation’ (Ball, 1990: 22). 
Taking a discursive account of education policy, Ball’s research draws 
attention to ‘the way in which these emergent discourses were constructed 
to define the field, articulate the positions and thus subtly set limits to the 
possibilities of education policy’ (1990: 23), to deconstruct the 
power/knowledge configurations of policy. That is to say, the mundane 
talking, writing and other forms of expressions of different actors can be 
seen as discursive practices, and thus be analysed to explore their 
interrelationship, negotiation, conflict or struggle in policy interpretation and 
enactment.  
  In relation to the conceptualization of discourse, Ball also conceptualizes 
policy as text, as the policy texts ‘posit a restructuring, redistribution and 
	 97	
disruption of power relations’ (Ball, 1994: 20). A policy text may carry and 
present conflicting interests, present the voice of dominant interests, or 
alternatively a compromise between competing interests. In the meantime, 
the effects of policy enactment can differ from the intentions of policy 
authors, since the policy text is ‘decoded in complex ways via actors’ 
interpretations and meanings in relation to their history, experiences, skills, 
resources and context’ (Ball, 1994: 16). Ball’s conceptualizations of policy 
as discourse and as text are ‘implicit in each other’ (1994: 15), providing 
the policy analysts with an understanding that is based ‘not on constraint 
or agency but on the changing relationships between constraint and 
agency and their inter-penetration’ (1994: 21, original emphasis). This 
conceptualization resonates with Bowe, Ball and Gold’s (1992) work on 
‘policy cycle’, upon which I will elaborate in the following section.  
2.2.2 Policy cycle 
Bowe, Ball and Gold (1992) put forward the ‘policy cycle’ framework to 
conceptualise the policy trajectory as three inter-related contexts, namely 
the context of influence, the context of policy text production and the 
context of practice. This framework can be used to facilitate the 
Foucauldian exploration of discourse and policy. According to Bowe, Ball 
and Gold (1992), each of the three policy contexts consists of a number of 
arenas of action, which involve struggle and compromise. The context of 
influence is where the policy is initiated, and therefore it is where discourse 
produces the possibilities of policy – what is a social problem and what is 
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a possible solution. In education, for example, it shapes ‘the definition and 
social purposes of education, what it means to be educated’ (Bowe, Ball 
and Gold, 1992: 19). The arenas within this context illustrate how the 
interested parties struggle to shape or are shaped by the policy discourses 
and policy agendas. Another context refers to policy text production. While 
articulated in the language of general public good, the policy text is the 
outcome of struggle and compromise and therefore presents the interests 
of particular groups. The arenas within this context illustrate how different 
interests are integrated into and presented through the policy texts. The 
last context is the context of practice. Bowe, Ball and Gold point out that 
‘policy is not simply received and implemented within this arena, rather it 
is subject to interpretation and then “recreated”’ (1992: 22). That is to say, 
within the context of practice, the arenas illustrate how actors interpret and 
enact the policy within the limits of discourse. In sum, the three contexts 
constitute a conceptual structure for a policy trajectory study approach, 
which ‘provides a mechanism for linking and tracing the discursive origins 
and possibilities of policy, as well as the intentions embedded in, responses 
to and effects of policy’ (Ball, 1994: 26). It is particularly useful for my 
Foucauldian policy discourse analysis, as it connects the broad social 
context (political, economic and cultural) with policy text production 
(through struggle and compromise) and the actors’ interpretations and 
translations of the policy.  
  Another important feature of ‘policy cycle’, as identified by Rizvi and 
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Lingard, is that it ‘rejects a one-way, linear account of relationships 
between the setting of policy agendas, the production of the policy text and 
its implementation into practice’ (2010: 6). The three contexts’ ‘boundaries’ 
are permeable, and as Ball has commented, ‘[t]hey are loosely coupled 
and there is no one simple direction of flow of information between them’ 
(1994: 26). Therefore, the policy cycle framework can ‘capture the 
interactive, synergistic set of relationships between these contexts’ (Rizvi 
and Lingard, 2010: 6).  
  Policy sociology researchers have also put forward a range of questions 
for critical policy analysis, which are framed around three issues: 
contextual issues, policy and textual issues, and implementation and 
outcomes issues (Rizvi and Lingard, 2010: 54-56). Under the ‘policy and 
textual issues’, some questions match with the discourse analysis 
approach, so I have included them in my analysis to accompany the ‘policy 
cycle’ analysis. These questions include: ‘how is the policy problem 
conceptualised? What alternative problems constructions have been 
rejected/neglected? How have any competing interests been sutured 
together in the text? Who has advocated and promoted the policy and why?’ 
(Rizvi and Lingard, 2010: 54)  
2.2.3 Policy archaeology: the role of social regularities 
While creating a space for policy discourse analysis, the ‘policy cycle’ 
framework still needs to be complemented by other theoretical resources 
to strengthen its explanatory power for the discursive formation of 
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educational policy. The work of Scheurich (1994) meets this need. Drawing 
from the work of Foucault (2002), Scheurich puts forward a new policy 
study methodology called ‘policy archaeology’. His exploration of the four 
policy arenas partly matches with the policy cycle framework:  
Arena I. The education/social problem arena: the study of the social 
construction of specific education and social problems. Arena II. The 
social regularities arena: the identification of the network of social 
regularities across education and social problems. Arena III. The 
policy solution arena: the study of the social construction of the range 
of acceptable policy solutions. Arena IV. The policy studies arena: the 
study of the social functions of policy studies itself. (Scheurich, 1994: 
300)  
What can be identified is that exploring the social construction of 
educational problem, or policy agenda, Arena I matches the ‘context of 
influence’ in the policy cycle. In addition, exploring the social construction 
of the range of acceptable policy solutions, Arena III matches the ‘context 
of policy text production’. Yet different to the policy cycle framework, 
Scheurich differentiates the ‘social regularities arena’ (Arena II) from the 
‘education/social problem arena’ (Arena I). To Scheurich, the grid of social 
regularities, including gender, race, class, governmentality and 
professionalization, constitutes ‘what becomes socially visible as a social 
problem and what becomes socially visible as a range of credible policy 
solutions’ (Scheurich, 1994: 301). That is, the network of social regularities 
refers to some ‘deeper’ features of social organisation, instead of being on 
the surface of the contexts of specific social problems. From a Foucauldian 
perspective, the social regularity acts as the ‘rules of formation’ (Foucault, 
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2002: 42). The analysis of the social regularities can therefore deepen the 
analysis of the discursive production of the policy agenda and policy texts. 
Noting its theoretical potential, I integrate this concept into the policy cycle 
framework, creating an additional ‘pre-context’ of social regularities, which 
shapes the context of influence and refers to the ‘deeper’ features of the 
social organisations (see chapter 8, section 2).  
3. Policy as a temporary consensus between groups 
Conceptualising public policy as a product of group equilibrium, Truman 
(1951), Latham (1952) and Dye (2008) have redefined what is called ‘policy’ 
and offered valuable implications for my research. In his 1951 book, 
Truman explores how the interactions among interest groups shaped the 
US governmental process, which covers public opinion, political parties, 
elections, legislative process, executive, administrative process and 
judiciary. Exploring the role of interest groups in the entire governmental 
process, this book brings an ‘interest group’ approach into political 
research. Although it does not specifically discuss the way that the interest 
groups shape policy-making, its formulation of interest groups affecting the 
legislative process offers some implications for policy studies. The primary 
implication is that ‘even a temporarily viable legislative decision usually 
must involve the adjustment and compromise of interest. Even where 
virtual unanimity prevails in the legislature, the process of reconciling 
conflicting interest must have taken place’ (Truman, 1951: 392). This 
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statement points out that the nature of the legislative decision making, 
which can also be extended to policy making, is ‘a unique amalgam’ 
(Truman, 1951: 391) of the adjustment and compromise of group interests. 
Another main implication is that the underlying impetus of legislative 
changes lies in the changes of the balance of influences among interest 
groups. As Truman puts it:  
Depending on the circumstances and the relative importance of these 
factors in a given situation some groups will enjoy comparatively 
effective access, and others will find difficulty in securing even 
perfunctory treatment. As conditions change, as some of these 
influences become more and others less potent, the fortunes of group 
claims upon the legislature will rise or decline. (Truman, 1951: 350) 
This statement clearly reveals the connections between the changes in the 
balance of influences among interest groups and the changes in the 
legislature process.  
  Following Truman’s ideas, Latham re-conceptualises the nature of public 
policy as the ‘equilibrium reached in the group struggle’. As he puts it, ‘what 
may be called public policy is actually the equilibrium reached in the group 
struggle at any given moment, and it represents a balance which the 
contending factions of groups constantly strive to weight in their favour’ 
(1952: 390). Latham’s contribution is that he introduces Truman’s ideas 
into policy studies and re-conceptualises the nature of public policy 
accordingly. Dye extends Latham’s idea by revealing the underlying 
impetus of the changes of policy: ‘changes in the relative influence of any 
interest groups can be expected to result in changes in public policy; policy 
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will move in the direction desired by the groups gaining influence and away 
from the desires of groups losing influence’ (Dye, 2008: 23). In brief, policy 
changes when interest groups lose or gain influences.  
  The works of Truman (1951), Latham (1952) and Dye (2008) on policy 
as a product of group equilibrium offers me a unique perspective to 
examine the formation of several unique forms of schooling for migrant 
children in Shanghai and Beijing. While providing me with valuable 
implications, their works cannot be applied directly to my research. The first 
issue is the use of the word ‘equilibrium’. This word contains notions of 
harmony and balance, which are not in keeping with a policy sociology 
perspective revealing conflict which I take in this study (see chapter 5, 
section 1). I suggest the use of the idea of temporary policy settlements 
instead, which suggests a temporary consensus between groups (Gale, 
1999). This idea is more appropriate as it encompasses the ideas of 
struggle and compromise in policies in different countries and contexts 
(Ball, 1990, 1994; Apple, 2000, 2004; Lingard and Rizvi, 2009), including 
what I have found in my data (see chapter 11, section 2). Another issue is 
that the works of Truman (1951), Latham (1952) and Dye (2008) mainly 
focus on the ‘policy-making’ phase, yet my research takes a ‘policy 
enactment’ (Ball, Maguire and Braun, 2012) perspective to re-
conceptualise the ‘policy making - policy implementation - policy evaluation’ 
linear development, and to examine the whole policy trajectory (see 
chapter 5, section 1). In addition, their arguments were put forward in the 
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US context, under which an important organisational form of social groups 
is the formal interest group. It is important to note that policy enactment is 
shaped by the political system (including political institutions, policy making 
process, legislative system, etc.) in which it is located, yet the political 
systems are not the same in different contexts, such as the US and China. 
Under the Chinese context, social groups do not often present themselves 
as formal interest groups, although the individuals in the same group do 
share the same interests. For example, while being widely considered as 
a social group, the migrant people have not established formal interest 
groups through which to influence public policy. Therefore, in my analysis 
of the formation of a new school system for migrant children, I prefer not to 
use the concept of ‘interest group’. Instead, I will look at the individual and 
collective actors, such as the district municipality of education, the UIP 
schools, the state schools, and the migrant parents to see how they interact 
with each other.  
4. Conclusion: towards a multi-dimensional policy analysis 
framework  
Taking a policy sociology approach, my study aims at excavating and 
presenting the complexities in the policy enactment process (Ball, 1990, 
1994; see also, chapter 5, section 1). As Ball reminds us, ‘the complexity 
and scope of policy analysis - from an interest in the workings of the state 
to a concern with contexts of practice and the distributional outcomes of 
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policy - preclude the possibility of successful single theory explanations’ 
(Ball, 1993: 10). Different theoretical tools can facilitate researchers’ 
understandings of different aspects or dimensions of the same research 
topic to enrich the analysis. That is the value of a ‘toolbox of diverse 
concepts and theories’ in policy analysis (Ball, 1993: 10). In this chapter, I 
have reviewed the three main theoretical tools for my study. The following 
is a summary of how I use them to construct my own analytical framework.  
  From Bourdieu, I understand that educational policy can be 
conceptualised as a social field, and thus can be affected by other fields 
through cross-field effects (Lingard and Rawolle, 2oo4; see also, section 
1.1.1). I am going to analyze the cross-field effects among the political field, 
economic field, public policy field and education policy field to explore the 
external influences for the post-2013 policy change. Using my empirical 
data to address the limitations in Lingard and Rawolle (2004), I have added 
several elements (the role of agents, the logic of practice, and the level one 
field analysis) and reconstructed the cross-field effects framework. The 
updated framework contains three analytical steps: Step 1: outline the 
interrelated fields, including their distribution/hierarchy within the field of 
power, their logics of practice, and the agents they share. Step 2: explore 
how field A ‘exports’1 its logic of practice to field B through the agents in 
																																																						
1 It is important to note that 'field' is a theoretical concept, a way of thinking 
through the social world, instead of a straight forward description of social reality 
(Ladwig, 1994). Therefore, the use of the term ‘export’ here is in a metaphorical 
sense to present how the agents transfer the logic of field A into field B, which will 
be elaborated in more detail in chapter 7. Yet the social actors may be aware that 
the social life can be divided into certain sectors or aspects, such as politics, 
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dominant positions. Step 3: explore how the changed/‘confined’ logic in 
field B shapes the relative values of different configurations of capital, the 
agents’ relative positions and the ways they exert their capital in the 
struggle for position within the field. This work is presented in chapter 7. 
  If examined from the perspective of Foucauldian emphasis on discourse, 
the power/knowledge configuration of government policy can be 
deconstructed (see section 2). The Foucauldian theoretical resources of 
‘policy as discourse’ and ‘policy as text’ (Ball, 1990, 1994), ‘policy cycle’ 
(Bowe, Ball and Gold, 1992) and ‘policy archaeology’ (Scheurich, 1994) 
provide me with theoretical tools to analyze the discursive formation of 
‘education as social welfare’ in the enactment of the post-2013 restrictive 
schooling policy in the educational system. By integrating Scheurich’s idea 
of social regularities as pre-context to the three contexts of the policy cycle, 
namely, the context of influence, context of policy text production and the 
context of practice, I have developed the policy cycle framework. This work 
is presented in chapter 8. 
  Policy can also be understood as a temporary consensus between 
different groups (see section 3). Based on this conceptulisation, I consider 
the formation of the interim quasi-state school system for migrant children 
in Shanghai as a temporary settlement reached through the interaction of 
the individual and collective actors, including district municipality of 
																																																						
economy and education. Thus they see the existence of these sectors/aspects as 
reality. Both the perspectives of the researcher and the actors are presented in 
this thesis. 
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education, unregistered informal private schools, state schools and migrant 
parents, among others. More specifically, my analysis will give 
explanations to the following questions: what is the goal of each actor in 
the struggle? Who is in the dominant position? What kinds of compromises 
has each actor made? What benefits has each actor achieved in the end? 
What kind of temporary settlement of interests has been produced through 
the group struggle? It helps to reveal the unequal power relations invested 
and realized in the formation and function of the semi-state school system. 
This work is presented in chapter 11. 
  When examining the policy enactment in state schools, I explore the 
interaction and relationship of state school teachers, migrant parents and 
children and local children with Bourdieu’s theoretical tools of field, habitus 
and cultural capital (see section 1). The analysis tries to give an answer to: 
how do these relationships shape migrant children’s study and social 
inclusion in school? I explore the unique identity of the migrant family, 
which has three key dimensions: migrant, rural and a working-class 
background. By focusing on the several dimensions shaping migrants’ 
habitus, I examine how migrant parents and children exert their capitals 
and interact with teachers and local children; how their habitus guides their 
actions in the school field. This work is presented in chapter 10. 
  One might argue that the policy enactment approach in this study 
appears to exclude legal frameworks. I acknowledge that the exploration 
of the legal frameworks is important for policy studies. In my thesis, the 
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discussions of the legal framework of migrant children’s schooling can 
merely be found in chapter 2 (section 2.1) and chapter 6 (section 2, table 
3). The reason for the limited discussions of the legal aspect is that 
currently a comprehensive legal ‘framework’ has not been established with 
regard to the migrant children’s schooling. In the Chinese educational legal 
system, the only detailed law item on migrant children’s schooling can be 
found in the Law of Compulsory Education:  
If the parents are working or living in the places which are not the 
places where they have their household registration cards registered 
and want their compulsory education aged children to access state 
schools there, the receiving municipality should provide equal 
educational opportunities for these children. The detailed policies 
should be decided by the provincial governments.  
Here the law simply proposes the principle that the migrant children have 
the equal educational right and the receiving municipality should guarantee 
their rights. Without detailed regulations, the law leaves the local 
governments with the space of discretion on their policies. In other words, 
it is hard to conceptualise a ‘legal field’ on migrant children’s schooling 
empirically. This is the reason why my explorations of policy enactment 
mainly focus on the policy fields.  
  Another potential argument about my policy enactment approach is that 
it appears to exclude the historical social processes. I admit that this is a 
limitation due to the limited scope of the project and available data. In this 
thesis, I have preliminarily reviewed the development of the policy text 
since 1996 (chapter 6). Yet I have not done in-depth explorations on the 
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historical social processes with regard to how the development of the TMC 
policy was shaped by the external influences from politics, economy and 
population policy and how the restrictive schooling policy was enacted in 
the educational system since late 1990s. The answers to these questions 
can extend the existing knowledge of the power relations invested and 
realized in the enactment of the TMC policy. I propose the future study to 
explore these historical social processes, based on the generation and 
analysis of relevant data. 
  Finally, it is important to note that the analytical focus of this study is on 
the national social space. I acknowledge that there is also a global 
dimension of the power relations in the national policy. In other words, the 
fields in the national social space are linked to and hence are influenced 
by the global fields (Lingard, Rawolle, and Taylor, 2005; Thomson, 2005; 
Rawolle and Lingard, 2008), just as Lingard, Rawolle and Taylor point out:  
Given the social rather than geographical character of Bourdieu’s 
concept of social fields, it is also argued that the concept [field] can be, 
and indeed has to be, stretched beyond the nation to take account of 
the emergent global policy field in education. (Lingard, Rawolle, and 
Taylor, 2005: 759) 
Their argument that field has social rather than geographical character 
resonates with what is found in my research context. For example, shaped 
by global processes of marketization reforms, the past forty-years 
marketization in China has contributed to the rise of the social welfare logic 
in the migrants’ school enrolment criteria system after 2013 (see chapter 7, 
section 3). What can be identified here is that the marketization logic in the 
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global political and economic field shapes the logic of the national fields 
and intensifies the migrant children’s disadvantages in the educational field. 
This example indicates that it is empirically possible to include the global 
dimension into the analysis of the power relations invested in the 
enactment of TMC policy in national and local level. Yet being a tightly 
focused PhD project, this study limits its scope in examining the national 
and local social fields and hence does not examine the international 
dimension. Recognising this limitation, in the future I will try and 
conceptualise public policy field as local, national and global and explore 
the intersections of the three dimensions.  
Being reflexive about the ‘toolbox’ approach to theory 
With regard to the ‘toolbox’ approach to theory I take in this study, one 
might have the following concerns or inquiries. One is that there might be 
some contradictions between the various theoretical resources I use, such 
as Bourdieu and Foucault. I recognise the risk of theoretical inconsistency, 
as different theories and concepts were created by different theorists within 
specific historical contexts and under different ontological and 
epistemological stances – as such, they cannot always be coherent in all 
aspects regarding all topics. However, this situation can even arise when 
the concepts have been created by the same theorist, as the theorist’s 
thinking evolved over decades and hence emphasized particular aspects 
of their conceptual work somewhat differently at different times. Moreover 
	 111	
for some theorists such as Bourdieu and Foucault, they do not intend their 
works to be blueprints. What they intend to provide are some theoretical 
lenses to be developed by others. They leave a space for individual 
scholars to integrate different theoretical resources and to create a 
theoretical consistency with regard to their particular research contexts. In 
my study, different theoretical tools are applied in the chapter 7, 8, 10 & 11. 
The tools are chosen according to the focuses of inquiry of each chapter, 
which embody different aspects and dimensions of my main research 
question. In other words, the use of the different theoretical tools is 
coherent in the sense that they facilitate my exploration of each sub 
question, contributing towards the thesis’ main research question.  
  Another concern might be: is it necessary to use Foucault in this study? 
What couldn’t Bourdieu do (given that he develops concepts such as 
symbolic violence, misrecognition and doxa)? I acknowledge that it is 
possible to take a full-Bourdieusian approach to develop the thesis in 
response to its research questions. That is to say, with regard to the focus 
of inquiry of chapter 8, it is possible to use the Bourdieusian concepts, 
instead of the Foucauldian ones, to frame the analysis. Yet in my earlier 
data analyses, when I already had Bourdieusian, Foucauldian and other 
theoretical resources in mind, my interpretations of the data directed me to 
Foucauldian ones. The Foucauldian concepts, such as ‘policy as 
text/discourse’ and ‘policy cycle’, are well-developed for policy studies and 
resonate with my empirical data on how the restrictive schooling policy is 
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enacted in the educational system. As a result, they supply and extend my 
Bourdieusian analysis of why and how the migrant children’s schooling 
criteria became restrictive after 2013. By focusing on different forms of 
power relations among different actors, Bourdieu and Foucault help me to 
generate a well-rounded and comprehensive analysis to excavate the 
power relations invested and realized in policy. More specifically, Bourdieu 
puts forward the concept of field, which, taken together with capital and 
habitus, creates a conceptual social space. Within this social space, there 
are interrelated fields and their subfields with unequal power relationships 
between them. Bourdieu’s concept of field facilitates my examination of the 
power relations between migrant groups, local municipalities of education, 
Ministry of education, State Council, and national political leader (chapter 
7). In other words, my analysis in chapter 7 concentrates on the actors 
holding both disadvantaged and dominant positions in the bureaucratic 
system. Changing the focus of my analysis, Foucault’s concept of 
discourse, as a configuration of ‘knowledge/power’, helps to deconstruct 
the power relations between the migrant group, state school educators, 
local municipality of education, and also the state and the urban society 
(chapter 8). My analysis in chapter 8 concentrates on the actors involved 
in educational practices, and supplies the Bourdieusian perspective which 
focus on the actors in the bureaucratic system. Finally, I acknowledge that 
apart from the above concepts, Bourdieu and Foucault have developed 
other concepts such as symbolic violence, misrecognition, doxa and 
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governmentality. These concepts can be used to facilitate the scholarly 
exploration of the power relations invested and realized in the migrant 
children’s schooling policy in China. Yet due to the limitations in the scope 
of the project (especially the relevant data), I have not used these concepts 
in my thesis. I aim to extend this project in the future with the help of the 
above concepts. 
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Chapter 5: Methodology 
In this chapter, I will give an account of my methods, data sources, 
sampling strategies, my relationships with respondents, the data analysis 
method, ethical issues, and some limitations of my research.  
  The data for this study was collected from a pilot study and the main 
fieldwork. The pilot study was conducted in Beijing over two weeks in July 
2014. I conducted semi-structured interviews with 29 participants. With the 
experiences gained from the pilot study, I adjusted my interview questions 
and the sampling scope in the main fieldwork, which was conducted in 
Beijing and Shanghai for eight weeks from March to May 2015. The main 
fieldwork involved 66 interviewees.  
1. Qualitative research, post-structuralism and policy sociology 
Given my thesis research question, ‘how do different individuals, 
organisations and groups of actors interpret and enact the policy for 
migrant children’s schooling?’, a qualitative approach is appropriate for this 
research. While not denying the value of quantitative methods in certain 
research contexts, with an ontological orientation of objectivism and an 
epistemological orientation of positivism (Bryman, 2016), I argue that 
qualitative methods, especially semi-structured interviews, are the most 
appropriate. This approach enables me to collect in-depth data about 
different actors’ experiences, interpretations, and attitudes of, and about, 
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migrant children’s schooling and related policies. 
  This research follows the policy sociology approach. As a branch of 
critical social research, policy sociology is ‘rooted in the social science 
tradition, historically informed and drawing on qualitative and illuminative 
techniques’ (Ozga, 1987: 144). It seeks to ‘unpack’ the apparent ‘common 
sense’ of policy and analyse the thinking behind policy texts. Adopting a 
post-structural stance, policy sociology problematizes the idea that policy 
objectively relates the ‘truth’ of a policy problem and solution. As 
summarized by Foucault, the research of the regime of truth:  
[I]s not a battle on behalf of the truth, but a battle about the status of 
truth and the economic and political role it plays. The essential political 
problem for the intellectual is not to criticise the ideological contents 
supposedly linked to science or to ensure that his own scientific 
practice is accompanied by a correct ideology, but that of ascertaining 
the possibility of constituting a new politics of truth. (Foucault, 1972: 
132)  
Policy sociology rejects seeing policy as an objective and true reality to be 
discovered. It argues that what some might see as a straightforward 
identification of policy issues and solutions is ‘socially constructed’ (Blaikie, 
2000: 119) and policy ‘typically posits a restructuring, redistribution and 
disruption of power relations’ (Ball, 1994: 20). In accordance with its 
ontological position, policy sociology goes beyond simply excavating and 
reporting the ‘facts’ about the policy. It does not aim to reveal the universal 
principles, patterns, or correlations underneath the policy phenomenon. 
Instead, the emphasis is to generate contextual understanding of how the 
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policy is interpreted and enacted, based on a holistic analytical approach.  
  Policy sociology rejects a ‘one-way, linear account of relationships 
between the setting of policy agendas, the production of the policy text and 
its implementation into practice’ (Rizvi and Lingard, 2010: 6), an approach 
which sees the nature of policy as a linear, undifferentiated, ‘top down’ or 
‘bottom up’ process (Ball, Maguire, Braun, 2012: 4, 6). The policy process 
is instead conceptualized as ‘policy enactment’, under which policy is 
‘made sense of, mediated and struggled over, and sometimes ignored’ in 
non-linear, dynamic, diverse and complex ways (Ball, Maguire, Braun, 
2012: 2, 3). The whole process is ‘permeated by relations of power’ and is 
‘diversely and repeatedly contested and/or subjected to different 
“interpretations”’ within the ‘jumbled, messy, contested creative and 
mundane social interactions’ (Ball, Maguire, Braun, 2012: 2, 3, 6, 9). Here 
the deconstructive orientation of policy sociology can be identified.  
2. Sources of data  
Following the policy sociology approach, the aim of this study is to 
deconstruct the socially constructed reality of policy. As power relations 
permeate daily life, they embed themselves in various configurations, 
including texts, conversations, knowledge, material resources, beliefs, 
events, administrative settlements, and social interactions (Ball, 2012). 
Therefore, multiple data resources can enrich the scope and depth of the 
research. In my research, semi-structured interviews and policy documents 
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have been used to generate qualitative data.  
2.1 Semi-structured interview 
As a ‘conversation with a purpose’ (Burgess, 1984: 102), the semi-
structured interview functions differently from the structured and 
unstructured interviews. The structured interview, organised in accordance 
with the survey interviews (Robson, and McCartan, 2011; Mason, 2002), 
has ‘pre-determined questions with fixed wording, usually in a pre-set order’ 
(Robson, and McCartan, 2011: 285). Compared with a structured interview, 
the semi-structured interview is more like a conversation or discussion 
between the researcher and respondent. While the researcher does have 
a checklist of topics or themes, the order and wording of the questions are 
always ready to be modified, so that the researcher can get a sense of how 
the issues are connected in the respondents’ own perceptions (Hollway 
and Jefferson, 2000). In addition some unplanned questions are asked, as 
some themes emerge during the interview. More importantly, semi-
structured interviews are in accordance with an epistemological position 
that ‘knowledge is situated and contextual… rather than facts simply being 
reported’ (Mason, 2002: 62-63). All these features make the semi-
structured, instead of structured, interview suitable for my research, which 
aims to situate and contextualize the respondents’ experiences, 
interpretations and attitudes, and to construct, and reconstruct, situated 
knowledge of policy enactment.  
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  While unstructured interviews, as another method to generate qualitative 
data, can be suitable for research contexts similar to my own, I did not 
apply this method in my project. My choice was based on practical 
considerations: I already had relatively clear interview topics/themes 
before accessing the field, based on my literature review and previous 
knowledge about the research topic; my research covers a large and varied 
number of respondents; and my research does not follow an ethnographic 
approach. Under these circumstances, the semi-structured interview can 
generate the appropriate data (in terms of the scope, quantity and 
relevancy) within an appropriate time period. Therefore, it better suits my 
research project than the unstructured interview.  
  There are 95 participants four of whom were interviewed twice for 
additional information. 1  Appendix One lists all the respondents and 
Appendix Two lists the interview schedule. In my research design, the 
priority is given to face-to-face interviews, since people’s gestures and 
facial expressions could offer additional information for better 
understanding what they were talking about. My face-to-face interviews 
include 83 participants: 10 government officers, 20 school leaders, 15 
teachers, 17 migrant parents, 12 migrant children, five local parents, and 
four local children. Realizing that the telephone interview is not an ideal 
																																																						
1 In the fieldwork, sometimes I felt I needed further information regarding certain 
topics after the interviews. In most cases, I tended not to disturb them by 
requesting another interview. Instead, I tried to collect relevant information from 
the later interviews. However, in a few cases, I felt that I needed the original 
respondents to offer further explanations, which is why I interviewed four of them 
twice. 
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form in my research context, I did not use it unless I was unable to conduct 
face-to-face interviews. During the fieldwork, nine parents and three 
government officers preferred to have telephone interviews, and I complied 
with their requests. The reason given was that they do not have private 
space in their offices and they preferred not to do the interviews in their 
homes or other places. These 12 telephone interviews, like the face-to-
face interviews, provided me with rich data. Additionally, an email interview 
was conducted with a Beijing Municipality of Education department whose 
work is relevant to migrant children. At the beginning, I contacted an officer 
in that department through his office telephone number, without any prior 
acquaintance or recommendation. In response, he refused a face-to-face 
or telephone interview and suggested an email interview with questions 
generally directed to the whole department. As a result, I sent my interview 
questions to the department’s official email address and then received a 
response based on collective discussions (as the officer told me). Yet I 
noticed that the answers were mostly copied from published government 
documents, without presenting the officers’ own interpretations or attitudes.  
  In terms of length, 17 of the interviews are above 60 minutes, 18 are 
between 40-60 minutes, 17 are between 20-40 minutes, and 43 are 
between 10-20 minutes. The 43 short interviews include: 16 children, 16 
parents, eight teachers, two government officers and one school leader. 
Here, I argue that their short length does not equal poor quality. My 
interviews with certain categories of respondents, such as children and 
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teachers, are designed to cover a smaller scope and thus are expected to 
be short. In addition, in my research design, the later stage interviews, 
which tend to be very short, are considered as supplementary. The 
following factors mutually contribute to the short length of some interviews: 
first, all of the children’s interviews are shorter than 20 minutes. One reason 
is that the interview was designed to cover a smaller scope than that of the 
government officers, school leaders and parents. The interview questions 
mainly focus on the children’s experiences in school. The other reason is 
that the children I interviewed are very young: most of them are in primary 
school (aged below 12). It can be hard for some children at this young age 
to maintain a conversation with an adult stranger. As I did not establish an 
intimate relationship with the children in advance, the stranger identity 
increases the difficulty of making the children fully engage in a conversation. 
Second, 16 out of 31 parent interviews are shorter than 20 minutes. Unlike 
some school leaders and government officers who tended to dominate the 
conversation and often started new topics by themselves, the parents 
tended to follow my questions. While most of them were natural and highly 
involved, and responded to each of the topics with sufficient details, they 
did not talk too much on one topic and extend the conversations. Third, 
eight out of 15 teacher interviews are shorter than 20 minutes. Like the 
children’s interviews, the teacher interviews were designed to cover a small 
scope, concentrating on their teaching practice and relationships with 
children. While we also talked about the government policy and student 
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recruitment, this part of the conversations was limited. Another factor 
contributing to the shorter length is the researcher-dominated relationship 
between me and the teachers (see section 4). Finally, the later stage 
interviewees, especially the ones with parents, tend to be much shorter 
than the early stage ones. The reason is that I had already collected 
sufficient data about the local policies and schooling practices from the 
government officers and school leaders. Therefore, in the interviews with 
the parents, I wanted to focus on their own stories.  
  Before I knocked on the doors of each school, I always arrived an hour 
earlier than the appointed time. I used this extra time to randomly and 
informally interview some residents living around the school, especially the 
persons who have young children. I stopped people on the street or visited 
their shops to chat with them about the school’s reputation, teaching quality 
and enrolment conditions. The responses I collected from them are not 
recorded in audio records, but in my field notes afterwards. These 
discussions are not counted as formal interviews, but served as useful 
additional background information for my inside-school interviews. 
Similarly, when I was in the school, I took the chance to observe classroom 
teaching and free outdoor activities in certain schools, which helped to 
inform the data gathered from the interviews in school. For example, most 
teachers reported that they cannot distinguish migrant children from local 
children merely from their appearance and accent. My observations have 
confirmed what they said, as I found that all the students are talking to each 
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other in standard Mandarin, and I could not tell who is migrant and who is 
local from their appearances. Through the informal interviews with 
residents living around the schools and the observations in schools, I have 
collected useful information to support my fieldwork and data analysis.  
2.2 Policy documents  
Policy text ‘posit a restructuring, redistribution and disruption of power 
relations’ (Ball, 1994: 20; see also chapter 4, section 2.2.1). Thus a text 
can offer valuable data for researchers to deconstruct the power relations 
invested and realized in the policy. Another direct usefulness of the policy 
document is that it offers information about what should or is supposed to 
happen (namely, the policy maker’s intention). While as a researcher 
influenced by policy sociology, I do not give a top-down and linear account 
of policy; however I do acknowledge the influential role that the policy 
maker plays. As such, there is a need to figure out the policy maker’s aims. 
I have analysed a series of key policy texts related to migrant population 
and education provision for their children. These policy texts include: a 
series of migrant children’s schooling policies promulgated by the Ministry 
of Education and municipalities of education in city and district levels in 
Beijing and Shanghai since 2001; the central government policies 
mentioning migrant population promulgated in 2011, 2013 and 2014; and 
the central government policy documents related to the fundamental 
political principles of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee 
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since 2002. (Chapter 6 contains and discusses the key policy texts that I 
have analysed)   
3. Sampling  
Jennifer Mason cautions researchers to ‘[r]emember that qualitative 
research is very often about depth, nuance and complexity, and 
understanding how these work. Therefore, the act of focusing through 
sampling is likely to be as strategic as it is practical’ (Mason, 2002: 121). In 
this section, I will explain why I focus on Beijing and Shanghai as sites for 
case studies, and why I focus on particular respondents. I will also 
elaborate on how I chose and contacted my respondents, and give an 
outline of their background: what kinds of people are they? What kinds of 
schools are they from? In which districts are these schools located? 
3.1 Beijing and Shanghai as data collection sites 
While there is considerable variation among Chinese cities, considering the 
practical limitations of the research scope, especially with regard to data 
collection and analysis, this research intended to explore a smaller number 
of cases in more depth, focusing on two main cities within different contexts. 
The reasons why I choose Beijing and Shanghai are threefold. First, as 
global metropolises, Beijing and Shanghai can present acute examples of 
common problems related to migrant children’s education in Chinese 
global metropolises. Second, since Beijing and Shanghai have different 
histories and differ in terms of socio-cultural, economic and political 
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contexts, they can provide a useful contrast. As stated in chapter 3 (section 
4), the government of Beijing has been considered by existing literature 
‘unsuccessful’ in implementing the TMC policy, while the government of 
Shanghai has been considered as a ‘successful’ example. Additionally, 
researchers such as Qi and Zhou (2006) and Peng, Dong and Zhao (2005) 
argue that as the ‘political and cultural centre’ of China, there is a tendency 
towards conservative behaviours in the local governments in Beijing, 
whereas researchers such as Liu (2012) and Zhu and Guo (2009) argue 
that as the ‘economic/commercial centre’ of China, there is a tendency 
towards innovative (against conservative) behaviours in Shanghai. This 
might partially explain the differences in actors’ experiences involved in the 
TMC policy between Beijing and Shanghai. In this research, these 
differences, as well as their origins, will be explored in order to deepen the 
understanding of the factors affecting actors’ interpretation and enactment 
of the TMC policy. Finally, the existing literature on Beijing and Shanghai is 
extensive and can serve as a concrete foundation for future research, as I 
have reviewed in chapter 3.  
  While choosing Beijing and Shanghai as data collection sites, I do not 
identify my study as a typical example of a ‘case study’ (Yin, 1994, 2014). 
The reason is that the educational system in Beijing and Shanghai, as a 
‘loosely-coupled’ system (Meyer and Rowan, 1978), is too broad to be 
considered as a bounded unit, since it covers many schools, government 
departments and individuals. Yet my research still matches some of the 
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spirit of a case study: taking a holistic perspective, it traces the policy 
trajectories throughout the local educational system in both cities, making 
each city a single study unit. In the meantime, the data is collected in a 
natural setting to present the complexities of the particular study unit, 
instead of being collected through an experimental or controlled variables 
design to produce high generalisability. In terms of the generalisability of 
the research findings from these two cities, it is important to note that within 
a qualitative research lens, no research has infinite generalisability. As 
Bryman comments, ‘the people who are interviewed in qualitative research 
are not meant to be representative of a population’ (2016: 399). That is to 
say, my research findings cannot be properly understood and applied to 
the contexts beyond my research setting. Yet on the other hand, I do expect 
my research findings to resonate with those researchers and practitioners 
who are within the same or similar context as mine. Youdell points out that 
the qualitative research findings ‘do not contain, expose or reflect any 
universal truth, but these petite narratives do resonate’ (2006: 513). The 
resonance can be understood in two ways: the first is what Yin terms as 
analytical generalisation (1994). The contribution I have made in this thesis 
in Bourdieusian policy theorisations may be applicable to other studies 
following a policy sociology approach. My research findings may also 
resonate with studies with other theoretical resources, but with the shared 
topic of internal migrant children’s education in China. However if that 
researcher is looking at migrant children in England, for instance, s/he may 
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not find that part of my research relevant since there is not a distinctive 
rural/urban migrant flow in England. 
3.2 A map of interviewees 
I set out below the rationale behind the decision-making with regard to who 
should be invited to participate: the policy I am looking at is an educational 
policy regarding migrant children’s schooling, therefore the people in the 
government educational department (as the policy maker) and schools (as 
the locale of the policy) can be considered as the key stakeholders. It is for 
this reason that I started with interviewing officers (in central, city and 
district level educational departments) and school leaders, teachers, 
parents and children (both local and migrant). It is important to note that 
during the fieldwork, I did find some other stakeholders whom I did not 
anticipate at the beginning, such as the Sub-district Office of Culture and 
Education (SOCE) and the former unregistered and informal private 
schools, now registered private schools for migrant children. My pilot study 
and main fieldwork cover 19 schools in nine districts in Beijing and 
Shanghai. The total number of the participants is 95, including: 13 
government officers, 20 school leaders (including 15 headteachers, one 
chairman of the board of directors and 4 department heads), 15 teachers, 
26 migrant parents, 12 migrant children, 5 local parents and 4 local 
children1. Appendix One lists all the participants.  
																																																						
1 I have more interviewees with migrant parents and children, as the focus of my 
research is on the educational experiences of migrant families.  
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  The total number of participants in the pilot study and main fieldwork in 
Beijing is 52, including: one Ministry of Education officer, three Beijing 
municipality of education officers, five district government officers, eight 
school leaders (including six headteachers, one deputy-headteacher and 
a department head), nine teachers, 14 migrant parents, seven migrant 
children, three local parents, and two local children. While these 
participants are dispersed in six different districts, most of them are from 
three districts, namely Shijingshan, Mentougou and Fengtai. The school 
leaders, teachers, parents and children are from eight schools, which can 
be classified into five types: four state schools (primary), one state school 
(junior secondary), one licensed private school, one unlicensed informal 
school, and one unlicensed informal nursery. Table 1 lists all the 
participants in Beijing.  
Table 1: participants in Beijing 
(Abbreviation code: ‘f’=face-to-face; ‘t’=telephone) 
District School type School name School 
leader 
Teacher Migrant 
parent 
Migrant 
child 
Local 
parent 
Local 
child 
Government 
officer 
Shijingshan Licensed private school  School I  1 (f) 1 (f) 3 (t)    1 (f)  
 
 
 
3 (f;t) 
State school (primary) School E  1 (f)      
Mentougou State school (junior 
secondary) 
School F  1 (f) 1 (f) 2 (f)     2 (f) 
State school (primary) School G 1 (f) 2 (f)     
Fengtai State school (primary) School A 1 (f) 2 (f) 2 (f) 2 (f) 2 (f) 1 (f) 1 (t) 
State school (primary) School B 2 (f)  1 (f) 1 (f) 1 (f) 1 (f)  
Xicheng Unlicensed informal nursery Nursery A  1 (f) 4 (f) 1 (f)    
Chaoyang Unlicensed informal school School H 1 (f) 2 (f) 2 (f) 3 (f)    
Haidian         1 (f) 
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  In the main fieldwork in Shanghai, the total number of participants is 43, 
including: four district municipality of education officers, 12 school leaders 
(including eight headteachers, one chairman of the board of directors and 
three department heads), six teachers, 12 migrant parents, five migrant 
children, two local parents, and two local children. While these participants 
are dispersed in four different districts, most of them are from three of the 
districts, namely Baoshan, Pudong and Minhang. The school leaders, 
teachers, parents and children are from 11 schools, which can be classified 
into three types: four state schools (primary), three state schools (junior 
secondary), and four licensed private schools. Table 2 lists all the 
participants in Shanghai.  
Table 2: participants in Shanghai 
District Type of school School name School 
leader 
Teacher Migrant 
parent 
Migrant 
child 
Local 
parent 
Local 
child 
Government 
officer 
Baoshan State school (junior 
secondary) 
School J  1 (f) 1 (f)      
 
1 (f) State school (primary) School K  1 (f)  2 (f) 1 (f)    
Licensed private school School P  1 (f)      
State school (junior 
secondary) 
School L  1 (f)  3 (t)    
Pudong State school (junior 
secondary) 
School N  1 (f) 1 (f) 2 (f) 3 (f)    
 
1 (t) State school (primary) School O  1 (f)  1 (t)  1 (f) 1 (f) 
Licensed private school School Q  1 (f)      
Licensed private school School R  2 (f)      
Minhang State school (primary) School S  1 (f) 1 (f) 1 (f)  1 (f) 1 (f)  
2 (f) Licensed private school School T  1 (f) 2 (f) 3 (f;t) 1 (f)    
Xuhui State school (primary) School M 1 (f) 1 (f)      
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(Abbreviation code: ‘f’=face-to-face; ‘t’=telephone) 
3.3 Sampling strategy 
I followed a qualitative purposive sampling strategy (Bryman, 2016), so I 
contacted the schools, government departments and people that I believed 
had ‘direct reference to the research questions being asked’ for my 
research (Bryman, 2016: 408). In both pilot study and main fieldwork, I 
started by contacting government officers and school headteachers with 
whom I could get in touch through my social network. Snowball sampling 
(Bryman, 2016) was also used as some interviewed headteachers helped 
connect me to other headteachers and government officers, who were 
otherwise hard to reach through my own social network. After accessing 
schools, I took a ‘top down’ sampling strategy by asking the headteachers 
to connect me to teachers, then asking teachers to connect me to parents, 
and then to the children. The reason why I took this strategy is to make 
sure that the data collected from the parents, children, teachers and 
headteachers are from the same school and hence offer a relatively 
comprehensive picture of their particular context. The data collected this 
way offers a higher level of coherence than if I had randomly selected 
participants from different schools. In addition, my research design is 
flexible to ensure the data collection is open to emerging data. For example, 
during the pilot study in Beijing, after interviewing some school teachers 
and parents, I added the migrant parents and children in nursery to my 
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respondent list, because these parents are concerned about their 
children’s primary school enrolment and some of them are currently 
preparing the required documents for state school enrolment. In other 
words, they are engaged in the enactment of the schooling policy.  
  The following sections are the details of my sampling process in Beijing 
and Shanghai. In Beijing, my initial connections with the local government 
officers and school headteachers were facilitated by my former university 
professors, masters’ supervisor and his PhD students. I studied in the 
Faculty of Education, Beijing Normal University for seven years for my MA 
and M.Ed. As a nationwide influential faculty of education, the faculty has 
many academic staff and postgraduate students who have wide-ranging 
connections with government departments and schools. Some of the staff 
and postgraduate students are themselves government officers or school 
leaders; hence, I was able to access a wide social network through my 
professors and their students. As for the connections with government 
officers, I firstly identified the most relevant departments (to my research) 
in the Ministry of Education and local municipalities of education at city and 
district levels, and then asked my acquaintances to connect me to any of 
the officers in these departments. I also asked my acquaintances to 
connect me to officers in other municipality of education departments as 
long as my acquaintances believed they might offer valuable information 
for my research. As for the connections with headteachers of all types of 
schools, I relied on my acquaintances and contacted any school leaders 
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they recommended. I did give them broad criteria for recommending 
people: the schools should be for those of compulsory education age and 
the school should have migrant children, but the percentage is not so 
important. Eventually, most of the school leaders they recommended to me 
are in the districts Fengtai, Shijingshan and Mentougou, as shown in the 
Table 1. After I interviewed the school leaders, I then asked them to 
connect me to the teachers in their schools. Following this, I asked the 
respondent teachers to connect me to local and migrant parents in their 
classes. Then, I asked the parents whether I could interview their children.  
  In Shanghai, my initial connections with the government officers and 
school headteachers were facilitated by one of my classmate’s 
acquaintance officer L (who works in the Minhang District municipality of 
education) and by my family friend teacher J, who is a teacher in state 
school J in Baoshan District. Officer L accepted my request for interview 
and connected me to another officer in the same department. Later, Officer 
L connected me to two headteachers in Minhang District and one 
headteacher in Xuhui District. Furthermore, L also connected me to a staff 
member in a research institute affiliated to the Pudong District municipality 
of education; that person then connected me to four headteachers and an 
officer in the municipality of education in that district. In Baoshan district, 
my family friend teacher J introduced me to her headteacher. After the 
interview, the headteacher then connected me to two other schools’ 
headteachers and an officer in the municipality of education in that district. 
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Additionally, teacher J also connected me to a school leader in that district. 
After I accessed the schools, I repeated the same sampling process as in 
Beijing.  
  When seeking teachers to interview, I always asked the school leader to 
connect me to those who are working as class tutors and at the same time 
are teaching Chinese or Maths. In my research, 14 out of 15 interviewed 
teachers are class tutors, and 13 of them are Chinese or/and Maths 
teachers. The reason why I prefer class tutors is that they are responsible 
for all affairs in their classes, therefore they would have sufficient 
information on the children and their parents, and so importantly they had 
the ability to put me in touch with parents since they are the teachers who 
communicate with parents the most. The reason why I prefer Chinese and 
Maths teachers is that in the primary and secondary schools, Chinese and 
Maths are two of (and the only two in primary stage) the core subjects. 
These two subjects are scheduled almost every day (considerably more 
than the other subjects). Therefore, these teachers would typically be most 
familiar with the children.  
4. A reflection on the researcher-respondent relationships 
As suggested by Mason, a qualitative researcher should mobilise ‘active 
reflexivity’ to conduct critical self-scrutiny of her/his actions and role in the 
research process (Mason, 2002: 7). In this section, taking a reflexive 
perspective, I examine the formation and development of the relationships 
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between my respondents and me, which shapes the generation of 
interview data. While one might assume that the researcher is in the 
dominant position of the researcher-respondent dyad, some researchers 
argue that ‘power relations can be more complex and multidirectional than 
this, and sometimes they may simply be reversed’ (Mason, 2002: 80; see 
also Neal, 1995 and Scheurich, 1997). In my interview context, three types 
of (power) relations can be identified. These relationships are influenced 
by several factors, such as my identity as an acquaintance of my 
respondents’ acquaintances, a young person, a studying-abroad scholar, 
and a non-Beijing/Shanghai household registration (hukou) cardholder. It 
is also shaped by the way I conduct the interviews.  
  I acknowledge that the vast majority of the participants in my research 
are acquaintances of my acquaintances. One might query whether it is 
possible for people to feel comfortable and talk freely in front of an 
interviewer who is linked, albeit at one remove, to their social networks. 
They might be concerned that their conversations might be leaked to their 
common acquaintances, despite the fact I gave them a guarantee of 
confidentiality. I do not deny the possibility that people behave differently 
in front of an acquaintance of an acquaintance and with a stranger. Yet I 
want to argue that this situation would not necessarily result in individuals 
being afraid of talking freely in front of an acquaintance of acquaintance in 
all cases. My experience shows that most of the participants showed 
frankness and offered me sufficient and valuable information regarding my 
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interview questions. The sources of the participants’ frankness might be as 
a result of, but are not limited to, the following reasons. First of all, in the 
views of many Chinese people, migrant children’s education is not an 
intensively politicalized issue about which they should be highly cautious, 
as this issue is publicly discussed on social media, the internet and in 
newspapers, and these discussions often articulate a critical attitude 
towards the policy and practice. Secondly, as for the government officers 
and school leaders, the persons who introduced me to them are their 
friends, not superiors. Admittedly, I was introduced to the teachers by the 
school leaders, yet I did not ask them questions regarding the interpersonal 
relationships among teachers and headteachers. What I did ask was 
focused on migrant children’s study and socializing conditions. As for the 
parents who were introduced to me by teachers, I did ask about their 
interactions with the teachers, but the questions were mainly technical or 
practical in their phrasing, for instance ‘how often do you contact the 
teachers?’ Finally, it is important to note that many research projects rely 
on a happenstance selection of participants, but that this might not have 
been the best choice for this particular research. I have indeed tried to 
contact government officers, headteachers and parents without any 
personal recommendations, however in most cases they did not respond 
to my messages or refused my interview requests. Among the four cases 
reached in this way that I did finally get to interview, the government officer 
refused a face-to-face or telephone interview and suggested an email 
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interview. The contents of his emailed reply are mostly copied from 
published policy texts or government documents. The two migrant parents 
and a local parent showed suspicion of my student identity and my motive 
for interviewing them by double-checking my ID and student card or kept 
asking about my personal details and motives. And these three parents all 
refused my request to interview their children. None of the other 
participants responded in this way, therefore personal recommendations 
offered me increased trust on the part of the respondent. These cases 
show that sometimes people feel more comfortable than cautious when 
facing an interviewer who shares their social network, depending on the 
research topic, research questions and contexts.    
  A respondent-dominated mode can be identified in the relationship 
between me (a young research student) and the headteachers and 
government officers (middle aged senior educators in superior positions). 
In this situation, the difference in age and the match of competence play 
important roles in shaping the researcher-respondent relationship. It is 
interesting to note that the government officers and headteachers tend to 
talk much more than the teachers. The officers and headteachers 
appeared more interested and relaxed when talking to me. They do not feel 
any pressures in front of me, a junior scholar. Firstly, it is important to note 
that the figure of ‘scholar’ within the Chinese context is socially constructed 
as a neutral party who is serving the public good. As a result, like other 
categories of respondent, they felt free to speak to me, as they believe that 
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a scholar is not someone who is going to report the interviewed data to the 
government department, even if I was indeed introduced by their 
government officer friends. In the meantime, they appeared to enjoy 
speaking to me since they have a strong confidence in their practical 
knowledge (vs. my theoretical knowledge), as they are senior educators 
and hold institutionalized positions such as the title of distinguished teacher 
or the position of senior educational administrator, which function as 
institutionalized cultural capital. Indeed, I acknowledged their high status 
and behaved humbly in front of these senior professionals. For them, the 
interview is an opportunity for peer communication, a dialogue between 
professional educators and academia. The factor of age also contributed 
to this relationship, as I am a younger generation to the respondents. As 
the existing literature reminds us, the respondent is not always the 
powerless one in the interview. Within my research context, the 
respondents’ dominant position can be identified from the way they talk in 
the interview (Maguire and Ball, 1994; Gewirtz and Ozga, 1990). Some of 
the respondents gave me suggestions to improve my interview questions, 
sampling strategy and even suggested alternative research questions for 
me. Their taking the initiative in this way benefitted me considerably. 
Nevertheless, during the interviews, I did find it was hard to organize the 
conversations, as the respondents often digressed from my interview 
questions and talked about anything they wanted to talk about. This is the 
process Scheurich describes as ‘interviewees carv[ing] out spaces of their 
	 137	
own’ (Scheurich, 1997: 71). As a result, I found it hard to include all my 
interview topics in the time available. Another interesting observation I 
made is that most of the interview topics were raised and formulated by the 
respondents themselves before I proposed them. This situation is not 
replicated in my interviews with teachers, parents and children. Finally, 
when I first introduced myself as a doctoral student studying in the UK, 
most of them appreciated and encouraged me from the standpoint of a 
senior (in the sense of age and social status) by saying that ‘you are a 
promising young scholar’. Some of them chatted with me by talking about 
their visits or trips to Europe or their knowledge of foreign education, or 
about their own or their friends’ experiences of accomplishing a PhD, or 
about their children who are the same generation as me. In addition, they 
were glad to do me a favour and help connect me to other headteachers 
and officers. For them, this is a ‘piece of cake’, as described by several 
respondents. This is another benefit of the respondent-dominated 
relationship. This situation of respondent dominance in my research 
resonates with that of Sarah Neal (1995), when she was ‘a young, low-
status woman researcher’ (1995: 523) while interviewing male, middle-
aged powerful respondents such as the Vice-Chancellors or senior 
academics1. 
  A researcher-dominated mode can be identified in the relationship 
																																																						
1 Different from Sarah Neal, I had gender in common with the majority of the 
headteachers and government officers (male). This gender congruence may have 
made a difference to how they reacted towards me.  
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between the teachers and me, as a university scholar usually holds a 
higher-status position than a schoolteacher in the cultural field. While 
teachers do have expertise that I do not, such as the competency of 
teaching a certain subject, their competencies are not socially constructed 
as more valuable than the advanced academic knowledge within the 
Chinese context. In addition, some of the respondents were junior teachers 
without strong experience of teaching. More importantly, they do not hold 
a position with institutional status as headteachers do. The teachers did 
not appear as confident and relaxed as the headteachers and government 
officers while talking to a scholar. Some of them expressed their curiosity 
about the education and life in Europe, about which they did not know too 
much. Five junior teachers expressed their admiration for my academic 
background. Unlike their headteacher and officer counterparts, the 
teachers seldom commented on my interview questions or research 
questions, and they tended to give well-rounded answers according to 
each of my questions and stop and wait for my next question. They tended 
then to conform to the conventions of the interviewer-respondent 
relationship.  
  As for the migrant parents, a non-hierarchical researcher-respondent 
relationship can also be identified. In this situation, I argue that my 
intersectional identity of ‘middle-class’, ‘scholar’ and ‘non-Beijing/Shanghai 
household registration card holder’ produced a figure of a friendly outsider. 
My appearance and behaviour and the language I use (standard Mandarin 
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and formal oral language) all set me apart from the migrant parents. 
Interestingly, I believe a non-hierarchical and friendly researcher-
respondent relationship was still established despite the lack of obvious 
symmetry between the identities of me and the migrant parents, an 
argument which resonates with that of Vincent and Warren (2001) in 
relation to their research with respondents of various ages, ethnicities, 
social class backgrounds, and different genders. For the migrant parents 
facing this friendly outsider, they appeared to feel more relaxed and thus 
more able to share their stories. In the meantime, as I am a non-
Beijing/Shanghai household registration card holder, they believe that I can 
understand their situations from their point of view as an ‘outsider’, 
particularly in a way in which the government officers and school teachers 
do not (as they normally hold a local household registration card). It is 
important to note that not holding a Beijing/Shanghai household 
registration card does not make my life difficult in the way it does for those 
of the migrant families, as I am currently living outside China. Here the 
basis for our shared intimacy is our shared self-identity of ‘outsider’. This 
shared self-identity comes from a public discourse, which defines ‘outsider’ 
as non-local household registration card holder (see chapter 8, section 2). 
Finally, as I have mentioned earlier, for the migrant parents, a scholar is 
someone who serves the public good, for social justice. Here a moral 
embodiment has been attached to the identity of scholars. For example, 
they expect that I will be on their side and can deliver their voices into a 
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broader public arena (through public media) to raise awareness, or to 
facilitate their individual needs with my social network. As a result of these 
several factors, the migrant parents usually saw me as a friendly outsider 
and therefore were glad to share their stories with me. The narrative of their 
stories was frank, detailed and sometimes emotional: some of them did not 
avoid telling me some illegal things that they have done to obtain places 
for their children at local state schools, such as making a fake document 
and using their social networks in the educational sector. They did not hide 
their negative attitudes to some policies and practices and most of them 
seemed to be enjoying sharing their stories with me, assuming that I can 
understand their situation and affirm their arguments. In addition, some of 
them directly asked me to make their voices heard in the public arena 
through publication, and several parents asked me to use my social 
connections to help their children enrol in state schools1. They responded 
to each of my questions and tended to add sufficient details and personal 
experiences to facilitate my understanding. As the interviewer, I felt most 
relaxed when speaking to the parents, as they were natural and highly 
involved, making the interviews more like real life conversations than 
artificial academic interviews.  
  Apart from the above objective factors, my subjective control also 
shapes my relationships with the interviewees during the interview. One 
																																																						
1 Their children failed to enrol in a state school because they did not meet the 
required criteria. Under this situation, I was unable to help. I explained this to them.  
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endeavour is that in the vast majority cases I connected with the 
respondents through their friends or teachers, which creates a natural 
intimacy between the respondents and me. Another principle is that I kept 
the direct questions about the respondents’ personal details to a minimum, 
and tried to extend the information that was volunteered (Vincent and 
Warren 2001). It emerged that only few respondents expressed their 
caution or suspicion occasionally in response to my questions about their 
personal details.  
5. Data analysis 
In this section, I will explain how I transcribed the voice recordings, how I 
conducted two cycles of coding and produced a code list, and how the 
thesis chapters were produced based on the code list and relevant 
theoretical resources.  
5.1 Transcription 
As ten of the participants rejected my request to audio record, and one of 
the interviews was conducted through email, I have 85 voice recordings. 
Among these records, I selected 67 pieces for full transcription. The 
remaining 18 recordings include: two government officers, two school 
leaders, four teachers, nine parents, and one child. While I have listened 
to all these recordings and transcribed a small part of the conversations, I 
did not carry out full transcriptions for several reasons: first, in the early 
stage of the fieldwork, I was trying to contact as broad a range of 
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respondents as possible to avoid limiting my understanding. This practice 
produces some data that is not strongly relevant to my thesis research 
question. For example, in Beijing I conducted an interview with a nursery 
teacher as an additional piece of data. That respondent helped me a lot by 
connecting me to his former migrant students who have now either 
succeeded or failed to enrol in state schools in Beijing. Yet our conversation 
about migrant children in nursery is not strongly relevant to my thesis 
research question, which concentrates on compulsory education. 
Therefore, I only transcribed a small but relevant part of that interview. 
Second, during the fieldwork I also tried to do as many interviews as 
possible. Even when I finished the tasks in my plan, I still tried to do some 
additional interviews if I had the time and connections. The contents of 
some additional interviews turned out to overlap with other pieces of data, 
including: the information about the local state school enrolment criteria; 
the way that the TMC policy is implemented by the local government and 
the schools; and the experiences, attitudes and understanding of particular 
groups of respondents (such as the migrant parents and teachers) about 
the policy enactment. For example, in school K in Shanghai, I held 
interviews with a headteacher, two migrant parents, and one migrant child. 
I felt the two parents’ experiences and attitudes about the policy are similar 
to one another and also similar to other respondent migrant parents. 
Therefore, I decided to transcribe only one section of these parent interview 
recordings. I chose the interview with parent Ning, since her son Nian was 
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also interviewed and the two interviews can give me a complete picture of 
this family’s experiences. Finally, owing to a variety of reasons, some 
interviews were unsuccessful in collecting relevant data with regard to the 
interview topics. For example, some respondents turned out to have limited 
relevance to my research. For example, when I was interviewing Officer M 
in Shanghai, I realized that this respondent has very limited knowledge 
about migrant children’s schooling as his work is not strongly related to 
their experiences. As a result, that interview did not last long (only 12 
minutes) and I decided not to transcribe the full recording but only a small 
part of it, which may be relevant for my analysis. In addition, some 
respondents were not fully involved in the interview for various reasons. 
For example, my interviews with parents Fan and Fang were in their booths 
in a market during their working hours and our interviews were frequently 
interrupted by customers who came to buy things.  
  These voice recordings, which are all in Chinese Mandarin, were 
transcribed into Chinese characters and stored in Microsoft Word files. The 
whole transcription process was done by me without the help of 
transcription software. Considering that the meaning of the original 
conversations might be lost if translated, I did not translate the Chinese 
words into English. As my analysis was based on the Chinese version, 
when I decided to cite a particular piece of data in my thesis, I then 
translated those sentences into English. As for the translation, I did not 
invite/hire professional translators to do it. The professional translators may 
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not be as familiar with the research context as I am, since they may not be 
knowledgeable about the situation of migrant children in China and are not 
the person who did the interviews. In addition, while acknowledging that 
back translation may (or may not) improve the quality of the translation, I 
did not use this service owing to the financial constraints of this project. In 
the final stage of thesis writing, I double-checked each slice of data 
presented in the thesis to make sure that the English translation has the 
same meaning as the original Chinese sentences. Along with the thesis 
writing, my supervisor and other scholars who read my data (in the forms 
of a journal article, conference presentations and thesis drafts) have 
commented on my translation. Their feedback, from their perspectives as 
readers and English native speakers, helped me reflect on and improve my 
translations. I acknowledge that there might still be some inconsistences 
between the Chinese and English versions. This limitation can hardly be 
avoided in studies engaged with multiple languages, even if the 
professional back translation service has been used.  
5.2 Data analysis 
Mason reminds us that the transcription is always partial because it is ‘an 
inadequate record of non-verbal aspects of the interaction’ (2002: 77). 
While my data analysis is based on the transcription text, I am aware that 
the transcription is partial if compared to the oral version of the record, not 
to mention the original conversation under the interview context. Aware of 
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this, when I came across some transcribed texts that embodied emotional 
elements, I always revisited the voice records to give a more well-rounded 
understanding of the respondents’ sentences.  
  Following a qualitative approach, the data generation and analysis is not 
a process of simply excavating and reporting the ‘facts’ about policy (see 
section 1). Instead, the data is ‘produced by the activities of social 
researchers acting on some version of social reality’ (Blaikie, 2000: 120). 
Moreover, the data generation is flexible and sensitive to my research 
context, as I will elaborate. The methods I have used in the first cycle 
coding include (but are not limited to): in vivo coding, values coding, 
process coding, and emotion coding (Saldana, 2013). I am aware that ‘any 
item or slice of data can and sometimes should be coded in more than one 
way’ (Bryman, 2016: 582). Therefore, some slices of data are coded in 
more than one way, as described below. Under the in-vivo coding, a code 
is presented as a word or short phrase from the actual language of the 
interviewee, such as ‘it is unfair’ (migrant mother En). Under the values 
coding, a code reflects the interviewee’s perspectives or worldview, such 
as values, attitudes and beliefs. For example, as a values code, a 
‘standardization discourse’ can be identified from officer B (Beijing 
Municipality of Education) when talking about the development of the state 
school enrolment criteria system. As for the process coding, in brief it uses 
gerunds to present an action process. For example, officer B’s 
interpretation of the function of the ‘Five Documents’ can be coded as 
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‘identifying whether you are truly working in Beijing’. The emotion coding 
‘label[s] the emotions recalled and/or experienced by participant, or 
inferred by the researcher about the participant’ (Saldana, 2013: 105). For 
example, when talking about the migrant children’s attitudes towards 
teachers, teacher C repeated the term ‘indifference’ three times. Although 
she did not label her emotions in a specific term, her frustration (as an 
emotional code) can still be observed from her facial expressions as well 
as the words she uses. As a result of the first cycle coding, around 180 
codes were produced. In most cases, the codes are emerging from multiple 
slices of data. For example, under the category of the result of equal 
treatment inside school policy (see the Sub-theme 13 of Theme 4 in 
Appendix 3), there is a code titled ‘equal education discourse’. This code 
is emerging from six slices of data from teachers and school leaders, 
reflecting these educators’ experiences and understandings of how they 
treat migrant and local children equally at school. In addition, since I have 
‘cut’ the data into very finely differentiated codes, some codes are emerging 
from only one piece of data. For example, under the category of central 
government’s motivation of policy enactment (see the Sub-theme 2 of 
Theme 1 in Appendix 3), I list some codes which include only one piece of 
data. Among these codes, some are interrelated and hence could be 
integrated into a single code. For instance, the code ‘National political 
leader’ and ‘The harmony and stability of the society’ are both related to 
politics and hence could be integrated into a single code titled ‘politics’. Yet 
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the former refers to the role of political leader in policy enactment, while 
the latter refers to the political practice of the leaders, namely, pursuing 
social harmony and stability. Considering the nuances in the meanings of 
the two codes, I decided to keep them as two separate codes, making both 
codes ‘thin’.  
  These codes were then ‘segregated, grouped, regrouped and relinked in 
order to consolidate meaning and explanation’ (Grbich, 2007: 21) in the 
second cycle coding. The grouping of the codes is guided by my research 
questions and by the ontological and epistemological position that I have 
taken, which is to construct situated knowledge instead of discovering the 
‘truth’. My work is guided (not constrained) by the following themes, which 
are embodied in the interpretations of the respondents. The first theme is 
different aspects of the overall tag of ‘migrant children’s schooling policy’. 
This policy system includes three main sub-themes, which are repeatedly 
presented in the policies since 2001: ‘Two Main Channels’; supervising and 
supporting the unregistered informal private schools; and equal treatment 
inside school. Another theme, which emerged from the conversations 
between me and the respondents, is the state school enrolment criteria. 
These themes derive from the analytical question: what are the 
respondents’ experiences, attitudes and interpretations of the aims, 
functions and effects of the documentation system? The third is the 
different types of school settings recruiting migrant children, such as state 
school, government funded private school and unregistered informal 
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private school. This theme is intertwined with different aspects of migrant 
children’s school life, such as academic performance, peer relations, 
behaviours and home-school relations. Finally, some themes have been 
repeatedly raised by the respondents. For example, the ‘negative’ 
influences of recruiting migrant children for the local governments, schools 
and teachers; the conflicts and struggles between different actors 
(government in different levels, schools and parents); and the migrants’ 
living conditions. As a result of the above processes, the initial 180 codes 
were adjusted to 150 codes (each is affiliated with at least one / extract of 
data), which are categorized into 69 categories. The categories are 
grouped in 19 sub-themes under eight broad themes, producing a code list 
(see Appendix three). It is important to note that the divisions of first and 
second cycle of coding and the further analysis (connecting the theoretical 
ideas in relation to codes and data) are theoretical and imaginary, and there 
is not an actual boundary between them. Specifically, I had already started 
my second cycle coding alongside the first cycle coding, but not in a 
systemic way until I finished the first cycle. In the meantime, during the 
second cycle coding, the first cycle methods were still being used.  
  I then conducted further analysis, which aimed to produce the individual 
thesis chapters. At this stage, the main work was to interweave the data 
with theoretical resources and produce thesis arguments. This process 
lasted until the thesis was completed. The analysing process included 
adding, changing and deleting codes and categories produced by the first 
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and second cycle coding. The data analysis and the overall structure of 
thesis were guided by the thesis research questions together with the code 
list. The emergence of the codes and themes and the further data analysis 
(including thesis writing up) are data driven. Specifically, it is the fieldwork 
data that ‘directs’ me to seek theoretical support from the Bourdieusian, 
Foucauldian, and other theoretical resources I have adopted in this thesis. 
Yet to some degree the analysis process can also be considered as theory 
laden, since I had read some of the theories discussed earlier before 
collecting data and kept them in mind throughout my research design and 
data analysis, so it cannot be denied that my research is shaped by these 
theories from the beginning. In short, both theoretical resources and data 
were woven with each other throughout the research process, just as 
Mason comments: ‘decisions about how to organize your data… require 
you to engage fully with questions about the theoretical orientation of your 
study as well as the practical shape of your data’ (2002: 171).  
  The code list also played an important role in the analyzing process by 
outlining several major themes/sub-themes and linking the slices of data to 
the themes. In the thesis, each chapter is supported by the analysis of data 
across several themes in the code list. One example is chapter 7, which 
explores how the migrant children’s schooling policy is shaped by factors 
from political, economic and other public policy domains. Adopting 
Bourdieu’s field theory, chapter 7 involves the analysis of data about local 
governments and state schools’ pressures in recruiting migrant children, 
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the state school enrolment documentation system, and the development of 
the TMC policy, which are the themes/sub-themes in the code list. In the 
meantime, all the data chapters (chapter 6-11) are tied together by the 
thesis research question (see chapter 1, section 3). It is important to note 
that the role of the code list is constructive and supportive, instead of 
restrictive. That is to say, when analyzing data and writing thesis, I did not 
let the structure of the code list constrain my ideas. Instead, I treat the code 
list as a way to organize and present (part of) the data, to find who said 
what. Then I constantly revisited my original interview transcriptions and 
voice recordings in order to bring myself back to the contexts where the 
conversations took place. It is through this way that the thesis findings and 
arguments are constructed as situated knowledge of the respondents’ 
experiences, interpretations and attitudes. 
  The findings and arguments of this study were generated from the 
analysis of the whole set of data, yet in the thesis I only present part of the 
data. The reason is that a thesis is not merely a presentation of raw data; 
instead, it is a presentation of the arguments generated from data analysis 
guided by the research questions and theoretical resources. In my thesis, 
the selection of data was based on its relevance to the particular thesis 
research questions. More specifically, in line with each of the thesis findings 
and arguments, I present slices of data which act as examples and present 
the perspectives of the respondents, or extend the discussions of an 
argument. In addition, in some cases, I use my own words to summarize 
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the data, in order to comply with word limitations. In short, the quotes of 
data are used to be illustrative of the arguments made in the thesis; in the 
meantime, the arguments made are based on rigourous data analysis.  
  The coding and analysis were done with the search and edit functions of 
the Microsoft Word, assisted by the search function within the MacBook Air 
system. I did not use other software such as Nvivo or CAQDAS, since I felt 
I had the best control over, and ownership of, the data with minimal use of 
software. Furthermore, I do not believe it is necessary to use software to 
facilitate data analysis in every situation, since the software, such as 
CAQDAS, ‘itself does not actually code the data for you; that task is still 
the responsibility of the researcher’ (Saldana, 2013: 28). The use of 
software does not reduce any of the responsibilities of the researcher. The 
following is an example of how I used the search functions of the MacBook 
Air and Microsoft Word system: if I want to know which respondents have 
mentioned the registration card (hukou), I first open the file in which all the 
transcriptions (in the form of ‘doc.’) are stored; then I type in ‘hukou’ (in 
Chinese) in the ‘search’ area of the file, and it will automatically present all 
the pieces of ‘doc.’ documents which contain ‘hukou’; I then open each 
document and do the same search, and the document will automatically 
highlight all the sentences which contain ‘hukou’.  
  I also used the edit function of the Microsoft Word to facilitate my coding. 
The followings are the techniques I used in the coding and further analysis 
(some sample transcripts are presented in Appendix five): first, I 
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highlighted some sentences in the form of comments which appear on the 
right side of the page. These comments include the individual codes and 
the notes for myself. Second, for those long paragraphs containing several 
key points, I split them into several individual paragraphs to make the 
points clear. Third, for some key sentences which do not contain codes, I 
highlighted them with underlines and/or different colours to remind myself 
that they might contain useful information. Finally, I also kept all the original 
transcriptions without any modifications. Each time I when examined a 
piece of transcription, I opened the coded and the original versions at the 
same time. This way, I could check the highlighted information in the coded 
transcriptions and in the meantime read the original conversations within 
the contexts that they were produced.  
  To support and complement the analysis of the interview data, I have 
analysed the policy documents related to migrant children’s schooling. As 
a source of data, these policy documents provide me with valuable 
information about the different levels of governments’ policy aims and the 
state school enrolment criteria - the exact documents migrant children 
need to prepare in order to access state schools - hence providing 
background information to support my further analysis. Furthermore, as the 
main part of my analysis of policy documents, I have sorted out and 
classified all the details of the migrant children’s state school enrolment 
contained in the central government policy and in the city and district level 
policy texts in Beijing and Shanghai. I then analysed the historical 
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development of the migrant children’s schooling policy in central, city and 
district levels. In addition, I have compared the changes when the same 
policy item comes from the central government policy down to the district 
government policy. I also compared the state school enrolment criteria 
between different districts in one city and between Beijing and Shanghai. 
Additionally, I have also looked at relevant migrant population policy to find 
the connections it has with migrant children’s schooling policy, since both 
of them mention the migrant population and their children. The above 
works provide me with valuable data, together with the interview data, for 
my analysis, especially the Foucauldian analysis of the formation of policy 
discourse of ‘education as social welfare’ (see chapter 8).  
  While my analysis includes policy documents, the policy text (or more 
precisely, the construction of language) is not my analytical focus. Instead, 
the focus is on the knowledge/power configuration permeating the policy, 
which is embodied in a variety of forms, including: texts, conversations, 
knowledge, material resources, beliefs, events, administrative settlements, 
and social interactions (Ball, 2012). As I reviewed earlier, my analysis of 
the policy documents only counts as a small part of my data analysis. In 
the meantime, the policy document analysis focuses more on ‘what is 
underneath the policy’, instead of on ‘what is underneath the language 
used in the policy text’. Therefore, I do not label my analytical approach as 
critical discourse analysis, which seeks to ‘link language and its modes of 
use to the significance of power and social difference in society’ (Bryman, 
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2016: 532). While critical discourse analysis is strongly influenced by 
Foucault’s work on discourse, it has an analytical focus on language as a 
power resource (see, for example, Fairclough, 1992, 2000, 2001, 2010), 
which is not the focus of my analysis of policy documents.  
  Finally, it is important to note that the concept of validity can be applied 
to the research findings produced through the qualitative methods. In this 
qualitative sense, validity does not mean that the research finding should 
be the production of excavating the ‘facts’, as I elaborated earlier. Instead, 
in Mason’s account, ‘if your research is valid, it means that you are 
observing, identifying or “measuring” what you say you are’ (2002: 39). 
Mason points out that there are at least two ways to demonstrate the 
validity of qualitative research findings: one is the ‘validity of data 
generation methods’ and the other is the ‘validity of interpretation’ (2002: 
189-191). The focus of my research is ‘how do different individuals, 
organizations and groups of actors interpret and enact the policy for 
migrant children’s schooling?’ Accordingly, qualitative data is generated to 
produce a contextual understanding of the respondents’ experiences, 
interpretations and attitudes of the policy enactment. What can be 
identified here is the compatibility of data generation methods with my 
policy sociology approach. In addition, since I reject understandings of 
policy as an objective and true reality to be discovered, my data analysis 
aims to construct (and reconstruct) situated knowledge of policy enactment, 
which is intertwined with my own interpretations. It produces a particular 
	 155	
version, instead of the ‘reality’, of policy enactment. That is to say, my 
interpretation is valid in the sense that it was produced in a coherent way 
in accordance with my research questions and the ontological and 
epistemological positions I have taken.  
6. Ethical issues 
This research follows the BERA (British Educational Research Association) 
and BSA (British Sociological Association) ethical guidelines: first, before 
the interviews, I provided written information about the research and 
obtained informed consent from all adult respondents. As for the children, 
I obtained parental permission before speaking with them, and obtained 
oral consent from the children themselves before asking questions. All the 
children were accompanied by their parents during the interviews. As for 
the respondents I interviewed through telephone, I informed them about 
my research and their rights orally. In addition, I obtained informed consent 
from all school headteachers and teachers’ for my observations in schools 
and classrooms. Second, I informed all the participants that their 
participation is voluntary. That is to say, they should not feel obliged to 
participate in my research because of their superiors’ influence or teachers’ 
recommendations. I have clearly explained to all respondents that the 
interview can be terminated at any time and that there would not be any 
negative response if they rejected my interview request or quit during the 
interview. Third, the use of audio recording was negotiated before the 
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interview. Ten participants did not wish to be recorded but allowed me take 
notes, and I followed their requests. Fourth, I have the participants’ 
permission to publish what they said in the interviews. In respect of the 
interviewees’ and observed persons’ right of confidentiality and anonymity, 
their names as well as their institutions’ names are not published. 
Pseudonyms are used instead. In addition, the use of the internal 
documents of the schools and government departments is based on the 
formal permission of related regulation issuers. Finally, in order to protect 
the security of the data collected from the participants, I have stored the 
data securely on my laptop with password protection. Additionally, the data 
is deployed solely for this research.   
7. Limitations 
From the perspective of an ‘ideal world’, I would not consider my research 
as perfect – more resources (social networks) and more time in the field 
would have been an advantage. As for the limitations in regards to my 
social networks, I was expecting to interview some officers in Shanghai city 
municipality of education but I failed to access them. Although the data I 
collected from the four officers of district municipalities of education and 
from the policy texts is sufficient to support my thesis arguments, I believe 
that it would be ideal if I could have interviewed some officers at city level 
who might have a holistic view of the policy situation in Shanghai. 
Additionally, as reported by some interviewees, apart from the ‘ordinary’ 
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state schools that I have investigated, there are a small number of elite 
state schools that also recruit a small number of migrant children; however, 
I was unable to contact the school leaders at these elite schools owing to 
the limits of my social network. This is another limitation in the scope of my 
research. In addition, given the limited time in the field, I was not able to 
undertake participant observation in schools. Ideally, participant 
observation (for example, working as a teaching assistant or an 
administrative assistant, or participating in related administrative affairs for 
migrant children, such as teachers’ meetings and parents’ meetings) or 
sufficient non-participant observation would have provided me with another 
set of data (besides the interview data) to support my analysis of the 
interpretation and enactment of policy with actors in schools, such as 
teachers and school leaders and migrant and local families. 
8. Conclusion 
This research adopts a policy sociology approach. Drawing upon a post-
structural ontological and epistemological stance, I undertake qualitative 
methods to deconstruct the power relations underneath the policy. Different 
forms of data have been collected from the settings in Beijing and Shanghai, 
which present the complexity of the educational system in both sites in a 
holistic way. Semi-structured interviews (face-to-face and telephone) were 
used to collect data about the participants’ experiences, interpretations and 
attitudes about migrant children’s schooling and related policies. In addition, 
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as the policy text offers data about the dominant conflict or compromise of 
interests, I have analysed some population and education policies related 
to the migrant population.  
  In the fieldwork, I followed the purposive sampling and snowball 
sampling strategies to get in touch with 95 participants, including: 
government officers, school leaders (headteachers and department heads), 
teachers, migrant parents, migrant children, local parents and local 
children. Although all the participants in my research are acquaintances of 
my acquaintances, different modes of the researcher-respondent 
relationship can be identified with different types of participant: respondent-
dominant, researcher-dominant, or non-hierarchical. Despite the 
differences in relationship, most of the participants showed frankness and 
offered me sufficient and valuable data.  
  After data collection, I selected 67 pieces of the voice recordings to 
transcribe into Chinese. I then conducted two cycles of coding and 
produced a code list with eight themes, 19 sub-themes, 69 categories and 
150 codes. Based on the code list and relevant theoretical resources, I 
have done further analysis and produced the thesis data chapters (chapter 
6-11). The whole research process, including data collection, storage, 
analysis and presentation, follows the British Educational Research 
Association and British Sociological Association ethical guidelines.  
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Part II 
The analysis of Part II is organized around this question: how has the 
migrant children school enrolment policy developed and under what 
conditions?  
 
Chapter 6: The fluctuating policy development and the post-2013 
policy change 
In this chapter, I will review the policy development at central and local level 
since 1996, highlighting the post-2013 policy change. This review outlines 
the big picture, which serves as the foundation for my further analysis in 
chapter 7 and chapter 8.  
1. Introduction 
Before reviewing the policy development at nationwide, city and district 
levels, I will briefly introduce the hierarchy of the Chinese government 
administration system in order that the degree of discretion concerning 
policy, which is held at local level, is clear. There are five levels of 
government in the administration system: the top level is the central 
government; the second level is the provincial government; the provinces 
are divided into several cities, which is the third level; the cities are then 
divided into several counties (or districts), which is the fourth level; and the 
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counties are then divided into several villages/towns, the fifth level. In terms 
of implementing the superior government’s educational policy, there are 
certain degrees of legal discretion in the provincial, city, and county/district 
level. Take the migrant children’s state school enrolment criteria as an 
example: the Ministry of Education (MOE) policy does not establish specific 
criteria nationwide; what it does do is develop a direction, the essence of 
the law, for the inferior governments to follow. For example, the 2014 
Decisions on Facilitating Students’ Accessing to the Nearest Junior 
Secondary School without Exams states that: ‘the metropolitan areas 
should facilitate the school enrolment of migrant children who meet the 
criteria in a step by step way, according to its urban developmental plan, 
aim of population size control, and the capability of educational resources’. 
Here the nature of the MOE’s policy is that the setting of the local state 
school enrolment criteria should follow the urban development plan, whilst 
maintaining the aim of population size control and staying within the means 
of the available educational resources. Beijing, the city municipality of 
education, responded to the MOE policy by putting forward the ‘Five 
Documents’ as school enrolment criteria, and stating that its inferior district 
municipalities have the discretion to add (or not) sub-items under each 
document requirement. As a result, there can be different requirements in 
different districts in terms of the exact documentation needed. For example, 
in Xicheng District in Beijing, in 2015 the district municipality added the 
following sub-items under the item of ‘Proof of Employment’ required by 
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the Beijing Municipality of Education: 1) Paying for social insurance for at 
least three months before application; 2) Both parents’ proof of 
employment; 3) One of the parents should work in Xicheng District; 4) 
Individual businessman should pay taxes in Xicheng District. However in 
Mentougou District, only one sub-item is required under the Proof of 
Employment: the parent should work in Mentougou District. This shows 
that legal discretion at district government level is creating discrepancies 
in access to education.  
2. National level 
In the late 1990s, when an increasing number of migrant children appeared 
in the urban areas and had difficulties accessing local schools, their 
educational problems started to appear upon the policy agenda of the 
central government, since the government is responsible for providing 
compulsory education for all children. It was not until 1996 that the central 
government promulgated the first national policy on migrant children’s 
schooling. Since then, the central government policy development has 
undergone fluctuation with a trajectory from procedures that meant state 
schools were hard to access (1996-2001), to a relaxation of the criteria 
demanded from migrant families (2001-2014), and then, in more recent 
years, a return to more demanding criteria in order to gain a place at an 
urban state school (2014-). Table 3 presents the policy development at the 
central level. At the local level, the development of the city and district 
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governments’ policies follow the direction of the central policy, as I will 
elaborate in the next two sections. 
Table 3: the development of central educational policies for migrant children 
Year Policy-
maker 
Policy title Policy aim Sub-policies 
1996 MOE The Regulation on the 
Compulsory Education of 
Floating Children in Cities 
and Towns (Trial) 
‘To provide floating children 
with compulsory education 
according to the law’  
 
1998 MOE The Provisional Regulation 
on Floating Children’s School 
Attendance 
‘To provide floating children 
with compulsory education 
according to the law’  
The origin of Sub-policy 1 (TMC): 
‘the receiving local state school 
should be the mainstream 
receiver of floating children’  
2001 State 
Council1 
The State Council’s Decision 
on the Reform and 
Development of Fundamental 
Education 
‘To protect floating children’s 
right of accessing 
compulsory education 
according to the law’  
Sub-policy 1 (TMC): ‘the receiving 
local government and state 
school should be the mainstream 
channels of recruiting migrant 
children of compulsory education 
age’  
2003 Six ministries 
(jointly)2 
The Decisions on Improving 
the Compulsory Education of 
Migrant Peasant Workers’ 
Children in the Cities 
‘Following the items in the 
Law of Compulsory 
Education’ 
Sub-policy 1 (TMC)  
Sub-policy 2 (equal treatment 
inside school): ‘the receiving local 
state school should treat the 
migrant children the same as local 
students in tuition fees, awards 
and other aspects of school life’. 
Sub-policy 3 (‘supervising and 
supporting the unregistered 
																																																						
1 As the centre of government, the State Council is at the top of the ‘pyramid’ of 
the Chinese bureaucratic system. Its policy is superior to that of the Ministry of 
Education. 
2 The six ministries are: Ministry of Education, State Commission Office for Public 
Sector Reform, Ministry of Public Security, National Development and Reform 
Commission, Ministry of Finance, and Ministry of Human Resources and Social 
Security.  
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informal private schools’) 
 
 
 
 
 
2006 
 
State Council The State Council’s Decision 
on Solving the Problems 
Related with Migrant Peasant 
Workers 
‘Receiving compulsory 
education equally’ 
Sub-policy 1 (TMC)  
Sub-policy 2 (equal treatment 
inside school)  
Sub-policy 3 (‘supervising and 
supporting the unregistered 
informal private schools’) 
MOE The MOE’s Decisions on 
Implementing ‘The State 
Council’s Decision on Solving 
the Problems Related with 
Migrant Peasant Workers’ 
‘Receiving compulsory 
education equally’  
Sub-policy 1 (TMC) 
Sub-policy 2 (equal treatment 
inside school) 
Sub-policy 3 (‘supervising and 
supporting the unregistered 
informal private schools’)  
National 
Congress1 
Law of Compulsory Education 
(revised)  
‘Receiving compulsory 
education equally’  
 
2010 CCP Central 
Committee & 
State Council 
The National Medium and 
Long Term Planning Outline 
of Educational Reform and 
Development (2010-2020) 
‘Receiving compulsory 
education equally’  
Sub-policy 1 (TMC) 
2012 State Council The State Council’s Decision 
on Improving the Balanced 
Development of Compulsory 
Education 
‘Receiving compulsory 
education equally’  
Sub-policy 1 (TMC) 
2014 MOE The Decisions on Facilitating 
Students’ Accessing the 
Nearest Junior Secondary 
School without Exams 
‘Urban population size 
control’ discourse 
 
 
  First stage (1996-2001): In 1996, the MOE promulgated The Regulation 
on the Compulsory Education of Floating Children in Cities and Towns 
(Trial). Although this policy started to settle the responsibility for migrant 
																																																						
1 The supreme legislative body of China 
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children’s schooling on the receiving local government, it did not set explicit 
financial responsibility for the government. At the same time, the policy 
recognized the legitimacy of the informal school/class for migrant children, 
in order to reduce the pressure on local formal school systems. According 
to this policy, the informal school/class can be in the form of ‘night classes, 
weekend classes, and summer/winter holiday classes’, and ‘can only offer 
Chinese and Maths in primary education stage’. In 1998, the MOE 
promulgated The Provisional Regulation on Floating Children’s School 
Attendance. The policy also replicated the avoidance of the 1996 text of 
establishing the explicit responsibilities of the receiving local government 
and state schools with regard to migrant children. While stating that ‘the 
hometown local government should restrict compulsory education age 
children from floating away’, it continued to recognize the legitimacy of the 
informal school/class for migrant children. Yet compared to the 1996 policy, 
it signalled progress by stating that ‘the receiving local state school should 
be the mainstream receiver of floating children’, which became the origin 
of the TMC policy put forward in the 2001 policy. In short, at this stage, 
the policies did not require the receiving local government and state 
schools to take responsibility for migrant children’s schooling.  
  Second stage (2001-2006): Promulgated in 2001, The State Council’s 
Decision on the Reform and Development of Fundamental Education was 
the first State Council’s policy on migrant children’s education. As a 
milestone in the development of migrant children’s education policy, it 
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started to establish explicit responsibilities for the receiving local 
government and state school by stating that ‘the receiving local 
government and state school should be the mainstream channels for 
recruiting migrant children of compulsory education age’. This policy was 
therefore called ‘Two Mainstream Channels (TMC)’ for short, and has been 
followed by later policies. Yet the 2001 policy merely offered a direction for 
the subsequent policies without detailed statements. Promulgated in 2003, 
The Decisions on Improving the Compulsory Education of Migrant Peasant 
Workers’ Children in the Cities extended the TMC policy into what I call a 
framework for ‘equal compulsory education for migrant children’, which 
focuses on promoting migrant children’s equal education. In this framework 
or policy system, there are three main sub-policies. Sub-policy 1 is ‘Two 
Main Channels (TMC)’. Following the 2001 policy’s ‘TMC’, the 2003 policy 
established the financial responsibility of the receiving local government for 
the first time. Sub-policy 2 is ‘equal treatment inside school’. The 2003 
policy required that the receiving local state school treat the migrant 
children the same as local students in charging fees, awarding prizes and 
other aspects of school life. Sub-policy 3 is ‘supervising and supporting the 
unlicensed informal private schools’. The 2003 policy delegitimized the 
informal school/class for migrant children, and required that the receiving 
local government should supervise and support these schools in order to 
improve their quality. In short, it is during this stage that national 
policies emphasised the responsibility of the receiving local 
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government and state schools through formulating a policy system 
directed towards the ‘equal compulsory education for migrant 
children’. This had been the overall directive for subsequent policies 
until recently.  
  Third stage (2006-2014): In 2006, two important policies were 
promulgated and the Law of Compulsory Education (revised) also added 
an item on migrant children’s education. The 2006 The State Council’s 
Decision on Solving the Problems Related with Migrant Peasant Workers 
reaffirmed the 2003 policy system with sub-policies 1, 2 and 3. And The 
MOE’s Decisions on Implementing ‘The State Council’s Decision on 
Solving the Problems Related with Migrant Peasant Workers’ was a 
detailed version of the 2006 State Council’s policy. It followed the principals 
of the State Council’s policy and added some detailed regulations. For 
example, it made the responsibility of the receiving local government more 
practicable by offering two explicit ways of realizing the financial 
responsibility of the government:  
The government’s educational department should cooperate with the 
financial departments to include migrant children’s educational funding 
into the local educational appropriation budget. It should also provide 
funding for the state schools which recruit migrant children, according 
to the appropriation budget.  
This policy item has clarified the source of the funding for migrant children’s 
education. Another example is that it initially put forward that to ‘enrol in the 
nearest state school without any selective exams’ was the principle of 
school allocation. More importantly, the Law of Compulsory Education 
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(revised) confirmed ‘receiving compulsory education equally’ as the policy 
aim in the policies promulgated after 2006. In short, these three policies 
and law, taken together, produced significant progress, building on 
the 2003 ‘equal compulsory education for migrant children’ policy 
system, and making it a coherent policy system. Later on, the 2010 The 
Outline of National Medium & Long Term Planning of Educational Reform 
and Development (2010-2020) and 2012 The State Council’s Decision on 
Improving the Balanced Development of Compulsory Education followed 
this policy system.1   
  Fourth stage (2014 to present): A main change occurred in 2014 as a 
result of the alteration of the central government’s population policy in 2013. 
As I will elaborate in more detail in chapter 7, the Decision of the CCP 
Central Committee on Main Issues Concerning Comprehensively 
Deepening Reform (2013) states that the ‘super-large city must limit its 
population size in a strict way’ (my emphasis). The main policy tool that 
central and local government adopted to restrict migrant population size 
was establishing stricter admittance criteria for migrants trying to access 
social welfare, including access to state school education. As a result, the 
MOE promulgated The Decisions on Facilitating Students’ Accessing the 
																																																						
1 While these two policies did not mention sub-policy 2 (‘equal treatment inside 
school’ policy) and sub-policy 3 (‘supervising and supporting the unlicensed 
informal private schools’ policy). This neglect can be seen as a result of the word 
‘limitation’, since they are comprehensive policies for all aspects of education, 
rather than a specific policy on migrant children’s education. Since this policy did 
not revise or deny sub-policies 2 & 3, it can be seen as following the 2006 policy 
system. 
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Nearest Junior Secondary School without Exams in 2014, stating that: ‘the 
metropolitan areas should facilitate the school enrolment of migrant 
children who meet the criteria in an incremental way, according to its urban 
developmental plan, aim of population size control, and the capability of 
educational resources’. The 2014 MOE policy legitimates the 
restrictions on migrant children’s enrolment, which had already 
appeared in Beijing Municipality of Education in 2013. I will elaborate 
on this in the next section.  
3. City level 
Following the central government’s 2001 and subsequent policies, the local 
governments in Beijing and Shanghai started to promulgate local policies 
on migrant children’s education. Some of these policies are specific 
policies on migrant (educational) issues, while others are in the form of 
single items concerning migrant children in other policies, such as Beijing 
and Shanghai local governments’ annual regulations on student 
recruitment of compulsory education age. These policies identify the 
detailed state school enrolment criteria for migrant children on an annual 
basis. Within both cities, the state school enrolment criteria for migrant 
children are varied in different districts1, as I will explain in the next section.  
  In Beijing, the development of the city and district level criteria system 
has undergone constant alterations over how many documents are 
																																																						
1 There are 14 districts and 2 counties inside Beijing, while there are 16 districts 
and 1 county inside Shanghai.  
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required. As shown by Table 4, during the period of 2002 to 2011, it was 
relatively easy for a migrant family to meet the criteria in this stage. 
Although there were still lots of migrant children who were unable to enrol 
in local state schools owing to the limitations of the recruitment quotas1, 
the municipality was working hard to accept as many migrant children as 
possible. In order to achieve this goal, it established loose and 
accommodating state school enrolment criteria for migrant children. During 
2002-2007, the requirement was that migrant families should prepare the 
‘Four Documents’ (namely, ID, Household registration Card, Temporary 
Residential Certificate, and Proof of Employment). In the meantime, in 
2004, the city government proposed the ‘Five Documents’ as preferential 
criteria (rather than compulsory criteria) 2 for the 2006 and 2007 enrolment. 
In 2008, the ‘Five Documents’ were established as compulsory criteria. 
This drastic policy change made it difficult for migrant children to enrol in 
state schools. As a result, at the end of 2008, another local/national 
government policy reduced the ‘Five Documents’ to the ‘Three Documents’. 
This was to maintain the spirit of national policy at the time, which was 
aimed at ensuring migrant children’s access to state schools. The ‘Three 
Documents’ continued in 2009 and 2010, and then were reduced to ‘Two 
Documents’ in 2011. Yet after 2012, it became more difficult for migrant 
																																																						
1 This phenomenon can be reflected in the number of unregistered and informal 
private schools in that city. In Beijing, the number of these schools was 263 in 
2005 and 128 in 2010. 
2 The idea is that if you meet ‘The Four Documents’, you can enrol in state school; 
if you meet ‘The Five Documents’, not only can you enrol in a state school but 
also enjoy exemption of the ‘Jiedu Fee’.  
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families to meet the criteria, since the Beijing local government began 
again to follow ‘The Five Documents’, last in place in 2004. This tightening 
of the regulations was a result of changes in the nationwide migrant 
population, which in turn provoked new emphasis on restricting the size of 
that population. I will give detailed analyses in chapters 7 and chapter 8 as 
to why population size appeared on the education policy agenda.  
Table 4: the changing state school enrolment criteria in Beijing (since 2002) 
Year Policy-maker Policy title Criteria 
2002 Beijing 
Municipal of 
education 
Beijing Municipal of Education’s 
Regulation on Recruiting Jiedu Student1 
in Primary & Secondary School  
‘The Four Documents’:  
1) ID;  
2) Household registration Card; 
3) Temporary Residential Certificate; 
4) Proof of Employment  
2003 Beijing 
Municipal of 
education 
Beijing Municipal of Education’s 
Regulation on Student Recruitment in 
Compulsory education age in 2003  
‘The Four Documents’ (2002) 
 
 
2004 
Beijing 
Municipal of 
education 
Beijing Municipal of Education’s 
Regulation on Student Recruitment in 
Compulsory education age in 2004 
‘The Four Documents’ (2002) 
Ten local 
government 
departments 
in Beijing 
(jointly) 
On Implementing ‘The Decisions on 
Improving the Compulsory Education of 
Migrant Peasant Workers’ Children in 
the Cities’  
‘The Five Documents’:  
1) Household registration Card;  
2) Temporary Residential Certificate;  
3) Proof of Employment;  
4) Proof of House Renting or Ownership;   
5) Proof of No Guardian in the Hometown  
2005 Beijing 
Municipal of 
education 
Beijing Municipal of Education’s 
Regulation on Student Recruitment in 
Compulsory education age in 2005 
‘The Four Documents’ (2002) 
2006 Beijing Beijing Municipal of Education’s ‘The Four Documents’ (2002) 
																																																						
1 ‘Jiedu student’ means that the student is studying in a school outside his/her 
household registration place.  
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Municipal of 
education 
Regulation on Student Recruitment in 
Compulsory education age in 2006 
(In the meantime, the 2004 ‘Five Documents’ 
are set as preferential criteria, with which the 
migrant children can enjoy the exemption of 
the ‘Jiedu Fee’)  
2007 Beijing 
Municipal of 
education 
Beijing Municipal of Education’s 
Regulation on Student Recruitment in 
Compulsory education age in 2007 
‘The Four Documents’ (2002) 
(In the meantime, the 2004 ‘Five Documents’ 
are set as preferential criteria, with which the 
migrant children can enjoy the exemption of 
the ‘Jiedu Fee’)  
 
 
2008 
Beijing 
Municipal of 
education 
Beijing Municipal of Education’s 
Regulation on Student Recruitment in 
Compulsory education age in 2008 
‘The Five Documents’ (2004)  
Beijing Local 
Government 
Beijing Local Government’s Decision on 
Implementing ‘The State Council’s 
Decision on Exempting the Tuition Fees 
& Incidental Fees for the Students in 
Compulsory education age in Urban 
Areas’  
‘The Three Documents’:  
1) Household registration Card;  
2) Temporary Residential Certificate;   
3) Proof of Employment  
2009 Beijing 
Municipal of 
education 
Beijing Municipal of Education’s 
Regulation on Student Recruitment in 
Compulsory education age in 2009 
‘The Three Documents’ (2008)  
2010 Beijing 
Municipal of 
education 
Beijing Municipal of Education’s 
Regulation on Student Recruitment in 
Compulsory education age in 2010 
‘The Three Documents’ (2008)  
2011 Beijing 
Municipal of 
education 
Beijing Municipal of Education’s 
Regulation on Student Recruitment in 
Compulsory education age in 2011 
‘The Two Documents’:  
1) Household registration Card;  
2) Proof of House Renting or Ownership  
2012 Beijing 
Municipal of 
education 
Beijing Municipal of Education’s 
Regulation on Student Recruitment in 
Compulsory education age in 2012 
‘The Five Documents’ (2004) 
2013 Beijing 
Municipal of 
education 
Beijing Municipal of Education’s 
Regulation on Student Recruitment in 
Compulsory education age in 2013 
‘The Five Documents’ (2004) 
2014 Beijing Beijing Municipal of Education’s ‘The Five Documents’ (2004)  
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Municipal of 
education 
Regulation on Student Recruitment in 
Compulsory education age in 2014 
2015 Beijing 
Municipal of 
education 
Beijing Municipal of Education’s 
Regulation on Student Recruitment in 
Compulsory education age in 2015 
 ‘The Five Documents’ (2004)  
 
  As in Beijing, the development of the city and district level criteria system 
in Shanghai has undergone constant fluctuations over how many 
documents are required (see Table 5). During the period of 2003 to 2013, 
it was relatively easy for a migrant family to meet the criteria. From 2003 to 
2008, the state school enrolment policy did not establish explicit criteria for 
migrant children. In 2008, the government started to require ‘The Three 
Documents’. In 2010, the government extended the ‘Three Documents’ to 
‘Five Documents’. In 2011, ‘The Five Document’ requirement was reduced 
to another version of ‘Three Documents’ (different to the 2008 version). The 
2011 ‘Three Documents’ continued to function in 2012 and 2013. Yet in 
2013, following the newly promulgated Residence Permit Regulation of 
Shanghai (a migrant population policy), the city government promulgated 
The Regulation on Migrant Children’s Enrolment in Different Types of 
Schools. This policy claimed to establish a hierarchical system for migrant 
children’s educational welfare, in which ‘your welfare (access) matches 
your contributions’ with ‘living and working legally and steadily’ as the entry 
criteria. Under this system, the city government changed ‘The Three 
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Documents’ into the ‘Option 1&2’ criteria system1, making the criteria even 
more restrictive. After 2013, the specific requirements of the criteria 
became more restrictive from 2014 to 2015 (see Table 6).  
Table 5: the changing state school enrolment criteria in Shanghai (since 2003) 
Year Policy-maker Policy title Criteria 
2003 Shanghai 
Municipal of 
Education 
Shanghai Municipal of Education’s 
Regulation on Student Recruitment in 
Compulsory education age in 2003 
(No criteria) 
2004 Shanghai 
Municipal of 
Education 
Shanghai Municipal of Education’s 
Regulation on Student Recruitment in 
Compulsory education age in 2004 
(No criteria) 
2005 Shanghai 
Municipal of 
Education 
Shanghai Municipal of Education’s 
Regulation on Standardizing the Student 
Recruitment in Fundamental Education 
Stage 
(No criteria) 
2006 Shanghai 
Municipal of 
Education 
Shanghai Municipal of Education’s 
Regulation on Student Recruitment in 
Compulsory education age in 2006 
(No criteria) 
2007 Shanghai 
Municipal of 
Education 
Shanghai Municipal of Education’s 
Regulation on Student Recruitment in 
Compulsory education age in 2007 
(No criteria) 
 
 
2008 
Shanghai 
Municipal of 
Education 
Shanghai Municipal of Education’s 
Regulation on Student Recruitment in 
Compulsory education age in 2008 
(No criteria) 
Five local 
government 
The Regulation on Promoting the 
Exemption of Jiedu Fee 2  for Migrant 
‘The Three Documents’:  
1) ID; 
																																																						
1 This system keeps functioning in 2014 and 2015 with a further two documents 
added. The ‘Option 1&2’ criteria system has two characteristics compared to what 
existed before: first, the criteria became more restrictive. For ‘option 1’, the 
migrant parent should pay social insurance for a certain period. And for ‘option 2’, 
the Proof of Flexible Employment is only available for people with four certain 
types of jobs.  
2 ‘Jiedu fee’ is specifically applied to the ‘Jiedu student’, since the school cannot 
receive funding from the local government for recruiting ‘Jiedu students’.  
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departments in 
Shanghai (jointly)  
Peasant Workers’ Children in State 
Schools in Compulsory education age 
2) Household registration Card; 
3) Residence Permit or Proof of 
Employment  
(The ‘Three Documents’ are set as 
preferential criteria, with which the 
migrant children can enjoy the 
exemption of the ‘Jiedu Fee’)  
2009 Shanghai 
Municipal of 
Education 
Shanghai Municipal of Education’s 
Regulation on Student Recruitment in 
Compulsory education age in 2009 
Follow ‘The Three Documents’ 
established in 2008 
 
 
2010 
 
Shanghai 
Municipal of 
Education 
Shanghai Municipal of Education’s 
Regulation on School Enrolment of the 
Children of the ‘Temporal Residence Permit 
in Shanghai’ Holders  
 ‘The Five Documents’:  
1) Temporal Residence Permit;  
2) Household registration Card; 
3) Proof of Vaccination;  
4) Proof of Employment;  
5) Proof of House Renting or 
Ownership 
Shanghai 
Municipal of 
Education 
Shanghai Municipal of Education’s 
Regulation on Student Recruitment in 
Compulsory education age in 2010 
Follow ‘The Five Documents’ 
established in 2010 
2011 Shanghai 
Municipal of 
Education 
Shanghai Municipal of Education’s 
Regulation on Student Recruitment in 
Compulsory education age in 2011 
 ‘The Three Documents’:  
1) Residence Permit;  
2) Proof of Vaccination;  
3) Proof of Employment  
2012 Shanghai 
Municipal of 
Education 
Shanghai Municipal of Education’s 
Regulation on Student Recruitment in 
Compulsory education age in 2012 
Follow ‘The Three Documents’ 
established in 2011 
 
 
2013 
Shanghai 
Municipal of 
Education 
Shanghai Municipal of Education’s 
Regulation on Student Recruitment in 
Compulsory education age in 2013 
Follow ‘The Three Documents’ 
established in 2011 
Four local 
government 
departments in 
Shanghai (jointly)  
The Regulation on Migrant Children’s 
Enrolment in Different Types of Schools 
‘Option 1&2’:  
Option 1: Long-term Residence 
Permit;  
Option 2: Temporal Residence Permit 
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+ Proof of Flexible Employment  
2014 Shanghai 
Municipal of 
Education 
Shanghai Municipal of Education’s 
Regulation on Student Recruitment in 
Compulsory education age in 2014 
1) ‘Option 1&2’ (2013);  
2) Household registration Card; 
3) Proof of Vaccination  
2015 Shanghai 
Municipal of 
Education 
Shanghai Municipal of Education’s 
Regulation on Student Recruitment in 
Compulsory education age in 2015 
1) ‘Option 1&2’ (2013);  
2) Household registration Card; 
3) Proof of Vaccination  
 
Table 6: the specific requirements of the state school enrolment criteria in 
Shanghai (2014 & 2015)1 
Document Year 
2014 2015 
Option 1:  
Long-term Residence Permit 
N/A N/A 
Option 2:  
Temporal Residence Permit  
+  
Proof of Flexible 
Employment 
The Temporal Residence Permit 
should be registered for at least 
2 years 
1) The Temporal Residence 
Permit should be registered for 
at least 3 years 
2) The Proof of Flexible 
Employment should be 
registered for at least 2 years 
Household registration Card N/A N/A 
Proof of Vaccination N/A N/A 
 
4. District level 
As I have reviewed above, the development of district level policies 
followed that of the city and central government policy. In the meantime, 
some city municipalities of education (such as Beijing) merely list which 
																																																						
1 See the policy documents: Shanghai Municipality of Education’s Regulation on 
Student Recruitment in Compulsory education age (2014 & 2015)  
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documents are needed, offering the district municipalities the discretion to 
decide whether to establish the specific requirements under each 
document or not. As a result, some districts have established more 
restrictive criteria concerning some documents than at the city level after 
2013. In some districts in Beijing, such as Xicheng district, there is a huge 
migrant population and thus a huge need for children’s schooling, which 
goes beyond the capacity of the local state schools. As a result, the district 
municipality of education sets more restrictive state school enrolment 
criteria than that of the city government. In addition, the specific 
requirements in Xicheng district have become increasingly restrictive after 
2013. Taking the Proof of Employment as an example, its specific 
requirements kept increasing after 2013 (see Table 7). In Shanghai, the 
discretion of district government, while not as strong as the districts in 
Beijing, has still produced stricter district level criteria in some districts. For 
example, in 2014 Minhang district added ‘buying house(s) in Shanghai’ as 
a supplementary criterion to the city level criteria system. Under this 
criterion, if the migrant parents met all of the city municipality’s criteria but 
have not bought a house in Minhang, their children are only entitled to enrol 
in government-funded private schools instead of state schools.  
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Table 7: the specific requirements of the ‘Five Documents’ in Xicheng District, 
Beijing (2012-2015)1 
Document Year 
2012 2013 2014 2015 
Proof of 
Employment  
N/A N/A Paying for social insurance 
for at least three months 
before application 
1) Paying for social insurance 
for at least three months 
before application;  
2) Both parents’ proofs of 
employment;  
3) One of the parents should 
work in Xicheng District;  
4) Individual businessman 
should pay taxes in Xicheng 
District.  
Proof of House 
Renting / 
Ownership  
N/A N/A 1) Shared house renting 
and basement renting are 
not recognized as valid;  
2) An address only provides 
one state school enrolment 
quota for the same family 
within 6 years. 
1) Shared house renting and 
basement renting are not 
recognized as valid;  
2) An address only provides 
one state school enrolment 
quota for the same family 
within 6 years.  
Temporary 
Residential 
Certificate  
N/A N/A Both parents’ certificate 
should be issued in Xicheng 
District  
Both parents’ certificate 
should be issued in Xicheng 
district  
Household 
registration Card 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Proof of No 
Guardian in the 
Hometown  
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
 
																																																						
1  See the policy documents: Xicheng District Municipality of Education’s 
Regulation on Student Recruitment in Compulsory education age (2012, 2013, 
2014, and 2015)  
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  The discretion of district government allows for different districts to 
produce different requirements of ‘The Five Documents’. Table 8 gives an 
example of the district level differences in Beijing. In Shijingshan District, 
since there are no specific requirements about each of the five documents, 
the migrant children are able to enrol in state schools as long as their 
parents are in possession of all five documents. Yet Fengtai and Xicheng 
District both set specific requirements concerning some of the documents, 
thus producing some difficulties for the migrant parents when preparing 
their applications. Taking the Proof of Employment as an example, in 
Fengtai District the specific requirement is ‘at least one of the parents 
should work in Fengtai’. Therefore, if the migrant family is living in Fengtai 
District yet both parents are working outside this district, their child would 
not be able to enrol in state schools in this district. In Shanghai, the city 
municipality has not only listed which documents are needed, but also 
listed the specific requirements of each document. As a result, the district 
municipality is unable to use its discretion to the same extent as in Beijing. 
Nevertheless, there is still some local diversity between different districts.  
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Table 8: the specific requirements of ‘The Five Documents’ in three districts in 
Beijing (2014)  
Document District 
Xicheng District Fengtai District Shijingshan District 
Proof of Employment  Paying for social insurance 
for at least three months 
before application 
At least one of the parents 
should work in Fengtai  
N/A 
Proof of House Renting 
/ Ownership  
1) Shared house renting and 
basement renting are not 
recognized as valid;  
2) An address only provides 
one state school enrolment 
quota for the same family 
within 6 years. 
(No specific requirements) N/A 
Temporary Residential 
Certificate  
Both parents’ certificate 
should be issued in Xicheng 
District 
Both parents’ certificate 
should be issued in 
Fengtai District 
N/A 
Household registration 
Card   
N/A N/A N/A 
Proof of No Guardian in 
the Hometown  
N/A N/A N/A 
 
5. Conclusion 
From the analysis in this chapter, the complexity of policy development at 
both central and local levels can be identified. Indeed, the whole 
development can be seen as a fluctuation curve. At the central level with 
the first policy promulgated in 1996, the policy development has undergone 
four main stages: from denying the receiving local government’s 
responsibility (1996-2001) to the affirmation of that local government’s 
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responsibility (2001-2006), and then to the formation of the ‘equal 
compulsory education for migrant children’ policy system (2006-2014). The 
latest policy shift happened in 2014, when national policy started to 
legitimate the restrictions placed by the local municipalities on migrant 
children’s enrolment in state schools by linking the school enrolment 
criteria to the urban developmental plan, the aim of population size control 
and the capability of educational resources. At the local level, the 
development of city and district level policies followed that of the central 
government policy, while the discretion in the city and district level 
government has produced regional varieties and (in many cases) stricter 
criteria in the district level.  
  The current policy situation is hard on migrant families since the city and 
district governments in Beijing and Shanghai started to established strict 
state school enrolment criteria after 2013. While the majority of migrant 
children in these cities are able to meet the criteria and are enrolled in state 
schools, there is still a group of children who cannot meet the criteria and 
thus have to enrol in unregistered and informal private schools or go back 
to study in their parent’s (not their own) hometowns. The number of these 
migrant children is still unknown owing to the limits of the government’s 
demographic census. Yet according to my fieldwork in 10 districts of Beijing 
and Shanghai, the number of these children is not too small to ignore, since 
most of the respondent migrant parents reported that some of their friends 
have had to send their children back to their hometowns in order to enrol 
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in grade one at primary school.  
  The review of policy development in this chapter serves as the 
foundation for my further analysis in chapter 7 and chapter 8, which explore 
the external influences and internal impetuses for the post-2013 policy 
change in education.  
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Chapter 7: ‘Cross-field effects’: the external influences for the policy 
change 
Following the big picture I have drawn in chapter 6, this chapter focuses on 
the recent changes to the migrant children schooling policy since 2013. I 
will identify the external influences, from politics, economy and population 
policy, for the policy change in education, using Bourdieusian-influenced 
theories which I have reviewed in chapter 4 (section 1 and section 4).1 
1. Introduction  
As I have reviewed in the last chapter, the most recent change in direction 
in the migrant children’s schooling policy happened since 2013. As a result, 
many migrant children either had to return to their parents’ hometown to 
study, or to stay in the city and enrol in unregistered and informal private 
schools. For example, in Fengxian District of Shanghai, there were 7349 
migrant children applying for state school in 2013, yet only 5666 of them 
succeeded in preparing for the documents and finally got enrolled in the 
local state schools.2 Why was the policy changed at this particular time? 
As reviewed in chapter 3, while some existing studies have discussed how 
the policy influences the educational provision for these children (CNIER, 
																																																						
1 Note: a version of this chapter, together with some contents in chapter 4 (section 
1), has been published in the Journal of Education Policy (see Yu, 2017).  
2 Data source: Fengxian District government official website: ‘Fengxian District 
economic and social development statistical bulletin 2013’ 
(http:tj.fengxian.gov.cn/TJSJ/TJGB/1795.htm)   
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2008; Fan and Peng, 2009; Mok, Wong and Guo, 2011; Qian and Walker, 
2015; Liu, Liu and Yu, 2017), very few scholarly analyses have explored 
power relations between the different actors involved in the formation, 
enactment and development of the policy.  
  According to my empirical data, the drivers of change after 2013 were 
not entirely for the sake of education. The policy change is driven by 
dynamic factors both in and outside the education domain, including (but 
not limited to): the development of the population policy; the change of 
political leaders; the needs of the economic sector; and the pressures that 
the migrant children have brought to the local education sector. In short, 
educational policy is continuously re-made by politics, economy and other 
public policy domains, yet these influences are intertwined and function in 
a non-liner way. Therefore, we need an explanatory framework to outline 
the directions, scopes, dynamics and effects of these influences on 
education policy, whilst at the same time recognising the complexity of the 
cross domain effects. In this regard, Bourdieu’s field theory (together with 
capital and habitus) offers a unique way to conceptualise the power-
relations in and between the social domains (see chapter 4, section 1.2.1 
and section 4).  
2. Mapping out the interrelated fields in the social space  
In Bourdieu’s account, ‘it is one and the same thing to determine what the 
field is, where its limits lie, etc., and to determine what species of capital 
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are active in it, within what limits, and so on’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 
98-99). In empirical work, the field-specific capital, together with the agents 
who struggle for/with the capital, are the key to outlining a particular field. 
With regard to the policy of migrant children’s schooling, three fields and a 
sub-field can be conceptualised in my research context: political field, 
economic field, and public policy field with its sub-field of educational policy.  
  In the political field, the main agents include individuals (politicians, 
social organisation leaders, bureaucrats, state employees) and institutions 
(central and local government departments, think tanks, semi-state 
institutions). The ‘organisational resource’ (Lu, 2002) 1 , namely, the 
administrative power, is the main configuration of field specific capital, for 
which the agents compete. Compared with the political field, the economic 
field has a broader range of agents, including the state organisations, 
private sector institutions, managers, labourers, and costumers. This field 
is marked by the economic resources (especially material profits) for which 
the agents compete.  
  Like the economic field, the field of public policy has a wide scope of 
agents from the state sector (politicians, bureaucrats, state employees) to 
civil society (social organisations), the private sector (industries and 
companies) and individual citizens. Yet in the public policy field, the 
economic resource is not the only dominant configuration of capital. In the 
																																																						
1 As for the meaning of the ‘organisational resource’ in the Chinese context, 
please see my footnote in the first paragraph of the section 1.1 of chapter 2.   
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meantime, what the agents compete for is not limited to achieving 
economic, cultural, organisational (political) resources, but also the 
allocation of resources in an ‘authoritative’ way (Ball, 1990: 3). The field of 
public policy contains many sub-fields that are in line with the established 
domains of social life, such as education. Accordingly, some policies, such 
as educational policy, mainly function within the boundaries of their specific 
domains. There are also policies that involve the allocation of resources 
across various public domains and are thus influential across various sub-
fields. For example, the population policy influences the resources that 
different population groups are entitled to, including medical, employment, 
educational, and pension-related resources.  
  Bourdieu reminds us that ‘[e]very subfield has its own logic, rules and 
regularities, and each stage in the division of a field… entails a genuine 
qualitative leap’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 104). When shifting from 
the public policy field to its sub-field of educational policy, there is a 
qualitative leap. In the educational policy field, the field specific capital is 
narrowed down to the cultural and economic resources in the educational 
system. In the meantime, while the educational policy field also has a wide 
scope of agents as in the public policy field, its dominant agents are 
narrowed down to state education related departments and individuals, 
which are in dominated positions in the state administration system. The 
above features have positioned the educational policy as a dominated sub-
field in the public policy field in my research context.  
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  The distribution and hierarchy of these fields in the social space is 
visualised through a two-axes figure1 (Figure 5). As shown by the figure, 
the political field is contained in the field of power. As the organisational 
resource determines the ‘exchange rate’ (Bourdieu, 1996: 265) between 
different types of capital in other fields, the agents in the political field 
occupy dominant positions in other fields. The dominant agents in the 
economic field, such as the lead individuals and organisations in the state 
and private sector, also occupy a dominant position in the field of power, 
since they own strong economic resources. As a sub-field of public policy, 
the educational policy field occupies a subordinate position, since its 
agents have limited organisational and economic resources. As shown in 
the figure (see the orange zone), some agents are shared by the above 
fields and are functioning as the connections between fields. These agents 
are government educational departments at central, city, and district level, 
and the central government (State Council, CCP Central Committee). 
Located within the field of power, the governments and officers act as 
dominant agents in the field of public policy and its sub-field of education 
policy. These agents can transfer the logic of practice from one field to 
another, as I will elaborate later.  
																																																						
1 As I have elaborated earlier, two axes figure is frequently used in Bourdieu’s 
work to present the chiasmatic structure of the positions of the agents in particular 
fields and fields in the broader social space (see chapter 4, section 1.1.1, 
‘Analysing a field: a three-level approach’).  
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  According to Bourdieu, a well-rounded field analysis includes three-
levels1: the first is to analyse the position of the field vis-à-vis the field of 
power; the second is to map out the objective structure of the positions of 
the agents in the field; and the third is to analyse the habitus of the agents 
and the way they exert their capital (see Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 
104-105). In this section, the focus has been on the level one analysis, 
namely mapping out the individual fields and their connections and the 
hierarchy of these fields within the field of power. It serves as the 
foundation to understand the event effect and systemic effect, which I will 
elaborate in the following two sections. Furthermore, the level two and 
three analyses will be conducted alongside my analysis of these two effects.  
 
Figure 5: mapping out the interrelated fields in the social space 
 
 
																																																						
1 It is important to note that the three levels are conceptual, and in an empirical 
investigation there is no sequence of from where the analysis starts (see for 
example, Hardy, 2012). 
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3. Event effect 
Two types of cross-field effects (namely, ‘event effect’ and ‘systemic effect’) 
can be identified as moving between these fields and the sub-field. 
Through an event effect, the changes in the migrant population policy in 
2013 lead to the changes in the migrant children’s schooling policy. My 
analysis starts with the situation in the educational policy field before 2013.  
3.1 The educational policy field (before 2013) 
Before 2013, ‘social justice logic’ was acting as the logic of practice in the 
educational policy field. Accessing state school for children of compulsory 
education age in one’s place of residence was widely recognized as a basic 
right of all children, no matter migrant or local, by a range of agents, 
including central government, city government, district government, 
migrant families, state school headteachers and teachers. Under this logic, 
the central government launched the ‘Two Mainstream Channels’ policy in 
2001, which was followed by a series of later policies. Accordingly, Premier 
Jiabao Wen wrote the following inscription for a state primary school 
specializing in recruiting migrant children in 2003: ‘[u]nder the same sky, 
(migrant and local children) should grow and progress together’, which as 
a metaphor implies that all children have equal educational rights. With the 
authority of central government, this social justice logic was imposed on 
the agents in the educational policy field. Although there were some 
oppositional voices from local state schools and parents, their voices were 
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marginalised in that period, as I will elaborate below. Despite difficulties, 
for instance the lack of state school enrolment quotas for migrant children, 
the city and district governments in Beijing and Shanghai tried to enrol as 
many migrant children as possible though a variety of mechanisms. 
Ministry of Education officer A summarized why the central government is 
motivated by social justice:  
First, this is written in the Compulsory Education Law. Second, we are 
under pressure from public opinion. Third, the migrants have indeed 
contributed to the urban development. Fourth, if the migrant children 
cannot receive quality education, they might become ‘rubbish citizens’ 
[垃圾市民] in the future – that is not a good result for both themselves 
and society. Finally, although some local governments are ‘lazy’ [偷懒] 
in fulfilling their responsibilities, we in central government are not, 
because we are the institution who is responsible for the migrant 
children’s education ultimately … In sum, as a socialist state, the 
government has the responsibility to protect citizens’ educational 
rights.  
From A’s statement, we can find a logic that connects all the arguments: 
the government’s awareness of citizens’ legal rights, of the equal 
opportunity discourse in the public opinion and of social justice as an 
underlying ethical principle. As subordinated institutions of the central 
government, the city governments in Beijing and Shanghai have also 
worked hard with their resources. The Shanghai Municipality of Education 
has given a large amount of funding to transform the former unregistered 
private schools for migrant children into registered schools during 2008-
2011 (see chapter 9, section 4 and chapter 11, section 2 for details). 
Similarly, the Beijing Municipality of Education negotiated with state 
	 191	
schools to ask, or sometimes require, them to enlarge their class sizes, 
add new classes without recruiting more teachers, and rebuild their 
professional music and fine arts classrooms into regular classrooms, as 
reported by many school headteachers and government officers I 
interviewed. Although the schools have received additional funding to 
cover the expenses incurred by recruiting migrant children, the 
headteachers in the interviews complained that the schools’ regular 
teaching has been interrupted in order to make these accommodations. 
For example:  
Along with accepting extra numbers of migrant children, our class size 
becomes 45 per class, yet a reasonable class size should be 38 per 
class according to the government regulation. With this excessive 
class size, teachers feel stressed and the children are not able to 
receive enough teaching resources as they had before. What’s more, 
we used to have four classes in each grade, but now the number has 
increased to five, without an increase in the number of teachers. That 
means all the teachers’ workloads are increased… In order to meet 
the needs of the newly added classes, we have to rebuild our 
professional music and fine arts classrooms, which we have spent 
money to build up, into regular classrooms… We understand that 
accepting extra numbers of migrant children is a ‘political task’ [政治
任务], so we cooperate with the government positively. But I have to 
say that this is not good for education for its own sake. (Headteacher 
of State Primary School B) 
This statement reflects the schools’ reluctance but obedience when faced 
with the government’s policy, as a ‘political task’ [政治任务]. Here we can 
identify a conflict between social justice logic and what the headteacher 
perceives to be quality education (‘education for its own sake’). It is 
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important to note that social justice is understood here as being about 
access, rather than a more broadly conceived version of social justice, 
which would incorporate quality, too (see chapter 12, section 2). This 
version of social justice produces increasing workloads for state school 
teachers and decreasing teaching resources for students. In the meantime, 
it marginalizes the school’s voice in the educational policy field.  
  There were indeed some opponents of the social justice logic, for 
example, local mother Qian said:  
State school education, as social welfare, should only be open to 
selected migrants, since not all of them are as contributive to this city 
as we local people… Nowadays there are just too many migrants 
competing with us for the social welfare that they do not deserve… But 
our voice has not been heard by the government and state schools.  
As reflected in this mother’s disappointment, the oppositional voices 
against the dominant social justice logic were marginalized in the 
educational policy field and did not result in any changes to government 
policy. In contrast, under the social justice logic, the identity of ‘migrant 
people’ became a form of symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 1986) in the field of 
education in that period. The city and district governments and state 
schools responded to their appeal for access to education positively. The 
migrants’ confidence and satisfaction can be deduced from migrant father 
Fei’s description of the situation in the years before 2013:  
In the past years, there were no difficulties for our children to enrol in 
state schools in this school district. Almost all of my friends’ children 
had enrolled in state school. This had led to our optimistic expectation 
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for the future… What we thought was simple: every child has the 
educational right [to attend a state school], don’t they?  
Under the social justice logic, migrant children were in a better position 
compared with the disadvantages they experienced before 2001. With the 
symbolic capital of being ‘migrants’, they were able to enrol in state schools 
without needing to employ particular reserves of social and economic 
capital.  
  It is worth noting that the city and district governments’ hard work in 
fulfilling its social justice responsibility did not translate into total 
commitment from government personnel. Rather, the migrant children had 
become a prominent source of pressure for administrators. As Beijing 
Municipal of Education officer B says:  
In recent years, we have been under great pressure beyond our 
capabilities: first, the fast increasing number of migrant children goes 
far beyond our state school recruitment quota. This is the biggest 
problem we are facing. Second, the floating nature of migrant children 
brings lots difficulties to our planning of the state school recruitment 
quota, which should be based on the statistical data of the exact 
number of migrant children in certain school districts.  
B’s argument is that the city and district level government does not have 
unlimited resources and solving all migrant children’s schooling problems 
seems an ‘impossible mission’ for the government at these levels.  
3.2 The public policy field (2013): changing logic of practice 
Since the 1980s, restricting the population size of metropolitan areas has 
been a constant theme in central government’s public policies, which have 
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been designed to combat overpopulation in super-large cities and its 
negative influences on urban development (Hao 2014; Michieka and 
Fletcher 2012). The Regulation on the Criteria of Setting Up Cities and 
Towns (1986) proposed the idea of restricting the population size of big 
cities, which was adopted in the following policies. For instance, China's 
12th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development (2011) 
states that ‘the super-large city should limit its population size in a 
reasonable manner’ (my emphasis)1. Greater pressure was created in 
2013 when the Decision of the CCP Central Committee on Major Issues 
Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reform 2  required that ‘the 
super-large city should limit its population size in a strict way’ (my 
emphasis), thus removing the option of local discretion and urging local 
authorities to stick to strict restrictions. After 2013, the main policy tool that 
the government has adopted to restrict migrant population size is 
establishing stricter admittance criteria for migrants trying to access social 
welfare. For instance, in the Opinions of the State Council on Further 
Promoting the Reform of the Household Registration System (2014), the 
central government outlines its principles for setting up admittance criteria 
for migrants who want to obtain the local household registration (hukou). 
The indicators of the criteria include: having a legal and stable job; having 
legal and stable accommodation (including renting); the length of time that 
																																																						
1 The term ‘population’ here refers to the migrant population because this policy 
does not require that people with local household registration move out. 
2 In this document, the ‘reform’ refers to the ‘Opening up and reform’ since 1978. 
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the person has participated in the social insurance scheme; the length of 
time that the person has been living in the city uninterrupted.  
  Before 2013, the migrants as agents were in a better position in the 
public policy field compared with post-2013. Before 2013, the focus of their 
struggle with regard to staying in the city was around employment, rather 
than access to welfare. They were able to utilize their 
social/economic/cultural capital, which they gained mainly from their 
previous experiences in their rural hometowns, to interact with employers 
in the job market in order to find a job in the city. Yet after 2013, following 
the series of policies (as important events), the central government 
managed to change the structure of the relative positions of agents in the 
field. The logic of population policy has been changed so that certain types 
of social welfare, such as medical, employment, educational, and pension 
related resources, are now only open to migrants who are ‘contributive’ to 
the city’s economic and social development. Migrants’ struggles with other 
agents are no longer focused solely on competing in the job market but 
also on meeting the social welfare admittance criteria established by the 
government. These criteria set stronger economic, social and cultural 
competency requirements for migrants, placing the migrants in a more 
disadvantaged position in the field. As I will argue, after 2013, some 
migrant families had to activate more of their social and economic capital 
in order to try to access state school education (as a particular form of 
social welfare).  
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3.3 The educational policy field (after 2013)  
Since 2013, sanctioned by the State Council, the city municipalities of 
education in Beijing and Shanghai, as dominant agents in the educational 
policy field, started to consider state school education as a form of social 
welfare that is only open to migrants who are ‘contributive’ to the city. 
Although the social justice logic still exists, it is no longer at the core of the 
discourses active within the educational policy field. Now, the government 
is concerned with how to select the children whose parents are ‘contributive’ 
to the city. In Beijing, the city municipality of education started to require 
‘Five Documents’ pertaining to residence and employment criteria in 2012 
(see table 4 in chapter 6, section 3), and went further in 2014 when the city 
municipality required the district municipalities to set up further specific 
requirements to make it clear what can be considered as ‘contributions’. 
Taking the Proof of Employment as an example, in the year 2015, the 
Xicheng District Municipal of Education established four further specific 
requirements related to this document. First, provide both parents’ Proof of 
Employment; second, if the parent runs a personal business, s/he should 
have paid taxes in Xicheng; third, one of the parents should work in 
Xicheng; fourth, the parent should have already paid social insurance for 
at least three months. Here we can identify that requiring the applicant to 
provide the Proof of Employment is a means to ensure that this person is 
able to contribute to this city (or more specifically, to this district) by paying 
tax and social insurance, contributing to the city through both working and 
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consuming there. If both of the parents are working, then the contributions 
that this family can make are doubled. Additionally, paying for the social 
insurance for at least three months means that the applicant is not only a 
‘contributor to the city’, but also a ‘stable contributor to the city’. Only when 
the migrant parents provide all of the above documents and meet all of the 
specific requirements can their children enrol in local state schools. Beijing 
Municipal of Education Officer B strongly appreciates the efficiency of the 
criteria system: ‘the underlying principle and main function of the criteria 
system is to help us judge who is truly working for this city and who is not. 
If you meet our criteria, you are considered as “truly working for this city”.’ 
Through the criteria system, the local government legitimates its own 
definition of ‘what kind of migrants can be considered as “contributive” to 
the city and hence deserves the educational welfare of this city’. Here, the 
‘social welfare logic’ has been adopted from the field of public policy to its 
sub-field of educational policy by the dominant agents. I will back to this 
point and discuss the welfare discourse embodied in this criteria system in 
chapter 8 (section 4).  
  Another ‘benefit’ of this criteria system for the government is that the 
established criteria generate an ‘eligibility discourse’ and the hardship that 
some migrant children are facing seems no longer a problem, or a source 
of pressure, for the local or central government, as the ineligible applicant 
can now be positioned as illegitimate, demanding and irrational. For 
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example, when being asked about the hardship of migrant children in state 
school enrolment, officer A (Ministry of Education) responded that:  
Whether there is a ‘hardship’ or not depends on what kind of people 
you are. There is no difficulty for the eligible children [who have got all 
the required criteria] to enrol in state schools. However, if you are 
ineligible yet still insist to apply for a state school, you will face 
difficulties. But if you go back to your hometown and enrol in the state 
schools there, as required by policy, again, there would not be any 
difficulties for you. Therefore, our basic attitude is that, if you are not 
eligible, please apply for the state schools in your hometown, and your 
seat will be guaranteed.  
Comparing this statement with the same person’s statement on why the 
central government has the motivation to help as many migrant children as 
possible enrol in the state schools before 2013 (cited above in section 3.1), 
we can see clearly the shift from the social justice discourse to social 
welfare logic. Along with the shift of the policy discourse, the developmental 
direction of the policies returns to the pre-2001 era. Both pre-2001 and 
post-2013 policies try to reduce the receiving municipality’s responsibilities 
for migrant children’s schooling, and both produce further hardships for 
migrant children. Yet, compared with the pre-2001 policies, the post-2013 
ones do not reject providing state school education for migrant children; 
what they reject is providing education for those who are not ‘eligible’. With 
the eligibility discourse, the post-2013 policy appears to be more legitimate 
than previously. The educational needs of (some) migrant children are not 
simply ignored as appeared to be the case pre-2001, but positioned as 
illegitimate demands. 
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  Many migrant parents argue that they are ‘contributive’ to the city, so 
their children deserve state school education. For example:  
It is unfair to established admittance criteria against our children, since 
we are also contributors to this city like the local people. I have been 
working in Beijing for ten years, undertaking the dirtiest and hardest 
jobs. And finally, my daughter is not allowed to enrol in state school. It 
is unfair! (Migrant mother En)  
Here, this mother also adopts the social welfare logic to argue that they are 
‘contributive’ to the city’s development. However, since ‘contributor’ is 
defined by the government through its legitimated criteria, the migrant 
parents’ voices have been marginalized and their understandings of 
making a contribution to the city, such as ‘undertaking the dirtiest and 
hardest jobs’, rendered unjustifiable. As a marginalized group in the field, 
migrants have no choice but to follow this social welfare logic and struggle 
with attaining all these school enrolment criteria. This is different from the 
situation immediately before 2013, when migrant children could access 
urban state schools relatively easily with their symbolic capital of being a 
‘migrant’. Nowadays, the migrant parents need to try hard to obtain the 
required documents to prove that they are ‘contributive’. For example, En 
reports her first-hand experience:  
I am not working and not renting a house through a legal way, 
therefore I cannot meet the required criteria, and would have no choice 
but to send my daughter back to my hometown. However, our family 
has no close relatives in my hometown, except for my parents who are 
too old to take care of my child. Therefore, we have to try some ‘special’ 
ways to get all the required documents: with the help of my friends, I 
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have signed a fake job contract and a fake house-renting contract with 
others, at the expense of paying some money…  
Here we can find intense forms of social and economic capital being 
wielded by the migrant families in order to get their children enrolled in state 
schools, and this situation is again different to that immediately before 2013. 
In other words, the position of the migrants becomes more disadvantaged 
in the field of educational policy. 
  Another drastic change is the nature of educational policy. Now, the state 
school enrolment criteria have become an apparatus of government 
‘population control mechanism’, as Pudong District Municipal of Education 
officer K (Shanghai) reports:  
Now the state school enrolment criteria in Shanghai can be considered 
as a sub-system of the residential certificate policy [a type of migrant 
population policy]… To a large degree, we chose these state school 
enrolment criteria to meet the needs of the government’s migrant 
population control policy… Here, education is treated as a certain type 
of social welfare.  
A’s statement is confirmed in the An Explanation of the Policy of School 
Enrolment in Compulsory Education Age (2014), promulgated by the 
Shanghai Municipal of Education. This policy clearly reveals the changed 
nature of the educational policy, now working as a population control 
mechanism of the government. This mechanism works well, according to 
the views of government officers in both Beijing and Shanghai. These 
officers report that since 2013, many migrant parents have sent their 
children back to their hometowns for schooling, so they feel that the 
pressure on the city and district governments has been reduced.  
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  From this discussion, we can outline the way that the event effect works: 
when an important event (the change of government population policy in 
2013) happens in the field of public policy, it changes the logic of the field; 
then, the agents in dominant positions in the educational policy field 
introduce the changed logic from the public policy field. In the meantime, 
the changes in both fields are consolidated under influences from political 
and economic fields, via the field of power, through systemic effects.  
4. Systemic effect  
4.1 The changed political logic: the rise of economic logic in the field 
of power 
During 2012/131, there was a change of logic in the political field as a result 
of the leadership transition in central government. In the period that Jintao 
Hu was President (2002-2012/13), the dominant political discourse was 
‘the construction of a harmonious society’, which is reflected in a series of 
policy texts, including The Decision of the CCP Central Committee on 
Several Main Issues Concerning the Construction of A Socialist 
Harmonious Society (2006). In accordance with this discourse, the pursuit 
of social justice was the logic of practice in the political field. As the Chinese 
																																																						
1  The years 2012-2013 can be seen as the ‘transitional period’ of political 
leadership: the leadership position of CCP (General Secretary & Chairman of the 
Central Military Commission of CCP) were transferred from Jintao Hu to Jinping 
Xi in 2012, then the leadership position of the state (President & Chairman of the 
Central Military Commission of the State) were transferred from Jintao Hu to 
Jinping Xi in 2013. 
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political leaders, as agents, occupy a dominant position in the field of power, 
their pursuit of social justice brought this logic to a dominant position in the 
field of power. After the leadership transition (2012/13-), the dominant 
central government political discourse changed to ‘realizing the China 
Dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation’. President Jinping 
Xi has elaborated the meaning of ‘China Dream’ in many speeches, 
political conferences and interviews, claiming that ‘the idea in essence is 
to make the country prosperous and strong, rejuvenate the nation, and see 
that the people are happy’ (国家富强, 民族振兴, 人民幸福)1. Under this 
discourse, pursuing national prosperity becomes a dominant logic in the 
political field. While this logic is not directly opposed to the social justice 
logic, it emphasizes the nation’s economic and social competence. The 
political leaders’ pursuit of economic and social competence enhances the 
relative value of economic capital within the social value system. 
Accordingly, a logic emphasising economic rationality has been brought to 
a dominant position in the field of power. The economic logic, which has 
not been changed in substance owing to the leadership transition, 
embodies itself in the population policy as the workforce who can meet the 
needs of the market in the city are welcomed, and would be offered 
commensurate social welfare. Under this economic logic, the discourse of 
a harmonious society is no longer at the core of the field of power.  
																																																						
1 Xi said this sentence in his speech in the closing ceremony of the 12th National 
People’s Congress assembly, in which he was selected as the President of P. R. 
China. 
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4.2 The field of public policy (and its sub-fields) under the systemic 
effect 
The field of power constantly produces a systemic effect on the field of 
public policy (and its sub-field of education policy) before and after 2012/13. 
Before 2012/13, there was no policy rigorously restricting urban population 
size in the field of public policy, as the strict restriction of the migrant 
population’s access to services in cities will bring hardship to migrants. The 
strict restriction can further lead to civil unrest, great opposition and 
accusations of inequality against the government, which is not what the 
central government hopes to see under the logic of pursuing of social 
justice. When it comes down to the field of education policy, the nature of 
systemic effect is reflected in the Ministry of Education officer A’s statement:  
The central government has attached importance to solving the 
problems of migrant children’s schooling, because this issue has a 
direct influence on our citizens’ well-being, on social stability, on social 
harmony, on urban development, and finally, on the future of our 
socialism.  
Here, officer A connects migrant children’s schooling policy to a broader 
political agenda, namely, ‘social stability’, ‘social harmony’ and ‘the future 
of our socialism’. The values of social stability and social harmony are in 
accordance with the social justice logic in the field of power.  
  However, after 2012/13 with the marginalization of the social justice logic, 
there is less of a necessity for the central and local government to worry 
too much about the potentially negative consequences of setting strict 
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restrictions on migrant populations. Promoting economic and social 
development at the same time as reducing the population burden through 
the selection of workforce becomes the core of the government’s concerns 
in terms of population. In addition, this new logic in the public policy field is 
consolidated by the rising prominence of economic logic in the field of 
power. Accordingly, the local municipalities of education follow the intuition 
of the central government. As observed by officer D (Beijing Municipal of 
Education):  
You might have observed that, after the leadership transition in the 
central government, the ‘Two Mainstream Channels’ policy seems to 
be rarely referred to by the central government. It indeed occasionally 
refers to this policy, but the frequency is reduced compared with the 
situation before.  
As a result, the ‘exporting’ of social welfare logic from the field of public 
policy into educational policy field (through event effect) was consolidated 
by the economic logic in the field of power through systemic effect.1  
5. Conclusion  
Adopting Bourdieusian theoretical resources, this chapter offers an 
understanding of how politics, economy and migrant population policy 
influences educational policy in the Chinese context. It contributes to 
Bourdieusian theorizing by offering a framework to explore the interactions 
																																																						
1 One might argue that this model is unidirectional without exploring the effects 
from the educational policy field to other fields, which is another aspect of the 
complexities of field exchange. While acknowledging this potential research gap, 
I would note that this is not the interest of investigation in this chapter, which 
focuses on how politics, economy and migrant population policies influence 
educational policy.  
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among fields. Bourdieu does not pursue a general theory on the 
interactions of fields, leaving researchers a space to work within their 
particular research contexts. Based on the Australian context, Lingard and 
Rawolle (2004) have written innovatively on ‘cross-field effects’. In my 
research, instead of simply appropriating the idea of cross-field effects into 
a new space, I have addressed several limitations to it with the support of 
my empirical data. I have conceptualized the agents as the points of 
connection between different fields. I also integrated the logic of practice 
as a key element of the cross-field effects analysis. In addition, I have 
added Bourdieu’s level one field analysis into Lingard and Rawolle’s 
framework. Based on these works, I have produced an updated framework 
to outline the directions, scopes and dynamics of the cross-field effects 
(see chapter 4, section 4, paragraph 2).  
  Applying Bourdieu’s level one field analysis, I have mapped out the 
distribution and hierarchy of the individual fields (with the sub-field) and the 
field of power in the social space with the educational policy field occupying 
a subordinate position (see Figure 5 in section 2). This has revealed how 
the logic of one field is exported to another field by which agents under 
which effect. Extending Lingard and Rawolle’s conceptualisation of event 
effect and systemic effect, I have identified that the event effect functions 
in an ‘active’ way, producing direct influence from the public policy field to 
the educational policy field. The systemic effect functions in a ‘passive’ and 
‘static’ way with indirect influence from the political and economic fields on 
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the public policy field via the field of power. These two effects function 
synchronously. In addition, by conceptualising the interrelations between a 
field and its sub-field(s), and between the field of power and other fields, I 
have extended the analytical scope of the cross-field effect framework. 
Finally, my conceptualisation of the systemic effect also identifies a 
mechanism of functional homology between individual fields and the field 
of power (Bourdieu, 2005; Thomson and Holdsworth, 2003; Thomson, 
2005) and extends Bourdieu’s theorizing. That is, the logics of the 
individual fields are consistent with the logic of the field of power through 
the dominant agents; in the meantime, the dominant agents in certain fields 
(such as political leaders in the political field) can convert the changes in 
these fields into resulting in a change of the logic of the field of power. 
Acknowledging that any theoretical or empirical claims are particular to the 
spatio-temporal contexts in which are generated, my work is not aiming to 
produce a ‘general theory’ that is applicable to all fields under all contexts. 
Yet it can still be valuable for further research, especially the exploration of 
the interactions between the educational policy, population policy, politics, 
and economy. 
  Putting this analytical framework into practice, we can identify some 
changes which have increased migrant children’s hardship in state school 
enrolment after 2013, and which have not been revealed by the existing 
research. Under the event effect, state school education becomes a type 
of social welfare only open to migrants who are ‘contributive’ (as defined 
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by the government) to the city’s development and educational policy 
becomes a mechanism of population control deployed by the government. 
As a result, the city and district government sets up a series of strict state 
school enrolment criteria, establishing stronger economic, social and 
cultural competency requirements for migrants. Under the systemic effect, 
the current social welfare logic in the educational policy field is reaffirmed 
by the rising strength of economic logic in the field of power. The migrant 
group’s symbolic capital of being ‘migrant’ has been diminished, and their 
position is again one of marginalization. As a result, for those migrant 
families who cannot exert their social/cultural/economic capital to meet the 
state school enrolment criteria, their appeal to enrol in schools has been 
marginalized, although in an apparently legitimate manner. While this 
research is a ‘research of policy’ instead of ‘research for policy’ (Fay 1975, 
cited in Ball 1997), it still offers some implications for the policy-makers, as 
it reveals that the migrant children, taken together, have become more 
disadvantaged in the educational policy field after 2013. This situation 
deserves much wider social awareness, in order that access to state 
education in the city where their parents live is available to all children.   
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Chapter 8: Discourse, power and policy cycle: how the change 
happens in the educational system?  
Following the discussion in chapter 7 of the external influences for the post-
2013 policy change, this chapter examines how the restrictive schooling 
policy is enacted in the educational system: under what conditions has the 
policy agenda been set? What principles and values lie underneath and 
informing the policy text? How does the criteria system function in practice?  
1. Introduction  
As I have reviewed earlier (chapter 4, section 2 and section 4), I have 
adopted some Foucauldian theoretical tools, namely, ‘policy as discourse’ 
and ‘policy as text’ (Ball, 1990, 1994), ‘policy cycle’ (Bowe, Ball and Gold, 
1992) and ‘policy archaeology’ (Foucault, 2002; Scheurich, 1994), to 
analyze the discursive formation with the post-2013 policy change. The 
policy cycle contains three main inter-related contexts, namely the context 
of influence, the context of policy text production and the context of practice. 
I integrate Scheurich’s concept of social regularities into the policy cycle 
and create an additional ‘pre-context’ of social regularities. Although this 
chapter starts from the pre-context and ends at ‘context of practice’, I do 
not mean to suggest that there is a chronological order or a direct causal 
relationship among them, as I have reviewed in chapter 4 (see section 
2.2.2). What I have tried to present throughout my analysis is the co-
	 209	
existence and interaction among the contexts. Applying this conceptual 
framework to the Chinese context, it explores how a restrictive state school 
enrolment criteria system was established and how it functions in practice 
and with what effects. It aims at revealing the inseparable nature of 
‘knowledge/power’ invested and realized in the post-2013 state school 
enrolment criteria system. 
2. Pre-context: two social regularities in the broader social context of 
education and migration 
This section introduces two social regularities (Scheurich, 1994), which 
refer to some ‘deeper’ features of social organization in the educational 
and political fields, providing a broader context to migrant children’s 
schooling policy. Shaping people’s understanding of ‘who are 
outsiders/local residents’ and ‘what education is for’, the particular social 
regularities on which I shall focus shape policy agenda setting and policy 
text production, and thus serve as the pre-context of the policy cycle.  
  The first social regularity is the discourse of ‘outsider’ (外地人), under 
which the object of the discourse is the ‘outsider’ who does not hold a local 
household registration (hukou) card even if the person is in fact born and 
raised locally. The institutional roots of this discourse is the household 
registration system (see chapter 2, section 3). Before the Chinese 
economic reform in 1978, people were not allowed to move to reside out 
of their places of birth unless they obtained official approval. When they 
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were able to move to another place, their household registration card (‘HR 
card’ for short) was transferred correspondingly. Under this social 
administration system, there was a consistency between people’s HR card 
and their place of residence.1 After 1978, people were free to move and 
reside outside their hometowns. Yet the household registration system, as 
an embodied form of state sponsored welfare chauvinism (Kitschelt, 1995), 
under which the priority in social benefits is directed first and foremost to 
the region’s ‘own group’ (Mudde, 2000: 189), has not been changed. When 
people moved, not all of them could get their HR card moved to the new 
residential regions accordingly (Wu, 2009). For those who cannot or have 
not, they are not fully entitled to the local welfare provisions. Under this 
system, a person’s right to access local welfare is tied to the status of their 
HR card. What has been established is a conceptual binary opposition 
between local residents, who hold the local HR card, and ‘outsiders’, who 
live in the same region but do not hold the card. Interestingly, some people 
who are tagged as ‘local residents’ are in fact migrants but have managed 
to obtain the local HR card. Similarly, some people who are tagged as 
‘outsiders’ are in fact born and raised locally but failed to obtain the local 
HR card, just like the second-generation migrant children in my study2. 
																																																						
1 This consistency has practical implications, as the amount of funding that the 
local government receives for providing social welfare (e.g. to provide places in 
state schools or services in state hospitals) was calculated by the number of 
people who hold the local household registration. That is to say, all of the residents 
in a particular region whose HR cards are also registered in that region are entitled 
to the social welfare provided by the local government in that region. 
2 Their HR cards are registered in their parents’ hometowns and they have not 
been transferred to their current residential places.   
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Under this binary, the ‘local residents’ (including the policy makers in local 
government departments) consider the ‘outsiders’ as ‘floating’ and 
‘unstable’ and therefore not entitled to the local social welfare. Accordingly, 
the local government’s planning of welfare provision (such as how many 
state schools should be established) is normally dependent on the number 
of residents who hold the local HR card, leading to the insufficiency of 
welfare provision for residents who do not. 
  The second social regularity is found in teachers’ professional 
understandings of their role. Under the exam-orientated education tradition 
(Bo and West, 2015; Chan et al., 2008; see also chapter 2, section 2.2 for 
details), school education has been understood by educators and parents 
as being mainly about the quality of teaching and learning and is the 
dominant discourse in the educational practice of professional educators 
in China. ‘The purpose of schooling is to provide the students with “quality 
education”’ (Teacher K, state junior secondary school N). A ‘quality 
education’ is widely defined as meeting certain standards in terms of exam 
performance. Insulating itself from those political discourses in education, 
such as educational equity (equal educational is a right of all), the quality 
of teaching and learning discourse provides a version of the purposes of 
education, where the classroom is abstracted from the political, social, 
economic and cultural context: According to the responses of the majority 
of the state school teachers and leaders I interviewed, in their everyday 
teaching practice, the students’ family background (such as rural or urban, 
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migrant or local, etc.) is of little concern, and whether each child can find a 
school place is none of their business. Their job starts when children 
appear in their classrooms; education is simply about teaching and 
learning. As long as you are a student of the school, you deserve a quality 
education provided by the teachers. As Teacher K states, ‘[i]n fact, I do not 
care [who is local and who is migrant]. What is my concern is that: are you 
a hardworking student? Do you have any difficulties with your study? Do 
you need my help? These are the focuses in my work’ (Teacher K, state 
junior secondary school N). The majority of the respondent teachers share 
similar opinions that they do not care about this difference in status. In 
order to fulfil their responsibilities, teachers point to the importance of a 
healthy study environment; this is understood as consisting of an 
appropriate number of students in each class, cooperative parents who are 
able to facilitate the teachers’ work, and obedient students who comply with 
teachers’ orders. In other words, the absence of any of these factors could 
destroy the teachers’ expectations. These include: recruiting a 
disproportionately large number of children as this reduces the educational 
resources available on average for each child, thus leading potentially to 
decreasing exam scores; uncooperative parents would bring about extra 
burdens for the teachers; and undesirable behaviours and attitudes of 
students would have negative effects on the teaching and learning in 
school.     
 
	 213	
 
3. Context of influence: problematizing ‘migrant children in state 
school’   
‘What I tried to do from the beginning was to analyse the process of 
“problematisation” – which means: how and why certain things, behaviour, 
phenomena, processes become a problem’ (Foucault, 1983). For Foucault, 
problematisation is ‘both an object of study and a method/a research 
disposition’ (Ball, 2013: 28). By examining the process of problematisation, 
Foucault problematises the practices and objects of discourse. Following 
Foucault’s analytical approach, this section critically examines the 
problematisation of ‘migrant children in state schools’ and how it facilitates 
the introduction of the policy agenda to limit population size from the public 
policy field into the educational policy field. As stated in chapter 7 (section 
3.2), considering recent years of overpopulation in super-large cities (such 
as Beijing and Shanghai) and its negative influences on urban 
development, in 2013 the central government launched a new policy to 
strictly limit the population size in super-large cities. While this central 
government policy itself did not establish school access as a means of 
limiting migrant population size, the local governments in Beijing and 
Shanghai initially introduced the policy agenda of limiting migrant 
population size into the educational field. This new policy agenda is a result 
of the consensus of interests between teachers, state schools, local 
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government and central government, shaped by the social regularities in 
the broader social context, as I will elaborate in this section.  
  In recent years, the state schools in Beijing and Shanghai have recruited 
a disproportionate number of students as a result of receiving migrant 
children, who may otherwise lose their chance of schooling in their 
receiving district. As a result, the teachers and school leaders identified 
burdens such as increased workloads, negative emotions, and shortage of 
teaching resources, which result in the declining academic performance of 
the school. First, six out of nine teachers in my sample complained that 
their work burdens have increased, since some migrant parents are unable 
to cooperate with them on their children’s education at home as their local 
counterparts do. For example:  
For us, the biggest problem is that things do not go well in the home-
school cooperation. Many migrant children often do not finish their 
homework. So the teachers have to spend more time to give these 
students extra tutorials and supervisions. For the students, their 
parents do not have sufficient literacy to guide their study – that is one 
reason. Another reason is that they are busy with their work. For 
example, when their children come back home after school, they might 
still be working as a babysitter in someone else’s home. They do not 
have the attention to supervise their children (Teacher L, state primary 
school M).   
By mentioning that ‘the teachers have to spend more time to give these 
students extra tutorials and supervisions’, this teacher expresses her 
expectation that the students are capable of a good academic performance, 
which is felt by the teachers to be the core purpose of education. Second, 
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some degree of frustration can be identified in four of the nine teachers 
when they describe their feelings about some migrant children and their 
parents. A good example is teacher C (state primary school G), whose 
frustration has two origins: the first is that she feels some migrant parents 
do not respect her work by ignoring her communication and requests:  
My heart is broken… I have communicated with the migrant parents 
many times, requesting them to help check their children’s homework 
to make sure they finish it. But many of them just ignored my request, 
and their children never complete their homework. The parents do not 
supervise the children at all. That makes me and other teachers angry. 
Sometimes we could not tolerate this and asked the parents to come 
and talk to us and they promised to do as we request. But the next day, 
their children had still not finished their homework, leaving the 
workbook blank! (with a bitter smile)  
The other cause for concern is that she feels some migrant students always 
treat her with an indifferent attitude:  
Indifference [冷漠] – that is their attitude towards teachers. Sometimes 
the students talk loudly during a class and make lots of noise, so I 
shout, ‘keep quiet!’ but nobody has any reaction. They just focus on 
their own business and do not care about you. They do not even have 
an awareness of ‘how should I behave in front of the teachers?’, which 
they should have.  
The negative emotions that this teacher has perceived come from her 
expectation that the parents should be cooperative and the students should 
be obedient. With these ideal behaviours, the parents and students would 
be contributors to the ‘quality education’ mission, which is the ideal of the 
discourse of education for practitioners, a discourse that places emphasis 
on teaching and learning. Third, more than half of the respondent teachers 
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and school leaders reported a shortage of teaching and learning resources 
in their school owing to the recruitment of a disproportionately large number 
of migrant students. The teachers report that the average teaching 
resources for each child has decreased, while headteachers report that the 
schools have to turn specialist music and arts classrooms into regular 
classrooms at the expense of losing these specialist spaces. The school 
leaders report that the small class teaching reform in their schools, which 
aims to improve educational quality through the reduction of class sizes, 
has had to be stopped.  
  With all these negative emotions and perceived burdens and difficulties, 
around half of the respondent teachers and school leaders conclude that 
there is an ongoing tendency of ‘declining educational quality’. Just as a 
headteacher reports: 
The educational quality is declining… We have never been like this: 
this year, the school’s exam scores in Chinese and Maths are even 
below the average score of all schools in Fengtai District! This is the 
result of recruiting the extra group [beyond the school’s recruiting 
capacity] of around 50 migrant children last year, under the request of 
the district municipal of education. (Headteacher, state primary school 
B)  
What can be identified from the above analysis is the educators define 
quality education mainly by the academic and behavioural performance of 
students. This version of ‘quality education’, which acts as the ‘grids of 
specification’ (Foucault, 2002: 46), produces the object of discourse – 
‘declining educational quality’. The conclusions reached by the teachers 
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and headteachers of a situation of ‘declining educational quality’ seem 
unchallengeable, yet the way they interpret these facts in order to draw this 
conclusion is worth further discussion. If examined from another 
perspective, the same facts might produce a different conclusion. 
Education is successful in terms of social inclusion: entry into the state 
schools in Beijing and Shanghai gives migrant children equal status with 
local children and also allows them to live together with their parents, rather 
than being sent back to their parents’ hometowns alone. This situation is 
likely to positively influence their emotional and social development, which 
might also be considered as an element of ‘quality education’. However, 
this positive aspect has been eliminated by the teachers, who act as the 
‘authorities of delimitation’ (Foucault, 2002: 46). In this discursive formation, 
a statement that recruiting migrant children leads to the declining 
educational quality emerges. Accordingly, a small number of school 
leaders even consider recruiting migrant children as a ‘mandatory political 
task’, a burden they have to accept. As a headteacher complains:  
If it is not because of the - I would rather call it a “mandatory political 
task” [硬性政治任务 ] - from the city and district municipality of 
education, our school really cannot recruit so many migrant children, 
since we need to maintain the quality of education (Headteacher, state 
primary school B).  
For this headteacher, the commitment to education is focused on 
classroom practice and abstracted from the wider political and social 
contexts. As a result, while acknowledging that most of the migrant children 
are studying and behaving well (see also, chapter 2, section 4), most of the 
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respondent teachers and headteachers expressed their reluctance to 
recruit migrant children. While these teachers and school leaders all know 
that, rejected by the state school, these children might lose the chance of 
accessing formal education or have to leave their parents and study alone 
in their hometown, resulting in educational inequality, none of them 
consider this as an educational issue which is their responsibility. The 
discursive formation removes the teachers as a potential source of 
opposition to the local government’s new restrictive policy for migrants’ 
access to schooling, facilitating the marginalization of migrant family’s 
voices against the new policy.   
  Before 2013, under the social justice discourse in the political field, the 
local government had full responsibility for the school enrolment of migrant 
children (see chapter 7). In global metropolises like Beijing, the local 
municipalities of education are concerned not with the teachers’ worries 
over education quality, but with creating enough school places for the 
incoming migrant children (who are positioned as the ‘outsiders’). For the 
Beijing Municipality of Education, the existing state schools are already full, 
while setting up new schools is understood as financially and practically 
unrealistic. According to officers B, C and D, the floating nature and 
instability of the migrant population makes choosing the location for a new 
school extremely complex, not to mention that it is extremely hard to find 
suitable land to build a school campus in the inner city. According to these 
officers, when the local government is undertaking school campus planning, 
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whether to establish a new school and how many schools should be 
established is normally dependent on the number of students who hold the 
local HR card, as they are considered by the officers as the stable 
population. What can be identified here is the conceptual binary opposition 
of ‘stable vs. unstable/floating population’, which is in line with the 
discourse of the ‘outsider’. Under this discourse, those who do not hold the 
local HR card are tagged as ‘floating’ and ‘unstable’, and therefore are not 
included in the local school planning agenda. Facing huge pressure for 
school places from the migrant children, since 2013 the local governments 
in Beijing and Shanghai adopted the new national policy agenda of limiting 
migrant populations (see chapter 7, section 3.2). To achieve this, they have 
enhanced the state school enrolment criteria, as I will elaborate in the next 
section.  
  Like the local government, before 2013 the Ministry of Education had 
also been under pressure from public opinion for failing to recruit all migrant 
children into state schools nationwide. After 2013, the enhanced local state 
school enrolment criteria formed part of a new discourse, which was then 
affirmed by the Ministry. The emergence of a strict state school enrolment 
criteria system reduced the public’s anticipation of recruiting all migrant 
children into state schools, as argued by Ministry of Education officer A:  
Some migrant children do not meet the criteria to enrol in state schools 
in the receiving cities, but we cannot help them. Our principle is that 
we guarantee those who meet the criteria will enrol in state schools; 
for those who do not meet the criteria, we do not offer them places.  
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In officer A’s formulation, it seems reasonable that the migrant parents 
should take the responsibility for not meeting the criteria. Yet a key point 
has been concealed in this discourse, namely, whose interest is the criteria 
system protecting? With the confirmation of the Ministry, limiting migrant 
population size becomes a principle of the national education policy 
agenda. In 2014, a new policy featured in MOE’s The Decisions on 
Facilitating Students’ ‘Accessing to the Nearest Junior Secondary School 
without Exams’. The text notes that: ‘the metropolitan areas should 
facilitate the school enrolment of migrant children who meet the criteria in 
a step by step way, according to its urban developmental plan, aim of 
population size control, and the capability of educational resources’. It 
disclosures the link between the state school enrolment criteria and the 
national policy aim of limiting migrant population size.  
  As I have revealed in this section, this national educational policy agenda 
is the production of the consensus of interests between local state schools 
and teachers, local government and central government, shaped by the 
social regularities in the broader education and migration context. In the 
next section, I will elaborate what has happened within the context of policy 
text production. The new policy agenda has produced the restrictive state 
school enrolment criteria system, which redefines compulsory education 
as social welfare.  
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4. Context of policy text production: redefining compulsory education 
as social welfare 
Since 2013, the central government policy started to limit the population 
size of the super-large cities in a strict way. It is important to note that the 
agenda limiting migrant population size has produced a series of different 
policies in different fields. In the economic field, for example, a way of 
reducing migrant populations in the cities is to move the labour-intensive 
industry to suburban areas. In the social welfare field, enhancing the 
welfare admittance criteria became a specifically suitable way of reducing 
migrant populations, as migrants without local HR card are considered as 
outsiders and therefore not entitled to the local social welfare. Accessing 
compulsory education in one’s place of residence, which was once 
considered as a basic right for migrant children, has now been redefined 
as a restricted type of social welfare. The migrant children’s schooling issue 
has been included into the social welfare arena. In my interviews with 
government officers, I asked four of them (two in Beijing and two in 
Shanghai) about the function of the criteria system. All of them interpret 
that the purpose of setting up the criteria system is to judge whether a 
migrant person is truly working in this city, and to make sure the person is 
a ‘contributor to the city’ so they can be offered the right to access the local 
educational welfare. What lies behind the officers’ comment is a welfare 
discourse under which the state school education is understood as a 
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restricted type of social welfare open to all local residents, and occasionally 
open to those ‘outsiders’ who have a justifiable reason for living in and 
contributing to the city.  
  In the remaining part of this section, I will analyse each of the criteria in 
depth to reveal the grids of specification underneath the criteria and how 
they have contributed to the formation of the discursive object, namely, the 
people who are entitled to the educational welfare. Through establishing 
the criteria system, the welfare discourse has occupied a dominant position 
in the educational policy field. As Ball comments, policy discourses 
‘organise their own specific rationalities, making particular sets of ideas 
obvious, common sense and “true”’ (Ball, 2008: 5). In the meantime, the 
social justice discourse of ‘education as a basic right’ is marginalized. 
Before I undertake such detailed analysis, I would like to outline in brief the 
state school enrolment criteria in Beijing and Shanghai. In Beijing, the city 
government merely lists the five required documents without listing the 
specific requirements for each document. These specific requirements are 
at the discretion of the district government. Therefore, in my analysis of the 
criteria system in Beijing, I will adopt an example from one of its districts 
(see Table 9). In Shanghai, the city government sets up specific 
requirements for each of the documents, which are followed by the district 
government (see Table 10).  
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Table 9: the specific requirements of the ‘Five Documents’ in Xicheng, Beijing 
(2012-2015)1 
Document Year 
2012 2013 2014 2015 
Proof of 
Employment  
N/A N/A Paying for social insurance 
for at least three months 
before application 
· Already paid social 
insurance for at least three 
months;  
· Both parents’ Proof of 
Employment should be 
provided;  
· One of the parents should 
work in Xicheng;  
· Individual businessman 
should pay taxes in Xicheng.  
Proof of House 
Renting / 
Ownership  
N/A N/A · Shared house renting and 
basement renting are not 
recognized as valid;  
· An address only provides 
one state school enrolment 
quota for the same family 
within 6 years. 
· Shared house renting and 
basement renting are not 
recognized as valid;  
· An address only provides 
one state school enrolment 
quota for the same family 
within 6 years.  
Proof of No 
Guardian in the 
Hometown  
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Temporary 
Residential Permit2 
N/A N/A Both parents’ certificate 
should be issued in Xicheng  
Both parents’ certificate 
should be issued in Xicheng  
Household 
registration card3  
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
																																																						
1 Data source: Xicheng District Municipal of Education’s Regulation on Student 
Recruitment in Compulsory education age (2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015)  
2 This is a required document for all migrants living in a place other than their 
household registration (hukou) place. This document is similar to the passport for 
international migrants. 
3 The household registration card is similar to the ID card, it would always be 
required during the administrative procedures in China. 
	 224	
 
Table 10: the specific requirements of the criteria in Shanghai (2014 & 2015)1 
Document Year 
2014 2015 
Option 1: Long-term Residence 
Permit 
N/A N/A 
Option 2: Temporal Residence 
Permit + Proof of Flexible 
Employment 
The Temporal Residence 
Permit should be registered 
for at least 2 years 
· The Temporal Residence Permit 
should be registered for at least 3 
years 
· The Proof of Flexible Employment 
should be registered for at least 2 
years 
Household registration card N/A N/A 
Proof of Vaccination N/A N/A 
 
  In Beijing, the Proof of Employment has been a regular requirement in 
most of the annual state school recruitment policies since 2002. It was 
abandoned by the annual policy in 2011, but was reinstated by the 2012 
policy. After 2013, the district level municipals of education started to add 
some specific requirements under this criterion. For example, in Xicheng 
District the applicant’s Proof of Employment should meet all the following 
requirements: the applicant should have already paid for social insurance 
for at least three months; both parents of the migrant children should 
provide proof of employment; one of the parents should work in Xicheng; 
and individual businessmen should pay taxes in Xicheng. According to the 
																																																						
1  Data source: Shanghai Municipal of Education’s Regulation on Student 
Recruitment in Compulsory education age (2014 & 2015)  
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government officers’ interpretation, there are two basic reasons why the 
government requires the Proof of Employment, especially with the newly 
added specific requirements by district governments. First, holding this 
document means that the person is a ‘contributor to the city’. As officer F 
explains,  
Only the people who have got a legal job in Beijing are able to obtain 
the Proof of Employment. Therefore, it can be used to identify that a 
person is a ‘contributor to the city’. Therefore, his/her children are 
entitled to enjoy the educational welfare provided by this city. (Officer 
F, Mentougou Municipal of Education, Beijing) 
In other words, so long as you are working in a legal job, you are making 
direct contributions to this city by paying tax, consuming, and making the 
city operate. If both parents are working, the contribution your family can 
make is doubled, and therefore is more appreciated. In order to ensure that 
your contributions are made directly to this district (rather than other 
districts in this city), the district government requires that the applicant’s 
proof of employment should be issued in this district. As officer H (Sub-
district Office of Culture & Education, Haidian District, Beijing) points out, 
‘if you are working and paying tax in other districts in Beijing, your children 
cannot enjoy the educational welfare provided by this district because you 
have not made contributions to this district’. Furthermore, requesting the 
applicant pay for social insurance is to make sure that the applicant is not 
only a contributor but also a stable contributor to the city. In other words, 
you should have been working in and contributing to this city (district) on a 
long-term basis. With the Proof of Employment (with all its specific criteria) 
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required, what has been established and reaffirmed is an important rule 
that the benefits you get are in accordance with the contributions you have 
made. Yet the same rule, and the social welfare discourse in total, is not 
found in the school enrolment of local students. In other words, holding a 
local HR card, even if their parents do not contribute to the local economy, 
means the children should still be entitled to access local education. What 
can be identified here is the trace of the ‘outsider’ discourse as a social 
regularity within the broader context of migration, which legitimates the full 
rights of the local HR card holders, yet limits the rights of the ‘outsiders’. 
While not written into the educational policy, this rule constructs the 
cornerstone of the welfare discourse. It has supplanted the formerly 
dominant discourse that people took for granted before 2013: accessing 
compulsory education in the place of residence is a basic right for each 
child.  
  Second, holding a Proof of Employment also means that the person has 
a ‘justifiable’ reason for living in the city and enjoying the social welfare 
provided by the city. In other words, this is to ‘prevent people from 
unjustifiably sending their children to the metropolitan areas for a better 
education, while they themselves are not based in that city’, as explained 
by officer A (Ministry of Education). The government can define a ‘justifiable’ 
reason as having a legal job. This concept reflects the government and 
local residents’ worry about the migrant population, especially about the 
motivation behind their migration. For example, it is assumed that some 
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people might migrate to live in (but not work in) the metropolitan areas just 
to get their children access to better education. This reveals some trace of 
the discourse of ‘outsider’, which constantly generates suspicion and 
hostility towards the migrant population from local residents and 
government. The trace of this social regularity emerges again in my 
analysis of other documents below, especially the Proof of No Guardian in 
the Hometown. Similar to the rule of the benefits in accordance with the 
contributions, the concept of justifiable reason offers a criterion for the 
government to eliminate some ‘unentitled’ people, thus it becoming another 
important rule of the social welfare discourse. Again, this rule has 
marginalized some basic questions relating to the newly set state school 
enrolment criteria, such as: do we really need a ‘justifiable reason’ for 
people to enjoy the basic social welfare in their place of residence? If yes, 
then who should define the justifiable reasons?  
  In Beijing, the Proof of House Renting / Ownership has been required 
since 2011. Between 2011 and 2014 there was no specific requirement 
under this document. Since 2014, the district municipalities of education 
started to add specific requirements, such as ‘an address only provides 
one state school enrolment quota within a six-year period for the families 
living there’. According to the government officers’ interpretation, this 
requirement aims to prevent people from unjustifiably renting a house in 
order to get their children access schools that they apparently do not 
deserve. As Beijing Municipality of Education officer B explains, in some 
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school districts with ‘good’ schools a common phenomenon is that people 
rent or buy a house in this district in order to get their children enrolled in 
their preferred schools. Then in the following year, they rent or sell the 
house to others who want to get their children enrolled in the schools in 
this district. Therefore, requiring that an address only provides one school 
enrolment quota within a six-year period is to prevent people from 
temporarily renting a property for this purpose. In short, the function of the 
Proof of House Renting / Ownership matches that of the Proof of 
Employment, in that they both raise the justifiable reason discourse.  
  Another requirement that contributes to the ‘justifiable reason’ concept is 
the Proof of No Guardian in the Hometown. In Beijing, this document has 
been required since 2012. Its function is to make sure that the child does 
not have a guardian in his/her hometown, so s/he needs to study in Beijing 
with his/her parents. This additional criterion is seemingly unnecessary, 
given that the government has already requested the Proof of Employment, 
the Proof of House Renting/Ownership, and the Temporary Residential 
Permit, which are enough to prove that the child’s parents (guardians) are 
based in Beijing. The government’s insistence on this concept indicates its 
symbolic significance, which is aiming to strengthen the ‘justifiable reason’ 
concept: the migrant children should have a justifiable reason for studying 
outside their hometown. Again, the outsider discourse has demonstrated 
itself through this document: the state school system in Beijing is not open 
to children who do not hold a local HR card; unless you can prove that you 
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do not have guardian in your hometown, you are not allowed to study in 
the local state school. These restrictions and regulations have the effect of 
making the reasoning behind the policy seem ‘natural’ to people, so that 
they (migrant and local parents as well as government officers) tend to take 
it for granted. During my interviews with the migrant parents, when I asked 
them why they wanted their children to study in Beijing or Shanghai, the 
first reason given would always be ‘our parents are too old to take care of 
our children, so the children do not have guardians in the hometown’. This 
argument is in line with the restrictive criteria, and believed by parents to 
be the most convincing reason. Alternative arguments such as ‘isn’t it 
natural that a child should access compulsory education in a place where 
his/her immediate family is currently living?’ are marginalized and are 
excluded from the debate.  
  Similarly, in Shanghai the city municipality of education has established 
a two-option choice criteria system since 2013: each applicant should 
provide the Household Registration Card and Proof of Vaccination1, and 
should provide the document(s) either through ‘Option 1’ or through ‘Option 
2’ (see Table 10). If choosing ‘Option 1’, the applicant should then provide 
the Long-term Residence Permit, in applying for which s/he should provide 
the Proof of Employment and should have paid for social insurance for at 
least six months (which normally means the person’s job is a formal and 
																																																						
1 This document is required to reduce the possibility of epidemic diseases. Both 
local and migrant children must have this. 
	 230	
full-time job rather than an occasional and part-time one). If choosing 
‘Option 2’, the applicant should provide the Temporal Residence Permit 
and the Proof of Flexible Employment. The latter is only issued to people 
who have certain expertise and are working in these fields of expertise. 
The government recognizes four areas of expertise, all of which are 
considered as in urgent need for the social and economic development of 
Shanghai: nursing, agricultural labour, domestic service, and small 
business owner. In other words, both options carry with them the rule of 
the benefits in accordance with the contributions. So as long as you have 
a job in Shanghai and paid social insurance for at least six months, your 
children are able to enrol in the local state schools (through ‘Option 1’). If 
you have not got a formal and full-time job and thus are not paying social 
insurance, then at least your job should fall within the government’s 
designated areas that meet the urgent needs of the city (through ‘Option 
2’).  
  Furthermore, the local municipality of education has established a 
‘hierarchical system of school access criteria’, as termed by officer K in 
Pudong District Municipal of Education. For example, in Minhang District 
in Shanghai, there is an order of priority in the state school enrolment if the 
number of qualified applicants (who all meet the state school enrolment 
criteria) exceeds the number of places available. The first priority is given 
to people who hold the local household registration card; second priority is 
given to people who have more than 120 credits (calculated by their ability 
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to contribute to the city) with their Long-term Residence Permit; third 
priority is given to people who have bought a house in this district; and the 
final group merely meet the state school enrolment criteria. In practice, as 
reported by many of the respondent migrant parents and school leaders, 
the local state school system has the capacity to recruit level one to three 
applicants. Yet for the level four applicants, while they meet the general 
state school enrolment criteria, they have to attend the quasi-state schools 
with inferior conditions compared to the formal state schools (see chapter 
11). Within this hierarchical system, moving up a level means that the 
contribution you have made to the city and your ‘justifiable reasons’ for 
living in the city are increasing, correspondingly. The hierarchical system is 
an intensive and straightforward presentation of the rule of the benefits in 
accordance with the contributions and the concept of justifiable reason. 
Functioning as the grids of specification, the rules contribute to the 
formation of the object of the welfare discourse - the people who are 
entitled to educational welfare - and weave the criteria into a whole system 
carrying the welfare discourse. This complicated system has been put into 
practice, facilitated by a standardization discourse, which I will detail in the 
next section.  
5. Context of practice: producing a ‘well-regulated’ criteria system   
When put into practice, the district government presents the compulsory 
criteria system in the form of a ‘user manual’ for parents, which includes 
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user-friendly websites, posters, checklists, and consulting services. The 
municipalities of education have created specific webpages that list all the 
detailed requirements for each document. The same information has also 
been put on posters displayed on local community bulletin boards. During 
the application period, the Sub-district Office of Culture and Education 
(SOCE) provides A4 size checklists containing all the above information to 
facilitate the preparation. The SOCE also provides a telephone consulting 
service for those who are not internet literate or policy text literate. In 
addition, a cooperative mechanism has been established among SOCE, 
municipal of education and state schools in the school recruitment process. 
The extra-curricular tutorial schools in the private sector are also involved 
in the creation and dissemination of the assorted policy literature by 
creating webpages to guide parents’ document preparation. Similarly, 
some kindergartens invite SOCE staff to conduct workshops to provide the 
parents with first-hand guidance for their document preparation. Presented 
in a user-friendly way, these manuals are appreciated by migrant parents. 
What can be identified from the above practice is the formation of a series 
of ‘policy artefacts’ (Ball, Meg and Annette, 2012: 121-136) to ‘visualize’ 
these criteria. Facilitated by the policy artefacts, a comprehensive, efficient 
and well-regulated criteria system has been formed as a discursive object, 
as described by officer B:  
Since 2004, the standardization [规范化] of the criteria system started. 
In 2008, it was the first time that the Beijing Municipal of Education 
established the requirement of the ‘Three Documents’… But in 2011, 
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the ‘Three Documents’ was cut down to ‘Two Documents’… This back 
and forth situation reflects the hesitation of the [local] government, who 
were not sure what kinds of documents should be required. At that 
time, government was exploring, and the criteria system was to be 
standardized… Another problem is that the government supervision of 
the state school in its recruitment process was weak. It was the school 
that was in charge of the document checks and student recruitment, 
and there was not a ‘national student ID website network’ for 
government to monitor the student recruitment. As a result, subject to 
the decision of the headteacher, a migrant child can enrol in a state 
school without any documents. The whole process was not regulated. 
We started to require the ‘Five Documents’ since 2012. In 2013, 2014 
and 2015, we continued this documentation system, which has been 
increasingly standardized. Especially in 2015, the requirements of 
each document are formulated clearly in the policy text, including: 
what are the specific requirements of each document? Where should 
you get these documents? Which government department is 
responsible for the document check? (Officer B, Beijing Municipality of 
Education)  
This well-constructed criteria system is highly appreciated by the city and 
district governments in Beijing and Shanghai, since it serves as an efficient 
mechanism to regulate the process of recruiting (or restricting) migrant 
children’s school access. Under the discursive formation, a managerial and 
highly efficient criteria system (which promotes the social welfare discourse) 
is identified as ‘well-regulated’, thus justifying its implementation, and 
defines the former, more flexible criteria (which promoted the social justice 
discourse) as lacking in regulation and effectiveness. The ‘standardization’ 
process of the criteria system is driven by the principles of bureaucratic 
managerial efficiency, as the grids of specification in the discursive 
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formation. Underlying the principle of managerial efficiency is the 
disciplinary powers of bureaucracy (Foucault, 1979), which I will return to 
in the next section.  
  Parents now have full knowledge of the criteria system: the specific 
requirements of each document; how they can obtain these documents; 
how long it takes to get each of them; what difficulties they might encounter 
during the preparation; and what kinds of educational welfare they can 
access given the documents they have. The more knowledge they have 
about the criteria system, the more they accept as normal the restrictive 
conception of social welfare. As Ball reminds us, ‘[i]n Foucault’s terms we 
could see policy ensembles that include, for example, the market, 
management, appraisal and performativity as “regimes of truth” through 
which people govern themselves and others’ (1994: 22). Here, the criteria 
system and its policy artefacts act as tools of management, producing the 
idea of education as social welfare as a ‘truth’, while facilitating the 
promotion of this truth through schools, kindergartens, extra-curricular 
tutorial schools, government officers and the migrants themselves. Yet it 
avoids some crucial issues: why increase the degree of regulation in the 
criteria system? In whose interests is this regulation? 
  If failing to meet the criteria, some migrant parents claim their children’s 
educational rights by highlighting their contributions to the city. As I have 
presented in chapter 7 (section 3.3), migrant mother En adopts the social 
welfare discourse to strengthen her statement: ‘we are also contributors to 
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this city like the local people…’. Yet, in return, this statement reinforces the 
welfare discourse, which legitimates limiting migrant population size policy 
and produces continuing hardships for the migrant group. Others try to 
challenge the welfare discourse by challenging the legitimacy of setting up 
the criteria. Just as migrant father Fei argues, ‘like local children, our 
children are also Chinese citizens. They deserve equal treatment in school 
enrolment. The children are innocent. Why can’t they just access school?! 
I am very unhappy with the restriction from the government’. This kind of 
statement was powerful during the pre-2011 period, legitimized by the 
premier’s slogan - ‘under the same sky, [migrant and local children] should 
grow and progress together’ [同在蓝天下，共同成长进步]. However, it has 
lost its power along with the marginalization of the social justice discourse 
after 2013. Just as Ball has commented: ‘policy as discourse may have the 
effect of redistributing “voice”, so that it does not matter what some people 
say or think, and only certain voices can be heard as meaningful or 
authoritative’ (1994: 23).  
  ‘Discourse is the condition under which certain statements are 
considered to be the truth’ (Ball, 2013: 19). As revealed by the above 
analysis, the discursive formation legitimises the following statements: 
recruiting migrant children leads to declining educational quality; state 
school education is social welfare; and standardization is necessary for the 
school enrolment practice. These statements permeate the policy 
trajectory and legitimise the restrictive criteria system. Following the spirit 
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of Foucault’s archaeology (Foucault, 2002), the above sections present the 
discursive formation throughout the policy cycle. My analysis has also 
given a clue as to the power relations in the discursive practices, which is 
a main task of Foucault’s genealogy (Foucault, 1978, 1979). In the next 
section, I will concentrate on the power relations in Chinese society and 
their interrelations with the discursive formations.  
6. The power relations invested and realized in the discursive 
formation 
As suggested by Ball, power relation ‘is a central concept in the analysis of 
education and education policy’ (Ball, 2013: 29). From the above 
discussion, several aspects of the power relations in society can be 
identified. First, formed under the exam-orientated education tradition, the 
dominant discourse of school education as being mainly about ‘quality’ 
teaching and learning (defined in relation to exam results) shapes what Ball 
identifies as the ‘meaning of educational practice – what it means to teach 
and learn – and our sense of who we are in terms of these practices – what 
it means to be an educator, and to be educated’ (2013: 6). Taking this 
discourse for granted, the schools emphasis academic performance (in 
terms of the scores) as the core of the quality of the education they offer, 
and the educators enact this version of education in their teaching practice. 
This puts a high demand on the students’ familial cultural capital. Indeed, 
the issue of cultural capital introduces us to another aspect of the power 
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relations – the cultural imperialism (Young, 1990) of the privileged over the 
dominated; the latter, in this research, is the population group of rural 
working-class migrants (see chapter 10, section 2 and section 3). The 
cultural capital valued in the urban schools, as a field of cultural production, 
has been socially constructed as that of urban middle-class. This situation 
leads to migrant children’s difficulties in academic study in urban schools 
(Mu and Jia, 2016; Zhang and Luo, 2016; see also chapter 2, section 4 and 
chapter 10, section 5.1). As a result, the practice of recruiting a large 
number of migrant children has been considered by the teachers in my 
research as causing ‘declining educational quality’. A third aspect of the 
power relations, which functions together with the first and second aspects, 
is the disciplinary power (Foucault, 1979) underpinning the traditionally 
established discourse of ‘outsider’. This discourse enacts the classification 
of population by differentiating the ‘outsider’ from the local residents, and 
reinforces the state sponsored ‘welfare chauvinism’ embodied in the 
household registration system. It sets the migrant group, as the ‘outsider’, 
in a disadvantaged position in their struggle with local residents, teachers, 
schools and government in the urban field. In short, as Foucault maintains, 
power is the way in which individuals are constructed as ‘subject to 
someone else by control and dependence; and tied to his own identity by 
a conscience or self-knowledge’ (1982: 781). In my research context, the 
migrants are objectivized as ‘outsiders’ and as a risk to the educational 
quality of the school. The power relations between local residents, migrants, 
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educators, schools and government produce the formation and 
legitimisation of the restrictive criteria system in the policy trajectory, more 
specifically, in the contexts of influence and policy text production. When 
coming to the context of practice, the criteria system is again reinforced by 
the disciplinary powers of bureaucracy, which promote the principle of 
managerial efficiency through the ‘well-regulated’ criteria system. The 
standardization of the criteria system sets standards to unify the practice 
to enact the social welfare discourse, which is formed under the context of 
policy text production.  
7. Conclusion  
In this chapter, I have integrated a series of Foucauldian theoretical 
resources into a conceptual framework. Extending Foucault’s concept of 
‘discourse’, Ball’s conceptualization of ‘policy as discourse’ and ‘policy as 
text’ (1990, 1994) provides the conceptual foundation for my analysis. I 
adopt the ‘policy cycle’ (Bowe, Ball and Gold, 1992) as the basic framework 
to outline the scope of my analysis. I also complement the ‘policy cycle’ 
with ‘policy archaeology’ (Foucault, 2002; Scheurich, 1994) to direct my 
analytical focus to the discursive formation of educational policy. Applying 
this updated conceptual framework to the Chinese context, the findings of 
this chapter contribute to research on the discursive formation of 
educational policy and the underlying power relations.  
  The policy agenda of limiting migrant population size offers a consensus 
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of interests between teachers, state schools, local government and central 
government, and has been introduced into the educational policy field 
within the context of influence. This new agenda produces a restrictive 
state school enrolment criteria system, which leads to a discourse of 
education as social welfare informing the context of policy text production. 
Under the social welfare discourse, accessing compulsory education in 
one’s place of residence is understood as social welfare rather than a basic 
right. Two underlying principles have played an important role in the 
construction of the welfare discourse: the benefits you receive are in 
accordance with the contributions you have made; and having a ‘justifiable’ 
reason for living in and claiming welfare from this city. The formation of both 
this aspect of the state school enrolment criteria and the agenda of  
limiting the size of the are shaped by social regularities in the broader social 
context of education and migration. One is the discourse that education is 
all about teaching and learning and the construction of an ‘ideal’ pupil to 
fulfil teachers’ agendas; the other is a broader social and cultural discourse 
of the ‘outsider’. Shifting to the context of practice, the restrictive school 
enrolment criteria system becomes standardized and legitimized through 
the user-friendly policy artefacts established by the local government. 
Throughout the discursive formation of education as social welfare, the four 
contexts construct a ‘policy cycle’. The coexistence and permeable nature 
of the four contexts is especially clear when we regard how the social 
regularities shape the production of the new educational policy agenda, 
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and shape the selection of certain criteria (not others) in the policy text.  
  As Ball reminds us, ‘we need to appreciate the way in which policy 
ensembles, collections of related policies, exercise power through a 
production of “truth” and “knowledge”, as discourses’ (1994: 21, original 
emphasis). What are invested and realized in the discursive practices of 
the policy change are the disciplinary power and the ‘cultural imperialism’ 
of the privileged over the dominated, which objectivize migrants as 
‘outsiders’ and as a risk to the educational quality of the school. These 
power relations are embodied in the school and educator’s emphasis on 
academic performance (in terms of test scores), in the privileging of urban 
and middle-class culture in the school system, in the traditionally 
established discourse of ‘outsider’, and in the principles of bureaucratic 
managerial efficiency in the policy artefacts. The discursive practices result 
in further difficulties for migrant families in schooling. As they are a 
marginalized group in the educational field, the migrant families’ voices 
against the welfare discourse are largely unheard by schools and policy 
makers. Through the lens of ‘discourse’, this chapter tries to reveal the 
inseparable nature of ‘knowledge/power’ within policies, and highlights the 
power relations between local residents, migrants, educators, schools and 
governments in and throughout their mundane social interactions.  
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Part III 
The analysis of Part III is organized around this question: what kind of 
education and school experiences do migrant children have after 
they have enrolled in state (or quasi-state) schools?  
 
Chapter 9: Towards multiple types of schooling 
This chapter reviews the historical development and current situation of 
various types of schools available to migrant children and the migrant 
children’s experiences in these schools. It provides a foundation for the 
further analyses in chapter 10 and chapter 11.  
1. Introduction 
As stated earlier, since 2001, the local governments nationwide have tried 
hard to make sure the majority of migrant children could enrol in local state 
schools. In addition, the city governments have also provided some 
migrant children with private school education by paying for their tuition 
fees. By the end of 2014, nationwide there were 1.25 million migrant 
children studying in private schools with tuition fees paid by the government 
(He, 2015). In Shanghai, the percentage is higher. According to my 
fieldwork findings in Beijing and Shanghai, there are five types of schools 
from both state and private sector that recruit migrant children. These 
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schools have two shared origins, namely, state school or unlicensed 
informal private (UIP) school, as I will review in this chapter.  
2. State school 
Before the promulgation of the ‘Two Main Channel’ (TMC) policy, state 
schools only recruited a small number of migrant children. This situation 
changed after 2001. In recent years, the state school sector has recruited 
around 77%-80% migrant children nationwide, as shown in Table 11. At the 
local level, the recruitment figures in Beijing (see Table 12) and Shanghai 
(see Table 13) are in accordance with the national picture. Admittedly, the 
percentage of migrant children who are studying in state schools has not 
increased greatly during these years. However, the number of migrant 
children who are studying in state schools has increased significantly, since 
the total number of migrant children has been increasing every year.  
 
Table 11: the number of migrant children of compulsory education age 
nationwide (2007-2014)  
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Year Number (million) State school 
enrolment 
percentage 
2007 (Lack of data)  77.5% 1 
2008 (Lack of data)  77.2% 2 
2009 (Lack of data)  78.2% 3 
2010 4 11,67 (8.64 in primary and 3.02 in junior secondary schools) 79.2% 5 
2011 6 12.61 (9.33 in primary and 3.28 in junior secondary schools) 79.4% 7 
2012 8 13.94 (10.36 in primary and 3.58 in junior secondary schools) (Lack of data) 
2013 9 12.77 (9.31 in primary and 3.46 in junior secondary schools) (Lack of data)  
2014 10 12.95 (9.56 in primary and 3.39 in junior secondary schools) (Lack of data) 
2015 11 13.67 (10.14 in primary and 3.53 in junior secondary schools) (Lack of data) 
 
 
 
 
																																																						
1 Data source: unpublished Ministry of Education statistical data (obtained from interview) 
2 Data source: unpublished Ministry of Education statistical data (obtained from interview) 
3 Data source: unpublished Ministry of Education statistical data (obtained from interview) 
4 Data source: MOE official website: ‘2010 national education development statistical 
bulletin’ 
(http:www.moe.gov.cn/srcsite/A03/s180/moe_633/201203/t20120321_132634.html) 
5 Data source: unpublished MOE statistical data (obtained from interview) 
6 Data source: MOE official website: ‘2011 national education development statistical 
bulletin’ 
(http:www.moe.gov.cn/srcsite/A03/s180/moe_633/201208/t20120830_141305.html) 
7 Data source: unpublished MOE statistical data (obtained from interview) 
8 Data source: MOE official website: ‘2012 national education development statistical 
bulletin’ 
(http:www.moe.edu.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/moe/moe_633/201308/155798.html)   
9 Data source: MOE official website: ‘2013 national education development statistical 
bulletin’ 
(http:www.moe.edu.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/moe/moe_633/201407/171144.html) 
10 Data source: MOE official website: ‘2014 national education development statistical 
bulletin’ 
(http:www.moe.edu.cn/srcsite/A03/s180/moe_633/201508/t20150811_199589.html) 
11  Data source: Ministry of Education official website: ‘2014 national education 
development statistical bulletin’ 
(http:www.moe.edu.cn/srcsite/A03/s180/moe_633/201508/t20150811_199589.html) 
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Table 12: the number of migrant children of compulsory education age in Beijing 
(2010-2014) 
Year  Number  State school enrolment 
percentage 
2000  98,0001 70.7% 2 
20013 150,000 66.4% 
20024 180,000 75.0% 
20035 240,000 71.2% 
20046 320,700 66.2% 
2005 (Lack of data) (Lack of data) 
20067 370,000 69.1% 
2007 (Lack of data) (Lack of data) 
20088 400,000 69.0% 
2009 (Lack of data) (Lack of data) 
20109 438,000 70.8%  
201110 478,000 70.9% 
201211 491,000 74.7% 
201312 529,000 75.8% 
																																																						
1 Data source: Beijing Academy of Educational Sciences official website online 
report: ‘Setting up a comprehensive administrative mechanism for migrant 
children’s compulsory education in Beijing’ (http:58.135.194.5/index.asp)  
2 Data source: Education Supervision Bureau of People's Government of Beijing 
Municipality official website online report: ‘An investigation of floating children’s 
schooling and unregistered informal private schools in Beijing’ 
(http:www.bjjydd.gov.cn/)   
3 Data resource: Yuan et al. (2013: 32) 
4 Data resource: Yuan et al. (2013: 32) 
5 Data resource: Yuan et al. (2013: 32) 
6 Data resource: Yuan et al. (2013: 32) 
7 Data resource: Yuan et al. (2013: 32) 
8 Data resource: Yuan et al. (2013: 32) 
9 Data resource: Yuan et al. (2013: 32) 
10 Data source: Author. 2011. ‘Over seventy percent of migrant children have 
enrolled in state schools in Beijing’, Xinmin Evening News, October 25. 
http:xmwb.xinmin.cn/xmwb/html/2011-10/25/content_11_4.htm 
11  Beijing Municipality of Education website data: ‘A brief introduction to the 
education in Beijing (2012)’ 
(http:www.bjedu.gov.cn/publish/portal27/tab1654/info38597.htm)  
12 Data source: Author. 2015. ‘The numbers in the educational reform in Beijing’, 
China Education Daily, April 28. http://paper.jyb.cn/zgjyb/html/2015-
04/28/content_434566.htm?div=-1 
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2014 (Lack of data) 82.6% 1 
 
 
Table 13: the number of migrant children in compulsory education age in 
Shanghai (2001-2012) 
Year Number  State and government funded private school 
enrolment percentage 
2001 286,0002 (Lack of data) 
2002 319,0003 (Lack of data) 
2003 346,0004 34.68%5 
2004 378,0006 39.68%7 
20058 381,757  49.05% 
20069 385,703  53.88% 
2007 384,00010 (Lack of data) 
200811 402,00012 74.36% 
200913 420,000  92.7% (66.51% in state and 26.19% in private schools) 
																																																						
1  Data source: unpublished Beijing Municipality of Education statistical data 
(obtained from interview)  
2 Data source: Lu (2013: 8) 
3 Data source: Lu (2013: 8) 
4 Data source: Lu (2013: 8) 
5 Data source: Shanghai Municipality of Education official website: ‘The annual 
report of education in Shanghai (2004)’ 
(http:www.shmec.gov.cn/web/xxgk/rows_list.php?node_code=904) 
6 Data source: Lu (2013: 8) 
7 Data source: Shanghai Municipality of Education official website: ‘The annual 
report of education in Shanghai (2004)’ 
(http:www.shmec.gov.cn/web/xxgk/rows_list.php?node_code=904) 
8 Data source: Tian and Wu (2010: 217) 
9 Data source: Tian and Wu (2010: 217) 
10 Data source: Lu (2013: 8)  
11 Data source: Shanghai Municipality of Education official website: ‘What is the 
policy aim of improving migrant children’s education?’ 
(http:www.shmec.gov.cn/web/jyzt/ssxm09/jyzt_show.php?area_id=2540&article_
id=49645)  
12 Data source: Lu (2013: 8) 
13 Data source: Shanghai Municipality of Education official website: ‘The annual 
report of education in Shanghai (2009)’ 
(http:www.shmec.gov.cn/web/xxgk/rows_list.php?node_code=904) 
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20101 470,000  100%  
20112 501,700 100% (73.53% in state and 26.47% in private schools)  
20123 538,000 100% (74.72% in state and 25.28% in private schools) 
  
  According to the state school enrolment policy, a school should give the 
first priority to local students. If there are still vacancies after recruiting local 
students, then migrant children can be recruited. When enrolled in state 
schools, the migrant children enjoy free education, the same as their local 
classmates. Under the TMC policy, the state schools in Beijing and 
Shanghai have been trying hard to enrol as many migrant children as 
possible. Taking the school B (in Fengtai District, Beijing) as an example: 
the maximum recruitment quota of this school was 60, which was 
calculated by its maximum teacher and facility capacity. However, in 2012, 
nearly 400 students (mostly migrant children) applied to this school. Finally, 
under pressure from the district municipality of education, the school 
enlarged its recruitment number to 96. This number is far beyond the 
school’s capacity, and the extra 36 students have caused an overload of 
teachers’ work and a deficiency in teaching resources. The same situation 
arose in school C in the same district: this school’s maximum recruitment 
quota was 180, but it finally recruited 230 students. There were 50 extra 
																																																						
1 Data source: Shanghai Municipality of Education official website: ‘The progress 
of the three-year plan (2008-2010) for migrant children’s compulsory education’ 
(http:www.shmec.gov.cn/web/wsbs/webwork_article.php?article_id=60548).  
2 Data source: Shanghai Municipality of Education official website: ‘The annual 
report of education in Shanghai (2011)’ 
(http:www.shmec.gov.cn/web/xxgk/rows_list.php?node_code=904) 
3 Data source: Shanghai Municipality of Education official website: ‘The annual 
report of education in Shanghai (2012)’ 
(http:www.shmec.gov.cn/web/xxgk/rows_list.php?node_code=904) 
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migrant children allocated to this school directly by the district municipality 
of education.  
  As a result of losing local children because of their school choice and at 
the same time recruiting more and more migrant children, many state 
schools in Beijing and Shanghai have recruited more migrant than local 
students and hence become migrant majority schools. In Beijing, in 2013 
there were 562 schools (out of the total number of 1,440 schools for 
compulsory education age pupils) in which the percentage of migrant 
children is greater than 50%, and the highest percentage was 98%, as 
reported by Beijing Municipality of Education officers B and C. This 
phenomenon is common in both cities, as reported by all of the 
headteachers and municipality of education officers I interviewed, and is 
particularly notable in those districts with a large and concentrated migrant 
population. For example, the headteacher of school B reports that in 
Fengtai district of Beijing, except for several elite schools, most of the 
ordinary schools surrounded by migrant communities have a migrant 
population of more than 80%. Among the eleven schools I investigated 
(which were chosen through snowball sampling), two of them have more 
than 90% migrant students, six have 60-87% and the remaining three have 
30-40%. A direct reason is a matter of location. As a result of the increasing 
number of migrant workers living in the city, some communities have 
moved towards a migrant majority population. Another reason is the 
reputation of the school. Indeed, most of the respondent headteachers and 
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teachers were aware of the poor status of their schools locally (see chapter 
2, section 4). Therefore some local parents managed to send their children 
to other schools outside of their school district, a process that involves the 
possession and activation of social and economic capital (Lu, 2013; Zhou, 
2012). Unable to attract local students, the schools have vacancies and 
therefore have recruited migrant children to reach their capacity. When the 
percentage of migrant children increased, these schools entirely lost their 
appeal for many of the local students living nearby. This phenomenon is 
termed as the Chinese version of the ‘white flight’ (Coleman et al., 1975) 
by Qian and Walker (2015). They point out that these schools are 
nicknamed ‘street market schools’ by the local residents since they believe 
that migrant children spend their pre-school years in street markets. As a 
result of such negative impressions of migrant families, many local parents 
‘explore every opportunity to find another school for their children’ (Qian 
and Walker, 2015: 78). Their argument matches with other studies, which 
note that the migrant group is experiencing negative attitudes and even 
discrimination from some local residents (Goodburn, 2009; Chen et al., 
2011). As reported by some of the respondent migrant parents and 
teachers, some local parents who have a relatively high socio-economic 
background believe that given their rural origin and labourer working 
conditions, migrants do not have good behaviours, good hygiene habits, or 
a positive attitude to studying. These local parents do not want their 
children to be classmates with migrant children, worrying that the migrant 
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children might have a negative influence on their children. Finally, in recent 
years, under pressure from the local municipality of education, most of the 
state schools have recruited additional migrant children beyond their 
capacity. This also contributes to the increasing percentage of migrant 
children in state schools. 
  Within the state school system there are a small number of schools that 
are specifically run for migrant children. This kind of school does not reject 
local children. In other words, if local students in the school district want to 
enrol in these schools, they can still enrol. Nevertheless, according to my 
interview with the school headteachers, only a few local parents are willing 
to send their children to these schools because most of them do not 
consider these schools as ‘good’ schools, since they have been designated 
by the government to run for migrant children specifically. These schools 
have different developmental trajectories. The schools on the first 
trajectory are a product of district municipality of education’s enactment of 
the TMC policy. For example, in 2002, a year after the TMC policy’s 
promulgation, the Shijingshan Municipality of Education designated four 
state schools (two primary and two junior secondary) to run for migrant 
children specifically. As noted above (see chapter 7, section 3.1), Premier 
Jiabao Wen even wrote the inscription ‘Under the same sky, [migrant and 
local children] should grow and progress together’ [同在蓝天下，共同成长
进步 ] for one of the four schools to encourage the receiving local 
government to implement the TMC policy. A similar reform occurred in 
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Shanghai in the same period. The schools in the second trajectory are 
found in Baoshan District in Shanghai with five1 senior secondary schools 
for adult students. The adult schools are not responsible for recruiting 
students of compulsory education age. Yet since some of them have 
surplus teaching resources, in order to earn extra fees to enhance the 
teachers’ income, they started to recruit migrant children from the early 
2000s. Later, this innovative action was affirmed by the district municipality 
of education since it realized that this kind of school could help recruiting 
migrant children. Therefore, the government started to fund these schools 
to support their recruitment of migrant children. I will give detailed 
elaborations of how this type of schooling was formed under what 
conditions in chapter 11 (section 2.3).  
  The following is the educational experience of a migrant family in the 
state schools in Beijing. I present the family’s socio-economic background, 
their experiences of state school enrolment and the children’s academic 
study conditions and peer relations in schools. Migrant mother Bai is 
originally from Hebei Province. She has been living in Beijing for more than 
ten years. Currently she does not have a stable career and instead works 
occasional jobs. Her husband is a building maintenance worker. They have 
two sons who were both born and raised in Beijing. The older son enrolled 
in a state junior high school in September 2014 after graduating from the 
																																																						
1 Data source: reported by an interviewed headteacher of this kind of school in 
Baoshan district  
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state primary school (school A) in which his younger brother enrolled in 
September 2012. Both schools are near the community in which they live. 
Bai reports that in 2014, the state school enrolment criteria became 
especially strict and some of their friends were unable to prepare some of 
the required documents (see chapter 8, section 4 for details). As a result, 
they had to send their children back to their hometowns. Luckily, this family 
prepared all the required documents well in advance and sent their older 
son to a state junior high school. When talking about her sons’ schooling 
experiences, Bai feels satisfied with the education they have received. A 
key point she mentioned is that the teachers are competent and 
responsible – ‘they have the spirit of educators’, as described by Bai. When 
asked if there is a ‘local/migrant’ division with regard to the children’s peer 
relationships in school, she does not think her sons have experienced this, 
as they were both born and raised in Beijing (like most of their classmates). 
The younger son, when asked who his friends are in his school, talks about 
the classmates who share the same interests as him - he plays basketball 
and attends an extra-curricular basketball course after school (paid for by 
his parents). He also talks about his friends who are also his neighbours 
and thus often come back home (or travel to school) with him. He does not 
mention the local/migrant division. As I will elaborate later, being born and 
raised in Beijing, the children’s habitus have been urbanized and they have 
gained relevant cultural capital in the urban school field (see chapter 10, 
section 4 and section 5.2). If compared with the other types of schooling, 
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as I will present in the next two sections, the state school is the ideal choice 
for the migrant children with regard to access to equal educational 
resources.  
3. Unlicensed informal private (UIP) school 
This type of school emerged in the late 1990s when some migrant children 
were rejected by receiving local state schools and were unable to afford to 
enrol in formal private schools. There was a boom of UIP schools in 
metropolitan areas such as Beijing and Shanghai during late 1990s and 
early 2000s. For example, in Beijing the number of UIP schools increased 
to 152 in 2000 and to 263 in 2005.1 Additionally, in some existing schools, 
their student numbers increased drastically. To offer an example, the 
headteacher of school H reported that his school was established in 1997 
with less than a hundred students. By the end of 1999, the number of 
students increased to 1,400, and in 2004 to 3,000.  
  The informal nature of these schools was formalised by two Ministry of 
Education policies in 1996 and 1998. The 1996 policy of The Regulation 
on the Compulsory Education of Floating Children in Cities and Towns 
(Trial) legitimates the establishment of informal educational settings by 
stating that ‘[i]f the children are not able to access state school, they can 
study in all forms of classes and study groups to access informal education’. 
This policy also sets up loose requirements for these educational settings 
																																																						
1  Data source: unpublished Beijing Municipality of Education statistical data 
(obtained from interview)  
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in terms of their organisational forms and teaching content:   
These classes and study groups can operate in the forms of night 
schools, weekend schools and holiday schools. In the primary level, 
the educational setting could offer only Chinese and Maths courses 
with the content aimed to eliminate illiteracy. In the junior secondary 
level, the setting could reduce its subjects. (1996 policy)  
These regulations accept the limitations of the educational level at which 
the schools can teach. Similarly, the 1998 policy of The Provisional 
Regulation on Floating Children’s School Attendance legitimates the 
informal nature of these schools by stating that ‘the established criteria of 
the informal school could be lower than that of regular school’. While 
legitimating the existence of these informal schools, the 1996 and 1998 
policies did not establish concrete responsibilities of the city and district 
government for supervising and supporting them. Without the 
government’s supervision, some schools did not have the standardized 
curriculum design and lacked certified teachers and basic teaching 
facilities (see chapter 3, section 2.3).  
  In 2003, the central government promulgated the ‘supervising and 
supporting the unlicensed informal private schools’ policy in The Decisions 
on Improving the Compulsory Education of Migrant Peasant Workers’ 
Children in the Cities. Through this policy, the local government could no 
longer ignore the existence of these schools. It states that:  
The local government should include these schools into the 
supervision system for the regular private schools. For unlicensed 
informal private schools, the local government should establish 
particular registration criteria, which can be looser than that of the 
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regular private schools, but only in some aspects, and not including 
the teacher’s qualification, school safety and hygiene. The local 
government should make a list of all of these schools in order to keep 
their information updated. For those who meet the registration criteria, 
the government should issue them with licenses; for those who cannot 
meet the registration criteria, the government should leave them a 
period to improve. After that period, if they still cannot meet the criteria, 
then the government should shut them down… The government 
should give them support and guidance in the following aspects: 
school campus, funding, teacher training, teaching and learning, etc. 
(2003 policy) 
Since 2003, the Beijing and Shanghai municipality of education have 
started to supervise and support the UIP schools. In pursuing this aim, the 
two cities have taken different actions, which produce very different 
consequences. In Shanghai, the government provided the schools with 
significant financial support to help them register. As a result, all the UIP 
schools were turned into licensed private schools (162) or were shut down 
(100) (Yuan et al., 2013: 90). In Beijing, the government did not want to 
provide the UIP schools with a large amount of money. It required that the 
schools meet the registration criteria with their own efforts. However, many 
schools failed to meet the criteria and kept operating as UIPs. However, 
the government was unable to shut down all of them because the local 
state schools had insufficient recruitment quotas to receive all the migrant 
children studying in the UIP schools. By 2013, there were still 81 UIP 
schools dispersed in several districts of Beijing with 42,000 students 
enrolled.1   
																																																						
1 Data source: unpublished Beijing Municipality of Education statistical data 
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  The following is the educational experience of a migrant family in one of 
the 81 UIP schools in Beijing. In this example, the parent is unsatisfied with 
the education provided by the school. Migrant mother Juan has been living 
in Beijing since 2005. She runs a small grocery shop, where she also lives 
with her husband and their only son. Her husband is a manual labourer. 
Their son was born in their hometown and was brought to Beijing at the 
age of three. He enrolled in an unregistered informal private school (school 
H) in 2008 and has stayed there ever since1. In 2008, it was relatively easy 
for migrant children to enrol in local state schools in Beijing, as the local 
government had not yet established strict school enrolment criteria. Juan 
reports that in her school district, the migrant children can enrol in state 
schools easily by presenting their household registration card as a proof. 
However, this family did not bring their card with them in Beijing and 
therefore lost the chance to send their son to a state school. Juan regrets 
losing this chance, as she is not satisfied with the UIP school in which her 
son is currently studying. She believes that her son is extremely clever, as 
he can quickly recite the articles in his Chinese text book after reading it 
two or three times, yet his test scores do not reflect his intelligence. This 
mother attributes his unsatisfactory performance to the education provided 
by the UIP school. A key issue she complains about is that the teachers 
are constantly changing. As a result, they cannot supervise and facilitate 
																																																						
(obtained from interview).  
1 The school provides both primary and junior secondary level education.  
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the students consistently. Her complaint of the poor condition of the school 
resonates with my visit to that school, as I noticed that the school does not 
even have a formal playground. During the interview, this mother keeps 
arguing that if her son was sent to a state school (no matter in Beijing or in 
the hometown), his academic performance would be much better than now. 
Yet she also mentions that there is no way they can send their son back to 
the hometown, since both parents are working in Beijing and the 
grandparents, who are living in the hometown, are too old to take care of 
the child. Furthermore, she is unable to accompany her son back to the 
village, as she cannot do any agricultural work because of her poor health. 
This mother’s dissatisfaction with the education provided by UIP schools 
reflects the poor condition of this type of schooling, which finds it hard to 
offer migrant children educational resources equal to those offered by the 
state schools. This is a reason why the local government wanted to 
supervise and improve the UIP schools to produce a number of licensed 
private schools.  
4. From unlicensed to licensed private school 
As noted earlier, after 2003 the city and district governments in Beijing and 
Shanghai have taken measures regarding the UIP schools, producing a 
series of licensed private schools to provide more positions for migrant 
children. Developed from UIP schools, these licensed schools are 
specifically run for migrant children, since the local parents would not send 
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their children to these schools. There are three types of licensed private 
schools. The first type is found in Beijing and the second and third types 
are found mainly in Shanghai.  
  In Beijing, some of the former UIP schools managed to attain the 
government criteria and registered as formal private schools. By 2004, 
there were 21 UIP schools registered as formal private schools. By 2006, 
there were 63 UIP schools registered with 46,667 migrant students, which 
accounts for 12% of the total number of migrant children (Tian and Wu, 
2010: 192). While these schools receive financial support from the local 
government, their main income is from tuition fees. Not relying on 
government funding, the schools are able to operate independently and do 
not need to follow the government’s student recruitment criteria. Therefore, 
a large percentage of students in these schools are those who are unable 
to meet the ‘Five Documents’ and thus cannot enrol in state schools.  
  The following is the educational experience of a migrant family in a 
former UIP, now registered private school, in Beijing. Migrant mother Lian 
has been living in Beijing for more than ten years. She has two daughters 
with her husband, both of whom were born and raised in Beijing. 
Interestingly, while her older daughter enrolled in a state school in 
September 2011, her younger daughter failed to enrol in a state school as 
they failed to prepare the more restrictive criteria in 2014, which she has 
not anticipated. The reason for their failure is that one of their five 
documents, the Temporary Residential Certificate, is not issued in the 
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same district in which they are currently living. This situation was not a 
problem in 2011 but it became a problem after 2013, as the state school 
enrolment criteria became increasingly strict. As a result, her younger 
daughter had to enrol in a former UIP, now a registered private school 
(school I). With one child studying in a state school and another studying 
in a former UIP school, this mother feels that the latter is not as good as 
the former. A key point she complains about is the large class sizes in 
school I. Because of the large class size, the teachers do not have 
sufficient attention for every child. Compared to school I, the state school 
teachers are perceived as more responsible, as they pay sufficient 
attention to every child and contact the parents in a timely way when they 
find anything unusual with the children. Another point this mother has made 
is that the family needs to pay 3,800 RMB (£400 equivalent) a year for the 
tuition fees. While acknowledging that this is a fairly reasonable amount for 
a school in the private sector, this mother feels that it is not a small amount 
for her family. She argues that if the policy had not changed in 2013 and 
her younger daughter had been able to enrol in a state school, then the 
family would have no need to pay this fee. In short, in the view of the 
migrant parents, the UIP descendant private school is an acceptable form 
of schooling, yet not an ideal one. 
  In Shanghai, the city municipality of education had a three-year plan 
(2008-10: Shanghai Municipality of Education’s Decision on Promoting the 
Compulsory Education for Migrant Peasant Workers’ Children), which 
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aimed to support the UIP schools to register. The main form of support is 
that the government purchases or controls the school with a huge amount 
of investment. As a result, by 2011 162 registered migrant children schools 
had emerged with 132,000 migrant children, which accounts for 28% of the 
total number of migrant children.1 While these newly licensed schools can 
be classified into two types, a common feature is that the children’s tuition 
fees and the school operation fees are provided by the local government. 
The first type is the government-purchased private school. The district 
municipality of education managed to purchase some UIP schools from 
their owners. It continues investing in order to register the school with the 
local government as the de facto owner. The former owner had the option 
of staying on to work as the headteacher. After the transformation, the 
schools are now under direct control of the government. The government 
funding becomes the sole financial resource of the school. The school 
cannot charge students for tuition fees and it must follow the state school 
student recruitment criteria. These schools have the legal status of private 
schools yet operate as state schools in terms of curriculum, management 
and recruitment. The second type is the government-controlled private 
schools. The situation could arise whereby the district municipality of 
education is unable or unwilling to purchase these schools. The idea is that 
the municipality does not replace the private owner, yet it still offers 
																																																						
1  Data resource: from the policy text Shanghai Municipality of Education’s 
Regulation on Improving the Hygiene Condition in the Private Primary School Run 
for Migrant Children in 2011.  
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financial investment to help the school to register. After registering, the 
school can only receive government funding as its sole financial resource. 
As a result, it cannot charge the students tuition fees and has to follow the 
state school recruitment criteria. As I will detail in chapter 11, these schools, 
together with the senior secondary state school recruiting migrant children 
in junior secondary stage (see section 2 in this chapter), have constructed 
an ‘interim quasi-state school system’, serving as a main schooling channel 
for migrant children in Shanghai.  
  The following is an example of the educational experience of a migrant 
family in a government-purchased private school in Shanghai. Migrant 
mother Uang has been living in Shanghai for ten years. She lives with her 
husband and their only daughter, who was born and raised in Shanghai. 
This family were unable to send their daughter to a state school because 
in their district, the migrant children are only entitled to access state schools 
if their parents have bought a house in the district. As a result, their 
daughter enrolled in a government-purchased private primary school 
(school T) in September 2014. While acknowledging that enrolling in a 
private school in Shanghai is better for her daughter than being sent back 
‘home’, this mother expresses her dissatisfaction with the education in that 
school. A key issue is that there are too many students in one class (similar 
to the situation in the former UIP schools in Beijing). In her daughter’s class, 
there are more than fifty students. The mother feels that the teachers are 
unable to pay sufficient attention to each child. In her opinion, forty students 
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should be the upper limit in an ideal situation. She has talked with her 
daughter’s class tutor about the capacity issue. The teacher feels sorry and 
admits that it is better for the children to be educated in regular state 
schools instead of the government-purchased/controlled private schools if 
possible. In short, the government-purchased/controlled private schools 
are not seen as ideal types of schooling by the migrant parents. As I will 
explain further in chapter 11, operating under the local government’s low 
cost and inferior schooling approach these quasi-state schools do not 
guarantee the migrant children a ‘good’ education.  
5. Conclusion 
As I have reviewed in this chapter with the promulgation of the TMC policy, 
more and more migrant children are now able to access schooling, 
studying in both state and private sector schools. The state schools act as 
the main channel for recruiting migrant children, as required by the TMC 
policy. In the private sector, while most of the unlicensed informal private 
(UIP) schools have been turned into licensed schools or been shut down, 
a number of UIP schools still exist in Beijing. The licensed private schools 
can be classified into three types. The first type is found in Beijing. 
Receiving a limited amount of government funding, the schools are able to 
operate independently and do not need to follow the government’s student 
recruitment criteria. The second and third types of schools are mainly found 
in Shanghai. Receiving full government funding as their sole financial 
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resource, these government-purchased/controlled schools have been 
partially included into the state sector and are offering quasi-state 
education for migrant children, but generally under worse conditions.  
  Among all these types of schooling, the state school is the ideal choice 
for the migrant children, as it provides them with the same education and 
level of resources as local children and for free. Most of the migrant parents 
I interviewed feel happy that their children can enrol in these schools - this 
is the achievement of the equal education for migrant children policy 
launched in 2001. Yet there are large numbers of children who are not 
studying in the state schools. Some are studying in government-
purchased/controlled private schools (in Shanghai) or licensed private 
schools specifically running for migrant children (in Beijing). Since these 
schools originate from the UIP schools, they are not considered as good 
as state schools, as I will elaborate in detail in chapter 11. Yet the students 
in these schools are still in a better position than other migrant children in 
the UIP schools (mostly found in Beijing), which are lacking in standardized 
curriculum design, certified teachers and basic teaching facilities. More 
importantly, the UIP school is illegal in its status, and therefore is facing the 
danger of being shut down at any time. If that happens, who will take care 
of these children? According to my interviews, the migrant parents will not 
send their children to the UIP schools as long as they can find any other 
type of schooling. Yet enrolling in a UIP school might still not be the worst 
situation for a migrant child. There is an invisible group of migrant children 
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who have not been included in the official statistical data, since they have 
already been sent back to their parents’ hometowns because they cannot 
meet the urban state school enrolment criteria. Although the state school 
education in their hometown might be better than the UIP or UIP 
descendant schools in Beijing and Shanghai, these children may suffer 
from being separated from their parents (or in some cases only their fathers, 
who need to stay in the cities). This situation might negatively influence 
their social and psychological development.  
  The review of various types of schools available to migrant children in 
this chapter provides a foundation for the further analyses of the school 
experiences of migrant children in state schools (chapter 10) and quasi-
state schools (chapter 11).  
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Chapter 10: Towards marginalization or social inclusion in state 
school? Habitus and cultural capital  
Following the overall review of the historical development and current 
situation of the schooling available to migrant children detailed in chapter 
9, this chapter focuses on the migrant majority state school, which is 
currently the predominant or majority schooling channel for migrant 
children.  
1. Introduction 
As noted earlier (chapter 9, section 2), the state school has become the 
predominant schooling channel for migrant children in Beijing and 
Shanghai. And the ‘migrant majority’ school is now an established part in 
the state school system and recruits the majority of migrant children. In this 
chapter, I will give an account of the following questions: in the migrant 
majority state schools, what kind of relationship do migrant parents have 
with teachers? What is the relationship between migrant and local children? 
And how are these relationships influencing migrant children’s study and 
social inclusion? The analysis here is based on the data collected from the 
headteachers, teachers, parents and students in six out of eleven state 
schools involved in my fieldwork. Among the eleven state schools, three 
have 30-40% of migrant children, six have 60-87% migrants, and two have 
more than 90% migrants. I do not include the three schools with less than 
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40% migrants in my analysis, since they are not migrant majority schools 
and would not represent the common situation of this type of school. 
Neither do I include the two schools with more than 90% migrants, as they 
were designated by the district municipality of education as ‘migrant-
focused schools’, and traditionally the local children do not enrol in these 
schools. The remaining six schools, which are school A, B, F, G, K, S, 
become the data source of this chapter.1 
  Aiming to explore the dynamics of the interactions and the power-
relations among migrant children, parents, teachers and local children in 
the school daily routines, this chapter adopts Bourdieusian concepts of 
field, habitus and capital to facilitate my empirical investigation (see 
chapter 4, section 1 and section 4). It conceptualizes the migrant majority 
state school as a field, and examine how migrant parents and children exert 
their capitals and interact with teachers and local children, shaped by their 
habitus. In this field, migrant children and parents have now become the 
main actors. Yet what is unchanged is the logic of practice on teaching and 
learning, since the staff and administration system have not changed. In 
the meantime, we should not neglect an invisible change – the class 
background of the remaining local students. As the headteacher of state 
primary school G claims, ‘nowadays almost all of the local students in this 
school are from a low-income working-class family background’. In my 
																																																						
1 All eleven schools are discussed above in relation to the school enrolment 
criteria in chapter 7 and chapter 8. 
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fieldwork, two out of the four participant local parents are working as a taxi 
driver and salesperson, one does not have a stable job, and one is a 
housewife, which resonates the headteacher’s observation. The following 
is a brief outline of how this invisible filtration mechanism works: first, the 
middle-class local residents with strong economic capital would not buy or 
rent a house in communities where most of their neighbours would be 
migrants. If, for certain reasons, they do live in these communities, many 
of them would not be happy to see their children becoming classmates with 
migrant children, so they would try to send their children to a ‘better’ school. 
Yet this school choice process requires the full involvement of the familial 
social and economic capitals, since many elite schools charge expensive 
school choice fees1. Many of the local working-class families would not be 
able to afford this. As a result, working-class children (both migrant and 
local) become the majority group in these ‘ordinary’ schools. Before 
elaborating the interactions between the children, parents and teachers in 
school, I will first present the reconstruction and differentiation of migrant 
parents’ and children’s identities in the urban life.  
 
 
 
																																																						
1 In Beijing and Shanghai, the practice of charging school choice fees has been 
gradually stopped in recent years. What I am describing here is the historical 
context within which some state schools became migrant majority schools.  
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2. Understanding the habitus of migrant parents and children  
As reviewed earlier (chapter 4, section 1.2.2), in the study of socially 
disadvantaged groups, there is a need to examine the dimensions that help 
constitute and shape their habitus. I argue that migrant parents and 
children have at least three main dimensions to their identity: migrant, 
working-class and rural, and they appear discriminated against on those 
three dimensions. Taking just one into consideration does not fully describe 
the scope of their habitus or the discrimination against them.  
  Within the context of Chinese metropolitan areas, migration can bring 
changes or disadvantages to people’s situations as it is not possible for 
most of the migrants to get their household registration moved to the 
metropolitan areas, which is an institutional barrier for their children’s 
schooling (see chapter 2, section 3). In addition, migration creates a new 
arena where the migrants and their children are tagged officially as ‘rural 
labourer’, which activates the other two dimensions of their identity, namely, 
rural and working-class. As I will elaborate in the next section, migration 
creates opportunities for the restructuring of migrant parents’ rural habitus, 
which is formed because they have ‘long been physically and socially 
connected to farmlands, a field that nurtures freestyle being and doing’ (Mu 
and Jia, 2016: 418). Yet part of their rural habitus has been retained, and 
informs the way in which for example the migrant parents do not treat 
themselves as academic educators (see section 3.1). Their migration also 
creates generational differences between the identities of parents and 
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children. For the children, the migration, or precisely, their parents’ 
migration, offers them spaces and forms of socialization, which differently 
shape their habitus in contrast to their parents’. This habitus is shaped by 
their adaptation to urban life and by their parents’ rural habitus. What the 
migration has not changed is the parents’ and children’s working-class 
background. Yet it is important to note that the migrant labourer’s social-
economic disadvantages can be more serious than those of their urban 
working-class counterpart, as they face higher financial pressures and thus 
are in a situation of striving for survival in the city (see section 3.2). This 
condition leads to the restructuring of their working-class habitus, 
producing a disposition of ‘striving for survival’ [忙于生计], which directs the 
parents’ focus to the survival of their family instead of other aspects, such 
as an enjoyable lifestyle or the cultural cultivation of their children. This 
habitus, blending rural and urban experiences, establishes migrant parents 
in a more disadvantaged position compared to their urban working-class 
counterparts. In the following two sections, I will explore how different 
dispositions indicate different habitus and forms and volumes of capital, 
setting the parents and children in different positions in the field of migrant 
majority state schooling.  
3. The continuation of the parents’ rural working-class habitus  
3.1 The continuities of rural habitus: not treating themselves as 
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academic educators 
Whilst living in an urban area, migrant families often gather in the 
communities where a large percentage of their fellow residents are 
migrants. Some live close to friends from their hometown. Additionally, their 
local social networks largely consist of their hometown friends or other 
migrants, since these people are their colleagues, neighbours, and friends’ 
friends, as reported by most of the interviewed migrant parents. As a result 
of these living and social network conditions, what has emerged is a 
migrant society inside the urban world, which does not offer many chances 
for the radical restructuring of the adult migrants’ rural habitus. In the field 
of urban education, the migrant parents’ rural habitus can be identified as 
marked by their disposition of ‘not treating themselves as academic 
educators’. This habitus is historically rooted in life as conducted in rural 
areas where the majority of the people have weak academic cultural capital 
with only basic literacy (or are illiterate), except for a small number of 
teachers, technical professionals (such as agriculture technicians) and civil 
servants. In the rural field of culture and education, teachers are the 
dominant group who possess the highest level of academic knowledge, 
which acts as valuable cultural capital in relevant situations. As for the 
ordinary people, doing traditional agricultural labour work that does not 
demand too high a degree of literacy, they are unfamiliar with styles of 
teaching and learning in school. As a result, many of them feel it is not 
‘doable’ or even ‘thinkable’ to intervene in their children’s education, even 
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if they are literate. As a result of these ‘subjective expectations of objective 
probabilities’ (Bourdieu, 1990c: 59), a gap between the school and home 
has been formed in the parent’s mind: the school is the legitimate and only 
site for academic education, and the home is not. This conceptual gap 
results in the parents’ disposition of not treating themselves as academic 
educators. It reinforces the teacher’s authority and their dominant position, 
reproducing the power structure of the rural educational field.  
  In my interviews, the vast majority of the migrant parents reported that 
they are unable to facilitate their children’s study at home, and some of 
them do not regularly check their children’s homework. As Lu (2013) 
reveals, 68.1% of the migrant parents in Shanghai have junior secondary 
school as their highest education level. This finding resonates with an 
empirical study in Beijing, which reports that 60% of the migrant parents 
have junior secondary school as their highest education level (Liu and 
Jacob, 2013). In some cases, as reported by many migrant parents and 
teachers, some parents are nearly illiterate and therefore struggle to 
engage with homework. When asked to tell me about her son’s studying at 
home, migrant mother Ning said: ‘He just wants to play. He does not have 
the motivation to study. I always tell his class tutor to help me put strict 
supervision on him’. Ning’s understanding of parental responsibility is the 
task of buying her son study materials which she has done. ‘I have bought 
him the self-teaching electronic pad, but he does not study hard. I have 
bought everything he needs to study, everything, but he just does not study 
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hard’. She feels helpless and anxious in the face of the child’s apparent 
lack of motivation and sees the teacher as the only person who can alter 
this situation. Briefly speaking, this mother might not be aware of the 
teachers’ perceptions of parental responsibility for supervising and guiding 
children’s study. Unlike Ning, migrant father Cai does supervise his son’s 
study sometimes: ‘when I finish my work and come back home, he always 
claims that he has finished this homework – that is what he claims. I 
sometimes check it, but not often, since the child is not a kid anymore, and 
now there are too many subjects.’ Cai’s reference to ‘that is what he claims’ 
indicates that the father is suspicious of his son’s self-report, but he does 
not exhaustively check his work because ‘now there are too many subjects’. 
Mentioning the complexity of the school curriculum shows the father’s lack 
of familiarity with the school system. Another example illustrates that the 
parent does not perceive the home as a site for school-like activities, 
reflecting migrant parents’ detachment from education. Migrant mother 
Ong reports that she was told by her daughter’s teacher that she loves and 
is skilled at painting, so she sends her to an extra-curricular painting course 
that costs ¥1,500 per term (£150 equivalent). Here we can see that the 
mother is very keen to support her child, but it is the teacher’s validation of 
painting as a worthwhile activity that encourages her to find an 
extracurricular class and tutor. For this family, communicating with the 
teacher is the main channel through which the parents respond to their 
children’s educational strengths. These cases suggest that migrant parents 
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do not treat themselves as academic educators – an aspect indicating the 
continuation of their rural habitus. Not treating themselves as educators, 
many migrant parents are reluctant to deploy their (weak) literacy as one 
form of cultural capital to support their children, yet they are ready to deploy 
their economic capital to support their children to form their own cultural 
capital.1  
3.2 ‘Striving for survival’ [忙于生计]: the disposition of (some) migrant 
labourers in the urban field 
As the migrant labourers do not generally have high incomes, they find the 
living expenses of the metropolitan areas are relatively high. Without local 
household registration, their access to some local social welfare (e.g., 
education, health care, subsidies, etc.) is limited (Lu, 2002). In addition, 
many migrant families have two or more children (while urban residents 
normally have only one 2 ), and this situation enhances their financial 
pressures. Taking all the factors into consideration, the migrant parents are 
facing more serious social and financial disadvantages compared to their 
urban working-class counterparts, and have to strive for their families’ 
																																																						
1 Rooted in the traditional Chinese culture, the parents attach importance to their 
children’s achievements of educational qualifications and cultural resources, 
although they do not necessarily feel confident about their own literacy in 
supporting the children’s academic study (see for example, Archer and Francis’s 
studies on British-Chinese parents: Francis and Archer, 2005; Archer and Francis, 
2006). 
2 The ‘one child’ policy was implemented successfully in cities with regard to the 
local residents. Rural residents are allowed to give birth to a second child if their 
first child is not a boy, in order to guarantee the supply of the agriculture manual 
labours. 
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survival. Taking a migrant family involved in my study as an example: the 
mother En has not had a stable job since giving birth to her daughter; her 
husband, who has junior secondary school literacy and is working as a TV 
technician, therefore has the pressure to work hard to guarantee the 
family’s income, since his salary is the main income of this family. En 
describes her husband as ‘always busy to earn money in order to support 
this family’s survival in Beijing’. In order to enhance their income, some 
migrants choose to extend their working hours or to do the ‘hardest jobs’ 
that have pretty good pay but need full devotion to the job (Li et al., 2010). 
For example, doing multiple part-time domestic jobs or running an open all 
hours restaurant can enhance their income, but they have less time to 
enjoy leisure with their children. What can be identified here is an invisible 
rule of time distribution, which guides every choice that migrant parents 
make and directs their concentration to the things that can best support 
their families’ survival. Under this ‘virtue of necessity’, ‘[t]he most 
improbable practices are therefore excluded, as unthinkable, by a kind of 
immediate submission to order’ (Bourdieu, 1990: 54). In other words, what 
has been formed is a disposition of ‘striving for survival’, which makes up 
part of the migrant labourer’s working-class habitus.   
  The disposition of striving for survival shapes the way that migrant 
parents convert time (as a particular type of resource) into economic, social 
or cultural capital. Some parents devote most of their time to work in order 
to gain economic capital, others devote their (or their families’) leisure time 
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to socializing, for example visiting old friends/relatives or attending events 
to meet more people, in order to gain social capital. For them, the 
conversion of time to economic and social capital is direct, instant and 
predictable, and these two types of capital are the most relevant for the 
families’ survival in the urban field. Yet the conversion of time to (their 
children’s) cultural capital through facilitating their children’s study is slow 
and unpredictable, and their children’s gain of cultural capital will not bring 
direct improvement for their current life condition. The way that the migrant 
parents interact with their children and the role they play in their children’s 
education can be understood as shaped by their habitus. As reported by a 
teacher I interviewed:  
I am not saying that they (migrant parents) do not care about their 
children’s study; it is really because they do not have the energy and 
the ability to deal with it… They do not have the energy, as some of 
them are running tiny businesses, they need to get up early and finish 
work late – so you cannot expect them… They are still in a struggle 
for survival, so they need to make sure that their families get basic 
supplies and survive in the city. They do not have spare attention to 
deal with the children - as long as the children do not make trouble… 
That’s the situation of some migrant parents in our school. (Teacher L 
in school M) 
From the teacher’s description, some migrant parents have to put work as 
their first priority with regard to their time distribution, which minimizes their 
attention to their children’s affairs (including education).1 In line with my 
																																																						
1 It is important to note that the majority of the teachers I interviewed have a deficit 
view of migrant families. The deficit view takes migrant people together and tags 
them with the label of ‘not able/not competent/not interested’. My findings might 
be seen as presenting such a deficit view. Yet by quoting what this and other 
teachers’ expressed, I am pointing to the gap between teachers’ expectations and 
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research, Zhang and Luo, based on the investigation of a state primary 
school in Beijing, also found that the migrant parents ‘tended to 
concentrate all their time and energy on making money in order to survive 
in the city’ and are unable to focus on their children’s education (Zhang and 
Luo, 2016: 226). In other words, flexibility and autonomy are often benefits 
held by middle-class professionals (Vincent, Ball and Braun, 2010), 
whereas migrant parents’ absence owing to inflexible working hours means 
that they have limited time in which to spend stimulating and developing 
their children.  
  While there is a continuation of migrants’ rural and working-class habitus, 
an urbanized effect can also be identified with regard to their habitus and 
cultural capital. This is especially the case in the second-generation 
migrant children, as I will elaborate in the following section. 
4. The children’s urbanized habitus and gain of cultural capital  
Among my migrant interviewees, all of the parents moved to Beijing and 
Shanghai after they completed schooling in their hometown – they are first-
generation migrants. Unlike their parents, the majority of migrant children 
can be seen as second-generation migrants, since they were born in or 
brought to the cities when they were under 3-years-old, without any 
previous schooling experiences in their hometown (see chapter 2, section 
																																																						
parental understandings of their role, as I will elaborate later, and am not passing 
value judgements about the parents’ behaviour or attitudes. I will come back and 
discuss the teachers’ deficit view of migrant parents in the end of section 5.1.  
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1.3). Socialized within an urban context, what they can see and hear in the 
city, their interactions with local people, and their school experiences have 
all been taken for granted as part of their life.  
  As has been identified in existing literature, accent and dialect, or what 
kind of language people feel comfortable speaking, is a part of people’s 
habitus (Koo et al., 2014; Mu and Jia, 2016). Born and/or raised in the city, 
where the daily communication and official teaching language is standard 
Mandarin, migrant children have internalized this dialect as the normal way 
of speaking. And the ability to speak standard Mandarin is an example of 
embodied cultural capital in the field of the urban school (Mu and Jia, 2016). 
According to my fieldwork data, speaking standard Mandarin is among the 
most urbanized aspects of the migrant children’s habitus: all of the 
interviewed children speak Mandarin and I, as a standard Mandarin 
speaker myself, cannot distinguish any differences from the language of 
urban residents; my school observations also support this finding.  
  As with the way people speak, the ways in which people behave and 
present themselves are also part of their habitus. As the second-generation 
migrant children are raised in the cities, they have internalized the ways of 
appearing and behaving demonstrated by the urban residents. The 
interviewed teachers commonly report that it is hard to differentiate migrant 
from local children in daily life1. As for their style of clothing, ‘I cannot really 
																																																						
1 It is crucial to note that ‘cannot distinguish’ does not mean ‘do not know’. The 
reason is that for many Chinese people, the information about where s/he is from 
is not considered as a matter of privacy. For the teachers, especially for the class 
tutors, knowing the students’ family backgrounds can facilitate their work. It is a 
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tell who is migrant and who is local from their appearance and clothing’ 
(headteacher of primary school A). Most teachers report they just cannot 
distinguish migrant children from local children: ‘If you do not tell me, I even 
don’t know which child in my class is local and which is migrant’ (teacher 
F, school F). Some teachers further point out that because these so-called 
migrant children are in fact born and raised in the city, there are no 
differences between them and the local children. Like the ability to speak 
standard Mandarin, the migrant children’s urbanized appearance and 
behaviour functions as another form of embodied cultural capital in the field 
of urban school.  
  In addition to the influences from the urban schools and society on the 
children, there are also influences from the parents shaped by their 
adaptation to the social and cultural mores of an urban environment. Unlike 
their urban counterparts, the migrant parents do not possess a form of 
cultural capital that would allow them to position themselves as a teacher 
at home. Yet they are willing to exert their economic capital to support their 
children in constructing their own cultural capital. The appreciation of extra-
curricular courses and hobbies is traditionally a marker of the habitus of 
families living in urban areas, where a variety of extra-curricular activities 
are available for free or at low price and therefore affordable (Bray, 2009; 
																																																						
common practice that the teachers get the students’ background information 
through a variety of ways, including (but not limited to): talking to the parents 
through one-to-one conversations or in the parent meetings; talking to other 
teachers about a particular student’s background; reported by the students 
themselves in classroom teaching activities or one-to-one conversations; and 
most importantly, the class tutor holds the information files of all the students. 
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see also chapter 2, section 2.3). After a long period of urban living 
experiences1, the migrant parents’ disposition has been gradually (and 
partly) restructured by their interaction with urban residents and by 
influences from their children’s schools, becoming enthusiastic consumers 
of such products. For example, migrant mother Ong, as I have already 
mentioned, when reminded by a teacher about her daughter’s enthusiasm 
for painting, enrolled her daughter on a painting course. As revealed by 
Yuan et al (2013), 48.4% of the migrant children (studying in state schools 
in Beijing) have been sent to extra-curricular academic courses, and 46.4% 
of the migrant children have been sent to extra-curricular activities, for 
example, sports or art classes. This data implies that it is highly possible 
that more than half of the migrant children are attending at least one of the 
extra-curricular academic courses or activities. My fieldwork supports this 
finding, as it shows that some migrant parents buy their children self-
teaching electronic pads, which are a common product in the urban 
supermarkets. With the acquisition of these hobbies, the migrant children 
have gained cultural capital that is valuable in the field of urban schooling.  
  While some existing literature claims that the accent, style of dress, and 
behaviours make the migrant children easily distinguishable from Beijing 
local children (Woronov, 2004; Goodburn, 2009; Mu and Jia, 2016; see 
also chapter 3, section 5 for a detailed review), my data does not support 
																																																						
1 The vast majority of the respondent migrant parents have been living in Beijing 
or Shanghai for more than ten years.  
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their findings. The different findings might be the result of different sampling 
designs or of regional differences inside Beijing, or simply because the 
demographic characters of migrant children have changed since previous 
studies were conducted. With all these possibilities, it is very likely that the 
existing literature refers to the first-generation migrant children1 who were 
brought to Beijing after they had already had some experiences of rural life, 
not the second-generation migrant children who are the focus of my study.  
5. The relationships among children, teachers and parents  
Bourdieu points out that: ‘when habitus encounters a social world of which 
it is the product, it is like a “fish in water”: it does not feel the weight of the 
water, and it takes the world about itself for granted’ (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant, 1992). What Bourdieu describes here can be called ‘field-
habitus match’ (Maton, 2012). This situation can be identified with the 
migrant children in their relationship with local children in the field of the 
migrant majority state school. The opposite situation to this is the ‘field-
habitus clash’ (Maton, 2012), which makes the actor feel like a ‘fish out of 
water’. This situation can be identified with the migrant parents in their 
relationship with the teachers in urban schools, producing problems in 
home-school cooperation, as I will elaborate below.  
																																																						
1 Unfortunately, none of Woronov (2004), Goodburn (2009) and Mu and Jia (2016) 
have pointed out at which age the migrant children came to Beijing. But it is very 
probable that many of their studies are referring to first-generation migrant 
children, since some of their data indicates that the children have some 
experience of living in rural areas before coming to Beijing, and Goodburn (2009) 
did ask questions about the children’s memories of the schools in their home 
villages.  
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5.1 ‘Incompetent parents’ and disappointed teachers  
As stated earlier (chapter 2, section 2.3), urban school teachers have an 
expectation of home-school cooperation. It seems self-evident to the 
teachers that the children’s education is a site of co-operation between 
home and school. For example, a primary school headteacher argues that:  
We believe that the children’s education should be a process of home-
school cooperation. Although the school should take the majority of 
the responsibility, the parents’ responsibilities should never be 
neglected, especially for the cultivation of children’s learning habits. 
(Headteacher of school B)  
In the view of the teachers, an ideal parent would be a person who cares 
about the child’s study and actively communicates and cooperates with the 
teachers. Teacher A uses herself (as a mother) as an example to describe 
the figure of an ideal parent: ‘I am a parent myself. Even though my son is 
still in nursery, I often contact his teachers to get updates about his 
condition in school. When I come to school to pick him up, I always take 
the chance to talk to the teachers, always’. This situation resonates with 
the context in some western counties where maternal involvement in 
primary school is understood as an indicator of ‘good’ mothering (Vincent, 
Ball and Braun, 2010). In most of my fieldwork schools, the home-school 
cooperation is embodied as the Fly-message group or/and QQ groups. The 
Fly-message group is a cell phone message sending system that can send 
messages to all parents included as group members. The QQ group is an 
online social media group in which the parents and teachers can interact. 
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The main function of these virtual teacher-parent communities is to make 
sure that teachers can easily contact all parents after school. As reported 
by teacher A, one of the routine functions of the Fly-message and QQ 
group is to inform the parents about their children’s homework so that they 
can check whether the children have completed it on time. In addition, the 
schools establish a parent commission, which functions as a bridge 
connecting home and school and facilitates home-school cooperation, for 
example, organizing teacher-parent forums.  
  Yet the habitus of migrant parents, does not include treating themselves 
as academic educators, and so they consider that communicating with 
teachers or supervising the children’s study is ‘not for the likes of us’ 
(Bourdieu, 1990c: 56). In rural areas where they themselves went to school, 
home-school co-operation is not encouraged. Thus, we see what Maton 
(2012) describes as ‘field-habitus clash’. For many of the migrant parents, 
even if they wanted to, their limited academic cultural capital in turn limits 
their capability to support their children’s study in the urban school field. In 
addition, shaped by their disposition of striving for survival, some migrant 
parents can spend very limited amounts of time facilitating their children’s 
education. The influence of the rural and working-class dimensions of 
habitus produces the classed child-rearing approach of migrant labourer 
parents, limiting their motivation to exert their (limited) academic cultural 
capital to support their children’s study. The migrant parents’ understanding 
of their role in their children’s education resonates with that of some groups 
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of working class parents in the Western context (Lareau, 1989, 2001; 
Gillies, 2007; Vincent, Ball and Braun, 2010). In a study of a small number 
of working-class parents’ educational involvement in the US context, 
Lareau finds that these parents ‘believe that as long as they provide love, 
food and safety, their children will grow and thrive. They do not focus on 
developing their children’s special talents’ (Lareau, 2002: 748–749). 
Similarly, in the UK context, Gillies suggests that working-class mothers in 
her study ‘viewed their role in terms of caring, protecting and loving their 
children, rather than teaching or cultivating them’ (Gillies, 2007: 154). While 
these parents are ‘proud of their children’s acquisition of early literacy and 
numeracy skills’, in other words, they are not uninterested in their children’s 
educational development, they do not ‘in general see themselves as 
educators’, as corroborated by another UK based study of working-class 
mothers (Vincent, Ball and Braun, 2010: 132). This situation is termed by 
Lareau (2003) as a child-rearing approach of ‘accomplishment of natural 
growth’, which entails children experiencing long stretches of leisure time 
and child-initiated play at home without many restrictions from their parents, 
and produces a separation between family and school. Some of Lareau’s 
respondent children did not enjoy or succeed at school, and this was 
reinforced by poor communication between parents and teachers. 
  In my research context, with a similar child-rearing approach, the migrant 
parents’ behaviours do not match with the teachers’ expectations of home-
school cooperation. As a result, a discourse of ‘incompetent parents’ has 
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arisen among the teachers. These educational professionals blame the 
migrant parents for not being able to communicate and cooperate with 
teachers to facilitate the students’ learning at home. They argue that the 
parents should be responsible for their children completing homework, and 
generating the motivation to study. Five out of seven teachers and school 
leaders who talk about the parent-teacher communication report that many 
migrant parents are reluctant to respond to teachers’ communication. For 
example, teacher B describes the situation in her school as follows:  
It’s very rare that the migrant parents respond to a teacher’s 
communication. We have a teacher-parents meeting once a term, but 
some parents do even not appear. Normally it is the teachers who 
contact the parents, not in reverse. We have a Fly-message group in 
each class, and our teachers use this group to keep the parents 
updated about the school news and inform them about their children’s 
homework… There are 28 students in my class, and each time I send 
the parents messages, I normally receive only one response. The 
others rarely contact teachers to talk about their children. And you 
don’t even expect them to come in to school to talk to you. (Teacher B, 
school A) 
What can be identified here is what the teacher sees as the failure of the 
school’s home-school cooperation mechanisms because of migrant 
parents’ reluctance to communicate with teachers. This situation of limited 
contact and cooperation is found in another study conducted in Beijing, in 
which a teacher respondent reports that ‘at best only 50% and at worst only 
20–30% of parents of migrant children attended the [teacher-parent] 
meeting. It is difficult to make contact with the parents. Sometimes, the 
telephone number is wrong’ (Li et al., 2010: 84). Another common point 
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that the interviewed teachers complain of is the migrant parents’ perceived 
‘uncooperative’ attitude to teachers’ requests to check their children’s 
homework, as I have presented earlier in chapter 8 (section 3). When being 
asked about the percentage of parents in her class who can be considered 
as ‘cooperative’, teacher L says about one third, and there is another one 
third who totally ignore teachers’ contact and have shown no cooperation. 
The finding here is supported by Yuan et al (2013). Their study found that 
only 58.4% of the interviewed migrant parents in Beijing are in the habit of 
checking their children’s homework on a weekly basis. Yet the teachers 
expect all the parents to help check the children’s homework on a daily 
basis as the interviewed teachers in my fieldwork claim that urban parents 
normally do. While some migrant parents’ perceived ‘uncooperative’ 
attitudes can be understood as shaped by their rural habitus of not treating 
themselves as academic educators, the influence of their working-class 
habitus should not be neglected. In my fieldwork interviews, the phrase 
‘striving for survival’, or similar terms such as ‘busy earning money to 
support the family’, are used by most of the teachers to explain the failure 
of home-school cooperation. Some teachers give examples of how some 
parents’ occupations shape the role they play in their children’s education. 
A typical example is that in some families, both parents are running tiny 
businesses such as a restaurant or stall. ‘As their restaurants or stalls 
normally close after dinnertime, they will not finish work and get back home 
until 10pm, when their children have already gone to bed’ (headteacher of 
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state primary school A). The finding here resonates with a study in Beijing, 
which reports that for half of the migrant parents the premier reason for 
their limited home-school cooperation is that they are too busy and do not 
have the time (Liu, Feng and Shenglong, 2012). From a teacher’s 
comparison of migrant parents and local parents (most of them are also 
from a working-class background) in terms of their willingness to check 
their children’s homework, the striving for survival of migrant parents can 
be clearly identified: 
In terms of their attitude to children’s education, the Shanghai local 
parents are more responsible. Many migrant parents are just busy with 
work or other things… While some Shanghai local students are not 
doing well in their study, they all complete their homework, since their 
parents always check their homework. However, many migrant 
parents don’t even ask their children about their homework. In their 
minds, the only thing they need to make sure is that their children have 
eaten well (laugh). (A teacher and senior management team member 
in primary school K)  
The local working-class parents are aware of and compliant with the 
school’s expectations of them. Not seeing themselves as partners with the 
school, the migrant parents also have practical reasons for finding such a 
role hard to carry out. Driven by their disadvantaged living condition, 
migrant labourer parents have had to devote their time to earn money or 
extend their social networks, described by the teacher as ‘busy with work 
or other things’. They are concerned with caring for their children physically 
and emotionally, but this does not seem to be enough for the teacher. 
  What the migrant parents are willing to do is to deploy their economic 
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capital to support their children to construct their own cultural capital. For 
example, as I have stated earlier, the migrant mothers (Ning and Ong) are 
willing to buy extra-curricular study materials or to pay for an extra-
curricular painting course for their children. Yet compared to the urban 
working-class parents who not only communicate and cooperate well with 
teachers as expected, but are also able to facilitate their children’s study at 
home, many migrant parents’ efforts are still positioned as insufficient in 
the urban state school field. As the children’s aspiration of study can be 
shaped by the interplay of their familial habitus and capital (Archer et al., 
2012), some migrant parents’ detached attitude towards academic study 
and their limited academic cultural capital limit their children’s motivations 
for academic study. As a result, many migrant children do not complete 
their homework and are reported by teachers as not concentrating in 
lessons. Apart from their attitude to study, some migrant children are 
perceived by teachers as having an indifferent attitude to teachers, as I 
have presented earlier in chapter 8 (section 3). A teacher comments that 
‘[t]he migrant children do not really care about learning and about the 
teachers’ requirements, since their parents do not care’ (teacher C in 
primary school G) 1 . Here, the teacher points out the connection she 
perceives between some children’s attitudes and the parents’ attitude. 
																																																						
1 It is important to note that not all teachers consider all the migrants as the same. 
Yet most teachers do not have a strong awareness of migrant people’s intra-group 
difference, as they tag migrant children with the label of ‘do not care about 
studying’. I will come back and discuss the teachers’ deficit view of migrant 
parents in the next paragraph.  
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What is perceived as the parents’ and children’s shared apathetic attitude 
results in extra-curricular teaching burdens for the teachers, since they 
have to give extra guidance to those who are unable to catch up with the 
class. For some of the interviewed teachers, a frustrating fact is that their 
efforts do not produce corresponding exam scores that they would 
otherwise expect, as a small number of migrant children have notably low 
scores (if compared with the local working class students, who themselves 
may not score highly in relation to students from more affluent parts of the 
cities), which make the overall average score of the class lower. In addition, 
as reported by most of the interviewed teachers, the majority of the migrant 
children in their classes later on end up with a high school or vocational 
school qualification or lower, which do not match the achievements of their 
local classmates. As a result, with more and more migrant children 
enrolling in state schools, the majority of the teachers feel that the students 
and parents are increasingly ‘out of control’. As summarized by the 
headteacher of primary school A: ‘our teachers feel extremely lonely, like 
as if they are the only people in this school who treat education seriously’. 
  Another factor that gets the migrant parents identified as ‘incompetent 
parents’ is many teachers’ deficit view of migrant families (Chen, 2014; Liu, 
Holmes and Albright, 2015). The deficit view is a result of the teachers’ 
earlier negative perceptions from their interactions with some migrant 
parents, who were perceived as very uncooperative. It is also a result of a 
negative societal discourse in which the rural-to-urban migrants are 
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associated with ‘dirty’ jobs and are perceived as less-educated, incapable 
and less trustworthy (Chen et al., 2011; Li et al., 2006). A majority of the 
respondent teachers and school leaders can be identified as having these 
negative perceptions. For example, eight out of the thirteen teachers do 
not have a strong awareness of migrant people’s intra-group differences, 
as they homogenise migrant people and tag them with the label of ‘poor 
performance’ or ‘uncooperative’, as if all migrants were the same. Only a 
small number of teachers have a strong awareness that the migrants are 
not all the same, as they consciously point out that migrant children can 
also perform well in exams and note that some migrant parents are as 
cooperative as local parents.  
5.2 Migrant and local children as ‘us’  
Mu and Jia, based on cases of Beijing state schools with 4-11% migrant 
children, have found that ‘different accents and undisciplined behavioural 
patterns of floating children reportedly distinguished them from their urban 
peers. Unfortunately, these different dispositions sometimes resulted in 
exclusion or even penalties in certain situations’ (2016: 419). Yet my 
research on migrant majority state schools in Beijing and Shanghai has not 
found a distinction in migrant and local children’s interactions and 
relationships. In my interviews, when being asked about their peer 
relationships with other students, both migrant and local children talk about 
how personality, gender, hobbies, extra-curricular activities, and classroom 
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seating position and grouping affect their relationships, but none of them 
ever mentioned the idea of local/migrant division. When being directly 
asked whether there is division between local and migrant children, migrant 
child Peng says: ‘not at all, our class is full of harmony!’ When being asked 
the same question, migrant mother Ning expresses the same feeling: ‘my 
son sometimes mentions his local classmates who play with him, and I feel 
they have a good relationship’. A teacher in primary school K, who is an 
urban father as well, confirms the good integration of migrant and local 
children: ‘my son is in year four in my school. There is not a migrant/local 
division here. I can tell you, all of his best brothers are migrant - aha!’ 
Besides, all of the interviewed teachers express the similar opinion that  
‘The migrant and local children have good relationships. I cannot see 
any problems with their relationship. It is because these so-called 
“migrant children” are actually born and raised in Beijing and are living 
in the communities around our school’ (teacher F, school F).  
All the above data shows that there is a shared identity of ‘us’ instead of 
‘we/they’ between migrant and local children.  
  Coming from working-class families, most of the local children in the 
migrant majority state schools have a similar social-economic status to the 
migrant children. Therefore, there is not a strong class gap between local 
and migrant children. Compared to their parents, there is not too marked a 
degree of urban/rural difference among the children, since most of the 
migrant children were born or raised in the city, and thus the children have 
embodied relevant cultural capital for urban life (including schooling), as I 
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elaborated earlier. The migrant children share similar accents, dialects, 
appearance, knowledge and hobbies with the local children. These 
similarities facilitate the integration of these children as a homogeneous 
group. Their similarities are further reinforced by the situation that most of 
them are living in the same areas or even the same community as a result 
of the policy that encourages families to use the local school. Both groups 
of children have a sense of belongingness to the cities, or more specifically, 
to their communities. Coming from similar family backgrounds, sharing 
similar knowledge and experiences, and sharing a belongingness to the 
communities in which they are living, both local and migrant children have 
a sense of ownership and belonging towards their school, making them 
feel like they are ‘at home’. In other words, here is the match of the habitus 
of the children (migrant and local) with the field (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 
1992: 128).  
  However, Zhang and Luo revealed that while migrant children in their 
study played games together with the local children, ‘when asked who their 
best friends were, they usually referred to migrant classmates’ (Zhang and 
Luo, 2016: 227). Here an ‘invisible wall’ can be identified with regard to the 
intimate peer relationships between migrant and local children. Yet instead 
of looking at the intimate relationship (in terms of ‘who is my best friend’), I 
focus on the daily interactions (in terms of ‘how we get along with each 
other’). As reflected by my empirical data, the migrant children have 
achieved considerable progress in their social inclusion with local peers if 
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compared to their parents, who suffer from being firmly positioned as ‘other’ 
in the urban field (Wong et al., 2007; Chow and Lou, 2015; Cheo, 2016).  
6. The effects of the relationship: cause for optimism or pessimism? 
The well-integrated relationship between migrant and local children in 
schools indicates that the migrant children can expect enhanced social 
inclusion when compared to their parents. Along with their urbanized 
habitus and urban-specific cultural capital, their schooling experiences also 
reinforce their belongingness to the urban society. We are seeing the 
growth of a generation of ‘new urban citizens’ who are deeply embedded 
in urban life. If compared to their migrant working-class parents, who suffer 
not only from poor social-economic condition but also from being seen as 
deficient in the urban field, the children’s future looks brighter.  
  Yet these new citizens might well become a new generation of the urban 
working-class, since their opportunities for upward mobility are still limited. 
The rural and migrant labourer habitus of the migrant parents produce a 
child-rearing approach of the ‘accomplishment of natural growth’. This 
approach limits their exertion of (limited) cultural capital to support their 
children’s academic study. Since parental involvement is such a well-
embedded feature of urban schooling in China, its lack might have serious 
consequences for children’s achievement. What the migrant parents are 
willing to do is to deploy their economic capital to support their children to 
construct their own cultural capital. Yet compared to the urban working-
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class parents who not only communicate and cooperate well with teachers 
as expected, but are also able to facilitate their children’s study at home, 
their efforts still seem to be insufficient in the urban state school field. As a 
result, as stated earlier in this chapter, a small number of migrant children 
in the schools I visited have notably lower scores than the local students 
ranked in the bottom. They are facing huge academic disadvantages. Even 
for the majority of migrant children in my fieldwork schools, whose overall 
test scores match the status of their local classmates, their academic 
performance can hardly be considered as at the same level as the local 
children (taken together across the two cities). The reason is that, as I have 
stated in chapter 2 (section 4), the migrant majority schools themselves are 
ranked in disadvantaged positions in the local league table. Lacking 
possession of the forms and volume of cultural capital that are valuable in 
the schooling field, the majority of the migrant children risk ending up with 
a high school or vocational school qualification or lower, as reported by 
most of the interviewed teachers according to their follow-up information 
about their former students. This situation would produce a generation of 
low skilled or unskilled workers with relatively poor social-economic 
conditions, much like their parents.   
7. Conclusion  
This chapter identifies an increasing number of state schools in Beijing and 
Shanghai in which the majority of students are second-generation migrant 
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children. Conceptualizing this situation as a field of migrant majority state 
schooling, a very particular subfield within the field of urban schooling, this 
chapter explores the special situation of the relationship among teachers, 
parents and students in these schools. As this kind of school has recently 
become an established part of the state school system in Beijing and 
Shanghai, the findings of this research offer valuable implications for future 
research, policy and practice.  
  Highlighting the re-structuring of habitus and the accumulation of new 
forms of capital within the urban field, this research examines both the rural 
and urbanized aspects of the migrants’ habitus and capital. In relation to 
this, it identifies the general differences between migrant parents and 
children. In addition, instead of looking partially at only one dimension of 
migrants’ identity, this research explores the three dimensions of migrant 
identity which I suggest are particularly influential in shaping attitudes to 
education, namely, migrant, coming from the rural, and being working-class. 
The continuation of some aspects of a rural habitus can be identified with 
migrant parents, for example the parents’ habitus of not treating 
themselves as academic educators, which is interlinked with some aspects 
of their working-class and migrant habitus, such as their disposition of 
striving for survival. The habitus of the migrant children is influenced by the 
urban, as they were born and/or raised in the city. This is illustrated by their 
manner of speaking, ways of behaving, self-presentation, and their 
appreciation of extra-curricular hobbies. These are valuable and valued 
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forms of cultural capital in the field of urban schooling.  
  Applying Bourdieusian theoretical resources to the empirical 
investigation, this chapter explores the interactions and relationships 
among teachers, parents and children. It identifies a ‘field-habitus clash’ 
(Maton, 2012) of migrant parents in the field of urban schooling, producing 
problems in their relationship with teachers, who have an expectation of 
home-school cooperation. In addition, my findings support the proposition 
that home-school interactions do have an influence on teaching and 
learning in school. It highlights the perceived importance of the role of 
parents for migrant children’s academic study in school. What can also be 
identified in the field of migrant majority state school is the well-integrated 
relationship of migrant and local children, indeed the relative lack of 
divisions between the migrant and local children. This finding highlights the 
unique situation of the migrant majority state school. The situation may be 
different in those schools where the majority of students are local, and 
where the migrant children may be marginalized in their peer relationships 
with local children. Finally, this chapter defines both positive and negative 
effects of migrant children’s social relationships for their future social 
inclusion in the city. Unlike their parents, social inclusion in school would 
reinforce their belongingness to urban society, producing a generation of 
‘new urban citizens’. However, like their parents, this generation might be 
a generation of low-skilled workers owing to their underachievement in 
academic study.  
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Chapter 11: The birth of an ‘interim quasi-state school system’  
While the last chapter focused on state schools, this chapter shifts to the 
‘interim quasi-state school system’, which is another main schooling 
channel for migrant children in Shanghai.  
1. Introduction  
As formulated in chapter 9 (section 2), the state schools are acting as the 
mainstream channel for recruiting migrant children. Besides the regular 
state schools, three other types of school also act as important channels 
for recruiting migrant children in Shanghai. These schools include: 
government-purchased private schools, government-controlled private 
schools, and senior secondary schools for adult students. Adopting a 
theoretical lens of policy as a temporary settlement of interests (Truman, 
1951; Latham, 1952; Dye, 2008; Gale, 1999; see chapter 4, section 3 and 
section 4 for details), I will first examine the role that the conflicts and 
compromises of interests among different actors, including the central, city 
and district government, unregistered informal private (UIP) schools, and 
state schools, play in the formation of these schools. Grounded in empirical 
data, I put forward the concept of an interim quasi-state school system. 
This concept helps illustrate the commonalities in the three forms of 
schooling and to answer the following questions: what kind of education 
are some migrant children receiving in Shanghai? Are there any problems 
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with their education, and what are the sources of these problems?  
2. The birth of three unique forms of schooling: policy enactment as 
‘temporary settlement of interests’  
While the national policy of ‘supervise and support the unregistered 
informal private schools’ (2003) gives local government the power to 
regulate the UIP schools, it also sets an obligation for the local government 
to take positive action to support their development, since shutting them 
down will not solve the problem of access to education, as the state schools 
are not able to recruit all the migrant children. The central government 
wanted the local government to provide these schools with financial 
support to help them register so that they can be utilized to solve the 
migrant children’s schooling problem by providing them with basic 
educational opportunities (which might not be as good as those available 
in the state school education). This policy allows for considerable discretion 
in the local government, positioning them in the dominant position in the 
field of migrant children’s schooling. The local government is the body that 
decides the school registration criteria; it also has discretion in setting the 
criteria (to make them either loose or restrictive); it is also responsible for 
providing the UIP schools with financial support, but there is no 
requirement that establishes the minimum amount of this support. 
Following the national policy, the Shanghai city and district governments’ 
aim was to help the UIP schools register and then utilize them to solve the 
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migrant children’s schooling problem. The first half of this aim matches the 
interest of the UIP school owners, that is, to register and to stay open. The 
government conducted the compromise initially, providing the schools with 
significant financial support to help them to register. After the schools have 
registered, the government covers all the operational expenses of the 
schools, including student tuition fees, teachers’ salary, facilities, etc. As a 
result, the schools became government funded private schools under the 
control of the local municipalities of education.  
2.1 Government-purchased private school 
In some situations, the district municipality of education managed to 
purchase some UIP schools from their owners. It continues to invest in 
order to help the school to register as a private school (with the local 
government as the de facto owner). As for the former owners of these 
schools, they will have to make a hard choice: either to leave, or to stay 
but work as the headteacher instead. If the owners choose to leave, then 
the district municipality will nominate senior management team members 
from local state schools to become the headteacher and deputy-
headteacher. Many of the former owners are reluctant to allow the 
government to purchase the school since the schools used to be their 
‘enterprise’, bringing them considerable profits. Now they have had to hand 
over this enterprise. A senior management team member in school P 
describes an owner’s reluctance when facing the government’s purchasing:  
When facing the transformation (of being purchased by the 
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government), the owner was really reluctant. Before been purchased 
by the government, he could earn hundreds of thousands per year 
through many ways, such as operating a canteen inside the school. 
However, after the transformation, as a headteacher employed by the 
government, he could only earn around a hundred thousand per year.  
While feeling reluctant, the owners have had to compromise with the 
municipality, since they do not have the financial ability to act alone and 
ensure their schools meet the registration criteria. Without the 
government’s investment, the schools will cease to exist. The district 
municipality is aware of the financial difficulties of the owners, hence they 
can coercively purchase the school. As officer J reports: 
We know that these owners are reluctant for their schools to be 
purchased by the government, because this transformation injures 
their personal interest. But we also know that they have no choice but 
to compromise, since they do not have the financial ability to get the 
schools to meet the registration criteria. As you might know, improving 
the campus houses needs a huge amount of money, which they 
cannot offer, but we government can and are glad to offer. (Officer J, 
Baoshan District Municipal of Education)  
The government’s purchasing at least compensates the owners’ early 
stage investments in the school while at the same time offers them a job 
as headteacher, which in truth is not a bad outcome of a failing investment. 
After the transformation, the schools are now under direct control of the 
local government, and the government funding becomes the sole financial 
resource of the school, which is calculated by the number of students it has 
recruited. The school cannot charge students for tuition fees and it should 
follow the state school student recruitment criteria. In terms of the 
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curriculum, the school teaches the same range of compulsory subjects as 
state schools 1 . I will elaborate in detail about how the government-
purchased schools operate in section 3.1.  
2.2 Government-controlled private school 
The above is the story of how the district government purchased the UIP 
schools. Yet in some other cases, the district municipality of education is 
unable or unwilling to purchase these schools for a variety of reasons. In 
some cases, the district is unable to purchase all the buildings of the UIP 
schools owing to budget limitations; in other cases, the owner has 
developed personal relationships with local notabilities and has therefore 
managed to maintain independence from the government’s purchasing. In 
other cases, the municipality feel that certain UIP schools might 
automatically vanish since there is a tendency for them to lose their 
students, so there is no need for the municipality to purchase these schools. 
In these cases, the municipality does not purchase the schools but controls 
them instead. The idea of government control is that the municipality does 
not replace the private owner, yet it still offers financial investment to help 
the school to register. After being registered, the school can only receive 
government funding as the sole financial resource, which is calculated by 
the number of students it has recruited. As in the government-purchasing 
																																																						
1 The schools also have some autonomy to run some optional school-based 
courses aside from the compulsory subjects such as Maths and Chinese. For 
example, it can open a pottery-making course if it has relevant teaching resources. 
The practice varies, depending on the special situation of each school.  
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situation, in the government-controlled situation, the owners of UIP schools 
have no choice but to compromise with the government, since they do not 
have the financial ability to register their schools. Yet as the owner of the 
former UIP school remains the owner of the registered school, s/he is able 
to nominate the headteacher and therefore retain partial control of the 
school. The municipality respects the owner’s discretion and does not 
intervene in the schools’ internal affairs, except for the funding and student 
recruitment affairs. This discretion is the production of a temporary 
settlement as a result of the compromise between the district municipality 
and the owners. Since the government is unable or unwilling to purchase 
the school, it has to compromise with the owners in order to make them 
cooperative and, eventually, realize its goal - placing these schools under 
a degree of government control. As officer L in Minhang municipality of 
education comments, ‘the taking over is a way of cooperation between the 
government and the private owner’. After the government’s takeover, the 
schools cannot charge the students for tuition fees and has to follow the 
state school recruitment criteria and teach the same compulsory subjects 
as state schools, as the government-purchased schools do. The school’s 
legal status as private school does not change, yet the government’s 
control of its financial resources and student recruitment makes it different 
to regular private schools. I will elaborate in detail about how the 
government-controlled schools operate in section 3.2.   
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2.3 Senior secondary state school recruiting migrant children in 
junior secondary stage 
Unlike the two forms of schooling that share the common origin of UIP 
school, the third type of school is indeed a state school. Yet what makes it 
different to a regular state school is that as senior secondary schools 
serving adults, these schools are not responsible for students in junior 
secondary level. For these schools, recruiting migrant children is a form of 
expansion of the market. Taking school L as an example, the reason why 
it started to recruit migrant children from 2003 onwards was to create extra 
income, as reported by its current headteacher:  
During that period [2003], there were 27 teachers in our school. 
However, owing to the lack of adult students, nearly half of the 
teachers have no work to do, wasting human resources. As a result, 
the teachers’ income was relatively low. Under this situation, our 
former headteacher came up with the innovative idea of recruiting 
migrant children to produce extra income.  
The school needs this extra income because there was a financial deficit 
owing to a lack of adult students. When school L started to recruit migrant 
children, it attracted a large number of students, since state schools have 
better reputations generally than UIP schools. Its popularity among migrant 
children in return reminded the district municipality of its value in solving 
the migrant children’s schooling problem. As a result, the municipality 
recognized and supported the school’s irregular student recruitment 
strategy by providing full funding for the education of migrant children in 
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this school. As a result, the school must follow the regular state school 
student recruitment criteria and the curriculum. With the municipality’s 
involvement, recruiting migrant children has been transformed from a 
‘market action’ into a ‘state action’, as summarised by the headteacher of 
school L, who considers this form of schooling as a win-win model for 
migrants, government and the school. I will elaborate in detail about how 
this type of schools operate in section 3.3. 
2.4 Summary 
As shown in this section, the formation of three new forms of schooling is 
not a production of a unilateral top-down policy of the government. Rather, 
it is a production of the temporary settlement of struggle among UIP 
schools, state schools, central and local government, all of which have 
made compromises in order to achieve their goals. It is worth noting that 
there does not seem to be space for the migrant voice, given that the policy 
initiatives are enacted for them. In this process, the district municipality of 
education always holds the dominant position, since it monopolises the two 
main resources for the UIP and state schools: it determines whether the 
UIP schools can exist and whether the senior secondary adult schools can 
continue recruiting migrant children; it also offers funding for these schools. 
Yet holding the dominant position does not mean the municipality do not 
need to make compromises. The main compromise that it has made is the 
huge amount of financial investment. At the same time, the school is not 
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always in a passive position. In the formation of the third form of schooling 
(the adult schools), the schools were the initiator. The three forms of 
schooling, taken together, construct an interim quasi-state school system, 
which serves as a main provider of migrant children’s education in 
Shanghai. In the next section, I will reveal the characteristics of this school 
system.  
3. Revealing the characteristics of the ‘interim quasi-state school 
system’  
The characteristics of the interim quasi-state school system is an 
integration of three aspects of belongingness to the state sector, offering 
quasi-state education and the interim nature. While the three aspects can 
be identified from all three types of schools, each of the aspects is more or 
less noticeable in different types of school.  
3.1 Government-purchased private school 
3.1.1 Belongingness to the state sector 
After purchasing the UIP schools, the district municipality of education 
takes some measures to transform them into de facto state schools. A 
direct way of doing this is to nominate some senior management team 
members from state schools to become the headteacher and deputy-
headteacher of these schools. If the former private owner chooses to stay 
and work as the headteacher, the municipality would then send an 
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inspector to supervise the headteacher. Through taking over the leadership 
of the school, the government makes sure that it holds full control. With the 
relocating of state school headteachers, the operational norms of the state 
sector are also being imported into these schools. After the transformation, 
in addition to teaching the same range of compulsory subjects as the state 
school, the textbooks in these schools have all been turned into the 
Shanghai version, and the newly recruited teachers must hold the Qualified 
Teacher Status as required in the state school. In addition, the teachers’ 
pay increases when the state purchases the school. The headteacher of 
school T emphasises the similarities between the government-purchased 
private school and the regular state school: ‘This school was run by a 
private owner. As a result, the teaching and management activities were 
not as uniform as now. Nowadays, the whole school internal management 
and teacher training mechanisms are following that of the state schools’. 
When regulating the migrant children’s school recruitment, the municipality 
treats these schools as a part of the local state school system, as reported 
by officer K:  
The enrolment criteria of these schools follow that of the state school. 
When allocating migrant children to schools, we treat these two types 
of schools as the same. That means which school the child will attend 
depends on which school has openings, not on the nature of the 
school. (Officer K, Pudong Municipality of Education) 
Another important change is that, unlike some private owners who expect 
to make a profit through reducing the costs, which leads to a shortage of 
teaching and learning resources, the municipality does not expect to make 
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a profit from the school. It is also willing to provide financial investment to 
improve the school facilities. For the migrant children studying in these 
schools, the education they have received is like that of the state schools: 
they do not need to pay tuition fees and they can enjoy the teaching 
resources, which follows the norms of state schools.  
3.1.2 Offering quasi-state education 
In the government-purchased private school, the belongingness to the 
state sector is weak if compared to the regular state schools. The nature 
of offering quasi-state education originated from how the municipality treats 
these schools. Even being purchased by the government, the legal status 
of these schools remains private. In other words, the municipality does not 
treat them as ‘real’ state schools. This can be reflected by the identity of 
the teachers, who have not been included into the civil servant system.1 
As a result, all the interviewed teachers and headteachers do not consider 
their schools as state schools, nor do they consider themselves as state 
school teachers, although all the schools’ income is from the state.  
  As for the district municipality of education, this type of school should be 
‘a place with basic study resources’, rather than ‘a place offering good 
education’. This can be identified in many aspects from the resources it 
allocates to the schools to its attitude towards the schools, as reported by 
																																																						
1 In China, the state school teacher would normally get civil servant status, which 
is normally offered to employees in government departments, state sector 
enterprises and social service institutions (such as schools and hospitals). This 
particular status is linked to particular welfare benefits, including the awarding of 
the local household registration, and so on.  
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the respondent headteachers. For example, unlike their counterparts in 
state schools and regular private schools, the teachers in this type of 
school have not been included into the official teacher professional 
development project; neither can they get a professional title1. Besides, 
compared to their state school counterparts, the funding that the schools 
can receive, which is calculated by the student number2, is inadequate. 
This amount of money can merely support the basic teaching activities 
without providing extra resources for the students to do extra-curricular 
activities and for the teachers to undertake professional development 
training. As for the government’s attitude towards this type of school, a 
good example is the language of the school’s license. In the license, the 
section ‘Aims of the school’ writes that ‘providing primary education mainly 
for children from rural-to-urban migrant worker family’, which limits the 
school’s recruitment scope into migrant children who are largely from low 
socio-economic status backgrounds. What is interesting is that it is unusual 
in China that the government sets limits to a school’s recruitment scope in 
terms of students’ socio-economic background. In the view of one of my 
respondents, who is the owner of a government-controlled private school3, 
the formulation of the language of the school’s license is ridiculous, as it 
reflects the municipality’s discrimination towards these schools and their 
																																																						
1 An example of professional title is ‘professor’ in the higher education system. 
Without a professional title, it might be hard for person to get his/her former 
professional experiences recognized by his/her new employer.  
2 The amount is ¥6000 (£630 equivalent) per student for one academic year.  
3 The government-controlled private school shares the same type of license as 
the government-purchased private school.  
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pupils, denying their quality of education and depriving schools and pupils 
of local children. In addition, the municipality requires that these schools 
establish a loose student/teacher ratio, which is ‘equipping at least 2 
teachers for 1 class’. Yet in the state schools, the student/teacher ratio 
should be ‘equipping at least 2.8 teachers for 1 class’. This clearly 
demonstrates an inferior teaching standard in these schools. Related to 
this is the fact that the municipality has not included this type of school into 
the league table, which may reflect the municipality’s unwillingness to 
supervise and improve the academic performance of these schools. In 
short, the municipality is conducting a ‘low cost and inferior schooling 
approach’ for these schools and their pupils. In response to the conflict of 
limited government funding and high demand for school enrolment from 
migrant children, the municipality chose to establish a large number of 
‘schools with basic study resources’ with relatively low costs, instead of 
creating a number of ‘schools offering good education’ with massive 
investment. In other words, the realisation of access to schools for migrant 
children is at the expense of reducing the standard of education they 
receive.  
  Under the low cost and inferior schooling approach, the schools are 
facing difficulties. A direct problem is a lack of teaching resources and 
hardware facilities owing to their financial deficit. A good example is school 
T in Minhang District, which does not have any music rooms - ‘that means 
the school’s orchestras has to do their rehearsal outside in the playground. 
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When it is raining, then they must cancel’ (headteacher of school T). In 
addition, the scope of the optional school-based courses, which are not on 
the national compulsory course list, is limited, owing to the inadequate 
teaching resources. Yet running a wide range of school-based courses, 
such as pottery, is a common practice in the state schools in Shanghai. 
What can be identified here is a gap in the optional curriculum between the 
government-purchased private school and the state school. Moreover, it is 
hard for the school to attract excellent teachers, owing to the low salary, 
absence of civil servant status and insufficient professional development 
resources, as reported by all the interviewed headteachers. Also 
insufficient is the number of the teachers. Facing these problems, some 
schools have tried to enlarge class sizes in order to obtain more funding, 
since the funding is calculated by the student number. Yet this endeavour 
has caused a new problem - oversized classes. As reported by the 
headteacher of school T, the student number in his school is 60 per class, 
while in state schools the number should be less than 45 per class. Such 
overcrowding incurs complaints from the migrant parents, as reported by 
migrant mother Uang: ‘there are too many students in one class, and the 
teachers do not have enough energy to take care of every child’. Facing all 
of the above problems, the quality of teaching and learning has been 
queried by the district municipality of education, migrant parents, and the 
headteachers and teachers themselves. For example, a senior leadership 
team member in school P says: ‘To be honest, there is still a gap between 
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the capabilities of our teachers and that of the state school teachers, since 
many of us are continuers from the private and informal school period’. 
Similarly, officer K comments that ‘after the transformation, the quality of 
teaching in these schools has been improved… However, if compared to 
regular state schools, I am afraid there is still a gap’ (Officer K, Pudong 
District Municipality of Education). The majority of the interviewed 
headteachers and parents also had similar comments.  
3.1.3 Interim nature 
In the view of the district municipality of education, the increasing 
educational need for places for migrant children is an acute social issue at 
present, but there is a possibility that it may reduce in intensity in the future 
because of the floating nature of the migrant population and the instability 
of government policy on migration. The local government’s worry about the 
possibility of the disappearance of migrant children can be identified in the 
words of officer K:  
We used to call these children ‘floating children’ [流动儿童], which 
means this group is always floating. There is no guarantee that they 
will stay in a place for a stable period. Under this circumstance, it is 
really hard for the municipality to have a long-term plan for their 
schooling… Their need for schooling is also affected by the policy. For 
example, in the last two years with the establishment of the strict state 
school enrolment criteria, less migrant children would enrol in the state 
school. (Officer K, Pudong Municipality of Education)  
With this understanding of migrant children’s educational needs, the 
municipality treats the government-purchased schools as an ‘emergency 
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mechanism’ for solving the urgent problem of floating children, rather than 
as regular schools that serve the long-term education needs of a stable 
social group. The situation occurs in the government-controlled private 
schools as well. The owner of school R feels that the municipality does not 
treat this type of school as regular schools; what it wants is merely that the 
schools offer migrant children a place to go:  
What is strange is that when the district municipality gathers the 
private owners together for a meeting, it seldom talks about education. 
What it always talks about is that the owners cannot do this and cannot 
do that, for the sake of campus safety… What I can feel is that the 
municipality does not have motivation to support us to be excellent in 
teaching. It merely wants us not to cause any troubles. ‘Interim’ is how 
the government treats us. It hopes to gradually shut our schools down 
- although it never directly says this, we can feel it.  
As the owner points out, ‘“interim” is how the government treats us’. The 
interim nature embodies as a series of actions (or non-actions) the district 
municipality’s attitude towards the schools. The main aspect is that the 
municipality does not have a long-term development plan for these schools. 
When asked about the government’s future plan for these schools, officer 
L expresses his uncertainty:  
‘For this type of schools, from a long term perspective, it is just an 
“interim mechanism”. Yet this interim mechanism might not terminate 
soon. This kind of school might gradually vanish when there is not 
much of a floating population in this area’ (Officer L, Minhang 
Municipality of Education).  
It seems that the municipality does not have a clear plan; instead, it is 
always waiting for possible changes to the current situation. In other words, 
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‘no plan’ is the plan. A supporting institutional arrangement for this ‘no plan’ 
is the rule of yearly registration, namely, the school should re-register every 
year, which gives the government annual discretion to terminate these 
schools.  
  Having an interim nature without a long-term plan, the schools are facing 
difficulties. As the headteacher of school T reports:  
What is not sure and what I always want to find out is ‘for how many 
more years can we exist’? This is a crucial question, because the 
answer to it will determine whether the government should increase 
the financial investment to build campus houses and to improve its 
facilities. But there is just no answer to this question. That makes me 
worried.  
The main reason for this headteacher’s worry is that the government’s 
financial support for these schools is unstable, depending on whether 
migrant children are welcomed in particular periods, as officer K discribes:  
In the past few years the government’s investment was relatively 
strong; yet in recent years, since the metropolitan cities such as Beijing 
and Shanghai started to control their population size, the city 
government do not offer as much financial support as usual. (Officer 
K, Pudong Municipality of Education) 
Another group that also feels worried is the teachers. With no guarantee of 
their future from the government and from the school, they do not consider 
their jobs as formal and sustainable. Instead, they consider this job as a 
job with no future, resulting in low motivation towards their responsibilities, 
as the headteacher of school T complains:  
The senior leadership team is the biggest problem for me. They still 
consider this job as a ‘job with no future’, believing that someday the 
school will be shut down, so there is no need for them to be highly 
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motivated and have self-discipline towards this job. As a result, I have 
had to take care of all the daily management work (which should not 
be the responsibility for a headteacher), including revising the draft of 
the school daily news! The teachers are the same. I know that when I 
am not at school, some teachers are often late for classes, which is 
unbelievable in a state school.  
As a result of the teachers’ low motivation, it is difficult for the headteacher 
to formalize the teaching and management in these schools as would be 
possible in state schools.  
3.2 Government-controlled private school 
3.2.1 ‘Belongingness’ to state sector 
Being privately owned, the government-controlled private school has less 
of sense of belonging, or ‘belongingness’, to the state sector than that of 
the government-purchased school. Yet since it is also partly controlled by 
the government, it can still be considered part of the state sector: the 
government funding is the sole financial resource; the school cannot 
charge the students tuition fees; when recruiting students, it must follow 
the state school’s criteria; it also follows the same compulsory subjects as 
in state schools. ‘After my school got registered, I have lost the control of 
my own school’, reported by the owner of school R with helplessness and 
frustration. The owners might not have benefited too much from the 
government’s actions, yet the takeover indeed improves the study 
resources for the migrant children, since the schools have received specific 
funding to improve its facilities. For example, in school Q:  
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The government has provided our school with funding to build a 
computer room, music room, science laboratory, general technology 
room, plastic playground, basketball court, and to purchase all the PE 
facilities including volleyballs and basketballs. In the Pudong district, 
a school can receive ¥800,000 [£80,000 equivalent] on average, all 
received at once. (Headteacher of the school Q)  
The migrant children enrolled in these schools can enjoy free education, 
as in the state schools. It is worth noting that in all three types of schools, 
the curriculum (in terms of the national compulsory subjects) and 
qualification of teaching staff are the same as in state schools.  
3.2.2 Offering quasi-state education 
The low cost and inferior schooling approach applied in the government-
purchased school also applies to the government-controlled school. 
Therefore, the nature of offering quasi-state education can also be 
identified in the latter. Additionally, this type of school is facing specific 
problems since they are still run by private owners. The district municipality 
only controls the school’s income and student recruitment, while inspection 
of its teaching and operation is minimal. This lack of supervision can result 
in corruption, as reported by the headteacher of school Q. Some owners 
try to hire as few teachers as possible in order to save the expenditure for 
teachers’ salary, then they managed to move the saved expenditure into 
their own pockets through financial fraud. As a result, a teacher’s income 
in these schools is even lower than that of the government-purchased 
schools, while the teachers’ work-load can be greater. For example, in 
school R (government-controlled) in Pudong district, the teacher’s average 
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wage is ¥2600/month (£260 equivalent), while in school J (government-
purchased) in Baoshan district, the amount is ¥3000+/month (£300+ 
equivalent); in school T (government-purchased) in Minhang district, the 
amount is ¥5000/month (£500+ equivalent). Admittedly, the same amount 
of money can have different purchasing power in different areas (even in 
different districts within Beijing and Shanghai), depending on the local 
economic conditions. Yet the two respondent headteachers in Pudong 
district both expressed regret about their teachers’ low income1, while the 
headteacher in Minhang district expresses his pride at his teachers’ good 
income. This situation has caused the instability and insufficiency of 
teacher supply in the government-controlled schools, which in turn has 
negatively influenced teaching quality and children’s social emotional 
development, as reported by the headteacher of school Q: 
When a teacher starts working, it takes some time for him/her to be 
familiar with the children. Yet when s/he and the students get familiar 
with each other after a term, s/he might suddenly quit this job in the 
middle of the term. When this emergency happens, I have to hire some 
part time teachers from extra-curricular educational companies. I 
believe this brings very bad influences to the teaching and learning, 
as well as the children’s social emotional development.  
What can be identified here are the negative influences of the instability 
and insufficiency of teacher supply.  
																																																						
1  In the government-controlled schools, the headteacher is not the owner; 
therefore, s/he has no right to decide the teachers’ wages.  
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3.2.3 Interim nature 
The interim nature, which can be identified in the government-purchased 
school, can also be identified in the government-controlled private school 
owing to the similarities in government treatment. Moreover, since the 
government is not the owner of the controlled private schools, it does not 
feel much responsibility to them. When there is not much need for migrant 
children’s schooling, the government might be glad to see these schools 
being closed down by their owners. The government’s attitude originates 
from its distrust and suspicion towards the private owners, as reported by 
the owner of school R:  
Each term we need to attend two or three meetings organized by the 
municipality, of which the theme would always be warning us what 
cannot be done, making us frustrated. Why does it organize these 
meetings for us? It is just because it does not trust us, neither does it 
respect us. It considers us as unprofessional and untrustworthy, 
because in its views the reason why we established the school is for 
profit, not for the sake of education. Now it has taken over the control 
of the school, it wants us to be marginalized.   
The municipality has devised a particular institutional design to realize the 
interim nature of the government-controlled private schools: there is a 
mismatch between the decision-making power of the municipality and the 
obligation of the private owner to take the (often negative) consequences 
of the decisions made by the municipality. For example, the owner does 
not have the right to decide the school’s student recruitment criteria, which 
is decided by the municipality. Since 2014, the criteria are hard for many 
	 316	
migrant families to attain. As a result, it is increasingly difficult for these 
schools to recruit enough students. These schools are facing the possibility 
of closing down in the near future. ‘My school is at the edge of extinction’, 
reported by the headteacher of school Q:  
In September 2013, we recruited 37 students. In September 2014, the 
number on roll dropped to 20. And in this year, I am not sure whether 
we are able to recruit this number of students, owing to the strict school 
enrolment criteria established by the government.  
Facing the same difficulty, the headteacher of school R, expects that his 
school can only survive for another two or three years. However, for the 
district municipality of education, the school’s difficulties are not seen as its 
business since it is not the owner.  
3.3 Senior secondary state school for adult students 
3.3.1 ‘Belongingness’ to the state sector  
This type of school is positioned firmly within the state sector and this can 
be identified from two aspects. First, these are state schools and are 
naturally under the government’s control; second, although recruiting 
migrant children is a ‘market action’, allowing the school to gain sufficient 
funding to survive, the recruitment is overseen by the district municipality 
of education through their control of the school’s funding and recruitment 
quota. In other words, the municipality’s control has increased the extent 
to which these senior secondary schools ‘belong’ in the state sector.   
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3.3.2 Offering quasi-state education 
As senior secondary schools for adult students, the official aim of these 
schools is not educating junior secondary stage students. Therefore, the 
government is unable to provide the school with quotas to hire teachers 
(with civil servant status) to educate the students at the junior secondary 
stage. Yet it is an established fact that the school has already recruited a 
large number of migrant children and therefore needs more teachers. 
Facing this dilemma, the school has to hire teachers without civil servant 
status at its own expense. In school L, among its total of 46 teachers, only 
26 teachers have civil servant status. For the remainder, their salary is 
much lower. As a result, the position of teacher without civil servant status 
can struggle to attract capable job seekers. The headteacher of school L 
comments that the teachers without civil servant status are not as capable 
as the teachers with civil servant status [编制]:  
The teachers without civil servant status do not have strong teacher 
professional capabilities and therefore have a negative influence on 
the quality of education. They cannot realize some of the school’s 
norms while the teachers with civil servant status can. There is a gap 
between these two groups of teachers in terms of their educational 
principles and their ability to realize the school’s norms on teaching 
and management.  
As a result, although it is a state school, the education it offers to the 
migrant children can hardly be understood as being as good as it is in 
regular state schools. Again, what can be identified in this type of school is 
the low cost and inferior schooling offer made to migrant children.  
	 318	
3.3.3 Interim nature 
In his opening sentence of our interview, the headteacher of school L 
reports that ‘recruiting migrant children is an interim work for our school’. 
Unlike the other two forms of schooling, the interim nature of this type of 
school can be identified as a ‘buffer mechanism’ for the district municipality 
to regulate the migrant children’s school enrolment. When the state school 
cannot recruit all the migrant children, these schools can help to recruit the 
extra students; when there is less demand for migrant children’s schooling 
in certain periods, these schools can then return to adult education. As 
commented by the headteacher of school L, the value of this type of school 
is to ‘help the district municipality to overcome the problem of migrant 
children’s schooling’:  
The state school is the priority choice for the migrant children. But in 
certain periods, the state schools are not able to recruit all the migrant 
children, so some children come to our school. In other words, this 
school is an ‘interim mechanism’ for migrant children’s schooling. If (in 
the future) the state schools have enough capacity to absorb all the 
migrant children, then our mission is accomplished, and we can return 
to the adult education sector. Yet before the arrival of this day, we 
should still work hard to recruit migrant children, to help the district 
municipality overcome the problem of migrant children’s schooling.  
3.4 Summary 
Figure 6 outlines the structure of the quasi-state school system, as well as 
its relationship with the state school system. As presented in the figure, the 
government-controlled and purchased private schools are the products of 
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the overlap between the state and private sector. The senior secondary 
state school, which recruits migrant children in the junior stage, is in the 
closest position to the private sector if compared with the regular state 
schools.  
Figure 6: educational system for migrant children in Shanghai 
 
  All three forms of schooling are not typical of state school education, yet 
all to some degree belong to the state sector. With strategies such as 
nominating the headteacher, providing funding as the sole financial 
resource and requiring the school to follow the state school enrolment 
criteria, the municipality has managed to include these once private sector 
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schools into the state sector. The following comment from the headteacher 
of school Q perfectly reflects the three forms of schooling and their degree 
of belonging to the state sector: 
Although our school has now been registered as a private school, it is 
not a real private school because a real private school does not rely 
on the government funding, yet we do. How much money the 
government gives to us [is] how much money we spend. Therefore, in 
many government documents, schools like ours have been given a 
special tag, namely, ‘private school for migrant children’, which means 
the school is not a real private one. For those real private schools, we 
call them ‘independent schools’.  
  Yet the degree of belonging to the state sector is limited, in terms of the 
schools’ financial capability, teaching resources, and the government’s 
attitude towards them, which, taken together, are reflected in their symbolic 
legal status of not being regular state schools. As a result, the education 
that they offer can be identified as ‘quasi-state education’. The weak 
foundation of the schools in their UIP period is a common reason for the 
current disadvantages. Additionally, the inferiority of each type of school is 
shaped by the course of the struggle among the actors in its formation. For 
example, in the government-controlled private schools, the discretion that 
the municipality permits for the schools’ owners leads to corruption, which 
in turn results in inferior teaching resources. Yet the common source of the 
difficulties these schools face is the willingness of the local government to 
make available a low cost and inferior form of schooling, which appears to 
meet the letter, but not the spirit, of the 2003 policy to supervise and 
support what were then UIP schools. And this approach is confirmed by a 
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recent central government policy, the National New Urbanization Planning 
(2014-2020), which states that: ‘For those migrant children who are not 
able to enrol in state schools, the local government should offer them free 
admissions to low-cost private schools through providing funding for these 
schools’. The outcome of this approach is the realisation of migrant 
children’s access to schooling, but at the expense of reducing the standard 
of education they receive.  
  Operating under the low cost and inferior schooling approach, the role 
these schools play can be understood as being the government’s ‘interim 
mechanism’ for solving the problems of access to schooling. The term 
‘interim’ was used by two headteachers, one owner, and one government 
officer in their interviews. Yet the interim nature has different characteristics 
in each form of schooling, shaped by the way that the actors are positioned 
in the field. In the government-purchased school, the interim nature 
originates from the municipality’s decision; in the government-controlled 
private school, the interim nature is also shaped by the municipality’s 
distrust and suspicion of the owner; and in the senior secondary adult 
school, the interim nature embodies a ‘buffer mechanism’ for the 
municipality. Treating these schools as an ‘emergency mechanism’, the 
local government does not establish sufficient regular state schools that 
meet the migrant children’s education needs in the long-term.  
  ‘Our school has a legal status of private school, yet is under the control 
of government, while it cannot enjoy the same benefits as state schools.’ 
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This comment by the owner of school R perfectly summarises the 
conflicted identity of the interim quasi-state school system.  
4. Redefining state school education  
The 2006 national equal education for migrant children policy requires the 
receiving local government to take the main responsibility for recruiting 
migrant children and to supervise and support the UIP schools. Yet the 
central government policy does not establish any responsibilities around 
the quality of the education offered. When the policy comes down to the 
local level, it has been adjusted according to local discretion. The local 
government redefines what can be considered as state education: the 
quasi-state school system, funded by the local government, can be 
considered as part of the state sector and thus is able to offer state 
education. In light of this notion, officer K claims that the goal of the TMC 
policy has been achieved:  
In Shanghai, the government senior leadership team has a unified 
statement (and expects us to follow this statement): there is no 
hardship, and there hasn’t been any hardship, in migrant children’s 
state school enrolment. The difficulty is indeed in meeting the migrants’ 
need of high-quality state school education. (Officer K, Pudong District 
Municipality of Education) 
In this officer’s words, the use of the term ‘state school’ has a broad scope 
that covers the quasi-state schools. Based on this definition, the migrant 
children’s school enrolment problem seems to have been solved and the 
goal of offering equal opportunity has been achieved. Yet an unsolved 
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question is, as revealed by officer K, can the quasi-state schools provide 
migrant children with equal opportunities as their counterparts in regular 
state schools?  
  An explanation for this situation is that the government at both central 
and local levels treat migrant children’s schooling as a ‘political task’ with a 
solution necessary for social stability (with the indicator of ‘every child 
having a place to study’), rather than an ‘educational cause’ for the proper 
development of human beings (with the indicator of ‘every child having 
access to a high quality education’). Ministry of Education officer A’s 
statement is representative of this attitude:  
The central government has attached importance to solving the 
problems of migrant children’s schooling because this issue has a 
direct influence on our citizens’ well-being, on social stability, on social 
harmony, on urban development, and finally, on the future of our 
socialism.  
Here, his emphasis is on the benefits of enabling migrant children to access 
schooling in order to improve social stability and social harmony as a 
political task, rather than for the migrant child’s individual educational 
development. This attitude of the central government acts as the source of 
legitimacy for the local government’s actions of redefining state school 
education. 
5. Conclusion  
Applying the theoretical idea that policy is a temporary settlement of 
interests (Truman, 1951; Latham, 1952; Dye, 2008; Gale, 1999) to the 
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Chinese context, this chapter complements the existing literature on policy 
enactment. It deconstructs the formation of three new forms of schooling 
for migrant children, which are not a result of unilateral top-down 
government policy-making. Rather, they are the result of the temporary 
settlement of struggles among different actors, including UIP schools, state 
schools, district municipality of education, and migrants.  
  Another main contribution of this chapter is its conceptualisation of an 
interim quasi-state school system, an idea which arises from empirical data. 
It conceptualises three characteristics of this system, namely the degree of 
belonging to the state sector, offering quasi-state educational provision, 
and being interim in nature. With the identification of these characteristics, 
the government’s attitude towards these schools is clear. Considering the 
floating nature of the migrant population and the instability of government 
policy, the government treats the quasi-state system as an emergency 
mechanism for solving the schooling problem of floating children, rather 
than a regular system designed for long-term education. What can be 
revealed is the government’s willingness to allow a low cost and inferior 
form of education provision in these schools.  
  Throughout the formation and functioning of the interim quasi-state 
school system, the migrant people’s voices are marginalized. While some 
of the interviewed parents express some dissatisfaction with these schools, 
most of them still deemed the school to be acceptable - at least it provides 
their children with a place to study. While realizing the migrant children’s 
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right to education, this system does not guarantee them a ‘good’ education. 
Furthermore, the existence of this isolated school system reinforces the 
state schools’ exclusivity as many migrant children cannot access them. 
These situations, as detailed above, have produced further obstacles to 
the migrant children’s attempts to access quality education.  
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Part IV 
Chapter 12: Conclusion 
In Chinese metropolitan areas, migrant children’s difficulties in accessing 
schooling have been an issue on the government public policy agenda 
since 2001. By 2006, a national policy framework aiming for ‘equal 
compulsory education for migrant children’ had been formed. The aim of 
this policy is to facilitate migrant children’s access to compulsory education 
on the same terms as local children (see chapter 6, section 2). As a result, 
progress has been made in terms of the number and percentage of migrant 
children who are able to access free compulsory education in state schools 
(see chapter 9, section 2). Yet a large number of children in Beijing and 
Shanghai – the settings for this research - are still unable to enrol in state 
schools as their families are not in possession of all the government-
required documents. This phenomenon has become more noticeable since 
2013, when the local governments set restrictive criteria for state school 
enrolment (see chapter 7 and chapter 8). While there are myriad studies 
about the schooling experiences of migrant children, less is known about 
how the policy concerning them has developed and is enacted, in what 
contexts, and under what conditions (see chapter 3 for a detailed review). 
Exploring how the policy influences the educational provision for migrant 
children was my starting point.  
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  My research does not simply limit itself to excavating and reporting the 
‘facts’ about how the policy is implemented into practice. Instead, it aims to 
produce scholarly analyses of the power relations between the different 
actors involved in the formation, enactment and development of the policy, 
following a qualitative policy sociology approach (chapter 5). The overall 
research question is ‘How do different individuals, organizations and 
groups of actors interpret and enact the policy for migrant children’s 
schooling?’ Following this question, this thesis examines not only things 
happening outside schools in local and central government, traditionally 
considered as the main policy arenas, but also things happening inside 
schools, which is yet another policy arena following the policy enactment 
perspective (Ball, Maguire and Braun, 2012). The analysis is organized 
around two further sub questions: i) under what conditions has the 
enrolment policy for migrant children developed? (chapters 6, 7 and 8); ii) 
what kind of education and school experiences do migrant children have 
after they have enrolled in state (or quasi-state) schools? (chapters 9, 10 
and 11)  
  As the concluding chapter, this chapter summarises the empirical 
findings (section 1). It also discusses the principles of social justice guiding 
the policy enactment and explores the structuring, restructuring and 
reproduction of power relations in the policy enactment process (section 2). 
Finally, it discusses the strategies for progressive changes towards the 
objective of attaining equality of condition (section 3).  
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1. The policy enactment in practice 
1.1 Under what conditions has the enrolment policy for migrant 
children developed? 
As has been revealed in chapter 6, migrant children’s schooling policy has 
undergone fluctuating developments with the latest policy shift coming in 
2013. Chapters 7 and chapter 8 focus on how this policy change happened 
and under what conditions, acknowledging that the policy is constantly 
shaped by various factors from both without and within the education 
system.  
  Bourdieu’s field theory helps one to understand how the school 
enrolment criteria became more restrictive under the influences of politics, 
economy and population policy. As elaborated in chapter 7, as a sub-field 
in a dominated position within the public policy field, the logic of the 
educational policy field is constantly shaped by the logics of the broader 
public policy field, political field and the economic field. As a result, as the 
social justice discourse became marginalized in the political field and a 
social welfare discourse became more prominent in the public policy field 
after 2013, educational policy has become a mechanism of population 
control deployed by the government.  
  In examining what happens inside the education system, a Foucauldian-
influenced ‘policy cycle’ framework, which contains three interrelated 
contexts, helps to explain why and how the local municipality of education 
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introduced the social welfare logic into the educational policy field. As 
elaborated in chapter 8, state schools have problematized the recruitment 
of migrant children as the cause of ‘declining educational quality’. This 
identification of migrant children as problematic is shaped by two social 
regularities: the teachers’ professional understanding of their roles as 
educators and the broader deficit social discourse that places migrants as 
‘outsiders’. In the context of influence, the school and teachers’ interest in 
recruiting less migrant children moves into a consensus with the local 
municipality of education. The latter adopts the new national policy agenda 
of limiting migrant populations and produces a restrictive criteria system, 
which imports a welfare discourse into the context of policy text production. 
The criteria system then becomes standardized and legitimized through 
user-friendly policy artefacts established by the local government in the 
context of practice.  
1.2 What kind of education and school experiences do migrant 
children have after being enrolled in state (or quasi-state) schools?  
Since 2001, the local government has made good progress in facilitating 
migrant children’s access to schooling with multiple types of schools in both 
state and private sectors involved. The state schools act as the main 
channel of schooling, as required by the ‘Two Main Channel’ (TMC) policy. 
In recent years, the state sector has recruited around 77%-80% migrant 
children nationwide (see Table 11 in chapter 9, section 2). With an 
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increasing number of migrant children enrolled, many state schools have 
become migrant majority schools. This kind of school has already become 
an established part of the state school system. In the private sector, most 
of the former unlicensed informal private (UIP) schools have been shut 
down or turned into licensed schools, under the policy of ‘supervising and 
supporting the unregistered informal private schools’. These licensed 
schools are more or less funded by the government and thus can be 
considered as quasi-state schools, recruiting around twenty-eight percent 
of migrant children in Shanghai. Then the remaining question is: does 
enrolling in state or quasi-state schools mean that the migrant children can 
now enjoy equal educational resources and expect to have outcomes 
equal to the local children?  
  Those children who are enrolled in state schools enjoy access to the 
same educational resources as the local children. Then the question is: 
does access to equal educational resources produce social inclusion and 
finally lead to equal outcomes? Drawing on Bourdieu’s concepts of habitus 
and capital, chapter 10 identifies limited home-school cooperation as a 
result of migrant parents’ rural habitus and lack of the relevant cultural 
capital. As the home-school cooperation is an assumed part of urban 
schooling, the respondent teachers felt that the limited cooperation is a 
main reason for some migrant children’s underachievement in academic 
study. As reported by most of the respondent teachers, the majority of the 
migrant children risk ending up with a high school or vocational school 
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qualification or lower, leading them into low skilled jobs. In the meantime, 
and more positively, a well-integrated relationship can be identified 
between migrant and local children, a relationship that reinforces the 
migrant children’s social inclusion-in urban society. This situation is likely 
to produce a generation of new urban citizens who may yet remain working 
as low skilled workers like their parents.  
  As for the quasi-state school system in the private sector, it is an 
established part of the local school system in Shanghai (chapter 11). By 
promulgating the policy of ‘supervising and supporting the unregistered 
informal private schools’, the central government aims to facilitate the 
migrant children’s equal access to education. Yet in the local government’s 
interpretation, migrant children’s schooling is a political task rather than an 
educational tool for the full development of human beings. At the local level, 
the interim quasi-state school system is an emergency mechanism for 
solving the schooling problem of floating children, rather than a regular 
system designed for long-term education. While realizing the migrant 
children’s right to education, this system does not guarantee them a ‘good’ 
education, as it amounts to a low cost and inferior schooling approach.  
1.3 The nature of policy enactment  
The above discussion summarises the empirical findings organized around 
two sub questions of the overall research question (the sub questions are: 
1. how has the migrant children school enrolment policy developed and 
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under what conditions? 2. what kind of education and school experiences 
do migrant children have after they have enrolled in state (or quasi-state) 
schools?) With regard to the overall question - ‘How do different individuals, 
organisations and groups of actors interpret and enact the policy for 
migrant children’s schooling?’ - my findings extend our understanding of 
the nature of policy enactment, highlighting three points: first, educational 
policy is not only shaped by factors in the education system, but also by 
individuals and organizations in the broader social space; additionally, it is 
shaped by a complex interrelationship of factors both inside and outside 
the school. As I have elaborated in chapter 7, the migrant children’s 
schooling policy is shaped by the development of the population policy, the 
change of political leaders and the needs of the economic sector. The 
changes to state school enrolment criteria and the establishment of 
different forms of schooling are the results of interactions between migrant 
families, state school teachers, former unregistered informal private 
schools and local and central government departments (chapter 8 and 
chapter 11). These finding emphasis the importance of the multi-focused 
perspective in the scholarly exploration of educational policy (Ball, 1997).  
  Second, policy enactment is shaped by people’s interpretations and 
translations in and through their mundane social interactions. In my study, 
the teachers, school leaders, parents and children’s understandings of 
‘what education is for’, together with their dispositions and cultural 
resources, can influence the enactment of the policy. For some migrant 
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parents, their rural and working-class habitus produces an approach to 
child rearing similar to Lareau’s (2003) ‘accomplishment of natural growth’. 
This offers little motivation to exert their (limited) academic cultural capital 
to support their children’s study. Their understandings of their role in their 
children’s education do not match with the teachers’ expectations of home-
school cooperation. As a result, a discourse of ‘incompetent parents’ has 
arisen and migrant children’s school enrolment has been problematized in 
the school (chapter 10). The school’s problematisation of migrant children’s 
school enrolment moves into a consensus with the local municipality of 
education, which has been facing huge pressure for school places from the 
migrant children, resulting in a restrictive criteria system after 2013 
(chapter 8). These findings remind the researchers to ‘people’ (Ball 1997) 
the research subjects and pay attention to their experiences, attitudes and 
understandings of the policy.  
  Finally, my findings highlight the value of the policy trajectory study 
approach I have taken in this study, which ‘attends to the ways in which 
policies evolve, change and decay through time and space and their 
incoherence’ (Ball, 1997). This approach maintains that policy is ‘made 
sense of, mediated and struggled over, and sometimes ignored’ (Ball, 
Maguire, Braun, 2012: 3) in non-linear and dynamic ways, highlighting the 
evolvements and changes throughout the policy trajectory. We see this 
when we consider the national TMC policy in my study, the policy-maker 
(State Council)’s stance, as written in the policy document, is that migrant 
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children should ‘receive compulsory education equally’ (see chapter 6, 
section 2). Yet in the view of the Ministry of Education and local 
municipalities of education, who are the government bodies that 
‘implement’ this policy, the migrant children’s schooling is a ‘political task’ 
instead of an ‘educational cause’. As a result, the local government 
establishes an interim quasi-state school system to recruit migrant children. 
Yet the quality of education provided by this system cannot be considered 
as equal to that of the state school system. In addition, in the state school 
system, the migrant children’s school enrolment has been problematized 
by the educators. To be more specific, the teachers have problematized, 
not the restrictions on the children’s access to schooling, but rather the 
declining quality of the ‘raw material’ that they have to work with (the 
migrant children). The state school’s negative interpretation of the policy 
moves into a consensus with the local municipality of education, producing 
a restrictive criteria system which meets the letter, but not the spirit, of the 
TMC policy. And the teachers and heads offer tacit support to the actions 
of the local municipality by not speaking up for migrant families. In short, 
the enacted version of the policy is different from what is written in the TMC 
policy document, as a result of the interpretations and translations of 
central and local government, schools and educators.  
  In sum, as Ball reminds us, ‘the “effects” of policy cannot be simply read 
off from texts and are the outcome of conflict and struggle between 
“interests” in context’ (1994: 21). The strength of a policy enactment 
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approach is that it recognizes the complexities of policy and aims to ‘look 
for the iterations embedded within chaos’ (Ball, 1994: 15). The iterations 
embedded within chaos, from the point of view of a policy sociology 
approach, is the power relations working both in and through people’s one-
to-one interactions and macro social relations mediated by institutions. I 
will come back and discuss the structure, reproduction and restructuring of 
the power relations in the TMC policy in section 2.2. Before that, I will first 
examine the principles of social justice guiding the practices of the central 
and local government, who occupy dominant positions in the policy 
enactment.  
2. The principles of social justice?  
This section discusses the principles of social justice guiding the 
government’s practices in policy formulation and enactment. As I will 
elaborate, distributive justice is the main principle in practice. Distributive 
justice refers to ‘the principles by which goods are distributed in society’ 
(Gewirtz, 1998: 470). The conventional conception of distributive justice is 
classically defined by Rawls as follows: ‘the subject matter of justice is the 
basic structure of society, or more exactly, the way in which the major social 
institutions… distribute fundamental rights and duties’ (1972: 7). Under the 
distributive paradigm, the primary concerns are the more equal distribution 
of rights, duties and social and economic goods between social groups 
(equality of opportunity), or seek to ensure everyone does have an equal 
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opportunity to succeed by taking compensatory measures to prevent 
disadvantage, for example, distributing more resources for disadvantaged 
groups (aiming for increasing opportunities for equality of outcome). In 
either situation, attention is drawn to the allocation of social goods or rights, 
mainly in material configurations. Yet the reproduction and restructuring of 
the unequal power relations in society are overlooked. As argued by Lynch, 
without addressing these ‘fundamental problems of hierarchies of power, 
wealth and other privileges’, disadvantaged groups will continue to occupy 
the subordinate positions, even if the identity of those groups changes 
‘from white to black, from citizens to migrant workers’ (1995: 12, 14, 24). 
Therefore, the distributive understanding of social justice is restrictive, as 
it privileges ‘who gets what’, while bracketing out questions about ‘the 
nature of the “what” and what influences are brought to bear upon it’ 
(Troyna and Vincent, 1995: 156). Noting the limitations of the distributive 
paradigm, some researchers underline the importance of the relational 
understanding of justice, which refers to ‘the way in which relations of 
power are distributed in society’ (Gewirtz, 1998: 471). Relational justice 
concerns how power is embedded in, and restructured and reproduced, 
both through people’s one-to-one interactions and through macro social 
relations mediated by institutions. Unequal power relations in society were 
analysed by American philosopher, Iris Marion Young as five faces of 
oppression: exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural 
imperialism and violence (Young, 1990). Some of these ‘faces’ resonate 
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with my findings, as I will discuss later. In short, both distributional and 
relational dimensions of justice facilitate our understanding of social 
inequalities from different perspectives. By integrating and encompassing 
these two perspectives, Lynch (1995) argues for the importance of the 
objective of equality of condition, which offers a more holistic 
conceptualization of equality to inform progressive action to address 
inequalities. In pursuing this objective, the scope of actions should be 
extended to involve not only the equalization of resources or wealth, but 
also of power and privilege and to achieve what Young (1990) formulates 
as ‘justice as freedom from oppressive relations’. In this section, I examine 
to what extent particular social justice objectives have been achieved in 
the enactment of the migrant children’s schooling policy.  
2.1 Achieving distributive justice: from equality of opportunity to 
equality of outcome?  
Treating state school education as a certain type of social good, the 
national policy of equal education for migrant children emphasizes 
providing education for as many migrant children as possible. Assuming 
access to schooling will result unproblematically in educational 
achievement, this policy puts primary emphasis on the school enrolment 
rates, with little attention paid to the rates of success after a few years’ 
study in state school. What can be identified is that this policy is informed 
by the principle of distributive justice, and more specifically, an equality of 
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opportunity objective, which emphasizes access to education. Yet 
considering the limits of the capabilities of the receiving local governments, 
the TMC policy does not require them to recruit all the migrant children into 
the state school system. What it requires is that the state school should be 
the mainstream channel for migrant children. In recent years the local 
government has made good progress and the state sector has recruited 
around 77%-80% migrant children nationwide. This figure can be seen as 
a proof of a significant, but not complete, realization of the TMC policy goal. 
Yet the degree to which equality of opportunity has been realized is still 
questionable, since around 20% migrant children have failed to enrol in 
state schools even before 2014 when the school enrolment criteria became 
more restrictive. This group of children have had to enrol in expensive 
private schools, low cost and inferior private schools, unregistered informal 
private (UIP) schools, or have been sent to their parents’ hometowns. After 
2014, further inequality has emerged from the establishment of the 
restrictive school criteria, which is legitimized by the TMC policy as it does 
not require the state school sector to recruit all the migrant children. Under 
the restrictive school criteria, only those children of migrants who are 
defined as ‘contributors to the city’ by the local government are now entitled 
to access education provision (chapter 8). As a result, the migrant 
children’s opportunities to access state schools have been reduced, 
compared with the situation in the years when there was progress (2001-
2014).  
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  In addition, the central government policy does not establish as a 
responsibility for the local government that it should offer exactly the same 
type of schooling for the migrant children. In doing so, central government 
tolerates the potentially unequal educational experiences in and through 
different types of schooling, such as the quasi-state school system in 
Shanghai (see chapter 11). In other words, while the local government 
equalizes the majority of the migrant children’s school access, it overlooks 
questions about the quality of that education. The government follows the 
objective of equality of opportunity but does not aim to increase 
opportunities for equality of outcome. The eighty percent of migrant 
children who have enrolled in state schools do enjoy access to apparently 
equal educational conditions as their urban counterparts. However, while 
they enjoy more advantageous educational conditions than those migrant 
children who study outside the state sector, the available data suggest that 
many of them are underperforming in state schools (see chapter 2, section 
4 and chapter 10, section 5.1). Yet in the view of the local government, the 
migrant children’s academic underperformance is not an urgent and 
serious issue when compared to the issue of school access, which is an 
ongoing political task.  
  Furthermore, under the distributive paradigm, the fact that the majority 
of migrant children can access state sector schools is understood as a 
success of the TMC policy. Yet the power relations that produce the migrant 
children’s continued difficulties in schooling remain unchallenged, or even 
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unrecognized. When examined from the relational dimension of justice, the 
effects of the enactment of the TMC policy can hardly be considered as 
achieving the equality objective. I will elaborate this issue in the next 
section. 
2.2 How far are the policy outcomes from achieving relational justice? 
The structure, reproduction and restructuring of the power relations  
Ball suggests that policy ‘typically posits a restructuring, redistribution and 
disruption of power relations’ (1994: 20). In section 1.3 where I comment 
on the nature of policy enactment, I have reviewed how TMC policy is 
interpreted, translated and enacted by different individuals and institutions 
and how it evolves, changes and decays throughout its trajectory. In this 
section, I will identify several aspects of the power relations among those 
individuals and institutions in their interactions and social relations.  
  Bourdieu’s field theory, together with the Foucauldian concept of 
discourse and the policy cycle framework, help to examine the dominated 
position of the educational policy field in the national social space (chapter 
7), and how this situation reinforces migrant children’s marginalised 
position in school enrolment (chapter 8). After 2013, with the change of 
national political leaders and the establishment of restrictive population 
policies, the social justice discourse has been marginalized within the 
educational policy field. In this field, what has been formed instead is a 
discourse of education as welfare. As a result, the migrant group’s symbolic 
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capital of being ‘migrant’, which once had some value in the political and 
educational fields, has diminished and their position is again one of 
marginalization in state school enrolment. More importantly, regardless of 
the policy change since 2013, the migrant population has traditionally been 
set in a disadvantaged position compared with the local residents under 
the household registration (hukou) system. As I have noted earlier (see 
chapter 2, section 3 and chapter 8, section 2), the household registration 
system is an embodied form of state sponsored ‘welfare chauvinism’ 
(Kitschelt, 1995; Mudde, 2000), namely, the state's restrictions on access 
to welfare for certain social group, especially migrants. It creates an inferior 
‘outsider’ status for the migrants who do not hold local household 
registration cards, setting them in a disadvantaged position.  
  Bourdieu’s conceptual toolkit also helps one to examine the reproduction 
and reinforcement of the migrants’ socio-economic status in school 
(chapter 10). Enrolling in state schools, the migrant children’s 
disadvantaged position has not been fundamentally changed. As an 
embodied form of cultural imperialism (Young, 1990), the cultural capital 
valued in the schools has been that associated with the urban middle 
classes. Under the exam-orientated education tradition, possession and 
activation of relevant cultural capital, in the form of parents’ literacy (the 
embodied state) and the cultural goods they own (the objectified state), will 
offer families a relatively advantaged position in the educational field. Yet 
coming from rural, working class family backgrounds, the migrant children 
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are lacking in relevant familial cultural capital to support their study. The 
lacking of familial cultural capital arises from the migrant parents’ habitus 
of not treating themselves as academic educators, setting migrant children 
in a disadvantaged position compared to their local counterpart. Without 
sufficient attention to equality of outcome and measures beyond merely 
equal distribution, the equal opportunity policy risks reproducing the rural 
migrant workers’ socio-economic status. In addition, with the establishment 
of the quasi-state schools, the migrant children’s hardship becomes less 
problematic in terms of the government discourse; in the meantime, the 
migrant parents’ pursuit of a ‘good education’ has been marginalized 
(chapter 11). As a result, the migrants’ disadvantaged position has been 
reinforced yet in an apparently legitimate way. 
  Furthermore, the processes by which policy has been enacted has also 
shaped the relative position of certain types of schools compared with 
others in the educational field (chapter 10 and chapter 11). The migrant 
majority state schools, which are traditionally non-elitist and ordinary 
schools, are now facing the problem of ‘declining education quality’ in terms 
of their declining exam results and school reputation. As for the teachers, 
while they are facing increasing burdens and emotional pressures, their 
work does not produce the outcomes (in terms of the exam scores) they 
expect. As for the semi-state schools, their position has been improved by 
acquiring formal legal status and funding from the local government. Yet 
obtaining legal status and being thereby defined as offering a particular 
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niche provision for a low status group also legitimizes the schools’ inferior 
status (chapter 11). These schools do not have the scope for improvement, 
since the local government adopts an approach that legitimises low cost 
and inferior schooling. In short, the enactment of the policy reinforces the 
existing stratification in the urban school system by marginalizing the 
migrant majority state schools and creating a group of disadvantaged semi-
state schools, thereby producing a number of ‘unsuccessful’ apparently 
‘failing’ schools and teachers.  
  In short, the processes of policy enactment have reproduced, reinforced 
and disguised the migrant group’s disadvantages in the urban educational 
system: their difficulties in school enrolment; their underperformance as a 
group in state schools; and the quality of education they receive in semi-
state schools and UIP descendant private schools. What can be identified 
from the above discussions is the marginalisation and powerlessness of 
migrant groups within an educational system marked by ‘welfare 
chauvinism’ and ‘cultural imperialism’. Thus the existing power relations in 
the broader social space are restructured and reproduced through the 
migrant children’s schooling policy, as I have noted at the beginning of this 
section quoting Ball’s comment. Returning to the relational dimension of 
justice, which examines ‘the way in which relations of power are distributed 
in society’ (Gewirtz, 1998: 471), the effects of the policy formulation and 
enactment can hardly be identified as achieving the objectives of justice.  
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3. The directions for progressive change and recommendations: 
towards the equality of condition  
Extending Bourdieu’s argument that a key role for sociology is that of 
‘shining a spotlight on the blinkers’ (1990a: 16), Lingard argued that ‘policy 
sociology should not only describe relations of power and processes 
through which policies are developed and allocated, but also point to 
strategies for progressive change which might challenge oppressive 
structures and practices’ (2014: 166). As noted earlier, the migrant group 
is in a marginalised and powerlessness position and is suffering from 
‘welfare chauvinism’ and ‘cultural imperialism’ in and through the 
educational system. To address these issues, it is useful to examine the 
mechanisms of marginalization in social life and to make progressive 
changes. The aim is to achieve not only the equalization of social goods 
and opportunities (the distributive dimension of social justice) but also of 
power and privilege (the relational dimension of justice), in a move towards 
the equality of condition (Lynch, 1995). For the migrant group, a main 
institutional barrier to their access to social welfare (including their 
children’s state school access) is the household registration (hukou) 
system. Although in recent years the system is undergoing changes, with 
increasing types of social welfare being (partly) open to migrants, what has 
not been changed is the underlying principle of ‘welfare chauvinism’, which 
creates an inferior ‘outsider’ status for the people involved in migration. To 
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address this issue, the practical objective is to reform the household 
registration system to allow migrant groups the benefit of full citizenship, 
and thereby improve the migrant group’s relative position in society, instead 
of merely providing (some of) them with state (or semi-state) school 
education under the objective of equality of opportunity, as the current 
policies do.  
  Yet to change the hukou system thoroughly, could take years. At the 
moment, I suggest that we appreciate the accomplishments of the current 
hukou reforms, and think about ways to extend this in an incremental 
manner. For example, currently what has been widely established in the 
Chinese cities is the residential certificate system with local diversities. 
Under these reforms, the person’s access to certain type of social welfare 
can be determined by the type of residential certificate (long-term or 
temporary) s/he holds or the credits attached to her/his certificate (see for 
example, chapter 8, section 4, last paragraph). The positive effect of the 
establishment of the local residential certificate systems is that they make 
the local welfare system more open to migrants. In the future, the local 
government should attach more types of basic social welfares to all types 
of residential certificates. In the field of education, the goal should be that 
all residential certificate holders are guaranteed school positions for their 
dependent children of compulsory education age. What is currently 
underdeveloped in the Law of Compulsory Education is that it has not set 
up accountability mechanisms for local and central government to ensure 
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the provision of equal educational opportunities for migrant children. Noting 
this underdevelopment in the legal system, the direction of the future legal 
reform is to make it clear in the educational law and local educational 
policies that all residential certificate holders have the right to access 
compulsory education locally. 
  In the meantime, what should not be forgotten is that the equalization of 
opportunity for migrant children’s school access has not yet been fully 
realized although the national policy was promulgated in 2001. And the 
recent policy change, which is largely shaped by the central and local 
government’s goal of reducing the overpopulated condition of super-large 
cities, has further reduced migrant children’s opportunities to access 
school. I draw attention to the question of whether the government policies 
for addressing the overpopulation problem should be used to limit 
children’s right of access compulsory education? From a legal point of view, 
migrant children’s right of school access in their places of residence is 
affirmed by the Law of Compulsory Education. To protect migrant children’s 
right to education, the central and local governments should reconsider 
their work in the pursuit of equality of opportunity. 
  In addition, as for those migrant children who are enrolled in state 
schools or quasi-state schools and hence enjoy free compulsory education 
provided by the state, the issue of equality of outcome should be taken into 
consideration by the local government. The existence of the quasi-state 
school system indicates that the equality objective has not been fully 
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achieved. The local government should rethink the legitimacy of their low 
cost and inferior schooling offer: should the schooling for migrant children 
be treated as a mechanism in response to a political task, or as a regular 
system designed for long-term education? There is a moral and ethical 
element to this question, given that education is a fundamental mechanism 
for the individual development of all citizens. Although having shortcomings, 
the quasi-state school system should not be simply shut down. The reason 
is that a large proportion of migrant children are currently studying in or will 
enroll in these schools (28% in Shanghai for example, see chapter 9, 
section 4), hence they will lose the chance for schooling if these schools 
are shut down. Recognizing this practical dilemma, a pragmatic strategy 
for the local government is to keep the quasi-state schools yet alter its 
approach to these schools which currently focuses on keeping their costs 
low as they are seen as an inferior alternative to state schools. With regard 
to the future reform, chapter 11 (section 3) has some implications for the 
government (especially the local government) to improve the quality of 
these schools: first, it should enhance its financial investments to provide 
the schools with adequate teaching resources and hardware facilities, 
especially for the arts, music and PE and optional school-based courses. 
Second, more financial resources should be invested in the schools to 
make sure that they can recruit an adequate number of teachers for all 
subjects. In the meantime, the state school’s standard of student/teacher 
ratio (equipping at least 2.8 teachers for 1 class) should be applied to these 
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quasi-state schools to cut down their class sizes. Third, the government 
should treat the quasi-state school teachers equally with the state school 
teachers in the aspects such as salary, professional development, and the 
award of a professional title. In this way the schools can attract and 
maintain excellent teachers. In short, the long-term goal is to transfer these 
schools from being an interim mechanism for the fulfillment of a political 
task to being a part of the regular state school system.  
  As for the migrant children in state schools, who enjoy access to 
apparently equal educational conditions to those of their urban 
counterparts, many of them are lacking in appropriate familial cultural 
capital to support their study to produce equal outcome with their local 
classmates. As I have stated earlier, the ‘appropriate’ familial cultural 
capital is socially constructed as that of urban-cultural and of middle-class. 
In terms of the ‘cultural imperialism’ underlying these inequalities, the issue 
of the measures to make progressive changes goes beyond the scope of 
this study. Therefore I will leave this question for later studies to focus on 
the construction of ‘appropriate’ cultural capital in the educational field, 
especially with regard to the aspects of curriculum, textbook and 
assessment. Yet with regard to the practical problem of many migrant 
children’s lack of familial academic support, I propose that the state schools, 
supported by the government, could provide them with additional support 
that does not rely on parental labour, in order to try to produce equal 
outcomes. One single step may be small, yet collectively small steps can 
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produce a qualitative leap.  
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Appendix 1: a list of all participants 
Government officers 
Name Description f/t/e Length Transcript 
Officer A Male; works in a junior leadership position in 
Ministry of Education; whose work is 
relevant to migrant children’s education. 
Face-to-
face 
105’ √ 
Officer B Male; works in a junior leadership position in 
Beijing Municipality of Education; whose 
work is relevant to migrant children’s 
education. 
Face-to-
face 
100’ √ 
Officer C Female; works in a senior leadership 
position Beijing Municipality of Education; 
whose work is relevant to migrant children’s 
education.  
Face-to-
face 
45’ √ 
Officer D Male; works in Beijing Municipality of 
Education; not in a leadership position; 
whose work is slightly relevant to migrant 
children’s education.  
telephone 15’ ✕ 
Officer E  Male; works in Fengtai Municipality of 
Education (Beijing); works in a junior 
leadership position; whose work is slightly 
relevant to migrant children’s education. 
telephone 30’ No voice 
recording 
Officer F Female; works in Mentougou Municipality of 
Education (Beijing); not in a leadership 
position; whose work is relevant to migrant 
children’s education. 
Face-to-
face 
47’ √ 
Officer G Female; works in Mentougou Municipality of 
Education (Beijing); not in a leadership 
position; whose work is relevant to migrant 
children’s education. 
Face-to-
face 
23’ √ 
Officer H Male; works in the Sub-district Office of Face-to- 57’ √ 
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Culture and Education (SOCE) of 
Wanshoulu, Haidian District of Beijing; works 
in a senior leadership position; whose work 
is relevant to migrant children’s education. 
face 
Officer I Male; works in the SOCE (Laoshan), 
Shijingshan District of Beijing; not in a 
leadership position; whose work is relevant 
to migrant children’s education. 
Face-to-
face 
25’ No voice 
recording 
Officer J Male; works in Baoshan Municipality of 
Education (Shanghai); works in a junior 
leadership position; whose work is relevant 
to migrant children’s education. 
Face-to-
face 
59’ √ 
Officer K Male; works in Pudong Municipality of 
Education (Shanghai); works in a junior 
leadership position; whose work is relevant 
to migrant children’s education. 
telephone 33’ √ 
Officer L Male; works in Minhang Municipality of 
Education (Shanghai); works in a junior 
leadership position; whose work is slightly 
relevant to migrant children’s education. 
Face-to-
face 
70’ No voice 
recording 
Officer M Male; works in Minhang Municipality of 
Education (Shanghai); not in a leadership 
position; whose work is slightly relevant to 
migrant children’s education. 
Face-to-
face 
12’ ✕ 
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School leaders 
Name Description f/t/e Length Transcript 
School A Female; headteacher Face  75’ √ 
School B Female; headteacher Face  34’ √ 
School B Male; senior leadership team 
member 
Face  51’ √ 
School E Female; headteacher Face  50’ No voice 
recording 
School F Female; deputy-headteacher Face  43’ √ 
School G Male; headteacher Face 52’ √ 
School H Male; headteacher Face  147’ √ 
School I Male; headteacher Face  70’ √ 
School J Male; headteacher Face  154’ √ 
School K Male; senior leadership team 
member  
Face  58’ √ 
School L Male; headteacher Face  64’ √ 
School M Female; headteacher Face  73’ ✕ 
School N Male; headteacher Face  72’ √ 
School O Male; headteacher Face  64’ No voice 
recording 
School P Female; senior leadership team 
member 
Face  90’ √ 
School Q Male; headteacher Face  90’ √ 
School R Male; headteacher Face  10’ ✕ 
School R Male; senior leadership team 
member 
Face  140’ √ 
School S Female; senior leadership team 
member 
Face  30’ √ 
School T Male; headteacher Face  174’ √ 
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Teachers 
Name Description f/t/e Length Transcript 
Teacher A Female; Maths teacher and class 
tutor in school A  
Face 28’ √ 
Teacher B Female; Chinese teacher and 
class tutor in school A  
Face 15’ √ 
Teacher C Female; Chinese teacher and 
class tutor in school G 
Face 32’ √ 
Teacher D Male; Chinese teacher and class 
tutor in school G 
Face 16’ √ 
Teacher F Male; Chinese teacher and class 
tutor in school F 
Face 22’ √ 
Teacher G Male; Chinese teacher and class 
tutor in school H 
Face 18’ No voice 
recording 
Teacher P Male; nursery teacher and class 
tutor in nursery A  
Face 80’ ✕ 
Teacher H Female; Maths & Chinese teacher 
and class tutor in school H 
Face 12’ √ 
Teacher I Female; Maths & Chinese teacher 
and class tutor in school I 
Face 15’ √ 
Teacher J Female; Chinese teacher and 
class tutor in school J  
Face 14’ ✕ 
Teacher K Female; Chinese teacher and 
class tutor in school N   
Face 45’ √ 
Teacher L Female; Maths teacher and class 
tutor in school M 
Face 21’ √ 
Teacher M Female; Maths teacher and class 
tutor in school S 
Face 48’ √ 
Teacher N Female; Chinese teacher and 
class tutor in school T 
Face 16’ ✕ 
Teacher O Male; PE teacher in school T Face 18’ ✕ 
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Migrant parents 
Name Description f/t/e Length Transcript 
Bai 
 
 
Migrant mother; aged between 30-40; has been in 
Beijing for more than ten years; no stable job; lives 
with husband and two sons; her husband is 
working as a building maintenance worker; both 
sons were born and raised in Beijing and are 
currently studying in state schools (including 
school A) in Beijing.  
Face 43’ √ 
Cai 
 
Migrant father; aged around 40; have been in 
Beijing for ten years; doing a manual labourer job; 
lives with his wife, who is also a manual labourer, 
and the only son, who was brought to Beijing at the 
age of three and is now studying in state school F.  
Face  34’ √ 
Dan 
 
Migrant mother; aged around 40; has been in 
Beijing for more than ten years; runs her own 
business in a supermarket in Beijing; has bought a 
house in Beijing; lives with husband and the only 
son who was born and raised in Beijing; husband 
works as a cook in the district government; son is 
studying in a state school (school F). 
Face  53’ √ 
Duan Migrant mother; aged around 40; works in a 
liquefied gas company; has been living in Beijing 
for thirteen years; living with husband and their 
only son; her son was born and raised in Beijing, 
and now studying in a state school (school B).  
Face  18’ ✕ 
En 
 
Migrant mother; aged around 30s; living in Beijing 
for nine years, during which she met her husband, 
who is also a rural migrant and working as a TV 
technician, and now has a daughter who was born 
and raised in Beijing; does not have a stable job, 
and is currently working as a part time voluntary 
teacher (with no pay) in her daughter’s nursery, 
Face  52’ √ 
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which is an unregistered informal educational 
setting for migrant children; her only daughter is 
studying in a state school in Beijing.  
Fan 
 
Migrant father; aged between 40-50; has been 
living in Beijing for 25 years; running own small 
business with his wife in a grass-root market; has 
two daughters and a son, all of them have been 
sent back to hometown to enrol in state school.  
Face 15’ ✕ 
Fang 
 
Migrant father; aged around 40; have been living in 
Beijing for ten years; running own small business 
in a grass-root market; his only son was born and 
raised in Beijing but have been sent back to the 
hometown at the grade four of primary school; and 
his wife is now accompanying their son in the 
hometown.    
Face 10’ ✕ 
Fei 
 
Migrant father; has been living in Beijing for 
fourteen years; running own small business with 
his wife in a grass-root market; has only one 
daughter, born and raised in Beijing.  
Face  25’  √ 
Geng 
 
Migrant mother; aged around 40; works as a 
marketing manager; have been living in Beijing for 
20 years; her husband is living and working in 
Baoding, which is a city near Beijing; her only son 
is studying in a state school in Beijing (school A).  
Face  80’ √ 
Hong 
 
Migrant mother; have been living in shanghai for 
twelve years; lives with husband and two children; 
her son was brought to Shanghai at one, and is 
now studying in a state junior high school (school 
L).  
telephone 7’ ✕ 
Ing 
 
Migrant father; aged around 40; have been living in 
Beijing since 2006; a worker in industry; living with 
wife and their only son, who came to Beijing in 
2012 after completed primary education in 
hometown; the son is now studying in the 
Face  21’ √ 
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unregistered informal private school H.  
Juan 
 
 
Migrant mother; aged around 40; have been living 
in Beijing since 2005; running a small grocery 
shop; her husband is doing manual labourer work; 
their only son is now studying in an unregistered 
informal private school (school H). 
Face  25’ √ 
Kang 
 
Migrant mother; have been in Beijing for five years; 
works as manual labourer; lives with husband and 
two children; both children are studying in the 
registered private school I; the older child 
transferred to Beijing from the hometown in the 
grade three of primary school; the younger child 
came to Beijing after graduated from nursery.   
telephone 15’ No voice 
recording 
Lian 
 
Migrant mother; living in Beijing for more than ten 
years; lives with husband and two daughters; both 
daughters were born and raised in Beijing; the 
older daughter is studying in a state school while 
the younger one is studying in a registered private 
school (school I).  
telephone 18’ √ 
Lin 
 
Migrant mother; has been living in Shanghai for 
twelve years; running her own restaurant with her 
husband; her son was brought to Shanghai when 
he was two; the son is now studying in a state 
junior secondary school (school N).  
Face  57’ √ 
Ma 
 
Migrant father in Beijing; lives with wife and two 
sons; the older son enrolled in a state junior 
secondary school after graduated from school I; 
the younger son is studying in school I.  
telephone 14’ No voice 
recording 
Ning 
 
Migrant mother; aged between 30-40; has been 
living in Shanghai for ten years; lives with husband 
and two sons; works as a waitress in the canteen 
of her sons’ school; both sons were born in the 
hometown but been brought to and grown up in 
Shanghai when they were very young; both 
Face  41’ √ 
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completed nursery education in Shanghai and now 
are studying in a state school (school K). 
Ong 
 
Migrant mother; aged around 40; has been living in 
Shanghai for twelve years; works as a worker in a 
factory; lives with husband and three children; her 
husband is working in the construction industry; 
her oldest daughter was born in the hometown and 
been brought to Shanghai before school age and 
now is studying in a state junior high school (school 
L); her second daughter was born and raised in 
Shanghai and is now studying in a state primary 
school grade five; her third child was born in 
Shanghai and is now is the nursery. 
telephone 16’ √ 
Ting 
 
Migrant father; aged around 40; have been living in 
Shanghai for fifteen years; lives with wife and two 
children; his daughter was brought to Shanghai at 
two years old and is now studying in a state junior 
high school (school L). 
telephone 10’ ✕ 
Pang 
 
Migrant father; have been living in Shanghai for 
sixteen years; works as an individual locksmith; 
lives with wife and two children; both children were 
born and raised in Shanghai and are now studying 
in state schools. 
Face  42’ √ 
Ran 
 
Migrant mother; has been living in Shanghai since 
2005; working in the domestic service sector; living 
with husband and their only daughter; her daughter 
was brought to Shanghai when she was half year 
old; she is now studying in a state primary school 
(school O).  
telephone 24’ No voice 
recording 
Sun 
 
Migrant father; has been living in Shanghai for 
fifteen years; works as a worker in a factory; lives 
with wife and two children; his wife does not have 
a formal job; their older child was born in the 
hometown and brought to Shanghai before school 
telephone 11’ No voice 
recording 
	 358	
age; their younger child was born and raised in 
Shanghai; both children are studying in a 
government-purchased private school (school T). 
Tian 
 
Migrant mother; has been living in Shanghai for 
more than ten years; she and her husband both 
work as workers in factories; they have only one 
child who were born in their hometown, and then 
been brought to Shanghai at the age of three; the 
child is now studying in a government-purchased 
private school (school T). 
telephone 9’ ✕ 
Uang 
 
Migrant mother; has been living in Shanghai for ten 
years; lives with husband and their only daughter; 
her daughter was born and raised in Shanghai and 
is now studying in a government-purchased private 
school (school T).  
Face 10’ √ 
Xia 
 
Migrant mother; housewife; lives with husband and 
only son; her son is studying in a state school 
(school S).  
Face 15’ ✕ 
Yan 
 
Migrant father; has been living in Shanghai since 
1998; lives with wife and their only son; his son was 
brought to Shanghai when he was one-year-old 
and is now studying in a state primary school 
(school K). 
Face  30’ ✕ 
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Migrant children  
Name Description f/t/e Length Transcript 
Bang  Son of Bai; eight years old; born and raised in 
Beijing; studying in school A.  
Face  15’ √ 
Dun  Son of Duan; ten years old; was born and raised 
in Beijing; now studying in a state school in Beijing 
(school B). 
Face  7’ ✕ 
Er  daughter of En; eight years old; born and raised in 
Beijing; studying in a state school in Beijing. 
Face  10’ √ 
Gao A 13 years old girl; the only child in her family; 
came to Beijing in 2011 after completed grade four 
in primary school; now studying in an unlicensed 
informal junior high school (school H).  
Face  12’ √ 
Ge  Son of Geng; ten years old; was born and raised 
in Beijing; now studying in a state school in Beijing 
(school A).  
Face  13’ √ 
Huang A 13 years old girl; has a younger sister; came to 
Beijing in 2008 and studying here from nursery; 
she and her sister are both studying in an 
unlicensed informal junior high school (school H).   
Face  9’ √ 
Jian Son of Juan; was born in the hometown and been 
brought to Beijing at the age of three; now 
studying in school H. 
Face  10’ √ 
Liang  Son of Lin; come to Shanghai at the age of two; 
studying in a state junior secondary school 
(school N). 
Face  14’ √ 
Nian  Son of Ning; came to Shanghai before nursery; 
now is studying in school K.  
Face  13’ √ 
Peng Older daughter of Pang; born and raised in 
Shanghai and now studying in a state junior high 
school (school N). 
Face 12’ √ 
Pu Younger son of Pang; born and raised in 
Shanghai; studying in state primary school. 
Face  8’ √ 
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Uain Daughter of Uang; born and raised in Shanghai; 
now studying in school T.   
Face 11’  √ 
 
Local parents  
Name Description f/t/e Length Transcript 
An 
 
Beijing local mother; aged between 30-40; works 
as a salesperson; lives with husband and their 
only son; son is studying in school A. 
Face  42’ √ 
Chang Beijing local father; aged between 30-40; no 
stable job; lives with wife and their only son; son 
is studying in school B. 
Face  20’ ✕ 
Ma 
 
Beijing local mother; aged between 30-40; works 
as a taxi driver; her son is studying in school A.   
Face  38’ √ 
Qian 
 
Shanghai local mother; aged between 30-40; 
works as a HR manager in a company; lives with 
husband and their only daughter; her daughter is 
studying in state primary school O. 
Face 16’ √ 
Zhang  Shanghai local mother; housewife; her daughter is 
studying in school S. 
Face 15’ √ 
 
Local children  
Name Description f/t/e Length Transcript 
Miao Son of Ma; studying in school A. Face 11’ √ 
Chong Son of Chang; studying in school B.  Face  12’ √ 
Qing Daughter of Qian; ten years old; studying in school 
O.  
Face 10’ √ 
Zheng  Daughter of Zhang; nine years old; studying in 
school S.   
Face  12’ √ 
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Appendix 2: interview schedule 
The interview questions are organised under three main themes, namely, 
the participants’ experiences, interpretations and attitudes about migrant 
children’s schooling and related policies. It is important to note that during 
the semi-structured interviews, some new questions were added in a 
flexible way. In the meantime, some questions in the lists were not put 
forward by me but by the participants. In addition, the question lists have 
been adjusted along with the progress of my fieldwork, as I have got some 
new ideas after each interview. It turns out that the questions for my last 
interview were slightly different from the original ones. The lists presented 
below are in their original versions.  
Government officers 
• Please talk about your understanding/attitude towards the TMC policy 
(broadly) 
• What has been changed since 2001? (the practice, the policy itself and 
what the government has done) 
• What kinds of criteria has the government set for the local state schools 
when recruiting migrant children?  
• Do you think the TMC policy’s aim has been attained in 
nationwide/Beijing/Shanghai?  
(if yes) based on what criteria can you believe it has been attained?  
(if not yet) what are the reasons/factors which have caused this result?  
(if not yet) do you think the TMC policy’s aim can really been attained in 
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the current condition?  
• What kinds of roles (or responsibilities) do you think the government and 
state school should undertake?  
• What kinds of roles has the government played in implementing this policy? 
What has been done by the government?  
• What kinds of difficulties has the government met during policy 
implementation?  
• What benefits can the government achieve by implementing this policy?  
• Please talk about the relationship/struggling within government in 
different levels (central/provincial/city/county) in the policy implementation.   
• Please talk about the relationship between government and the local state 
schools when implementing the TMC policy.  
• Please talk about the relationship between government and the private 
schools for migrant children when implementing the TMC policy. 
State school leaders 
• Please talk about your understanding/attitude towards the TMC policy 
(broadly) 
• What kinds of criteria has the government set for the local state schools 
when recruiting migrant children?  
• Do you think the TMC policy’s aim has been attained in Beijing/Shanghai?  
(if yes) based on what criteria can you believe it has been attained?  
(if not yet) what are the reasons/factors which have caused this result?  
(if not yet) do you think the TMC policy’s aim can really been attained in 
the current condition?  
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• What kinds of roles (or responsibilities) do you think the government and 
state school should undertake?  
• What kinds of roles has your school played in implementing this policy? 
What has been done/changed in your school in implementing this policy?  
• What kinds of difficulties has your school met during policy 
implementation?  
• What benefits can your school achieve by implementing this policy?  
• Please talk about the relationship between government and your school.  
• Are any tensions in peer group relationships between migrant children 
and others?  
Private school leaders 
• Please talk about your understanding/attitude towards the TMC policy 
(broadly) 
• What kinds of criteria has the government set for the local state schools 
when recruiting migrant children?  
• What’s the government’s attitude to your school?  
• Do you think the TMC policy’s aim has been attained in Beijing/Shanghai?  
(if yes) based on what criteria can you believe it has been attained?  
(if not yet) what are the reasons/factors which have caused this result?  
(if not yet) do you think the TMC’s aim can really been attained in the 
current condition?  
• What kinds of roles (or responsibilities) do you think the government and 
state school should undertake?  
• What kinds of roles has you school played in implementing this policy? 
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What has been done/changed in your school in implementing this policy?  
• Are there any benefits your school has achieved since the TMC policy 
began?  
• What kinds of difficulties has your school met since the TMC policy began?  
• Please talk about the relationship between government and your school.  
State school teachers 
• Please talk about your understanding/attitude towards the TMC policy 
(broadly) 
• What has been done/changed in your school in implementing this policy?  
• Please talk about the migrant children in your school generally. Are there 
any pressing issues for you concerning their education?  
• Please tell me about the relationship between the migrant children, local 
children and teachers in the classroom and outside classroom activities in 
your school.  
• What is your relationship with migrant children’s families?  
• Are there any special policies toward migrant children in your school?  
Private school teachers 
• Please talk about your understanding/attitude towards the TMC policy 
(broadly) 
• What’s the government’s attitude to your school?  
• Please talk about the children in your school generally.  
• Are there any pressing issues for you concerning their education?  
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• What is your relationship with your students’ families?  
Migrant parents 
• Please tell me something about your family and children: the family history? 
How long have you been resident in Beijing/Shanghai? What is you and 
your partner’s occupation? What your children like to do at school and at 
home? …… 
• Why did your children enrol in public/private school rather than 
private/state school? Why this particular school? 
• Did you and your children meet with any difficulties when trying to enrol 
in state schools?  
• Please tell me about your children’s experience in school (broadly).  
• Please talk about the good aspects and less good aspects about your 
children’s education in Beijing/Shanghai. How about the education your 
children would have received your place of origin?  
• Have you ever heard of the TMC policy? (if yes) what is your 
understanding/attitude towards this policy? (broadly) 
• Do you think the TMC policy’s aim has been attained in Beijing?  
(if yes) based on what criteria can you believe it has been attained? 
(if not yet) what are the reasons/factors which have caused this result?  
(if not yet) do you think the TMC policy’s aim can really been attained in 
the current condition?  
• What kinds of roles (or responsibilities) do you think the government and 
state school should undertake?  
• What’s the government, state schools and local parents’ attitude towards 
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your peer group and your children’s education?  
• Tell me more about your children’s academic performance, and behaviors 
in/outside school.  
• Tell me more about your children’s relationship with other migrant children, 
local children and the teachers. 
Local parents 
• Nowadays there is a diversity of children’s origins in some schools in 
Beijing/Shanghai. How about the situation in your children’s school?  
• What’s your personal attitude towards migrant workers and their 
children’s education?  
• Have you ever heard of the TMC policy? (if yes) what is your 
understanding/attitude towards this policy? (broadly) 
• What kinds of roles (or responsibilities) do you think the government and 
state school should undertake?  
• Tell me more about your children’s academic performance, and behaviors 
in/outside school.  
• Tell me more about your children’s relationship with migrant children and 
the teachers. 
Migrant children 
• What do you like doing best at school?  
• Which teachers do you like and why?      
• Which courses do you like and why?  
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• What do you like to do after school?  
• Who are your friends? What do you like about them?   
• Does everyone gets along in your class? 
Local children 
• What do you like doing best at school?  
• Which teachers do you like and why?      
• Which courses do you like and why?  
• What do you like to do after school?  
• Who are your friends? What do you like about them?   
• If everyone gets along in your class? 
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Appendix 3: code list   
Note:	as	I	have	explained	in	chapter	5	(section	5.1,	the	last	paragraph),	the	code	
list	was	originally	in	Chinese.	In	this	appendix	version,	I	have	translated	all	the	
category	and	code	titles.	I	have	also	translated	part	of	the	transcript	extracts,	
which	has	been	directly	quoted	in	the	thesis	(including	its	previous	drafts)	and	
conference	presentations.	It	is	important	to	note	that	the	findings	and	
arguments	of	this	study	were	generated	from	the	analysis	of	the	whole	set	of	
data,	including	but	not	limited	to	the	extracts	in	the	code	list	(see	detailed	
elaborations	in	chapter	5,	section	5.2).	 	
Theme 1: the ‘Two Main Channel’ (TMC) policy  
Sub-theme 1: the enactment of the TMC policy 
Categories	 	 Codes	 	 Extracts	
	
The	hardship	of	
migrant	children’s	
state	school	
enrolment	
	 	
‘There	is	no	
hardship	in	
migrant	children’s	
state	school	
enrolment’	
·	‘In	Shanghai,	the	government	senior	leadership	team	has	a	
unified	statement	(and	expects	us	to	follow	this	statement):	
there	is	no	hardship,	and	there	hasn’t	been	any	hardship,	in	
migrant	children’s	state	school	enrolment.	The	difficulty	is	
indeed	in	meeting	the	migrants’	need	of	high-quality	state	
school	education.’	[Officer	K]	 	
·	(another	extract	in	Chinese)	
	
	
	
	
	
	
The	government’s	
attitude	to	this	
issue	
·	‘We	have	already	tried	our	best	to	implement	this	policy,	
so	you	cannot	say	that	we	are	not	trying	hard’	[Officer	A]	 	
·	‘The	migrant	children’s	schooling	is	an	important	issue,	
and	the	Ministry	of	Education	has	put	importance	on	it.	
And	we	have	achieved	great	progresses	on	implementing	
this	policy.’	[Officer	A]	 	
Increasing	number	
of	migrant	
·	‘Although	the	ratio	of	migrant	children	studying	in	state	
schools	has	been	between	78.2%	to	79.4%	during	past	few	
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The	achievement	
of	the	TMC	policy	
children	studying	
in	state	schools	
years,	the	actual	amount	of	the	migrant	students	studying	
in	state	schools	were	increasing	every	year	by	0.09-0.1	
million	in	the	nationwide,	since	the	total	number	of	migrant	
children	was	increasing.’	[Officer	A]	 	
·	(five	other	extracts	in	Chinese)	
The	goal	of	the	
TMC	policy	 	
·	‘The	goal	of	TMC	is	to	make	sure	that	migrant	children	are	
able	to	enroll	in	state	schools.	Nowadays	what	we	have	
done	has	already	gone	beyond	this	goal.	And	what	we	are	
doing	is	going	towards	“receiving	excellent	education”.’	
[Officer	B]	 	
·	(another	extract	in	Chinese)	
	
	
	
	
	
	
The	problems	in	
the	policy	
enactment	
Policy	changes	
drastically	
·	‘The	government	changes	the	policy	drastically’	
[Headteacher	of	School	E]	 	
Low-lying	land	
effect	
·	‘If	we	do	not	set	up	strict	criteria,	there	will	be	much	more	
migrant	children	come	to	study	in	Beijing.	And	the	amount	
would	exceed	our	state	schools’	recruitment	capability.	For	
extract,	the	state	school	enrollment	criteria	in	our	district	
are	not	as	strict	as	that	of	Haidian	and	Shijingshan	District,	
therefore,	some	migrant	children	(who	are	residents	of	that	
two	districts)	apply	for	schools	in	our	district,	simply	
because	they	are	not	qualified	in	their	districts’	[Officer	F]	 	
·	(two	other	extracts	in	Chinese)	
‘a	weight	that	
cannot	be	held’	
·	‘As	a	result,	it	in	fact	brought	a	big	challenge	to	the	local	
educational	resources,	in	other	words,	to	the	local	children.	
Then	in	recent	years…felt	that	if	this	situation	continues,	it	
might	become	‘a	weight	that	cannot	be	held’	(laugh).’	
[officer	K]	
·	‘The	policy	goal	goes	a	little	bit	beyond	the	government’s	
capability:	it	is	too	early	to	claim	the	“TMC”	policy	goal,	
since	we	do	not	have	enough	capability	to	fulfill	the	
responsibility	set	up	by	the	TMC	policy.’	[Officer	A]	 	 	
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Sub-theme 2: the actors’ motivations in the policy enactment 
Category	 Codes	 Extracts	
	
	
	
	
	
Central	
government	
National	political	
leader	
·	‘You	might	have	observed	that,	after	the	leadership	
transition	in	the	central	government,	the	‘Two	
Mainstream	Channels’	policy	seems	to	be	rarely	referred	
to	by	the	central	government.	It	indeed	occasionally	refers	
to	this	policy,	but	the	frequency	is	reduced	compared	with	
the	situation	before.’	[officer	D]	 	 	 	
The	harmony	and	
stability	of	the	
society	
·	‘The	central	government	has	attached	importance	to	
solving	the	problems	of	migrant	children’s	schooling,	
because	this	issue	has	a	direct	influence	on	our	citizens’	
well-being,	on	social	stability,	on	social	harmony,	on	urban	
development,	and	finally,	on	the	future	of	our	socialism.’	
[Officer	A]	
Compulsory	
education	is	a	public	
goods	
·	‘one	aspect	of	the	nature	of	compulsory	education	is	that	
it	is	a	public	goods’	[Officer	A]	 	
	
The	pressure	from	
the	law	
·	‘this	is	written	in	the	Compulsory	Education	Law’	[Officer	
A]	 	
·	(another	extract	in	Chinese)	
The	pressure	from	
the	public	opinions	
·	‘we	are	under	the	pressure	from	public	opinions’	[Officer	
A]	 	
·	(another	extract	in	Chinese)	
The	migrants	have	
contributions	to	the	
city	
·	‘the	migrants	have	indeed	contributed	to	the	urban	
development’	[Officer	A]	
·	(another	extract	in	Chinese)	
The	city	needs	the	
migrant	workers	
·	‘The	city	needs	the	migrant	workers	as	workforce.	There	
is	an	interest	relationship	between	the	city	and	the	
migrant	people.’	[Officer	A]	 	
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The	future	of	the	
migrant	children	
·	‘if	the	migrant	children	cannot	receive	qualified	
education,	they	might	become	“rubbish	citizens”	in	the	
future	–	that	is	not	a	good	result	for	both	themselves	and	
the	society’	[Officer	A]	 	
·	(another	extract	in	Chinese)	
Local	
government	
Follow	the	superior’s	
requirements	
·	‘the	Shanghai	local	government	always	follow	the	central	
government’s	directions’	[Officer	K]	 	
·	(another	extract	in	Chinese)	
Government’s	
responsibility	
·	‘it	is	the	government’s	responsibility.	If	we	do	not	do	this,	
who	should	do	this?’	[Officer	B]	 	
·	(another	extract	in	Chinese)	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
State	school	
Follow	the	
government	policy	
·	‘In	fact,	for	us,	we	do	not	have	our	own	motivations	to	
implement	the	TMC	policy.	We	just	follow	the	
government’s	policies	(laugh)’	[headteacher	of	school	K]	
·	We	understand	that	accepting	extra	numbers	of	migrant	
children	is	a	‘political	task’	[政治任务],	so	we	cooperate	
with	the	government	positively.	[headteacher	of	school	B]	
·	‘If	it	is	not	because	of	the	-	I	would	rather	call	it	a	
“mandatory	political	task”	[硬性政治任务]	-	from	the	city	
and	district	municipality	of	education,	our	school	really	
cannot	recruit	so	many	migrant	children,	since	we	need	to	
maintain	the	quality	of	education.’	[headteacher	of	school	
B]	 	
·	(four	other	extracts	in	Chinese)	
The	decreasing	local	
students	
·	‘the	number	of	local	students	in	this	school	district	has	
been	decreased’	[Headteacher	of	school	J]	 	
·	(three	other	extracts	in	Chinese)	
The	government’s	
funding	incentive	 	
·	‘no	matter	you	recruit	local	or	migrant	student,	you	will	
receive	government	funding	calculated	by	your	total	
student	number,	which	is	3300/year	per	student’	
[Headteacher	of	school	N]	 	 	
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·	(another	extract	in	Chinese)	
Equal	education	
discourse	
·	‘the	school	is	a	place	for	to	educate	children,	and	the	
children	can	not	be	divided	into	“local”	and	“migrant”!’	
[Headteacher	of	school	A]	 	
·	‘As	for	recruiting	students,	we	do	not	have	the	utilitarian	
motivations.	What	we	are	thinking	is	just	simple:	we	are	
doing	educational	enterprise,	so	we	recruit	as	much	
children	as	we	can;	we	do	not	consider	other	potential	
utilitarian	interests.’	[Headteacher	of	school	O]	
	
Sub-theme 3: the difficulties of the receiving local governments  
Category	 Codes	 Extracts	
	
Financial	issue	
Financial	system	 ·	‘It	is	hard	for	the	destination	local	governments	in	
the	east	nine	provinces	to	directly	receive	funds	from	
the	central	government	specifically	for	children’s	
schooling’	[Officer	A]	 	 	
·	(two	other	extracts	in	Chinese)	
Lack	for	financial	
resources	 	
·	‘the	difficulty	is	the	lack	of	resources’	[officer	K]	
·	(one	other	extract	in	Chinese)	
	
Political	issue	
Decentralization	 ·	‘In	the	political	system,	the	local	interests	sometimes	
mismatch	the	interests	in	central	level.’	[Officer	A]	 	
·	(two	other	extracts	in	Chinese)	
	
	
	
	
	
The	difficulties	
for	setting	up	
‘It	takes	a	few	years	
and	cannot	solve	the	
problems	at	present’	
·	‘If	you	want	to	set	up	a	new	school,	the	first	step	is	
to	get	the	approval	from	related	government	
department,	and	this	takes	two	to	three	years.	Then	it	
takes	you	another	few	years	to	build	the	school	
campus	and	recruit	qualified	teachers	and	staff.	
Therefore,	setting	up	new	schools	cannot	solve	the	
problems	at	present.’	[Officer	C]	 	 	
·	(another	extract	in	Chinese)	
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new	state	
schools	to	recruit	
migrant	children	
Lacking	for	suitable	
school	campus	in	the	
central	city	
·	‘it	is	hard	to	find	suitable	school	campus	in	the	
central	city’	[Officer	B]	 	
·	(another	extract	in	Chinese)	
The	floating	and	
instable	nature	of	
migrants	 	
·	‘The	floating	nature	of	migrant	children	brings	lots	
difficulties	to	our	planning	of	the	state	school	
recruitment	quota,	which	should	be	based	on	the	
statistical	data	of	the	exact	number	of	migrant	
children	in	certain	school	district.’	[Officer	B]	
·	‘We	used	to	call	these	children	‘floating	children’	[流
动儿童],	which	means	this	group	is	always	floating.	
There	is	no	guarantee	that	they	will	stay	in	a	place	for	
a	stable	period.	Under	this	circumstance,	it	is	really	
hard	for	the	municipality	to	have	a	long-term	plan	for	
their	schooling.’	[Officer	K]	 	
·	(three	other	extracts	in	Chinese)	
	
Sub-theme 4: micro-politics: the struggling among different actors 
Category	 Codes	 Extracts	
	
	
	
Potential	
conflictions	 	
Limited	responsibility	(local	
government)	vs.	Unlimited	
responsibility	(central	
government)	
·	(one	extract	in	Chinese)	
Looking	forward	to	the	funding	
(school)	vs.	Worrying	about	the	
‘low-lying	land	effect’	
(government)	
·	(one	extract	in	Chinese)	
Migrants	can	choose	the	school	
but	the	locals	cannot	
·	(one	extract	in	Chinese)	
	 The	nature	of	the	TMC	policy:	an	
‘encouraging	rather	than	
·	‘Our	attitude	towards	these	provinces	and	cities	is	
always	encouraging,	rather	than	mandatory.	We	know	
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Struggling	among	
the	governments	
in	different	levels	
mandatory’	policy	 that	all	of	them	have	already	tried	their	best,	and	are	
undertaking	a	huge	pressure.	For	those	who	have	not	
implemented	the	policy	well,	they	have	their	special	
reasons,	which	are	reasonable.	Therefore,	it	is	
inappropriate	for	us	to	punish	them	or	compel	them	to	
attain	the	policy	aim.’	[Officer	A]	
The	local	government	has	
autonomy	
·	(two	extracts	in	Chinese)	
The	local	policy	should	not	
violate	the	central	policy	
·	(one	extract	in	Chinese)	
The	central	government	as	
coordinator	
·	(one	extract	in	Chinese)	
The	negotiation	between	
governments	in	different	levels	
·	(one	extract	in	Chinese)	
Struggling	among	governments	
in	different	districts	
·	‘if	you	are	working	and	paying	tax	in	other	districts	in	
Beijing,	your	children	cannot	enjoy	the	educational	
welfare	provide	by	this	district,	because	you	have	not	
made	contributions	to	this	district’	[Officer	H]	 	
UIP	school	vs	
government	
‘Old	friends’	with	conflicts	 ·	‘When	facing	the	transformation	(of	being	purchased	by	
the	government),	the	owner	was	really	reluctant.	Before	
been	purchased	by	the	government,	he	could	earn	
hundreds	of	thousands	per	year	through	many	ways,	
such	as	operating	a	canteen	inside	the	school.	However,	
after	the	transformation,	as	a	headteacher	employed	by	
the	government,	he	could	only	earn	around	a	hundred	
thousand	per	year.’	[school	leader	of	school	P]	 	
·	‘We	know	that	these	owners	are	reluctant	for	their	
schools	to	be	purchased	by	the	government,	because	this	
transformation	injures	their	personal	interest.	But	we	
also	know	that	they	have	no	choice	but	to	compromise,	
since	they	do	not	have	the	financial	ability	to	get	the	
schools	to	meet	the	registration	criteria.	As	you	might	
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know,	improving	the	campus	houses	needs	a	huge	
amount	of	money,	which	they	cannot	offer,	but	we	
government	can	and	are	glad	to	offer.’	[officer	J]	 	
·	‘The	government	has	provided	our	school	with	funding	
to	build	a	computer	room,	music	room,	science	
laboratory,	general	technology	room,	plastic	playground,	
basketball	court,	and	to	purchase	all	the	PE	facilities	
including	volleyballs	and	basketballs.	In	the	Pudong	
district,	a	school	can	receive	¥800,000	[£80,000	
equivalent]	on	average,	all	received	at	once.’	
(headteacher	school	Q)	 	
·	(another	extract	in	Chinese)	
	
	
	
Theme 2: the documentation system (state school enrollment criteria) 
Sub-theme 5: actors’ attitudes towards the documentation 
Category	 Codes	 Extracts	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
‘Eligible	children’	
discourse	
·	‘Whether	there	is	a	“hardship”	or	not	depends	on	what	
kind	of	people	you	are.	There	is	no	difficulty	for	the	eligible	
children	(who	have	got	all	the	required	criteria)	to	enroll	in	
state	schools.	However,	if	you	are	ineligible	yet	still	insist	to	
apply	for	a	state	school,	you	will	face	difficulties.	But	if	you	
go	back	hometown	and	enroll	in	the	state	schools	there,	as	
required	by	policy,	again,	there	would	not	be	any	
difficulties	for	you.	Therefore,	our	basic	attitude	is	that,	if	
you	are	not	eligible,	please	apply	for	the	state	schools	in	
your	hometown,	and	your	seat	will	be	guaranteed.’	[officer	
A]	 	 	
·	‘Some	migrant	children	do	not	meet	the	criteria	to	enrol	
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Government	 in	state	schools	in	the	receiving	cities,	but	we	cannot	help	
them.	Our	principle	is	that	we	guarantee	those	who	meet	
the	criteria	will	enrol	in	state	schools;	for	those	who	do	not	
meet	the	criteria,	we	do	not	offer	them	places.’	[officer	A]	 	
·	‘Well,	since	recent	two	or	three	years,	regarding	the	
migrant	children’s	school	enrolment,	[the	government]	
started	to	set	some…we	should	not	call	them	restrictive	
requirements…you	see,	we	Shanghai	local	children	also	
need	to	meet	some	requirements	in	order	to	enrol	in	
schools.	Similarly,	as	for	the	migrant	children,	some	
requirements	regarding	to	their	parents’	certificate	status	
have	been	set	up.’	[officer	K]	
‘hierarchical	system	of	
school	access	criteria’	
(享受梯度的服务)	
discourse	
·	(one	extract	in	Chinese)	
‘Standardization’	
discourse	
· ‘Since	2004,	the	standardization	[规范化]	of	the	criteria	
system	started.	In	2008,	it	was	the	first	time	that	the	
Beijing	Municipal	of	Education	established	the	
requirement	of	the	‘Three	Documents’…	At	that	time,	
government	was	exploring,	and	the	criteria	system	was	to	
be	standardized…	The	whole	process	was	not	regulated.	
We	started	to	require	the	‘Five	Documents’	since	2012.	In	
2013,	2014	and	2015,	we	continued	this	documentation	
system,	which	has	been	increasingly	standardized.’	[officer	
B]	 	 	
·	(another	extract	in	Chinese)	
	
	
	
	
	
A	form	of	local	
protectionism	
·	(four	extracts	in	Chinese)	
‘Migrants	have	
contribution	to	the	
city’	(parental	
perspective)	
·	‘It	is	unfair	to	set	up	admittance	criteria	against	our	
children,	since	we	are	also	contributors	to	this	city	like	the	
local	people.	I	have	been	working	in	Beijing	for	more	than	
ten	years,	undertaking	the	dirtiest	and	hardest	jobs.	And	
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Migrant	
parents	
finally,	my	daughter	is	not	allowed	to	enroll	in	state	school.	
It	is	unfair!’	[Migrant	mother	En]	 	
·	(two	other	extracts	in	Chinese)	
Children’s	educational	
right	(parental	
perspective)	
· ‘like	local	children,	our	children	are	also	Chinese	citizens.	
They	deserve	equal	treating	in	school	enrolment.	The	
children	are	innocent.	Why	they	cannot	just	access	to	
school?!	I	am	very	discontent	with	the	restriction	from	the	
government’	[Migrant	father	Fei]	
·	(three	other	extracts	in	Chinese)	
create	unnecessary	
problems	for	parents	 	
·	(two	extracts	in	Chinese)	
State	school	 Follow	the	
government’s	rule	
·	(five	extracts	in	Chinese)	
	
Sub-theme 6: the functions of the documents 
Category	 Codes	 Extracts	
	
As	a	whole	
Follow	the	migrant	
population	policy	
·	‘Now	the	state	school	enrolment	criteria	in	Shanghai	
can	be	considered	as	a	sub-system	of	the	residential	
certificate	policy	(a	type	of	migrant	population	policy)…	
To	a	large	extent,	we	chose	these	state	school	
enrolment	criteria	to	meet	the	needs	of	the	
government’s	migrant	population	control	policy…	Here,	
education	is	treated	as	a	certain	type	of	social	welfare’	
[Officer	K]	
	
	
	
	
	
To	make	sure	the	
person	is	a	‘contributor	
to	the	city’	
·	‘Only	the	people	who	have	got	a	legal	job	in	Beijing	are	
able	to	obtain	the	Proof	of	Employment.	Therefore,	it	
can	be	used	to	identify	that	a	person	is	a	‘contributor	to	
the	city’.	Therefore,	his/her	children	are	entitled	to	
enjoy	the	educational	welfare	provided	by	this	city.’	
[Officer	F]	 	
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Proof	of	
employment	
Prevent	people	from	
‘unjustifiably	sending	
their	children	to	the	
metropolitan	areas	for	a	
better	education’	
·	‘…	to	prevent	people	from	unjustifiably	sending	their	
children	to	the	metropolitan	areas	for	a	better	
education,	while	they	themselves	are	not	based	in	that	
city’	[Officer	A]	 	
For	the	social	stability	 ·	(one	extract	in	Chinese)	
	
	
	
Proof	of	House	
Renting	or	
Ownership	
Prevent	people	from	
‘moving	to	the	
metropolitan	cities	for	a	
better	education	for	
their	children’	
·	‘To	prevent	people	from	unjust	sending	their	children	
to	the	metropolitan	cities	for	a	better	education,	while	
themselves	are	not	based	in	that	city’	[Officer	A]	
Easy	for	the	
government	
administration	
·	(one	extract	in	Chinese)	
‘make	sure	that	the	
child	is	living	in	an	
appropriate	house’	
·	‘This	document	helps	to	make	sure	that	the	child	is	
living	in	an	appropriate	house’	[Officer	F]	 	 	
	
Sub-theme 7: the difficulties of preparing for the documents 
Category	 Codes	 Extracts	
Temporary	
residential	
Permit	
Have	not	been	living	for	
enough	time	in	the	city	
·	(six	extracts	in	Chinese)	
Did	not	realized	its	
importance	
·	(two	extracts	in	Chinese)	
	
Proof	of	House	
Renting	/	
Ownership	
no	house	rent	contract	 ·	(one	extract	in	Chinese)	
Living	in	illegal	houses	 ·	(tree	extracts	in	Chinese)	
Has	not	obtained	the	
certificate	
·	(four	extracts	in	Chinese)	
The	certificate	does	not	
match	with	temporary	
·	(two	extracts	in	Chinese)	
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residential	Permit	
	
	
Proof	for	paying	
for	social	
insurance	
Pay	for	the	social	insurance	
for	less	than	half	a	year	
·	(six	extracts	in	Chinese)	
Some	employers	do	not	pay	
for	the	insurance	 	
·	(four	extracts	in	Chinese)	
Individual	businessman	is	
not	eligible	to	pay	for	the	
insurance	
·	(three	extracts	in	Chinese)	
Proof	of	Flexible	
Employment	
Holding	this	document	for	
less	than	certain	years	
·	(four	extracts	in	Chinese)	
	
Sub-theme 8: the migrants’ strategies to meet the criteria 
Category	 Codes	 Extracts	
Social	insurance	 Fake	documents	 ·	(one	extract	in	Chinese)	
Proof	for	paying	for	
social	insurance	 	
Employed	by	big	
factories	
·	(two	extracts	in	Chinese)	
Proof	of	Flexible	
Employment	
Being	pragmatic	in	
occupation	choice	
·	(two	extracts	in	Chinese)	
Proof	of	employment	 Sign	a	fake	employment	
contract	
·	(one	extract	in	Chinese)	
	
Proof	of	House	
Renting	/	Ownership	
Sign	a	fake	house	renting	
contract	
·	‘we	have	to	try	some	“special”	ways	to	get	all	
the	required	documents:	with	the	help	of	my	
friends,	I	have	signed	a	fake	job	contract	and	a	
fake	house-renting	contract	with	others,	at	the	
expense	of	paying	some	money’	[Migrant	
mother	En]	
·	(another	extract	in	Chinese)	
	
	
	 380	
	
	
Theme 3: migrants’ life in urban areas 
	
Category	 Codes	 Extracts	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Life	condition	
‘striving	for	
survival’	(‘Mang	
Yu	Shengji’)	
·	‘…	some	of	them	are	running	tiny	businesses,	they	need	
to	get	up	early	and	finish	work	late	–	so	you	cannot	
expect	them…	They	are	still	in	a	struggle	for	survival,	so	
they	need	to	make	sure	that	their	families	get	basic	
supplies	and	survive	in	the	city.	They	do	not	have	spare	
attention	to	deal	with	the	children	-	as	long	as	the	
children	do	not	make	trouble…’	[teacher	L]	 	
·	‘As	their	restaurants	or	stalls	normally	close	after	
dinnertime,	they	will	not	finish	work	and	get	back	home	
until	10pm,	when	their	children	have	already	gone	to	
bed’	[headteacher	of	school	A]	 	
·	(four	other	extracts	in	Chinese)	
Limited	time	for	
accompany	&	
supervision	
·	‘In	terms	of	their	attitude	to	children’s	education,	the	
Shanghai	local	parents	are	more	responsible.	Many	
migrant	parents	are	busy	with	work	or	other	things…	
While	some	Shanghai	local	students	are	not	doing	well	in	
their	study,	they	all	complete	their	homework,	since	their	
parents	always	check	their	homework.	However,	many	
migrant	parents	even	not	ask	the	children	about	their	
homework.	In	their	minds,	the	only	thing	they	need	to	
make	sure	is	that	their	children	have	eaten	well	(laugh).’	
[Senior	management	team	member	in	school	K]	 	
·	‘The	migrant	parents	are	not	able,	or	are	not	willing,	or	
do	not	have	time	to	supervise	their	children’s	study.	We	
have	communicated	with	them	to	convince	them	that	it	is	
important	for	their	children	to	accomplish	all	the	
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homework	everyday,	and	that	they	have	the	responsibility	
to	supervise	their	children.	But	they	just	ignore	our	
message.	As	a	result,	many	children	do	not	accomplish	
the	homework.	Eventually,	we	have	no	choice	but	to	give	
extra	supervision	and	guidance	for	the	students	to	make	
sure	they	have	learnt	what	they	need	to	learn.’	[Teacher	
C]	 	
·	(five	other	extracts	in	Chinese)	
Social	network	 Job	networking	 ·	(two	extracts	in	Chinese)	
Countryman	 ·	‘have	asked	my	elder	sister’s	husband	to	find	someone	
who	can	help.	He	did	speak	to	someone,	but	that	person	
said	it	is	very	hard	and	they	could	not	help.’	[migrant	
mother	Ong]	
·	(one	other	extract	in	Chinese)	
Local	network	 ·	‘no,	we	non-local	labourers	do	not	have	local	friends,	
unless	your	landlord	is	willing	to	help.	Otherwise	you	will	
have	no	way.’	[migrant	mother	Ong]	
·	(three	other	extracts	in	Chinese)	
Social	network	in	
educational	field	
·	(three	extracts	in	Chinese)	
	
	
	
Theme 4: migrant children in state school 
Sub-theme 10: the academic performance and social inclusion  
Category	 Codes	 Extracts	
	 Many	are	as	good	as	local	
students	
·	(four	extracts	in	Chinese)	
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Academic	
performance	
Overall	are	not	as	good	as	
local	students	
·	(two	extracts	in	Chinese)	
Some	are	laid	back	 ·	(six	extracts	in	Chinese)	
Transferred	students	 ·	(three	extracts	in	Chinese)	
Problems	with	English	 ·	(three	extracts	in	Chinese)	
	
	
Behaviour	
Bad	behavior	 ·	(one	extract	in	Chinese)	
Low	comprehension	
ability	
·	(one	extract	in	Chinese)	
Serve	for	the	class	
community	
·	(two	extracts	in	Chinese)	
	
	
	
	
Social	inclusion	 	
Local	and	migrant	
children	are	well	
integrated	
·	‘If	you	do	not	tell	me,	I	even	don’t	which	child	in	my	
class	is	local	and	which	is	migrant’	[Teacher	F]	 	
·	(four	other	extracts	in	Chinese)	
Children	do	not	have	the	
concept	of	‘local	vs	
migrant’	
·	(five	extracts	in	Chinese)	
	
Both	local/migrant	
children	are	working	class	
background	
·	‘We	do	not	have	this	issue,	since	almost	all	of	the	
local	student	in	this	school	are	from	low-income	
working-class	family	background’	[Headteacher	of	
school	G]	 	
·	(two	extracts	in	Chinese)	
	
Sub-theme 11: the ‘negative’ influences for schools 
Category	 Codes	 Extracts	
	
	
	
‘The	reduction	
Rebuild	the	professional	
music	and	arts	
classrooms	into	regular	
classrooms	
·	‘In	order	to	meet	the	needs	of	the	newly	added	
classes,	we	have	to	rebuild	our	professional	music	
and	fine	arts	classrooms,	which	we	have	spent	
money	to	build	up,	into	regular	classrooms’	
[headteacher	of	school	B]	 	
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or	teaching	
resources	per	
child’	
·	(three	other	extracts	in	Chinese)	
‘The	reduction	of	
teaching	resources	per	
child’	
·	‘leading	to	the	reduction	of	the	teaching	
resources	per	child’	[Officer	D]	 	
Hamper	the	small	class	
teaching	reform	
·	‘Along	with	accepting	extra	numbers	of	migrant	
children,	our	class	size	becomes	45	per	class,	yet	a	
reasonable	class	size	should	be	38	per	class	
according	to	the	government	regulation.’	
[headteacher	of	school	B]	
·	‘in	Shanghai,	there	was	a	period	that	the	birth	
rate	was	decreasing,	and	we	took	this	chance	to	
promote	the	small	class	size	teaching	practice.	Yet	
under	the	TMC	policy,	we	did	not	say	no	to	the	
migrant	children	and	tried	to	include	them	[into	
the	state	school].	It	meant	challenges	for	the	
schools,	making	the	class	size	even	bigger	rather	
than	smaller.’	[officer	K]	 	
·	(two	other	extracts	in	Chinese)	
Academic	
performance	
‘Declining’	educational	
quality’	 	
·	‘The	educational	quality	is	declining…	We	have	
never	been	like	this:	this	year,	the	school’s	exam	
scores	in	Chinese	and	Maths	are	even	below	the	
average	score	of	all	schools	in	Fengtai	District!	This	
is	the	result	of	recruiting	the	extra	group	[beyond	
the	school’s	recruiting	capacity]	of	around	50	
migrant	children	last	year,	under	the	request	of	the	
district	municipal	of	education.’	[Headteacher	of	
school	B]	
Disturb	local	students’	
study	
·	(one	extract	in	Chinese)	
Graduation	 	 Excellent	migrant	
student	will	not	stay	
·	(two	extracts	in	Chinese)	
Reputation	 	 School	reputation	 ·	(one	extract	in	Chinese)	
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Sub-theme 12: the ‘negative’ influences for teachers 
Category	 Codes	 Extracts	
Increasing	
work	burdens	
The	parents’	home	
education	has	negative	
impacts	towards	
teacher’s	education	in	
school	
·	‘Sometimes	the	parents	do	things	against	[the	school	
education].	For	example,	when	your	child	has	problems,	
you	do	not	come	to	the	school.	What’s	more,	when	the	
teacher	is	contacting	you,	you	are	behaving	like	‘I	am	not	
going	to	the	school!’	We	have	parents	like	this.’	
[headteacher	of	school	A]	
·	(two	other	extracts	in	Chinese)	
Lacking	academic	
foundation	in	nursery	
·	(one	extract	in	Chinese)	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
‘uncooperative’	
parents	
Migrant	parents	are	
conceived	as	not	
cooperating	well	with	
teachers	
· ‘(Many)	migrant	parents	are	unable,	or	are	unwilling,	or	
do	not	have	time	to	supervise	their	children’s	study.	We	
have	communicated	with	them	to	convince	them	that	it	is	
important	for	their	children	to	finish	all	of	their	
homework	every	day,	and	that	they	have	the	
responsibility	to	supervise	their	children.	But	they	just	
ignore	our	message.	As	a	result,	many	children	do	not	
complete	their	homework.	Eventually,	we	have	no	choice	
but	to	give	extra	supervision	and	guidance	for	the	
students	to	make	sure	they	have	learnt	what	they	need	to	
learn.’	[teacher	C]	 	
· ‘For	us,	the	biggest	problem	is	that	things	do	not	go	
well	in	the	home-school	cooperation.	Many	migrant	
children	often	do	not	finish	their	homework.	So	the	
teachers	have	to	spend	more	time	to	give	these	students	
extra	tutorials	and	supervisions.	For	the	students,	their	
parents	do	not	have	sufficient	literacy	to	guide	their	study	
–	that	is	one	reason.	Another	reason	is	that	they	are	busy	
with	their	work.	For	example,	when	their	children	come	
back	home	after	school,	they	might	still	be	working	as	a	
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babysitter	in	someone	else’s	home.	They	do	not	have	the	
attention	to	supervise	their	children’.	[teacher	L]	
· ‘It’s	very	rare	that	the	migrant	parents	respond	to	a	
teacher’s	communication.	We	have	a	teacher-parents	
meeting	once	a	term,	but	some	parents	do	even	not	
appear.	Normally	it	is	the	teachers	who	contact	the	
parents,	not	in	reverse.	We	have	a	Fly-message	group	in	
each	class,	and	our	teachers	use	this	group	to	keep	the	
parents	updated	about	the	school	news	and	inform	them	
about	their	children’s	homework…	There	are	28	students	
in	my	class,	and	each	time	I	send	the	parents	messages,	I	
normally	receive	only	one	response.	The	others	rarely	
contact	teachers	to	talk	about	their	children.	And	you	
don’t	even	expect	them	to	come	in	to	school	to	talk	to	
you.’	[teacher	B]	
· (three	other	extracts	in	Chinese)	
Parent	perceived	not	
to	care	about	
children’s	study	
·	‘[t]he	migrant	children	do	not	really	care	about	learning	
and	about	the	teachers’	requirements,	since	their	parents	
do	not	care.’	[teacher	C]	
·	‘generally	the	parents	do	not	put	enough	importance	on	
their	children’s	education’	[headteacher	of	school	A]	
· ‘In	terms	of	their	attitude	to	children’s	education,	the	
Shanghai	local	parents	are	more	responsible.	Many	
migrant	parents	are	just	busy	with	work	or	other	things…	
While	some	Shanghai	local	students	are	not	doing	well	in	
their	study,	they	all	complete	their	homework,	since	their	
parents	always	check	their	homework.	However,	many	
migrant	parents	don’t	even	ask	their	children	about	their	
homework.	In	their	minds,	the	only	thing	they	need	to	
make	sure	is	that	their	children	have	eaten	well	(laugh)’	
[school	leader	in	school	K]	
· (two	other	extracts	in	Chinese)	
The	parent	put	not	 · 	‘Our	teachers	feel	extremely	lonely,	like	as	if	they	are	
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Teachers’	
Frustration	
enough	importance	to	
teachers’	
communication	
the	only	people	in	this	school	who	treat	education	
seriously’	[headteacher	of	school	A]	
· ‘My	heart	is	broken…	I	have	communicated	with	the	
migrant	parents	many	times,	requesting	them	to	help	
check	their	children’s	homework	to	make	sure	they	finish	
it.	But	many	of	them	just	ignored	my	request,	and	their	
children	never	complete	their	homework.	The	parents	do	
not	supervise	the	children	at	all.	That	makes	me	and	
other	teachers	angry.	Sometimes	we	could	not	tolerate	
this	and	asked	the	parents	to	come	and	talk	to	us	and	
they	promised	to	do	as	we	request.	But	the	next	day,	
their	children	had	still	not	finished	their	homework,	
leaving	the	workbook	blank!	(with	a	bitter	smile)’	
[Teacher	C]	 	
·	(another	extract	in	Chinese)	
Indifference	–	that	is	
their	attitude	towards	
teachers	
·	‘Indifference–that	is	their	attitude	towards	teachers.	
Sometimes	the	students	talk	loudly	during	a	class	and	
make	lots	of	noise,	so	I	shout,	“keep	quiet!”	but	nobody	
has	any	reaction.	They	just	focus	on	their	own	business	
and	do	not	care	about	you.	They	do	not	even	have	an	
awareness	of	‘how	should	I	behave	in	front	of	the	
teachers?’,	which	they	should	have.’	[Teacher	C]	 	
	
Sub-theme 13: the conditions of equal treatment inside state school 
Category	 Codes	 Extracts	
	
	
School’s	policy	
enactment	
Mix	local	and	
migrant	children	in	
the	same	class	
·	(five	extracts	in	Chinese)	
Equal	treating	in	the	
rewarding	
·	(four	extracts	in	Chinese)	
Equal	treating	in	 ·	(one	extract	in	Chinese)	
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financial	support	
	
	
	
	
	
	
The	result	of	
policy	
enactment	
Equal	education	
discourse	
·	‘From	the	school’s	perspective,	I	actually	do	not	care	
about	the	“equal	treating	inside	school”	policy,	because	it	
is	our	natural	responsibility	to	take	care	every	child,	no	
mater	s/he	is	local	or	migrant.’	[Headteacher	of	school	G]	 	
· ‘As	for	the	students	in	my	class,	I	have	no	idea	who	is	
local	and	who	is	migrant.	In	fact,	I	do	not	care.	What	I	do	
concern	is	that:	are	you	a	hardworking	student?	Have	you	
got	any	difficulties	with	your	study?	Do	you	need	my	
help?	These	are	the	focuses	in	my	work.’	[Teacher	K]	
·	‘the	school	is	a	place	to	educate	children,	and	the	
children	can	not	be	divided	into	“local”	and	“migrant”!’	
[Headteacher	of	school	A]	 	
·	‘As	for	recruiting	students,	we	do	not	have	the	utilitarian	
motivations.	What	we	are	thinking	is	just	simple:	we	are	
doing	educational	enterprise,	so	we	recruit	as	many	
children	as	we	can;	we	do	not	consider	other	potential	
utilitarian	interests.’	[Headteacher	of	school	O]	 	
·	(two	other	extracts	in	Chinese)	
Migrant-local	
children’s	
relationship	
·	‘…	not	at	all,	our	class	is	full	of	harmony!’	[migrant	child	
Peng]	
·	‘my	son	sometimes	mentions	his	local	classmates	who	
play	with	him,	and	I	feel	they	have	a	good	relationship’	
[migrant	mother	Ning]	
·	‘my	son	is	in	year	four	in	my	school.	There	is	not	a	
migrant/local	division	here.	I	can	tell	you,	all	of	his	best	
brothers	are	migrant	-	aha!’	[school	leader	in	school	K]	
·	‘The	migrant	and	local	children	have	good	relationships.	
I	cannot	see	any	problems	with	their	relationship.	It	is	
because	these	so-called	“migrant	children”	are	actually	
born	and	raised	in	Beijing	and	are	living	in	the	
communities	around	our	school.’	[teacher	F,	school	F]	
	 388	
·	(two	other	extracts	in	Chinese)	 	
Problems	 Not	equal	treating	in	
the	rewarding	
·	(two	extracts	in	Chinese)	
Set	a	class	
exclusively	for	local	
children	
·	(one	extract	in	Chinese)	
	
	
	
Theme 5: the government funded private school (Namin Xuexiao) 
Sub-theme 14: teaching and school operation 
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
The	quality	of	
teaching	
The	government’s	
perspective	
·	‘After	the	transformation,	the	quality	of	teaching	in	these	
schools	has	been	improved…	However,	if	compared	to	
regular	state	schools,	I	am	afraid	there	is	still	a	gap.’	[Officer	
K]	 	
·	(another	extract	in	Chinese)	
The	headteacher’s	
perspective	
·	‘This	school	was	run	by	a	private	owner.	As	a	result,	the	
teaching	and	management	activities	were	not	as	uniform	as	
now.	Nowadays,	the	whole	school	internal	management	and	
teacher	training	mechanisms	are	following	that	of	the	state	
schools.’	[headteacher	of	school	T]	 	
·	‘We	still	need	time	and	effort	to	improve	our	teachers’	
capabilities…	’	[Headteacher	of	school	T]	 	 	
· ‘When	a	teacher	starts	working,	it	takes	some	time	for	
him/her	to	be	familiar	with	the	children.	Yet	when	s/he	and	
the	students	get	familiar	with	each	other	after	a	term,	s/he	
might	suddenly	quit	this	job	in	the	middle	of	the	term.	When	
this	emergency	happens,	I	have	to	hire	some	part	time	
teachers	from	extra-curricular	educational	companies.	I	
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believe	this	brings	very	bad	influences	to	the	teaching	and	
learning,	as	well	as	the	children’s	social	emotional	
development.’	[Headteacher	of	school	Q]	 	
·	(another	extract	in	Chinese)	
From	the	teacher’s	
aspect	
· ‘To	be	honest,	there	is	still	a	gap	between	the	capabilities	
of	our	teachers	and	that	of	the	state	school	teachers,	since	
many	of	us	are	continuers	from	the	private	and	informal	
school	period.’	[Senior	leadership	team	member	in	school	P]	 	
·	(another	extract	in	Chinese)	
From	the	parent’s	
aspect	
· ‘We	prefer	state	school	because	it	has	better	teaching	
quality’	 	
· ‘There	are	too	many	students	in	one	class,	therefore	the	
teachers	do	not	have	enough	energy	to	take	care	of	every	
child’	 	
·	(two	other	extracts	in	Chinese)	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
The	problems	
related	with	the	
teachers	
Low	income	 ·	‘The	teacher’s	salary	is	just	too	low	-	£280	per	month.	It	is	
even	less	than	the	salary	of	a	cleaner’	[Headteacher	of	
school	R]	 	
·	(another	extract	in	Chinese)	
No	cival	servent	
status	(Bian	Zhi)	&	
professional	titles	
(Zhi	Cheng)	
·	‘The	teachers	without	civil	servant	status	do	not	have	
strong	teacher	professional	capabilities	and	therefore	have	a	
negative	influence	on	the	quality	of	education.	They	cannot	
realize	some	of	the	school’s	norms	while	the	teachers	with	
civil	servant	status	can.’	[headteacher	of	school	L]	 	
·	(two	other	extracts	in	Chinese)	
Lacking	for	CPD	
opportunities	
·	‘There	are	few	chances	for	our	teachers	to	access	formal	
teacher	professional	development	training	programmes’	
[Senior	leadership	team	member	in	school	P]	 	 	
·	(two	other	extracts	in	Chinese)	
Teachers	have	high	
mobility	
·	‘Our	teachers	are	unstable	with	high	mobility…	It	is	
extremely	hard	for	our	teachers	to	get	the	‘civil	servant	
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status’.	At	the	same	time,	their	salary	is	low.	Therefore,	our	
teachers	are	always	trying	to	find	positions	in	better	schools.’	
[Headteacher	of	school	Q]	 	
·	(three	other	extracts	in	Chinese)	
Lacking	motivation	 	
	
	
	
·	‘Having	heavy	workloads,	the	teachers	cannot	receive	
enough	salary.	Therefore,	they	are	lacking	for	motivation	to	
work.’	[Senior	leadership	team	member	in	school	P]	 	
·	‘The	senior	leadership	team	is	the	biggest	problem	for	me.	
They	still	consider	this	job	as	a	‘job	with	no	future’,	believing	
that	someday	the	school	will	be	shut	down,	so	there	is	no	
need	for	them	to	be	highly	motivated	and	have	self-discipline	
towards	this	job.	As	a	result,	I	have	had	to	take	care	of	all	the	
daily	management	work	(which	should	not	be	the	
responsibility	for	a	headteacher),	including	revising	the	draft	
of	the	school	daily	news!	The	teachers	are	the	same.	I	know	
that	when	I	am	not	at	school,	some	teachers	are	often	late	
for	classes,	which	is	unbelievable	in	a	state	school.’	
[Headteacher	of	school	T]	 	
	
	
	
	
	
The	difficulties	in	
the	school	
operation	
‘it	[the	local	
government]	does	
not	trust	us’	
·	‘Each	term	we	need	to	attend	two	or	three	meetings	
organized	by	the	municipality,	of	which	the	theme	would	
always	be	warning	us	what	cannot	be	done,	making	us	
frustrated.	Why	does	it	organize	these	meetings	for	us?	It	is	
just	because	it	does	not	trust	us,	neither	does	it	respect	us.	It	
considers	us	as	unprofessional	and	untrustworthy,	because	in	
its	views	the	reason	why	we	established	the	school	is	for	
profit,	not	for	the	sake	of	education.’	[owner	of	school	R]	
	
Lacking	funding	 ·	‘Our	biggest	problem	is	lacking	funding,	since	we	are	not	
able	to	recruit	enough	students.’	[Headteacher	of	school	Q]	 	
· ‘The	costs	of	school	operation	are	increasing,	but	our	
funding	does	not	increase.’	[Headteacher	of	school	T]	
Lacking	teaching	 ·	‘We	are	lacking	for	the	classrooms	for	special	teaching	use,	
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facilities	and	
hardware	
such	as	laboratory	and	arts	classroom.’	[Headteacher	of	
school	T]	 	
·	(another	extract	in	Chinese)	
Lacking	teachers	 ·	‘Our	school	is	lacking	for	teachers	for	all	the	subjects	except	
for	Chinese,	math	and	English.’	[Headteacher	of	school	T]	 	
The	self-
perception	of	the	
schools	
Serving	the	‘bottom	
of	the	society’	
·	(one	extract	in	Chinese)	
	
Sub-theme 15: the identity dilemma  
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
The	‘state	school	
attributions’	 	
Government	
funding	 	
·	‘In	our	school,	all	the	teaching	facilities	and	hardware	
are	provided	by	the	local	government:	computer	room,	
playground,	basketball	stands,	sports	facilities,	
laboratories,	etc.	in	sum,	the	government	has	invested	
£80,000	to	improve	our	facilities.’	[Headteacher	of	
school	Q]	 	
·	‘Although	our	school	has	now	been	registered	as	a	
private	school,	it	is	not	a	real	private	school	because	a	
real	private	school	does	not	rely	on	the	government	
funding,	yet	we	do.	How	much	money	the	government	
gives	to	us	[is]	how	much	money	we	spend.’	
[headteacher	of	school	Q]	 	
·	(two	other	extracts	in	Chinese)	
Government	as	the	
in	facto	owner	
·	‘All	the	funding	of	the	school	is	originally	from	the	
municipal	of	education.	The	school	indeed	has	a	board	
of	directors,	yet	the	money	of	the	board	is	from	the	
municipal	of	education.’	[Senior	leadership	team	
member	in	school	P]	 	
The	dilemma	of	the	
owner	
·	(one	extract	in	Chinese)	
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The	headteacher	is	
assigned	by	the	
government	 	
·	‘The	headteacher	and	deputy	head	are	both	assigned	
by	the	municipal	of	education’	[Senior	leadership	team	
member	in	school	P]	 	
Operating	mode	 ·	‘The	whole	school	internal	management	and	teacher	
training	mechanisms	are	following	that	of	the	state	
schools’	[Headteacher	of	school	T]	 	 	
·	(another	extract	in	Chinese)	
Recruitment	criteria	 	 ·	‘Our	student	recruitment	criteria	follow	the	state	
school’	[Senior	leader	in	school	P]	 	
Included	into	the	
state	pedagogy	
system	(exam,	
teacher’s	award,	
assessment)	
·	(three	extracts	in	Chinese)	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
The	‘private	
school	
attributions’	
Teachers	without	
‘civil	servant	status	
(Bianzhi)’	
·	‘Our	teachers	are	recruited	by	the	school,	rather	than	
the	government,	therefore,	they	do	not	have	the	civil	
servant	status’	[Senior	leadership	team	member	in	
school	P]	 	
·	‘Without	the	civil	servant	status,	we	do	not	consider	
selves	as	“state	school	teachers”.’	[Senior	leader	in	
school	P]	
·	(two	other	extracts	in	Chinese)	
Being	called	‘private	
schools’	
·	According	to	the	business	license,	these	schools	are	
called	‘private	school’	 	
·	(one	extract	in	Chinese)	
Not	included	into	
the	state	school	
league	table	
·	‘Our	school	has	not	been	included	into	the	state	
school	league	table.	Therefore,	the	government	does	
not	have	high	expectations	or	requirements	towards	
our	students’	exam	results.’	[Senior	leader	in	school	P]	
The	school	is	owned	
by	individuals	
·	(three	extracts	in	Chinese)	
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(Weiban	Xiao)	
The	headteacher	is	
assigned	by	the	
school	owner	
(Weiban	Xiao)	
·	(two	extracts	in	Chinese)	
	 [A	summary]	 ·	‘Our	school	has	a	legal	status	of	private	school,	yet	is	
under	the	control	of	government,	while	it	cannot	enjoy	
the	same	benefits	as	state	schools.’	[owner	of	school	R]	
	
Sub-theme 16: the interim nature 
Category	 Codes	 Extracts	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Government’s	
‘interim’	design	
The	institutional	
design	
·	‘What	is	strange	is	that	when	the	district	municipality	
gathers	the	private	owners	together	for	a	meeting,	it	
seldom	talks	about	education.	What	it	always	talks	
about	is	what	the	owners	cannot	do	for	the	sake	of	
safety…	What	I	can	feel	is	that	the	municipality	does	
not	have	motivation	to	support	us	to	be	excellent	in	
teaching.	It	merely	wants	us	not	to	cause	any	troubles.	
‘Interim’	is	how	the	government	treats	us.	It	hopes	to	
gradually	shut	our	schools	down	-	although	it	never	
directly	says	this,	we	can	feel	it.’	[owner	of	school	R]	 	
·	‘Our	business	license	is	issued	on	a	yearly	base	(rather	
than	on	multi-year	base).	Through	this	way,	the	
government	can	shut	us	down	easily.	Under	this	kind	of	
policy,	it	is	impossible	for	us	to	gain	the	sense	of	
security.’	[owner	of	school	R]	 	 	
·	‘From	a	long-term	perspective,	a	nature	of	this	type	of	
school	is	its	interim	nature.	This	interim	period	would	
be	a	long	period	ends	with	the	decrease	of	the	amount	
of	floating	people	in	Shanghai.’	
·	‘For	this	type	of	schools,	from	a	long	term	perspective,	
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it	is	just	an	“interim	mechanism”.	Yet	this	interim	
mechanism	might	not	terminate	soon.	This	kind	of	
school	might	gradually	vanish	when	there	is	not	much	
of	a	floating	population	in	this	area’	[Officer	L]	 	
·	‘What	is	not	sure	and	what	I	always	want	to	find	out	is	
“for	how	many	more	years	can	we	exist?”	This	is	a	
crucial	question,	because	the	answer	to	it	will	
determine	whether	the	government	should	increase	
the	financial	investment	to	build	campus	houses	and	to	
improve	its	facilities.	But	there	is	just	no	answer	to	this	
question.	That	makes	me	worried.’	[headteacher	of	
school	T]	 	
·	‘This	school	is	an	‘interim	mechanism’	for	migrant	
children’s	schooling.	If	(in	the	future)	the	state	schools	
have	enough	capacity	to	absorb	all	the	migrant	
children,	then	our	mission	is	accomplished,	and	we	can	
return	to	the	adult	education	sector.	Yet	before	the	
arrival	of	this	day,	we	should	still	work	hard	to	recruit	
migrant	children,	to	help	the	district	municipality	
overcome	the	problem	of	migrant	children’s	schooling.’	
[headteacher	of	school	L]	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Restrictions	from	
the	government	
General	restrictions	 ·	(two	extracts	in	Chinese)	
Not	charging	for	
tuition	fees	
·	‘Although	our	school	has	now	been	registered	as	a	
private	school,	it	is	not	a	real	private	school.	Because	a	
real	private	school	does	not	rely	on	the	government	
funding,	yet	our	school	does.	How	much	money	the	
government	gives	to	us,	how	much	money	we	use.	
Therefore,	in	many	government	documents,	schools	
like	ours	have	been	given	a	special	tag,	namely,	“private	
school	for	migrant	children”,	which	means	the	school	is	
not	a	real	private	one.	For	those	real	private	schools,	
we	call	them	“independent	school”’	[Headteacher	of	
school	Q]	 	
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·	(one	extract	in	Chinese)	
Not	setting	up	
recruitment	criteria	
·	(one	extract	in	Chinese)	
Not	opening	to	local	
students	
·	(two	extracts	in	Chinese)	
	
Objective	
difficulty	
Losing	students	 ·	‘My	school	is	at	the	edge	of	extinction…	In	September	
2013,	we	recruited	37	students.	In	September	2014,	
the	number	on	roll	dropped	to	20.	And	in	this	year,	I	am	
not	sure	whether	we	are	able	to	recruit	this	number	of	
students,	owing	to	the	strict	school	enrolment	criteria	
established	by	the	government.’	[headteacher	of	school	
Q]	
·	(two	extracts	in	Chinese)	
	
	
	
	
Theme 6: registered private school 
	
Category	 Codes	 Extracts	
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Why	exist	
The	value	and	
necessity	of	the	
school	
·	‘the	essential	problem	is	that	the	state	school	
enrolment	quotas	are	very	limited,	thus	cannot	recruit	
all	the	migrant	children’	[Headteacher	of	school	T]	 	
·	‘It	is	not	appropriate	to	ask	the	migrant	children	to	go	
back	and	study	in	their	parents’	hometown,	since	their	
parents	are	working	in	Shanghai.	If	being	forced	to	
study	in	their	parents’	hometown,	these	children	will	
have	no	future	–	this	generation	will	again	lose	their	
future.	Therefore,	if	thinking	from	the	government’s	
side,	I	would	suggest	helping	these	children	enroll	in	
state	schools,	or	at	least	in	schools	like	ours.’	[Senior	
leadership	team	member	in	school	P]	 	
·	‘If	you	(the	government)	shut	down	all	the	schools	like	
us,	(then	many	children	would	lose	the	chances	to	
study	and	become	bad	guys),	in	the	future,	you	should	
consider	building	more	prisons.’	[Headteacher	of	school	
H]	 	
·	(four	extracts	in	Chinese)	
	
Government’s	
financial	support	
Tuition	fees	 	 ·	(two	extracts	in	Chinese)	
Book	fees	 	 ·	(one	extract	in	Chinese)	
Facilities	 ·	(two	extracts	in	Chinese)	
School	buildings	 	 ·	(two	extracts	in	Chinese)	
The	quality	of	
teaching	
Negative	aspect	 ·	(two	extracts	in	Chinese)	
Positive	aspect	 ·	(two	extracts	in	Chinese)	
	
	
	
Theme 7: state school (specifically running for migrant children)  
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Category	 Codes	 Extracts	
Aim	 	 The	aim	of	the	school	 ·	‘Recruiting	migrant	children	is	an	interim	work	for	
our	school’	[Headteacher	of	school	L]	 	
	
	
	
	
Interim	nature	
As	an	‘interim	
mechanism’	for	the	
state	school	
·	‘The	state	school	is	the	priority	choice	for	the	
migrant	children.	But	in	certain	periods,	the	state	
schools	are	not	able	to	recruit	all	the	migrant	children,	
so	some	children	come	to	our	school.	In	other	words,	
this	school	is	an	“interim	mechanism”	for	migrant	
children’s	schooling.	If	(in	the	future)	the	state	schools	
have	enough	capacity	to	absorb	all	the	migrant	
children,	then	our	mission	is	accomplished,	and	we	
can	return	to	the	adult	education	section.	Yet	before	
the	arrive	of	this	day,	we	should	still	work	hard	to	
recruit	migrant	children,	to	help	the	district	
municipality	overcome	the	problem	of	migrant	
children’s	schooling’	[Headteacher	of	school	L]	 	
	
	
	
	
Teachers	 	
Teachers	without	‘civil	
servant	status	
(Bianzhi)’	
·	‘The	teachers	without	civil	servant	status	do	not	have	
strong	teacher	professional	capabilities	and	therefore	
have	negative	influence	on	the	quality	of	education.	
They	cannot	realize	some	of	the	school’s	norms	while	
the	teachers	with	civil	servant	status	can.	There	is	a	
gap	between	these	two	groups	of	teachers	in	terms	of	
their	educational	principles	and	their	ability	to	realize	
the	school’s	norms	on	teaching	and	management.’	
[Headteacher	of	school	L]	 	
	
	
	
	
Theme 8: unregistered informal private (UIP) school 
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Category	 Codes	 Extracts	
The	nature	of	the	
schools	
‘stepchildren’	 ·	(one	extract	in	Chinese)	
Interim	nature	 ·	(one	extract	in	Chinese)	
	
	
	
The	value	of	the	school	
	
	
The	‘UIP	school	
movement’	
·	(one	extract	in	Chinese)	
Supplement	of	the	
state	schools	
·	(two	extracts	in	Chinese)	
The	legitimacy	of	this	
kind	of	schools	
·	‘Yes,	our	school	is	not	as	good	as	the	state	
schools.	But	it	is	still	better	than	none.	The	
government	itself	also	recoginsed	this.’	
[Headteacher	of	school	H]	
·	(another	extract	in	Chinese)	
Government’s	support	 Teacher	training	 ·	(one	extract	in	Chinese)	
The	quality	of	teaching	 The	external	comments	 ·	(one	extract	in	Chinese)	
The	internal	comments	 ·	(one	extract	in	Chinese)	
The	parents’	comments	 ·	(two	extracts	in	Chinese)	
The	students’	academic	
performance	
The	teacher’s	
comments	
·	(one	extract	in	Chinese)	
	
	
 
	
	
 
 
 
 
 
	 399	
Appendix 4: sample transcripts (English and Mandarin) 
Note: to protect the privacy of the respondents, in the presented sample 
transcripts, I use random letters to replace the names of people, school 
and community.  
Headteacher, school A 
我：请介绍一下您学校里随迁子女的基本情况（学习、人际关系…） 
 
校长：现在咱们学校是 90%外地学生。这个 90%当中呢，主要的是在我们
周边打低层次工的这样的人。为什么这个学校形成这种局面呢？因为这个
学校它原来是 A厂、B厂、C厂，全是八十年代的一种老企业。八十年代
所有的场子都倒闭了以后呢，周围的这些老、旧房子，三十年来形成了现
在这种局面。这种平房啊、包括农民的宅基地啊这种房子，老百姓不住
了，那么他们都在这地方有房子了，于是这地方就形成了一个特别大的租
房子的区域，所以整个儿都是一些外地流动子女在这儿租房子。所以我们
学校自然也就为这些孩子服务了，因为我们等于是卧在这个地区里面。从
就近入学这个角度，长期二三十年形成的，我们就老是这样的一种生源。
这样的话我们接收的孩子的层次主要的以卖菜的、做点儿小的什么麻辣烫
啊、小超市啊、小打印店啊，以这个为主体。所以呢，这么多年呢，因为
90%都是他们的孩子，所以倒没有跟北京孩子融不融洽的问题，因为他们
占主体了，严格地说。咱们说句开玩笑的话，都是北京孩子跟他们合不合
的问题了，是吧，因为主体已经是他们了。所以，整个儿学校就是为这些
孩子服务。总体来讲，没什么问题，管理呀没什么问题。 
    只不过我们遇到的管理上的问题就是，还是这些外地孩子他家长的素
质还是不够。然后最主要的是家长的家庭不稳定性还是特别高，比如说他
生二胎的、生三胎的，这样的话呢他就无暇顾及这个孩子，忙得生那个孩
子了。然后呢，这种，怎么说呀，就是说整个家长对孩子的教育重视程度
还是不行，然后孩子的习惯培养比较差。他们家长一般的还是忙于生意，
一般的晚上十点来钟到家，所以他们对孩子的教育就是不行。我们遇到的
一个问题就是，我们老师培养孩子会感觉很疲惫。因为咱们，说实话吧，
你像我们自己有孩子，孩子大了的，我们最大的感触，我们从小可能培养
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孩子学这个学那个。那咱们学校的孩子都不学这些，这些班儿的都没有，
没这经济条件，也没这意识。然后咱们都学这学那的，然后一上学就晚上
陪读、查作业、跟老师定期联系，这些在这所学校的家长里面… 所以老师
就会觉得特孤独，就他一个人在教孩子的这种感觉。有的时候反而家长还
在反作用力，比如说孩子出现问题的时候，你不来罢了，老师需要找你的
时候，他采取的方式就是“我不去！”，这样的家长也是有的。就是有一部
分家长是没能力管孩子，有一部分家长就是管都不想管，所以我们老师们
就是在这一块是比别的学校付出的东西更多。 
…… 
 
HY: Please talk about the migrant children in your school generally. For 
example, their academic performances and social relationships, and so on.  
 
Headteacher: Now in our school, 90% of the students are migrant. Among the 
migrant children, most of them are from low status labourer families living 
nearby. How this situation came into being? It is because the school is 
surrounded by factory A, factory B and factory C, all of which are old factories 
of the 1980s. Since the 1980s when all these factories were shut down, and the 
former residents left their old houses. As a result, this whole area became a place 
where migrant population rent houses. Therefore our school now serves for the 
migrant children, since it is located in this particular area. As our students are 
from the communities nearby, in the past twenty/thirty years the school recruits 
mainly the migrant children. The majority of their parents are working as, for 
example, selling vegetables and fruits, running a small stall or a shop, or running 
a small printing shop. As a result, for so many years, since 90% of our students 
are their children. There is not an issue of social inclusion of migrant children, 
because most students are migrant, seriously. This may be a joke, but the Beijing 
local children now need to worry whether they can get along with the migrant 
children, since the migrant children become the majority. In short, our school 
serves these children. Generally speaking, there are not big problems related to 
the school operation.  
  The only problem we have for the school operation is that the migrant parents 
are lacking for Suzhi [the Chinese term Suzhi refers to people’s literacy and 
proper behaviours]. Another main issue is that their families are not very stable. 
For example, some families have a second or third children. In this situation, the 
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parents will be busy with their new babies and will have less time to take care of 
their older children. Another problem is…how to say…generally the parents do 
not put enough importance on their children’s education, and they are not doing 
well in cultivating their children’s good habits. The parents are normally busy 
with their own businesses and often come back home at around 10pm, hence 
they are not doing well in their children’s education. A problem we have is that 
our teachers feel very tired in educating the children. Because we…to be honest, 
I have a child myself. When our children have grown up, we are aware that we 
have cultivated them by sending them to lean this and that [extra-curricular 
hobbies]. However the children in my school do not learn these. They do not 
attend these [extra-curricular hobbies] classes, because their parents do not have 
the money and are not aware the importance of these classes. In contrast, we 
send our children to learn this and that, and we accompany our children in the 
night to facilitate their study and to supervise them to make sure they have 
finished the homeworks. We also contact the teachers on a regular basis. Yet for 
the parents of the students in my schools, all of these… As a result, our teachers 
feel extremely lonely, like as if they are the only people in this school who treat 
education seriously. Sometimes the parents do things against [the school 
education]. For example, when your child has problems, you do not come to the 
school. What’s more, when the teacher is contacting you, you are behaving like ‘I 
am not going to the school!’ We have parents like this. While some parents are 
incapable to supervise their children, some others do not even want to supervise. 
As a result, the teachers have to devote more, if compared with the teachers in 
other schools. 
……  
 
Officer K, Shanghai 
…… 
我：在上海，“两为主”政策的发展大体是什么样的？  
K先生：两为主啊？这个两个为主是国务院的政策吧？这个早嘞，就是大
概在二零零几年的时候就开始了对吧。我们前几年就是好像是市教委出台
一个关于“持有上海市居住证（还是临时居住证，我有一点忘记了）子女入
学”的一个文件，那么近几年嘛..其实大部分还是在公办学校就读的呀。现
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在就是对随迁子女入学设置了一定的证件的要求，有一段时间呢就没设这
个限制，就全纳了。那么近两三年呢开始对随迁子女的入学设置了一定的..
也不叫入学条件..你像我们上海户籍的学生入学也是需要有入学的条件对
吧。那么对于随迁子女呢也相应地设置了家长持证方面的一些要求。 
    [第一阶段] 原先我们在义务教育都是强调按户籍所在地就读，早些年
的时候上海也基本上很少收随迁子女就读，公办学校一般只收上海户籍的
学生。[第二阶段] 那么后来随着国家政策的改变，随迁在父母工作地就读
的需求越来越高，所以我们后来就是..有一个阶段呢上海就是只要随迁子女
在上海就读，我们都是满足的。[第三阶段] 近年来上海人口急剧增长，中
央也提出来对北上广这种特大型城市也要适度控制人口规模嘛。所以其实
也不是教育方面提出的这个单个的要求，是跟着这个居住地控制人口增长
规模的这个要求，随着这个一块来的。   
我：您刚才提到，这两年设置入学条件可能是受到特大城市人口调控政策
的影响是吧？ 
K先生：对的，对的，对的。 
我：那么除了这个因素以外，还有没有别的因素影响到这两年的随迁子女
上学政策？ 
K先生：这个其实是根据国家的政治的需要吧..我们说政治需要..这个管理
思路的变化而变化。那么前几年就强调随迁子女都在那个居住地..跟着父母
来都要享受同等的义务教育嘛。所以领导有这个思路呗，就基本上采用全
纳的一种方式来接受了。这样以后呢其实也是对于我们当地的教育资源也
是大的一个冲击吧，就是对本地的孩子来说也带来了一定的冲击。那么这
几年就是觉得再这样下去可能对我们上海来说是“不能承受之重”了，哈哈
哈。随着..现在嘛正好也契合国家整体的一个对人口调控的一个大环境嘛，
所以正好是这样弄的。 
 
我：浦东教育局在推行“两为主”政策当中有没有遇到什么困难？ 
K先生：困难就是资源不足呀，我们现在..前几年因为为了做好这个工作，
公办学校都是扩班、扩班额，我们班额多得一个班级有五十几个咧。没有
实行这个政策的时候我们都..当时上海就因为随着人口出生率的下降，当时
正好有一段时间都在推行小班化教学咧。结果这个政策就是随迁子女入学
零拒绝、全纳这样一弄，冲击很大，不要说小班化了，班额越来越大。当
时领导就说“哪怕五十六十，都得收下”，所以我们有些学校班额都接近六
十、五十多。还有我们学校很多的专用教室，音乐室美术室什么室都拆
掉，都用来开班了。  
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…… 
 
…… 
HY: What is the development of the ‘Two Main Points’ policy in Shanghai?  
Officer K: You mean ‘Two Main Points’? I think this two Main Points is a State 
Council policy? It started in early 2000s I think. A few years ago, the Shanghai 
Municipality of education promulgated a policy document on ‘the school 
enrolment of the children whose parents hold the residential certificate, or 
temporal residential certificate’ if I remember correctly. And in recent years…in 
fact most [of the migrant children] have enrolled in state school. Now some 
required criteria have been set for the migrant children’s school enrolment, while 
in a previous period, there was no such restrictions and all migrant children were 
included [into state schools]. Well, since recent two or three years, regarding the 
migrant children’s school enrolment, [the government] started to set some…we 
should not call them restrictive requirements…you see, we Shanghai local 
children also need to meet some requirements in order to enrol in schools. 
Similarly, as for the migrant children, some requirements regarding to their 
parents’ certificate status have been set up.  
  [The first phrase] Previously in the compulsory education stage, we required 
the students to enrol in schools located in their household registration places. 
Only very few migrant children were recruited by schools in Shanghai, as the 
state schools normally only recruit students with Shanghai hukou. [The second 
phrase] In line with the changes of national policy, there were an increasing 
demand from the migrant children. As a result, what we did is…in a period, as 
long as the migrant children wanted to study in Shanghai, we met their needs. 
[The third phrase] In recent years Shanghai is undergoing a population boom. 
And the central government also proposed that the cities like Beijing, Shanghai 
and Guangzhou should limit their population sizes in a reasonable way. 
Therefore [the set-up of the restrictive school enrolment criteria] is not merely 
because of the request from the education sector; it indeed follows the need of 
limiting the increasing population size in the population receiving cities.   
HY: Just now you mentioned that the set-up of the schooling criteria in recent 
years might be a result of the changes in the super-large city population policy?  
Officer K: Yes, yes, yes.  
Me: Apart from this factor, are there any other factors that shape the recent years’ 
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schooling policy for migrant children?  
Officer K: It in fact follows the needs of the national politics...I mean political 
needs…namely follows the changes of the administrative principles. That is to 
say, previously the [leaders’] focus was on including migrant children into the 
local school system…they migrate with their parents and hence should enjoy the 
compulsory education equally. As the leaders had this principle, the migrant 
children were generally recruited [by the local educational system] in an 
inclusive way. As a result, it in fact brought a big challenge to the local 
educational resources, in other words, to the local children. Then in recent 
years…felt that if this situation continues, it might become ‘a weight that cannot 
be held’ (laugh). Along with…now it matches the national macro environment of 
controlling the population size, so…take this chance do it.  
 
HY: Has the Pudong Municipality of Education met any difficulties during the 
implementation of the TMC policy?  
Officer K: the difficulty is the lack of resources. We are now…in the past few 
years, in order to get the work done, our state schools have opened more classes 
and extended the numbers of students per class. The largest classes had more 
than fifty students. Before we implement the TMC policy, we…in Shanghai, 
there was a period that the birth rate was decreasing, and we took this chance to 
promote the small class size teaching practice. Yet under the TMC policy, we did 
not say no to the migrant children and tried to include them [into the state 
school]. It meant challenges for the schools, making the class size even bigger 
rather than smaller. In that period, our municipality leader said, ‘even if enlarging 
the class size to 50-60 students [per class], we still must recruit [the migrant 
children].’ As a result, some of our schools had the class size of nearly sixty or 
fifty students. In addition, many specialised classroom, such as the music or fine 
arts classroom, were changed into regular classroom in order to open more 
classes.  
…… 
Teacher L, school M 
…… 
我：这些孩子的学习情况怎么样？ 
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L老师：学习习惯比较差。比方说我们一年级开始就是..就很基本的啊，坐
的习惯、站的习惯，这些习惯，还有学习当中读书的习惯、写字的习惯，
这些习惯都是比较差。一年级因为我们没有书面作业，基本上像我们语文
都是口头作业比较多，那么口头作业呢就是看小孩子的自觉性。这个当中
就是女生比较自觉，因为女孩子有可能比较乖巧，或者说比较有灵气，或
者说比较听话一点，回家能够去完成。但是男孩子呢，玩心太重了（笑）。
家长有的是配合，有的是不配合，也是很明显。配合就是说，小孩子能够
完成作业的，这个小孩子的学习就是有提高。但你要觉得不管不顾，那么
小孩子的学习…  
我：您觉得配合的家长能够占到多大比例？ 
L老师：大概是有三分之一吧，（还有）三分之一是特别特别..基本上是没
怎么配合的。 
我：那么您跟家长联系，他们会回应吗？还是？ 
L老师：也不是，你看孩子读或不读，我们在课堂上也有小练习呀，从这
小练习当中就可以看出来，花功夫和不花功夫是一看就能看出来的。我们
现在就是说，你对课文熟不熟？课文里面的这些字你认识不认识？很简单
的一些事情。 
…… 
我：请再谈谈您对随迁子女家长的认识 
L老师：我们这边家长还是..不管是从学识… 我觉得差距在于，对小孩子
的一个教育的认识上面是有差距的，有些家长他就是说把小孩子扔到学校
里边，就是你学校的事情了。倒也不是说他不管，他真的还是没有精力、
没有这个能力去管。我了解下来，我们班级还有几个学生的家长是没有受
过教育的。有的就上过一年两年，然后就辍学了，因为家庭子女多嘛，然
后就把上学的机会让给弟弟、哥哥呀这些，农村重男轻女。然后你要让他
去辅导小孩子，根本不可能。他也没有这个精力，有的家长就是做生意，
做个体户呀，起早摸黑，你说他有什么..他还是在这种生存线上，先解决掉
温饱问题、家庭生计问题。他根本就没有这个能力、精力去管孩子。这小
孩子，只要他不闯祸，就可以了。他们的要求就是这样。小孩子能识几个
字，到时候能够打个工，就可以了，这就是一部分家长。 
…… 
  
…… 
HY: How is the migrant children’s academic performance?  
Teacher L: They have poor study habits. For example, from the grade one [of 
	 406	
primary school] we started to…like very basic, like how to sit, how to stand – 
these habits. In addition, regarding study, how to read, how to write – they are 
poor in these habits. In grade one, we do not have written homework, therefore 
for subject like Chinese, we normally arrange oral homework. And the 
[accomplishment of] oral homework depends on the self-discipline of the 
children. With this regard, the girls are more self-disciplined. Because girls might 
be more clever and smooth, or talented, or tend to follow the instructions, hence 
they can complete [the homework] when they go back home. Yet the boys are so 
eager to play (laugh). As for the parents, some of them are cooperative, some are 
not cooperative – very noticeable. Cooperative means that their children 
complete the homework, hence the children’s study improves. But if you [the 
parent] feel do not want to supervise or guide [the children], then the children’s 
study… 
HY: For you, what proportion of parents can be considered as cooperative?  
Teacher L: Probably about one third. [Another] one third of them are very 
very…almost not cooperative at all.  
HY: When you contact the parents, do they respond? Or…? 
Teacher L: Not that, you can tell from whether the children have learnt or not. In 
the classroom teaching we have small tests, which can clearly tell whether [the 
children] have spent time [at home] or not. What we can tell is: are you familiar 
with the text book? Can you recognise the Chinese characters in the text book? 
All this sort of simple things.  
…… 
HY: Please tell me more about the migrant parents.  
Teacher L: The parents in our school still…no matter from their knowledge… I 
think the gap is, their understanding of education for the children – there is a gap 
here. Some parents just ‘throw’ their children to the school and let the school do 
the remaining things. I am not saying that they do not care about their children’s 
study; it is really because they do not have the energy and the ability to deal with 
it. I have done an investigation and found that several parents in my class do not 
have educational experience themselves. Some got only one or two years’ 
education and then dropped out from the school, because they have many 
siblings in their families. They gave the chances of schooling to their younger 
brothers or older brothers – in the rural areas people do not treat women equally 
as men. Then you ask these parents to facilitate their children [with their study] - 
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it is impossible at all. They do not have the energy, as some of them are running 
tiny businesses, they need to get up early and finish work late – so you cannot 
expect them...they are still in a struggle for survival, so they need to make sure 
that their families get basic supplies and survive in the city. They do not have 
spare attention to deal with the children - as long as the children do not make 
trouble. That is all their expectation – their children have the basic reading ability 
and can do some labourer jobs later on, that is it. That’s the situation of some 
migrant parents in our school. 
……  
Migrant mother Ong, school L 
…… 
我：当时在准备入学证件时，有没有遇到一些困难？  
家长 Ong：现在主要就是这个社保，别的还好。现在还有它要求我们在上
海租的是大房子，因为小房子如果..房东就不给你出证明了，然后你就拿不
到房东的房产证、身份证啊那些复印件，你就办不了的。我家里现在租的
是房东的大房子，那些（证件）房东都帮我搞好了，现在主要就是我还拿
不到这个长期居住证。它一直要缴满六个月，我去年十月的时候是缴满了
的，然后我去办我就说办长期居住证，因为我们不懂嘛，我们是外地人
嘛，是吧，然后我去的时候，我就以为像这样已经成了长期居住证。现在
我三个孩子在这里上学，现在又是困难时间，今天我为了这个事情我又去
搞了一天，还是没搞好。因为我那个养老金中间停了两三个月嘛，现在它
又不给办，它不该停的，要一直交上去的，停掉了它就不给你办了。当时
那时候我不懂嘛，我以为就这样已经是长期居住证了，谁知道孩子拿到学
校去又说还是临时的，我才慌起来了嘛。现在已经没办法了，今天我又去
找了，又到我们派出所去，人家还是说没办法了，你必须积满六个月的
金，然后你再过来。 
我：您为什么会停掉呢？ 
家长 Ong：因为我去年工厂倒闭了，因为孩子要生活嘛，没办法，我又去
进了一个小厂，进了两三个月，小厂它是不交金的。然后我现在刚刚又进
了人家大企业，这个月又开始交，现在今天我又去问了，它要我现在再继
续缴满六个月才可以，现在我这个老二女儿马上要上初中，已经又来不及
了，又办不了了. 
我：那怎么办呢？ 
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家长 Ong：不知道，要不给就给她五年级再留一级。那没办法，我们在老
家也没地方送。现在我就是担心怕孩子上不了学。 
……  
 
我：当时为什么给大女儿选了 L学校？ 
家长 Ong：它就是在 XX小学的话，毕业只能升到 YY中学，因为我们没
有交金，就进不去了。我就选在 X区这里外地学校嘛，也比较近嘛，然后
女儿在这里报了之后又给分到 L学校那边去了，比较远的，分到那边我说
没办法，也要上学，不上学那怎么办是吧，也就这样去上了。不过那里面
的孙老师对我女儿都挺好的，经常打电话关心。 
我：所以女儿最后是被分到 L学校的？ 
家长 Ong：对，被分到那边去的，本身报名是在 xx地区报的。 
 
我：当时二女儿想上公办上不了，您有没有通过别的途径争取？ 
家长 Ong：有争取过，有争取过没办法呀，像我们外地人在这里打工有什
么办法，你找人又不认识人。我打电话到 XX小学，像前天我还打电话
去，人家 XX小学那个校长就是“这几样东西你都还不知道！到现在了你还
说什么啊？！”很凶的，那个什么姓赵的，赵校长。我就问一下他/她灵活
就业证是什么嘛，他/她说“到现在你还不懂，你还在问什么啊？”他/她说。 
我：您认识的朋友什么也没有人能帮上忙么？ 
家长 Ong：我们外地人哪，那天我姐夫也讲了，去找人。去找了人人家也
讲了，搞这个东西很难，搞不到的。 
我：您有认识本地的朋友么（能帮上忙的）？ 
家长 Ong：没有，我们打工的哪里有本地的朋友，要么就房东帮你，房东
不帮你你就没有办法的。 
 
我：您觉得 L学校怎么样？ 
家长 Ong：还满意的，我女儿在那里成绩还可以吧，老师也挺关心她的，
一般每次考试的话基本上在班级里都是前三名、前五名的。然后他们老师
又讲了，我女儿爱学画画，我又给她去参加了学画画嘛，一学期一千五百
块，反正我就只要她自己喜欢什么反正我就尽力而为满足她吧。 
…… 
 
…… 
HY: did you and your children meet with any difficulties when trying to enrol in 
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state schools? 
Migrant mother Ong: the main difficulty is to prepare for the social insurance 
certificate. The other documents are fine. It is now required that the candidates 
should rent big houses [standard flats]. If you rent a small house [a single 
room]… the landlord will not be able to issue you the certificate, which means 
you will not be able to get a copy of the landlord’s house owner certificate and 
ID and hence will fail [in meeting the government’s requirements]. My family is 
currently renting a big house, so our landlord has already prepared those 
documents for me. Currently, my only problem is that I do not have the long-
term residential certificate. The policy requires the candidate to pay for the 
pension [the social insurance] for six months uninterruptedly. I had paid for more 
than six months before October last year. Then I went to apply for the long-term 
residential certificate…because we do not know [the process], we are non-local, 
you know…I thought I have met the criteria for the long-term residential 
certificate. Now my three children need to study here [in Shanghai], it is a 
difficult period – today I spent a whole day for this document but I still failed. It 
is because my pension was suspended for two/three months, now I am not 
qualified to apply [for the document]. I should not have suspended my pension, 
since it should be paid uninterruptedly. If the pension is suspended, then you will 
not be able to get the certificate. At that time, I did not know [about this 
consequence], I thought what I got is a long-term residential certificate. When 
my child submitted the certificate to the school, the school said the certificate is a 
temporal one. I became panicked. Now there is no way to fix it. Today I went to 
the police station [which is in charge of the document application] again, they 
still said they cannot help because I need to have paid for six months before I can 
get the certificate.  
HY: why did you suspend [your social insurance]?  
Migrant mother Ong: it was because the factory I worked went bankrupt. My 
family needed [money for] living, therefore I had no choice but to start working 
for another factory, which is a small one. The small factories do not pay social 
insurance for their employees. Now I just started working for another big factory 
and start paying [for the social insurance] from this month. Today I went to asked 
[the police station], and it told me to keep paying uninterruptedly for six months 
before I can get the certificate. However my second daughter is about to apply 
for junior secondary school, and we will miss the chance [for this year] again, we 
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will fail to get the certificate again.  
HY: then are there any ways to solve this problem?  
Migrant mother Ong: I do not know. Perhaps I will let her re-enrol in the grade 5 
of the primary school [so that she can try an enrol in the secondary school in the 
next year when our documents are ready]. We have no choice, because our 
daughter has nowhere to go even in my hometown. I am very worried that she 
will not be accepted by any school.  
……  
 
HY: tell me the reasons why you chose school L for your older daughter.    
Migrant mother Ong: the thing is, if you graduate from primary school XX, you 
can only enrol in secondary school YY. [However] since we have not paid for the 
social insurance, we are not able to enrol in school YY. [At the beginning] we 
were considering the migrant schools in this community because they are close, 
and my daughter applied. Finally she was redistributed to school L which is far 
away from my home. I said we have no choice [but to accept this offer], or we 
will lose the chance for schooling. That is how she enrolled in this school. Her 
teacher, Sun, treats my daughter very well and often give us phone calls.  
HY: so your daughter was redistributed to school L?  
Migrant mother Ong: yes, she was redistributed to this school. Her original 
application was made to [the schools in] the xx community. 
 
HY: when your second daughter failed to enrol in state school, have you tried 
other ways?   
Migrant mother Ong: I have tried, but it did not work. Non-local labourers like 
me do not have ways. We wanted to use our social network but we know nobody 
[who has any power]. I have tried to give phone call to xx primary school in the 
day before yesterday. [Yet] what the headteacher responded is like: ‘it was 
simply a few documents, yet you have not figured out! [You have already missed 
the chance.] Now what you have got to say?!’ A very bad attituded person – what 
is the person’s surname? Oh, Zhao, headteacher Zhao. I was simply asking what 
the ‘certificate for flexible occupation’ is, yet s/he1 just responded: ‘Why are you 
																																																						
1	 In	Chinese,	the	pronunciation	of	‘she’	and	‘he’	is	the	same.	Therefore	I	do	not	know	the	
gender	of	headteacher	Zhao.	 	 	
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still asking this? How can you still do not know this [simple process]?!’ That is 
what s/he said.  
HY: are there any friends can help? 
Migrant mother Ong: we are non-local. I have asked my elder sister’s husband to 
find someone who can help. He did speak to someone, but that person said it is 
very hard and they could not help.  
HY: do you have any local friends [who can help]? 
Migrant mother Ong: no, we non-local labourers do not have local friends, unless 
your landlord is willing to help. Otherwise you will have no way.  
 
HY: how do you feel about school L?  
Migrant mother Ong: I am satisfied with this school. My daughter’s exam scores 
are good. The teachers are treating her well. Normally she ranks in the top 3-5 in 
her class in each exam. Her teacher told me that she has an enthusiasm for 
painting. Therefore I enrolled her on a painting course, which costs 1,500 per 
term. [Although I am not rich] I still try my best to fulfil my daughter’s interests.  
…… 
Migrant child Jian, school H 
我：能跟我说一说你学习怎么样么？ 
随迁子女 Jian：不行。老分心，后面的人老笑。 
我：为什么呢？ 
随迁子女 Jian：后面的人一有事情就笑，吵得我都没法学习，我都过去…
我一说他就笑，再转过来，他们又笑。 
我：是很多人么？ 
随迁子女 Jian：后面那一排 
 
我：刘老师是你们的语文老师吧，那你们班教数学的老师是谁？ 
随迁子女 Jian：教数学的是个女老师，我也不知道是谁。 
我：她姓什么？ 
随迁子女 Jian：我没记下。 
 
我：你们初一上了哪些课呀？ 
随迁子女 Jian：语文、数学、英语、思品、历史，还有生物、地理。 
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我：有化学么？ 
随迁子女 Jian：化学没有。我喜欢上化学。 
我：你在哪里上化学？ 
随迁子女 Jian：在我的家教机。 
…… 
 
我：你在班上跟哪些小朋友玩的比较好啊？ 
随迁子女 Jian：后面的，后面第一个… 
我：是男生还是女生？ 
随迁子女 Jian：男生，那当然（笑）。 
我：你为什么喜欢跟他玩？ 
随迁子女 Jian：他好玩 
我：为什么？ 
随迁子女 Jian：我也说不清 
我：很喜欢笑是吧？ 
随迁子女 Jian：不是很喜欢笑，他不笑，是后面的。 
 
我：你是什么时候来北京的？是在北京出生的么？ 
随迁子女 Jian：不是在北京出生的，我也不知道。 
我：你是在北京上幼儿园么？ 
随迁子女 Jian：是。 
我：你觉得自己是老家人还是北京人？ 
随迁子女 Jian：嗯..老家话也不会说（笑），北京的会说。 
我：你觉得你是北京人呢还是老家人呢？ 
随迁子女 Jian：当然是老家。 
我：为什么？ 
随迁子女 Jian：在老家出生的嘛。 
我：那你爸爸妈妈呢？ 
随迁子女 Jian：他们肯定觉得自己是老家人。 
 
我：你平时都喜欢什么体育活动？ 
随迁子女 Jian：打篮球我有点不会打，刚有点练手。 
我：你平时回家了都玩些什么？ 
随迁子女 Jian：看电视和出去找他们玩，还有一般在家里看那种童话书。 
我：你出去找他们，他们是？ 
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随迁子女 Jian：都是小学同学。 
……  
 
随迁子女 Jian：叔叔你要走了？叔叔你喝点水。叔叔再见！ 
 
HY: How is your study at school?  
Migrant child Jian: Not good. I cannot concentrate [in the study], because the 
people sitting in the back often laugh.  
HY: why?  
Migrant child Jian: People sitting in the back laugh at many things, which makes 
noise and disturb my study. I sometimes turn round…when I start speaking, they 
will laugh. When I turn round again, they laugh again. 
HY: Are there many of them?  
Migrant child Jian: the row behind of me.  
 
HY: I know that Mr Liu is your Chinese teacher, then who is your Maths teacher?  
Migrant child Jian: The Maths teacher is a lady. I do not know who she is.  
HY: Then what is her surname [how do you call her]? 
Migrant child Jian: I do not remember her surname.  
 
HY: What courses do you have in the grade one of junior secondary school?  
Migrant child Jian: Chinese, Maths, English, Moral Education, History, and 
Biology and Geography.  
HY: Do you have Chemistry course?  
Migrant child Jian: No, we do not. But I love Chemistry.  
HY: So where do you learn Chemistry?  
Migrant child Jian: In my self-teaching electronic pad.  
…… 
 
HY: Who are your friends in your class?  
Migrant child Jian: The one sitting behind me. The first one sitting right behind 
me.  
HY: Is it he or she?  
Migrant child Jian: He, of course (laugh).  
HY: Why do you like him?  
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Migrant child Jian: He is funny.  
HY: Funny in terms of?  
Migrant child Jian: It is hard to say.  
HY: Is he one of those people who always laugh? 
Migrant child Jian: [He does] not like laugh. He does not laugh. They are the 
ones behind.  
 
HY: When did you come to Beijing? Or were you born in Beijing?  
Migrant child Jian: No, I was not born in Beijing. I do not know when.  
HY: Did you attend nursery in Beijing?  
Migrant child Jian: Yes. 
HY: Do you consider yourself as a Beijing people or your hometown people?  
Migrant child Jian: Er... I do not speak the hometown dialect (laugh), yet I speak 
Beijing dialect.  
HY: Then do you consider yourself as a Beijing people or hometown people?  
Migrant child Jian: Of course hometown.  
HY: Why?  
Migrant child Jian: [I was] born in the hometown.  
HY: How about your parents?  
Migrant child Jian: I am sure they consider themselves as hometown people. 
 
HY: What kinds of sports do you like?  
Migrant child Jian: I play basketball but I am not very good at it. I just started to 
learn. 
HY: What entertainments do you have at home?  
Migrant child Jian: I watch TV and go out and play with them, and I read the 
fairy tales at home.  
HY: You said you go out and play with ‘them’. Who are ‘they’?  
Migrant child Jian: All are my primary school classmates.  
……  
 
Migrant child Jian: Uncle, are you leaving now? Please drink some water [before 
you leave]? Goodbye uncle!  
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Appendix 5: sample transcripts excerpts (coding) 
Note:	to	protect	the	privacy	of	the	respondents,	in	the	presented	sample	
transcript	excerpts,	I	use	random	letters	to	replace	the	names	of	people,	school	
and	community.	 	
Headteacher, school A 
	
	
	 1	
	
……	
HY:	Please	talk	about	the	migrant	children	in	your	school	generally.	For	
example,	their	academic	performances	and	social	relationships,	and	so	
on.	 	
	
Headteacher:	Now	in	our	school,	90%	of	the	students	are	migrant.	
Among	the	migrant	children,	most	of	them	are	from	low	status	labourer	
families	living	nearby.	How	this	situation	came	into	being?	It	is	because	
the	school	is	surrounded	by	factory	A,	factory	B	and	factory	C,	all	of	
which	are	old	factories	of	the	1980s.	Since	the	1980s	when	all	these	
factories	were	shut	down,	and	the	former	residents	left	their	old	houses.	
As	a	result,	this	whole	area	became	a	place	where	migrant	population	
rent	houses.	Therefore	our	school	now	serves	for	the	migrant	children,	
since	it	is	located	in	this	particular	area.	As	our	students	are	from	the	
communities	nearby,	in	the	past	twenty/thirty	years	the	school	recruits	
mainly	the	migrant	children.	The	majority	of	their	parents	are	working	as,	
for	example,	selling	vegetables	and	fruits,	running	a	small	stall	or	a	shop,	
or	running	a	small	printing	shop.	As	a	result,	for	so	many	years,	since	90%	
of	our	students	are	their	children.	There	is	not	an	issue	of	social	inclusion	
of	migrant	children,	because	most	students	are	migrant,	seriously.	This	
may	be	a	joke,	but	the	Beijing	local	children	now	need	to	worry	whether	
they	can	get	along	with	the	migrant	children,	since	the	migrant	children	
become	the	majority.	In	short,	our	school	serves	these	children.	
Generally	speaking,	there	are	not	big	problems	related	to	the	school	
operation.	 	
	 	 The	only	problem	we	have	for	the	school	operation	is	that	the	migrant	
parents	are	lacking	for	Suzhi	[the	Chinese	term	Suzhi	refers	to	people’s	
literacy	and	proper	behaviours].	Another	main	issue	is	that	their	families	
are	not	very	stable.	For	example,	some	families	have	a	second	or	third	
children.	In	this	situation,	the	parents	will	be	busy	with	their	new	babies	
and	will	have	less	time	to	take	care	of	their	older	children.	Another	
problem	is…how	to	say…generally	the	parents	do	not	put	enough	
importance	on	their	children’s	education,	and	they	are	not	doing	well	in	
0 Note	for	further	analysis:	the	information	in	the	highlighted	contents	shows	how	some	state	schools	became	‘migrant	majority’	schools.	This	situation	resonates	with	the	situations	in	most	of	my	fieldwork	schools.	I	can	do	further	analysis	later.	
0Code:	the	economic	and	community	changes	locally	
0Note:	the	state	schools	are	located	in	the	migrant	majority	communities.	 	
0Code:	the	life	condition	of	migrant	family	
0Code:	migrant	children’s	social	inclusion	
0Code:	(some)	parents’	home	education	has	negative	impacts	towards	teacher’s	education	in	school	 	Note	for	further	analysis:	the	headteachers’	words	here	resonate	with	that	of	some	other	respondent	headteachers,	teachers	and	parents.	 	
0	Code:	the	life	condition	of	migrant	family	
0
Code:	(some)	parent	perceived	not	to	care	about	children’s	study	
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	 2	
cultivating	their	children’s	good	habits.	The	parents	are	normally	busy	
with	their	own	businesses	and	often	come	back	home	at	around	10pm,	
hence	they	are	not	doing	well	in	their	children’s	education.	A	problem	
we	have	is	that	our	teachers	feel	very	tired	in	educating	the	children.	
Because	we…to	be	honest,	I	have	a	child	myself.	When	our	children	have	
grown	up,	we	are	aware	that	we	have	cultivated	them	by	sending	them	
to	lean	this	and	that	[extra-curricular	hobbies].	However	the	children	in	
my	school	do	not	learn	these.	They	do	not	attend	these	[extra-curricular	
hobbies]	classes,	because	their	parents	do	not	have	the	money	and	are	
not	aware	the	importance	of	these	classes.	In	contrast,	we	send	our	
children	to	learn	this	and	that,	and	we	accompany	our	children	in	the	
night	to	facilitate	their	study	and	to	supervise	them	to	make	sure	they	
have	finished	the	homeworks.	We	also	contact	the	teachers	on	a	regular	
basis.	Yet	for	the	parents	of	the	students	in	my	schools,	all	of	these…	As	a	
result,	our	teachers	feel	extremely	lonely,	like	as	if	they	are	the	only	
people	in	this	school	who	treat	education	seriously.	Sometimes	the	
parents	do	things	against	[the	school	education].	For	example,	when	
your	child	has	problems,	you	do	not	come	to	the	school.	What’s	more,	
when	the	teacher	is	contacting	you,	you	are	behaving	like	‘I	am	not	going	
to	the	school!’	We	have	parents	like	this.	While	some	parents	are	
incapable	to	supervise	their	children,	some	others	do	not	even	want	to	
supervise.	As	a	result,	the	teachers	have	to	devote	more,	if	compared	
with	the	teachers	in	other	schools.	
……	 	
	
0Code:	student’s	habits	
0 Note:	parent’s	occupational	conditions	have	impacts	on	their	children’s	education	
0  Code:	the	negative	influences	for	teachers	
0 Note:	some	respondent	parents	mention	that	they	send	their	children	to	the	extra-curricular	courses.	It	is	different	from	what	the	headteacher	says.	
0 Note:	this	headtecher	uses	‘we/us’	which	serves	to	‘other’	the	‘them’.	In	the	further	analysis,	I	can	check	the	other	interviews.	I	can	examine	how	the	educator’s	attitude	shape	their	interpretations	of	migrant	parents’	parenting.	 	
0 Code:	teacher’s	frustration	 	
0 Code:	(some)	parents’	home	education	has	negative	impacts	towards	teacher’s	education	in	school	
0 Note:	this	links	to	Bourdieu’s	concept	of	habitus	–	‘fish	out	of	water’.	
0 	Note:	this	links	to	Bourdieu’s	concept	of	cultural	capital	 	
0 
Code:	(some)	parent	perceived	not	to	care	about	children’s	study	
0 Code:	teacher’s	burdens	
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Officer K, Shanghai 
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
……	
HY:	What	is	the	development	of	the	‘Two	Main	Points’	policy	in	
Shanghai?	 	
Officer	K:	You	mean	‘Two	Main	Points’?	I	think	this	two	Main	Points	is	a	
State	Council	policy?	It	started	in	early	2000s	I	think.	A	few	years	ago,	the	
Shanghai	Municipality	of	education	promulgated	a	policy	document	on	
‘the	school	enrolment	of	the	children	whose	parents	hold	the	residential	
certificate,	or	temporal	residential	certificate’	if	I	remember	correctly.	
And	in	recent	years…in	fact	most	[of	the	migrant	children]	have	enrolled	
in	state	school.	Now	some	required	criteria	have	been	set	for	the	
migrant	children’s	school	enrolment,	while	in	a	previous	period,	there	
was	no	such	restrictions	and	all	migrant	children	were	included	[into	
state	schools].	Well,	since	recent	two	or	three	years,	regarding	the	
migrant	children’s	school	enrolment,	[the	government]	started	to	set	
some…we	should	not	call	them	restrictive	requirements…you	see,	we	
Shanghai	local	children	also	need	to	meet	some	requirements	in	order	to	
enrol	in	schools.	Similarly,	as	for	the	migrant	children,	some	
requirements	regarding	to	their	parents’	certificate	status	have	been	set	
up.	 	
	 	 [The	first	phrase]	Previously	in	the	compulsory	education	stage,	we	
required	the	students	to	enrol	in	schools	located	in	their	household	
registration	places.	Only	very	few	migrant	children	were	recruited	by	
schools	in	Shanghai,	as	the	state	schools	normally	only	recruit	students	
with	Shanghai	hukou.	 	
	 	 [The	second	phrase]	In	line	with	the	changes	of	national	policy,	there	
were	an	increasing	demand	from	the	migrant	children.	As	a	result,	what	
we	did	is…in	a	period,	as	long	as	the	migrant	children	wanted	to	study	in	
Shanghai,	we	met	their	needs.	 	
	
	
	
0 Note	for	further	analysis:	check	the	government	statistical	data	
0Coding:	‘eligible	children’	discourse	
0Note:	the	three	phrases	of	the	development	of	schooling	criteria:	restrictive	–	loose	–	restrictive.	The	situation	in	Shanghai	resonate	with	the	situation	in	Beijing,	see	the	officer’s	interview.	I	should	note	it	in	the	context	chapter.	 	
0Note	for	further	analysis:	it	resonates	with	the	national	policy	
0Note:	the	same	as	the	last	note.	Try	and	look	at	the	‘2008-10	Namin	school’	reform.	 	
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	 	 [The	third	phrase]	In	recent	years	Shanghai	is	undergoing	a	population	
boom.	And	the	central	government	also	proposed	that	the	cities	like	
Beijing,	Shanghai	and	Guangzhou	should	limit	their	population	sizes	in	a	
reasonable	way.	Therefore	[the	set-up	of	the	restrictive	school	enrolment	
criteria]	is	not	merely	because	of	the	request	from	the	education	sector;	
it	indeed	follows	the	need	of	limiting	the	increasing	population	size	in	
the	population	receiving	cities.	 	 	
HY:	Just	now	you	mentioned	that	the	set-up	of	the	schooling	criteria	in	
recent	years	might	be	a	result	of	the	changes	in	the	super-large	city	
population	policy?	 	
Officer	K:	Yes,	yes,	yes.	 	
Me:	Apart	from	this	factor,	are	there	any	other	factors	that	shape	the	
recent	years’	schooling	policy	for	migrant	children?	 	
Officer	K:	It	in	fact	follows	the	needs	of	the	national	politics...I	mean	
political	needs…namely	follows	the	changes	of	the	administrative	
principles.	That	is	to	say,	previously	the	[leaders’]	focus	was	on	including	
migrant	children	into	the	local	school	system…they	migrate	with	their	
parents	and	hence	should	enjoy	the	compulsory	education	equally.	As	
the	leaders	had	this	principle,	the	migrant	children	were	generally	
recruited	[by	the	local	educational	system]	in	an	inclusive	way.	As	a	result,	
it	in	fact	brought	a	big	challenge	to	the	local	educational	resources,	in	
other	words,	to	the	local	children.	Then	in	recent	years…felt	that	if	this	
situation	continues,	it	might	become	‘a	weight	that	cannot	be	held’	
(laugh).	Along	with…now	it	matches	the	national	macro	environment	of	
controlling	the	population	size,	so…take	this	chance	do	it.	 	
	
	
	
	
	
0Note:	in	fact,	the	2013	population	policy	states	to	limit	the	population	sizes	in	a	strict	way.	This	is	probably	an	error	in	the	officer’s	oral	conversation.	 	
0	Note:	this	officer	points	out	the	underlining	impetus	of	the	recent	educational	policy	changes.	It	indicates	that	the	educational	policy	follows	the	changed	population	policy.	Then,	what	are	the	impetus	of	the	population	policy?	Here	need	further	explorations.	 	
0
Note	(see	my	last	note):	this	whole	paragraph	presents	the	differences	before	and	after	2013,	shaped	by	the	politics	and	population	policy.	It	offers	a	direction	for	my	data	analysis.	 	
0Code:	‘a	weight	that	cannot	be	held’	
HY:	Has	the	Pudong	Municipality	of	Education	met	any	difficulties	during	
the	implementation	of	the	TMC	policy?	 	
Officer	K:	the	difficulty	is	the	lack	of	resources.	We	are	now…in	the	past	
few	years,	in	order	to	get	the	work	done,	our	state	schools	have	opened	
more	classes	and	extended	the	numbers	of	students	per	class.	The	
largest	classes	had	more	than	fifty	students.	Before	we	implement	the	
TMC	policy,	we…in	Shanghai,	there	was	a	period	that	the	birth	rate	was	
decreasing,	and	we	took	this	chance	to	promote	the	small	class	size	
teaching	practice.	Yet	under	the	TMC	policy,	we	did	not	say	no	to	the	
migrant	children	and	tried	to	include	them	[into	the	state	school].	It	
meant	challenges	for	the	schools,	making	the	class	size	even	bigger	
rather	than	smaller.	In	that	period,	our	municipality	leader	said,	‘even	if	
enlarging	the	class	size	to	50-60	students	[per	class],	we	still	must	recruit	
[the	migrant	children].’	As	a	result,	some	of	our	schools	had	the	class	size	
of	nearly	sixty	or	fifty	students.	In	addition,	many	specialised	classroom,	
such	as	the	music	or	fine	arts	classroom,	were	changed	into	regular	
classroom	in	order	to	open	more	classes.	 	
……	
	
0 Code:	lack	for	financial	resources	
0  Code:	Hamper	the	small	class	teaching	reform	
0 Code:	Rebuild	the	professional	music	and	arts	classrooms	into	regular	classrooms	
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Teacher L, school M 
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
……	
HY:	How	is	the	migrant	children’s	academic	performance?	 	
Teacher	L:	They	have	poor	study	habits.	For	example,	from	the	grade	one	
[of	primary	school]	we	started	to…like	very	basic,	like	how	to	sit,	how	to	
stand	–	these	habits.	In	addition,	regarding	study,	how	to	read,	how	to	
write	–	they	are	poor	in	these	habits.	In	grade	one,	we	do	not	have	
written	homework,	therefore	for	subject	like	Chinese,	we	normally	
arrange	oral	homework.	And	the	[accomplishment	of]	oral	homework	
depends	on	the	self-discipline	of	the	children.	With	this	regard,	the	girls	
are	more	self-disciplined.	Because	girls	might	be	more	clever	and	smooth,	
or	talented,	or	tend	to	follow	the	instructions,	hence	they	can	complete	
[the	homework]	when	they	go	back	home.	Yet	the	boys	are	so	eager	to	
play	(laugh).	As	for	the	parents,	some	of	them	are	cooperative,	some	are	
not	cooperative	–	very	noticeable.	Cooperative	means	that	their	children	
complete	the	homework,	hence	the	children’s	study	improves.	But	if	you	
[the	parent]	feel	do	not	want	to	supervise	or	guide	[the	children],	then	
the	children’s	study…	
HY:	For	you,	what	proportion	of	parents	can	be	considered	as	
cooperative?	 	
Teacher	L:	Probably	about	one	third.	[Another]	one	third	of	them	are	
very	very…almost	not	cooperative	at	all.	 	
HY:	When	you	contact	the	parents,	do	they	respond?	Or…?	
Teacher	L:	Not	that,	you	can	tell	from	whether	the	children	have	learnt	
or	not.	In	the	classroom	teaching	we	have	small	tests,	which	can	clearly	
tell	whether	[the	children]	have	spent	time	[at	home]	or	not.	What	we	
can	tell	is:	are	you	familiar	with	the	text	book?	Can	you	recognise	the	
Chinese	characters	in	the	text	book?	All	this	sort	of	simple	things.	 	
……	
	
	
 [YH1]: Note	for	further	analysis:	this	teacher	tends	to	generalise	some	migrant	children’s	‘poor’	study	habits	to	the	whole	migrant	group.	This	reflects	her	deficit	view	towards	the	migrant	group.	The	same	deficit	view	can	be	identified	from	some	other	respondent	teachers	and	headteachers.	 	
 [YH2]: Note:	the	teacher	points	out	the	gender	dimension	(although	the	teacher’s	understanding	can	be	a	result	of	her	gender	stereotype).	According	to	my	memory,	another	teacher	also	mentioned	that	the	migrant	girls	have	advantages	than	the	boys	in	their	academic	study	in	general.	While	gender	is	not	the	focus	of	this	thesis,	I	might	explore	this	topic	in	my	future	studies.	 	
 [YH3]: Note:	it	links	to	what	the	same	teachers	says	later	
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HY:	Please	tell	me	more	about	the	migrant	parents.	 	
Teacher	L:	The	parents	in	our	school	still…no	matter	from	their	
knowledge…	I	think	the	gap	is,	their	understanding	of	education	for	the	
children	–	there	is	a	gap	here.	Some	parents	just	‘throw’	their	children	to	
the	school	and	let	the	school	do	the	remaining	things.	I	am	not	saying	
that	they	do	not	care	about	their	children’s	study;	it	is	really	because	
they	do	not	have	the	energy	and	the	ability	to	deal	with	it.	I	have	done	
an	investigation	and	found	that	several	parents	in	my	class	do	not	have	
educational	experience	themselves.	Some	got	only	one	or	two	years’	
education	and	then	dropped	out	from	the	school,	because	they	have	
many	siblings	in	their	families.	They	gave	the	chances	of	schooling	to	
their	younger	brothers	or	older	brothers	–	in	the	rural	areas	people	do	
not	treat	women	equally	as	men.	Then	you	ask	these	parents	to	facilitate	
their	children	[with	their	study]	-	it	is	impossible	at	all.	They	do	not	have	
the	energy,	as	some	of	them	are	running	tiny	businesses,	they	need	to	
get	up	early	and	finish	work	late	–	so	you	cannot	expect	them...they	are	
still	in	a	struggle	for	survival,	so	they	need	to	make	sure	that	their	
families	get	basic	supplies	and	survive	in	the	city.	They	do	not	have	spare	
attention	to	deal	with	the	children	-	as	long	as	the	children	do	not	make	
trouble.	That	is	all	their	expectation	–	their	children	have	the	basic	
reading	ability	and	can	do	some	labourer	jobs	later	on,	that	is	it.	That’s	
the	situation	of	some	migrant	parents	in	our	school.	
……	 	
	 	
 [YH4]: code:	parental	involvement	(‘do	not	have	the	energy’)	
 [YH5]: code:	parental	involvement	(low	educational	level)	
 [YH6]: code:	life	condition	 	
 [YH7]: code:	striving	for	survival	
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Migrant mother Ong, school L 
	
	
	
	
	
……	
HY:	did	you	and	your	children	meet	with	any	difficulties	when	trying	to	
enrol	in	state	schools?	
Migrant	mother	Ong:	the	main	difficulty	is	to	prepare	for	the	social	
insurance	certificate.	The	other	documents	are	fine.	It	is	now	required	
that	the	candidates	should	rent	big	houses	[standard	flats].	If	you	rent	a	
small	house	[a	single	room]…	the	landlord	will	not	be	able	to	issue	you	
the	certificate,	which	means	you	will	not	be	able	to	get	a	copy	of	the	
landlord’s	house	owner	certificate	and	ID	and	hence	will	fail	[in	meeting	
the	government’s	requirements].	My	family	is	currently	renting	a	big	
house,	so	our	landlord	has	already	prepared	those	documents	for	me.	
Currently,	my	only	problem	is	that	I	do	not	have	the	long-term	residential	
certificate.	The	policy	requires	the	candidate	to	pay	for	the	pension	[the	
social	insurance]	for	six	months	uninterruptedly.	I	had	paid	for	more	than	
six	months	before	October	last	year.	Then	I	went	to	apply	for	the	
long-term	residential	certificate…because	we	do	not	know	[the	process],	
we	are	non-local,	you	know…I	thought	I	have	met	the	criteria	for	the	
long-term	residential	certificate.	Now	my	three	children	need	to	study	
here	[in	Shanghai],	it	is	a	difficult	period	–	today	I	spent	a	whole	day	for	
this	document	but	I	still	failed.	It	is	because	my	pension	was	suspended	
for	two/three	months,	now	I	am	not	qualified	to	apply	[for	the	
document].	I	should	not	have	suspended	my	pension,	since	it	should	be	
paid	uninterruptedly.	If	the	pension	is	suspended,	then	you	will	not	be	
able	to	get	the	certificate.	At	that	time,	I	did	not	know	[about	this	
consequence],	I	thought	what	I	got	is	a	long-term	residential	certificate.	
When	my	child	submitted	the	certificate	to	the	school,	the	school	said	
the	certificate	is	a	temporal	one.	I	became	panicked.	Now	there	is	no	
way	to	fix	it.	Today	I	went	to	the	police	station	[which	is	in	charge	of	the	
document	application]	again,	they	still	said	they	cannot	help	because	I	
need	to	have	paid	for	six	months	before	I	can	get	the	certificate.	 	
HY:	why	did	you	suspend	[your	social	insurance]?	 	
Migrant	mother	Ong:	it	was	because	the	factory	I	worked	went	bankrupt.	
 [YH1]: Code:	difficulties	of	preparing	for	the	social	insurance	certificate	
 [YH2]: Note	for	further	analysis:	this	reflects	the	respondent’s	self-identity.	It	might	link	to	Bourdieu’s	concept	of	habitus	in	my	further	analysis.	 	
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My	family	needed	[money	for]	living,	therefore	I	had	no	choice	but	to	
start	working	for	another	factory,	which	is	a	small	one.	The	small	
factories	do	not	pay	social	insurance	for	their	employees.	Now	I	just	
started	working	for	another	big	factory	and	start	paying	[for	the	social	
insurance]	from	this	month.	Today	I	went	to	asked	[the	police	station],	
and	it	told	me	to	keep	paying	uninterruptedly	for	six	months	before	I	can	
get	the	certificate.	However	my	second	daughter	is	about	to	apply	for	
junior	secondary	school,	and	we	will	miss	the	chance	[for	this	year]	again,	
we	will	fail	to	get	the	certificate	again.	 	
HY:	then	are	there	any	ways	to	solve	this	problem?	 	
Migrant	mother	Ong:	I	do	not	know.	Perhaps	I	will	let	her	re-enrol	in	the	
grade	5	of	the	primary	school	[so	that	she	can	try	an	enrol	in	the	
secondary	school	in	the	next	year	when	our	documents	are	ready].	We	
have	no	choice,	because	our	daughter	has	nowhere	to	go	even	in	my	
hometown.	I	am	very	worried	that	she	will	not	be	accepted	by	any	
school.	 	
……	 	
HY:	tell	me	the	reasons	why	you	chose	school	L	for	your	older	daughter.	 	 	 	
Migrant	mother	Ong:	the	thing	is,	if	you	graduate	from	primary	school	
XX,	you	can	only	enrol	in	secondary	school	YY.	[However]	since	we	have	
not	paid	for	the	social	insurance,	we	are	not	able	to	enrol	in	school	YY.	
[At	the	beginning]	we	were	considering	the	migrant	schools	in	this	
community	because	they	are	close,	and	my	daughter	applied.	Finally	she	
was	redistributed	to	school	L	which	is	far	away	from	my	home.	I	said	we	
have	no	choice	[but	to	accept	this	offer],	or	we	will	lose	the	chance	for	
schooling.	That	is	how	she	enrolled	in	this	school.	Her	teacher,	Sun,	
treats	my	daughter	very	well	and	often	give	us	phone	calls.	 	
HY:	so	your	daughter	was	redistributed	to	school	L?	 	
Migrant	mother	Ong:	yes,	she	was	redistributed	to	this	school.	Her	
original	application	was	made	to	[the	schools	in]	the	xx	community.	
 [YH3]: code:	paying	for	the	social	insurance	
 [YH4]: code:	the	strategies	of	migrant	families	
 [YH5]: Note:	this	is	a	situation	I	should	double	check	with	what	the	other	respondents	said.	 	
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HY:	when	your	second	daughter	failed	to	enrol	in	state	school,	have	you	
tried	other	ways?	 	 	
Migrant	mother	Ong:	I	have	tried,	but	it	did	not	work.	Non-local	
labourers	like	me	do	not	have	ways.	We	wanted	to	use	our	social	
network	but	we	know	nobody	[who	has	any	power].	I	have	tried	to	give	
phone	call	to	xx	primary	school	in	the	day	before	yesterday.	[Yet]	what	
the	headteacher	responded	is	like:	‘it	was	simply	a	few	documents,	yet	
you	have	not	figured	out!	[You	have	already	missed	the	chance.]	Now	
what	you	have	got	to	say?!’	A	very	bad	attituded	person	–	what	is	the	
person’s	surname?	Oh,	Zhao,	headteacher	Zhao.	I	was	simply	asking	
what	the	‘certificate	for	flexible	occupation’	is,	yet	s/he1	 just	responded:	
‘Why	are	you	still	asking	this?	How	can	you	still	do	not	know	this	[simple	
process]?!’	That	is	what	s/he	said.	 	
HY:	are	there	any	friends	can	help?	
Migrant	mother	Ong:	we	are	non-local.	I	have	asked	my	elder	sister’s	
husband	to	find	someone	who	can	help.	He	did	speak	to	someone,	but	
that	person	said	it	is	very	hard	and	they	could	not	help.	 	
HY:	do	you	have	any	local	friends	[who	can	help]?	
Migrant	mother	Ong:	no,	we	non-local	labourers	do	not	have	local	
friends,	unless	your	landlord	is	willing	to	help.	Otherwise	you	will	have	
no	way.	 	
HY:	how	do	you	feel	about	school	L?	 	
Migrant	mother	Ong:	I	am	satisfied	with	this	school.	My	daughter’s	exam	
scores	are	good.	The	teachers	are	treating	her	well.	Normally	she	ranks	
in	the	top	3-5	in	her	class	in	each	exam.	Her	teacher	told	me	that	she	has	
an	enthusiasm	for	painting.	Therefore	I	enrolled	her	on	a	painting	course,	
which	costs	1,500	per	term.	[Although	I	am	not	rich]	I	still	try	my	best	to	
fulfil	my	daughter’s	interests.	 	
……																																																									1	 In	Chinese,	the	pronunciation	of	‘she’	and	‘he’	is	the	same.	Therefore	I	do	not	know	the	gender	of	headteacher	Zhao.	 	 	
 [YH6]: code:	social	network	
 [YH7]: Note:	not	all	migrant	parents	are	like	this	mother.	Many	respondent	parents	are	very	clear	about	the	application	process	and	the	requirements	of	each	document.	 	
 [YH8]: code:	social	network	
 [YH9]: code:	social	network	
 [YH10]: Note:	the	mother	is	reminded	by	the	teacher	about	her	own	daughter’s	interest.	This	point	links	to	habitus.	 	
 [YH11]: Note:	this	migrant	mother	does	care	about	their	children’s	well-rounded	development.	 	
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Migrant child Jian, school H 
	
	
	
	
	
	
HY:	How	is	your	study	at	school?	 	
Migrant	child	Jian:	Not	good.	I	cannot	concentrate	[in	the	study],	
because	the	people	sitting	in	the	back	often	laugh.	 	
HY:	why?	 	
Migrant	child	Jian:	People	sitting	in	the	back	laugh	at	many	things,	which	
makes	noise	and	disturb	my	study.	I	sometimes	turn	round…when	I	start	
speaking,	they	will	laugh.	When	I	turn	round	again,	they	laugh	again.	
HY:	Are	there	many	of	them?	 	
Migrant	child	Jian:	the	row	behind	of	me.	 	
	
HY:	I	know	that	Mr	Liu	is	your	Chinese	teacher,	then	who	is	your	Maths	
teacher?	 	
Migrant	child	Jian:	The	Maths	teacher	is	a	lady.	I	do	not	know	who	she	is.	 	
HY:	Then	what	is	her	surname	[how	do	you	call	her]?	
Migrant	child	Jian:	I	do	not	remember	her	surname.	 	
	
HY:	What	courses	do	you	have	in	the	grade	one	of	junior	secondary	
school?	 	
Migrant	child	Jian:	Chinese,	Maths,	English,	Moral	Education,	History,	
and	Biology	and	Geography.	 	
HY:	Do	you	have	Chemistry	course?	 	
Migrant	child	Jian:	No,	we	do	not.	But	I	love	Chemistry.	 	
HY:	So	where	do	you	learn	Chemistry?	 	
Migrant	child	Jian:	In	my	self-teaching	electronic	pad.	 	
……	

	Note	for	further	analysis:	the	student	does	not	know	his	teacher’s	surname	-	this	is	unusual.	What	he	says	here	links	to	what	the	headteacher	says.	The	headteacher	mentions	that	the	teachers	in	this	UIP	school	frequently	change,	due	to	the	low	salary	and	continuing	professional	development	chances	in	the	school.	 	

 	Code:	the	exertion	of	economic	capital	 	Note	for	further	analysis:	his	mother	also	mentions	the	self-teaching	electronic	pad.	 	
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HY:	Who	are	your	friends	in	your	class?	 	
Migrant	child	Jian:	The	one	sitting	behind	me.	The	first	one	sitting	right	
behind	me.	 	
HY:	Is	it	he	or	she?	 	
Migrant	child	Jian:	He,	of	course	(laugh).	 	
HY:	Why	do	you	like	him?	 	
Migrant	child	Jian:	He	is	funny.	 	
HY:	Funny	in	terms	of?	 	
Migrant	child	Jian:	It	is	hard	to	say.	 	
HY:	Is	he	one	of	those	people	who	always	laugh?	
Migrant	child	Jian:	[He	does]	not	like	laugh.	He	does	not	laugh.	They	are	
the	ones	behind.	 	
	
HY:	When	did	you	come	to	Beijing?	Or	were	you	born	in	Beijing?	 	
Migrant	child	Jian:	No,	I	was	not	born	in	Beijing.	I	do	not	know	when.	 	
HY:	Did	you	attend	nursery	in	Beijing?	 	
Migrant	child	Jian:	Yes.	
HY:	Do	you	consider	yourself	as	a	Beijing	people	or	your	hometown	
people?	 	
Migrant	child	Jian:	Er...	I	do	not	speak	the	hometown	dialect	(laugh),	yet	I	
speak	Beijing	dialect.	 	
HY:	Then	do	you	consider	yourself	as	a	Beijing	people	or	hometown	
people?	 	
Migrant	child	Jian:	Of	course	hometown.	 	

	Note:	the	role	of	classroom	seat	arrangements	in	the	establishment	of	friendship	

	Note:	the	role	of	gender	in	the	establishment	of	friendship	

	Note:	migrant	children’s	self-identity	 	
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HY:	Why?	 	
Migrant	child	Jian:	[I	was]	born	in	the	hometown.	 	
HY:	How	about	your	parents?	 	
Migrant	child	Jian:	I	am	sure	they	consider	themselves	as	hometown	
people.	
	
HY:	What	kinds	of	sports	do	you	like?	 	
Migrant	child	Jian:	I	play	basketball	but	I	am	not	very	good	at	it.	I	just	
started	to	learn.	
HY:	What	entertainments	do	you	have	at	home?	 	
Migrant	child	Jian:	I	watch	TV	and	go	out	and	play	with	them,	and	I	read	
the	fairy	tales	at	home.	 	
HY:	You	said	you	go	out	and	play	with	‘them’.	Who	are	‘they’?	 	
Migrant	child	Jian:	All	are	my	primary	school	classmates.	 	
……	 	
	
Migrant	child	Jian:	Uncle,	are	you	leaving	now?	Please	drink	some	water	
[before	you	leave]?	Goodbye	uncle!	 	

	Note:	the	role	of	attending	the	same	school	in	the	establishment	of	children’s	friendship	

	Note:	Jian	is	a	very	polite	and	nice	little	boy.	His	behaviours	are	different	from	what	is	described	as	the	stereotype	of	migrant	children	in	the	Chinese	popular	discourse.	I	can	come	back	and	discuss	this	issue	in	my	thesis.	 	
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is very special for me. That is to say, you are one of the six people in the 
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world who have read through my whole thesis - the others are me, my 
supervisor, internal reader, and two viva examiners. You have made 
every sentence more beautiful.  
  In the past three years, I and my wife Wei-Lin Huang have been 
fighting and struggling for our PhD theses together. We started our PhDs 
in the same year and submitted our theses in the same year. We are a 
couple who enjoy sitting face-to-face or next to each other in cafés to 
write. I guess not many couples have the same experience of being so 
attached to one another and writing for three years - and there will be 
more in the future! Most of our thesis chapters were written in the Blooms 
Café (on the long table in the second floor), Café Nero (near Tottenham 
Court Road) and the Goodenough College Library (which we could not 
stay in for too long because of the uncomfortable chairs). During the 
winter, after a whole day’s writing, we sometimes walked to Chinatown to 
buy ingredients to make a hotpot. When we completed a chapter, we 
would celebrate by travelling. The café, the hotpot and the trips are 
unforgettable memories in London, which are exclusive to us. Both being 
doctors, it can sometimes be hard for us to agree with each other. As a 
result, every day we spent two hours debating, debating everything. 
During these debates, we learnt to be tolerant of one another and to 
understand each other’s viewpoints. And we know that it is the power of 
love that can bring these two very different people together and to care 
for each other. The end of the PhD is the beginning of our new life. We 
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are going to do the same things for the rest of our lives: researching, 
eating, travelling, and debating together.  
  I grew up in a family with two big bookcases in the house. The books in 
the bookcases are mostly novels, history and Chinese literature (my 
mother’s university textbooks). Among them, my favourite ones are the 
novels, especially Le Comte de Monte-Cristo and Shui Hu Zhuan, and a 
nature & history encyclopaedia for pupils. Although I have never touched 
most of the books on the shelves, the presence of the bookcases 
constantly reminded me of the existence of a spiritual world outside our 
mundane lives. I became curious about this world of knowledge. Perhaps 
this curiosity for knowledge is one of the roots of my later motivation for 
doing a PhD and living an academic life. In this sense, the bookcases in 
my house can be seen as what Bourdieu called the objectified state of 
cultural capital. My parents know little about my subject, yet their 
appreciation of knowledge and the people who own knowledge motivates 
me to be a scholar. From them, I have learnt to be curious, to be open, 
and to do what I enjoy and am good at.  
  For me, these acknowledgements are not merely a practice of looking 
backwards, but also a practice of looking forwards. By reviewing the 
encouragement, support, help and love that I received in my PhD life, I 
have stronger motivation to move forward in my study of educational 
policy. I know there will always be someone who cares about me and will 
go together with me.  
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